LAPR1973_03_22
00:24
It's hard to see how Panama can fail to achieve its objective of exerting painful diplomatic pressure on Washington through the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which began last week in Panama City. Such meetings offer the poor nations of the underdeveloped world an opportunity to mobilize international support for their grievances against the rich nations in the glare of world publicity. The following excerpts from a front page editorial in the Panamanian newspaper, La Estrella de Panamá, comments on the current negotiations.
00:54
Our foreign ministry has engaged in able, patient and cautious diplomatic efforts since 1961 to serve as host to the meeting of the UN Security Council in Panama. That we have achieved this objective, considering that our only element of pressure was our moral force, constitutes a victory for the constitutional government and for the people that support our sound foreign policy. When the Security Council meets at the Arosemena Palace, our flag will be flown together with those of the 131 members of the United Nations. Panama will never again be alone in the long and painful battle in which it has been engaged since 1903. People everywhere are always fair and freedom-loving. The peoples of the world will be with us this March.
01:37
The editorial continues, "In October 1971, Panamanian foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, addressed the 16th UN General Assembly and strongly denounced the existing situation in our country caused by foreign intervention in our sovereign territory." He said, "In 1903, Panama had imposed upon it a treaty that enabled the construction of a canal. A treaty that is humiliating to my country in most of its stipulations. By virtue of that treaty, a foreign territory known as the canal zone was embedded in the heart of our republic with its own government and laws issued from the United States." This from the Panama Daily, La Estrella de Panamá.
02:14
A further comment on the Panama situation from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior. "For 70 years", says General Omar Torrijos, "strong man of this country. Panama has provided the bodies and the US has provided the bullets." He's referring metaphorically to the colonial treaty, which is now under consideration of the United Nations Security Council. The 44-year-old General said that the approval of the new treaty can take place only by a plebiscite of the Panamanian people. With complete respect for the sovereignty of Panama, and without the qualifications that it be a perpetual or non-limited agreement.
02:50
Torrijos said, "One does not negotiate sovereignty. When we speak of sovereignty, they speak of economics. They say, 'Why are you so scornful of money?' As if money could buy everything. Sovereignty and only sovereignty is the question."
03:04
By airplane, car, and on foot, Torrijos toured the north of his country with Excélsior reporters. They observed the drama, the sadness, and the misery of the Panamanian peasants. Torrijos said, "We are subjugated by drought and erosion, as well as by a canal. An agrarian reform was initiated four years ago," and Torrijos said that this has total priority, but the canal by its very nature, is a more international issue.
03:30
Generation after generation, we have fought over this canal to change this situation. We haven't got a thing. The US has always insisted on a bilateral treaty and bilateral negotiations. We agreed with this and we're loyal to this until we realize that the canal is a service to the entire world. The world must realize that Panama is more than a canal, and that the canal is more than a ditch between two oceans. Around this ditch is a country, a nation, and a youth ready to sacrifice itself to regain jurisdiction over 1400 square kilometers now fenced off under the control of a foreign government.
04:04
Torrijos says that the legislature decided not to continue accepting the payment of $1.9 million so that the world can see that we are not being rented, we are being occupied. Excélsior asked Torrijos under what conditions he would sign a new treaty. The main problem he singled out was the length of time of the commitment. The US had been persistently pressing for an agreement in perpetuity, and their compromise offer of 90 years was evidently also too long for Torrijos. When the interviewer asked, "Do you feel that the other Latin American countries are behind you?" The general replied, "Yes, the sentiment of Latin Americans is almost unanimous." This was from Excélsior, the Mexico City daily.
04:45
And finally the London magazine, Latin America interprets the security council meeting in Panama as having important implications for US Latin American relations. Latin America says, "There is every reason to suppose that most, if not all, Latin American nations will use the occasion to air virtually every major complaint they have against the United States. During a visit to Mexico earlier this month, the Columbian foreign minister said that during the meeting, the countries of this continent must bring to discussion the disparity in the terms of trade, the growing indebtedness, the classic instability of raw material prices and the lack of markets which obstruct industrialization. The question of the 200-mile limit is also likely to be raised."
05:26
Latin America goes on to say, "It is the question of the canal and Panama's relations with the United States that are at the heart of the meeting, and it is here that the United States is most embarrassed. In the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Administration is anxious to follow a less exposed foreign policy and sees playing the world's policemen. It would be happy to make Panama substantial concessions, which if it were a free agent, would doubtless include formal recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and an end to the perpetuity clause of the 1903 treaty; much bigger payments to Panama for the use of the canal; probably a phasing out of the Canal Zone status as a colony of the United States; and perhaps even a gradual disbandment of the huge anti-guerilla training and operational base in the zone.
06:14
Though this would touch upon the sensitive question of continental security although Washington has made some concessions. Last month in a symbolic gesture, it removed the 20-foot-high wire fence separating the zone from Panama proper. The fence against which more than 20 Panamanians were killed in clashes with the United States Army in 1964. The United States ambassador, Robert Sayre, has publicly recognized that the zone is a Panamanian territory, though under United States jurisdiction. This commentary from the weekly Latin America.
LAPR1973_03_29
03:59
Shifting from the diplomatic to the military front, Campainha, a weekly newspaper published by Brazilian exiles in Santiago, Chile, describes with concern the increasing militarization in Brazil. When General George Underwood, commander of the Panama Canal Zone, traveled to Brazil last year to discuss Latin American problems, particularly the internal politics of Peru, Chile, and Uruguay, General Sousa Mellow of the Brazilian military stated, "The General Underwood's visit with us reinforces the spirit of our presidents, who examined together the problems of the world which gave Brazil and the United States responsibilities to maintain the continuation of democracy." The statement by General Mellow demonstrates the purposes of the Brazilian arms race to assume the responsibility along with the United States of "maintaining democracy" in Latin America.
04:45
Campainha continues, "The warlike capacity of the Brazilian armed forces has already far surpassed the necessities of maintaining territorial boundaries. This excess capacity constitutes a danger for other Latin American countries to the extent that it seeks to create conditions to impose its leadership in Latin America. There is reason to believe that this could include intervention in countries that become unreceptive to Brazilian and North American models of development. The Brazilian preoccupation with entering the group of nations, which possess nuclear arms, reflects this objective. An agreement with the German Brazilian Commission of scientific and technical cooperation was signed last November, to further promote research in nuclear energy and the construction of missiles. Also, last year, Westinghouse Electric began constructing the first nuclear power plant in the country with a potential capacity of 600,000 kilowatts."
05:41
Campainha continues, "That the installation of arms factories in Brazil continues rapidly. Dow Chemical had proposed that their Brazilian plants begin producing napalm, which would be used in Vietnam. The so-called end of that war has postponed Dow's production of napalm in Brazil, but for how long?" Campainha asks. Print Latino reported last July that the Italian manufacturer Fiat, was trying to convince the Brazilian government to build a military aeronautics plant in Brazil. A similar offer was received from the French firm Dassault, which tried to sell its patent for the construction of its mirage jets in Brazil. Although in its propaganda, the Brazilian military government insists that the massive arms purchases are only in keeping with their intention to "modernize the army." Realistically, this arms race has one objective, to enable the Brazilian army to repress liberation movements both within and without that country.
LAPR1973_05_03
13:47
The weekly report Latin America from London states that the US government is considering selling surplus stocks of a herbicide used in Vietnam to the governments of Brazil, Venezuela, and Paraguay. The herbicide Agent Orange was withdrawn from military use in Vietnam, because it was believed to damage human and animal fetuses in the womb, resulting in deformed children.
LAPR1973_05_24
15:04
At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.
15:18
There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers.
16:07
It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand".
16:37
The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later.
17:19
The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers.
17:49
The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.
18:19
Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.
18:44
In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.
19:13
Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.
19:36
When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy.
19:56
This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present.
20:28
US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala.
21:13
In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.
21:52
An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,
22:19
25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program.
22:53
A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.
23:28
Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,
23:42
The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.
24:10
On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.
24:28
In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.
24:54
The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."
25:11
The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:
25:39
On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright.
25:58
Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.
26:27
Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.
26:46
To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio.
27:20
In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."
27:45
These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.
28:07
In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.
28:34
For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."
LAPR1973_07_26
09:39
A complex series of electronic devices similar in nature to the ill-fated McNamara Line in Vietnam is being implanted along the 2000-mile border between the United States and Mexico, according to sources in the border patrol and immigration and naturalization service. The Mexican government has asked the United States for an official explanation of the new border security program, which the US apparently plans to begin soon. The Mexican chancellor said in an interview with the Mexican daily Excélsior that his government voiced certain points of disagreement with the plan and that he expects a prompt reply from the US.
10:13
Employed sophisticated military technology, the detection units contain noise sensors which are to be buried underground. The only thing showing will be a small antenna, which can detect footsteps at a range of 38 feet. There will also be infrared sensors to detect human body heat as well as metal detectors to register the appearance of money, keys or other items which might be in the pockets of illegal entrance. Although the sensors will not cover the entire border, they will be installed at commonly used entry points and will be moved frequently.
10:47
The new detection system comes in the wake of statements by immigration service officials that the border situation has gotten out of hand. The director of the Chula Vista office of the Immigration Service said recently that, "The situation grows worse every year because there is no law to prevent American companies from hiring illegal Mexican immigrants." In testimony before a special grand jury in San Diego, federal officials said that they had evidence which showed direct ties between groups dealing in illegal immigrant labor and certain industrial enterprises in southern California which employ day laborers. The proceeding story from Excélsior of Mexico City.
11:24
Reaction to the electronic fences has not been universally favorable. Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, Democrat from Texas, was quoted as saying, "The concept of a barrier is repugnant to me because I felt there would be some inherent international psychological repercussions that should be evaluated before any commitment is made. I believe techniques now available such as helicopter surveillance and other normal procedures would be more than adequate if the Border Patrol is staffed at a sufficient level, which it hasn't been."
LAPR1973_10_25
06:36
The following letter distributed by Tri-Continental News Service in New York was written by Beatriz Allende, daughter of the slain Chilean president, on October 5th, 1973 in Havana, Cuba, "To the progressive people of the United States, I address myself to you in these dramatic moments for my country, the Republic of Chile, which since September 11th has not only been suffering but fighting resolutely against the fascist military Junta that overthrew the constitutional president, Salvador Allende."
07:12
"The coup of September 11th can only be comprehended in its full magnitude when one understands that even before the Popular Unity took up the reins of government, U.S. imperialist monopolies and Chilean reaction were conspiring against the U.P. They tried to prevent first the U.P.'s ascension to the presidency and later the completion of its program of social and economic transformation, which the country demanded and the government was carrying out."
07:43
Ms. Beatriz Allende's letter continues that, "For the moment, the fascists have achieved their goal of blocking the revolutionary process by assassinating the president and overthrowing the democratically elected government. They countered on military men, traitors to their country, trained in U.S. military academies, and on the financial backing of U.S. monopolies and on the political and diplomatic support of the United States government."
08:07
"Today, Chile fuels its institutions swept away, its culture destroyed, its progressive ideas persecuted, its finest sons tortured and murdered, its working-class districts and universities bombed, repressing the workers throughout the length of the nation."
08:23
"The fascists are mistaken. They have not won. Alongside the fascist brutality arises popular resistance, which taking its inspiration from the example of President Allende is ready to fight and to win. The Chilean people today fighting in the streets, factories, hills and mines call on the solidarity of all progressive people throughout the world and especially the people of the United States."
08:50
The letter continues that, "We know that the U.S. government does not necessarily represent the real people the United States and that in our fight we can count on them as did the Vietnamese. We can count on the solidarity of the workers, the national minorities, students, professionals and other popular groupings which condemn the imperialist policy of the United States government and which at the same time support the revolutionary processes of those countries fighting for full sovereignty and social progress."
09:18
"With revolutionary greetings, signed Beatriz Allende", who is daughter of the late President Salvador Allende.
LAPR1974_05_09
02:08
International Bulletin reports that US Senate opposition to the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty is rekindling an old and potentially explosive conflict between the United States and Panama. A coalition of 35 conservative Senate Democrats and Republicans, dead set against returning the waterway and the Canal Zone to Panama, is prepared to block ratification of a new treaty. The nationalist government of Omar Torrijos is equally determined to regain sovereignty over the territory ceded in perpetuity to the US in a 1903 treaty. "If negotiations fail," says Torrijos, "we will be left with no other recourse but to fight."
02:50
After 70 years of ownership and control of the 550 square mile Canal Zone, last February, the US, under pressure from the United Nations and Latin American foreign ministers, acknowledged Panamanian sovereignty over the canal and the adjacent strip of land and agreed to work out a timetable for their return. The US made this historic promise in an eight point statement of principles signed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack. "There is opposition in both our countries to a reasonable resolution of our differences," Kissinger acknowledged. But he predicted that this was the first step toward a new era in inter-American affairs, says International Bulletin.
03:36
So far, the only Panamanian opposition to the agreement has come from right-wing business leaders in the National Civic Movement, which includes the Kiwanis Club, the Lions Club, and the Chamber of Commerce. The majority of the country's one and a half million people, including the National Student Federation, the unions, and the National Guard have expressed strong support for the agreement and the campaign to eradicate what they view as a colonial enclave in their country. But in the United States, where the canal dispute has attracted little public attention, the Panama Canal lobby in congress has rejected the Kissinger-Tack Agreement. A number of conservative senators and congressmen expressed dismay that Kissinger had signed away Teddy Roosevelt's canal.
04:22
Representative Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania called the agreement a sellout and surrender. And Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and John McClellan of Arkansas have put together a coalition of 35 senators, capable of defeating ratification of any new treaty, that would abrogate US rights and interests in the zone. Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, who introduced a countermeasure to the Thurmond-McClellan resolution, states, "The opposition is serious in terms of its sentiment and emotionalism, but none of it was addressed to the facts in the case. Rather, it was an appeal to Teddy Roosevelt and the days of the Rough Riders and the digging of the canal, that episode in our history."
05:04
Senator Thurmond said that he is against any treaty revision that would, "sacrifice United States sovereignty." "Under the 1903 treaty, we obtained sovereignty and perpetuity over the property," he said. "We bought it and paid for it. It's ours, and I don't favor giving it away." However, critics of the 1903 treaty say that Roosevelt stole the canal by gunboat diplomacy. After arranging a revolution in Panama, sending in the United States Marines and signing a treaty with the United States created government, Roosevelt bragged, "I took the canal while Congress was still debating what to do."
05:46
His Secretary of State John Hay admitted that the treaty was not so advantageous to Panama. Thurmond also claims that the canal would not be safe in the hands of the Panamanians. "Panama has such unstable governments," he said, "that, if the canal ever got in their hands, we don't know whose hands it would be in the next morning." He added, "They've got some unreasonable people down there, and the government is far to the left. And I think it'd be dangerous for this canal to get in the hands of anyone else. It ought to stay in the hands of the United States."
06:21
Congressman Flood, who has led the fight to protect US military and economic interests in the Canal Zone for over 20 years, went further, charging that Panama's Foreign Minister is a communist as red as your blood. Flood says, "Juan Tack is the devil in the peace, the brains behind the operation. Tack is palsy walsy with Castro and the Reds, and he will do anything the Soviets tell him to do." Flood lashed out at the Kissinger-Tack agreement, calling it "a blueprint for an abject surrender and a piece of diplomatic trickery."
06:55
Thurmond and McClellan would like to see the United States investment in the zone increased. Thurmond thinks the United States could build a free trade port on Panama's Atlantic Coast, as an inducement to discourage the Panamanian drive for sovereignty. "It is to Panama's advantage, really, that the United States should maintain control. Panama has fared very well from it. It has improved their economy and raised their standard of living. We pay big salaries down there," said Strom Thurmond. The United States pays Panama about $2 million a year for use of the canal, though the US takes in over 100 million annually in shipping revenue.
07:38
According to International Bulletin, the waterway is not all that is at stake in the battle over who controls the Canal Zone. The Pentagon has turned the entire zone into a virtual military garrison, complete with 14 bases, a Green Beret school, a counterinsurgency training center for pro-US Latin American military units, and 11,000 US troops.
08:00
Panama wants the US military out, except for those military installations absolutely necessary for the defense of the canal. The eight point agreement supports the Panamanian position, and so does Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin, who said his staff was told by a State Department official that the only justification for the Southern Command, headquartered in the zone, is for an intervention force in the Western Hemisphere.
08:25
"The last thing in the world we'd need to do", said Aspin, "is to start intervening militarily in the internal affairs of Latin American countries." Aspin has called for abolition of the entire Southern Command. Senator McGee voiced, "The Senate liberal position that the US military presence in the zone is overblown, but that there is a realistic national security interest in the canal, even after closing down old France Field, there are 14 to 15 military installations in the area. That is much too much," says McGee. McGee concluded, "Most of the military installations there are going to be the subject of negotiation with the thought of retaining only those that are basic to the international defense of the canal."
09:07
The right wing opposes any decrease in the overwhelming United States military presence in the zone. McClellan said he thinks it is important, not only to the defense of the United States, but to the defense of the whole Western Hemisphere. Thurmond concurred, "It is vital to our national defense. Most of the goods that went to Vietnam by boat, 80% of them went through the Panama Canal. It is vital to the free world that the United States keep control of the canal."
09:37
In 1964, says International bulletin, US troops shot and killed 20 Panamanian demonstrators and wounded more than 200, when they tried to raise their flag on Canal Zone territory. McGee and Mars fear a repetition of the incident, if a new treaty cannot be hammered out. Kissinger and his State Department want to avoid a confrontation with Panama that might jeopardize US ties with Latin America. Although critics have also suggested that Kissinger may be using right wing congressional opposition as a bargaining lever in the negotiations. Kissinger and liberals in Congress, like McGee, are prepared to acknowledge Panamanian sovereignty over the canal and zone, but they want to delay the actual date of the turnover as long as possible and to maintain as many US facilities in the zone as they can.
10:26
Foreign ministers from 24 Latin American countries told Kissinger, in Washington last month, that Senate efforts to go back on the eight point agreement are unacceptable. Thurmond, Flood, and McClellan all say they won't be affected by the OAS policy or Panamanian blackmail. Even Senate liberals, like McGee, don't like the foreign heat. "I don't think the OAS stand will influence the course of events here quite so much," McGee said. "I think sometimes we're set back a little bit here by too many speeches in Latin America, that are publicly directed towards the Congress, but it was only after international pressure was brought to bear on the United States, beginning in 1973, that Washington moved to resolve the smoldering canal conflict."
11:16
Panama's Chief of State Torrijos summed up Panamanian US relations this way, "70 years of colonialism, 10 years of negotiations, five years of nationalist revolution. Result? No hits, no runs, no errors." He says, this is, "the last chance for a peaceful settlement to the canal dispute and that the time has come for the US to recognize the basic Panamanian right to self-determination." This report on the US Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaty from International Bulletin.
LAPR1973_03_22
00:24 - 00:53
It's hard to see how Panama can fail to achieve its objective of exerting painful diplomatic pressure on Washington through the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which began last week in Panama City. Such meetings offer the poor nations of the underdeveloped world an opportunity to mobilize international support for their grievances against the rich nations in the glare of world publicity. The following excerpts from a front page editorial in the Panamanian newspaper, La Estrella de Panamá, comments on the current negotiations.
00:54 - 01:36
Our foreign ministry has engaged in able, patient and cautious diplomatic efforts since 1961 to serve as host to the meeting of the UN Security Council in Panama. That we have achieved this objective, considering that our only element of pressure was our moral force, constitutes a victory for the constitutional government and for the people that support our sound foreign policy. When the Security Council meets at the Arosemena Palace, our flag will be flown together with those of the 131 members of the United Nations. Panama will never again be alone in the long and painful battle in which it has been engaged since 1903. People everywhere are always fair and freedom-loving. The peoples of the world will be with us this March.
01:37 - 02:14
The editorial continues, "In October 1971, Panamanian foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, addressed the 16th UN General Assembly and strongly denounced the existing situation in our country caused by foreign intervention in our sovereign territory." He said, "In 1903, Panama had imposed upon it a treaty that enabled the construction of a canal. A treaty that is humiliating to my country in most of its stipulations. By virtue of that treaty, a foreign territory known as the canal zone was embedded in the heart of our republic with its own government and laws issued from the United States." This from the Panama Daily, La Estrella de Panamá.
02:14 - 02:50
A further comment on the Panama situation from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior. "For 70 years", says General Omar Torrijos, "strong man of this country. Panama has provided the bodies and the US has provided the bullets." He's referring metaphorically to the colonial treaty, which is now under consideration of the United Nations Security Council. The 44-year-old General said that the approval of the new treaty can take place only by a plebiscite of the Panamanian people. With complete respect for the sovereignty of Panama, and without the qualifications that it be a perpetual or non-limited agreement.
02:50 - 03:04
Torrijos said, "One does not negotiate sovereignty. When we speak of sovereignty, they speak of economics. They say, 'Why are you so scornful of money?' As if money could buy everything. Sovereignty and only sovereignty is the question."
03:04 - 03:29
By airplane, car, and on foot, Torrijos toured the north of his country with Excélsior reporters. They observed the drama, the sadness, and the misery of the Panamanian peasants. Torrijos said, "We are subjugated by drought and erosion, as well as by a canal. An agrarian reform was initiated four years ago," and Torrijos said that this has total priority, but the canal by its very nature, is a more international issue.
03:30 - 04:03
Generation after generation, we have fought over this canal to change this situation. We haven't got a thing. The US has always insisted on a bilateral treaty and bilateral negotiations. We agreed with this and we're loyal to this until we realize that the canal is a service to the entire world. The world must realize that Panama is more than a canal, and that the canal is more than a ditch between two oceans. Around this ditch is a country, a nation, and a youth ready to sacrifice itself to regain jurisdiction over 1400 square kilometers now fenced off under the control of a foreign government.
04:04 - 04:44
Torrijos says that the legislature decided not to continue accepting the payment of $1.9 million so that the world can see that we are not being rented, we are being occupied. Excélsior asked Torrijos under what conditions he would sign a new treaty. The main problem he singled out was the length of time of the commitment. The US had been persistently pressing for an agreement in perpetuity, and their compromise offer of 90 years was evidently also too long for Torrijos. When the interviewer asked, "Do you feel that the other Latin American countries are behind you?" The general replied, "Yes, the sentiment of Latin Americans is almost unanimous." This was from Excélsior, the Mexico City daily.
04:45 - 05:25
And finally the London magazine, Latin America interprets the security council meeting in Panama as having important implications for US Latin American relations. Latin America says, "There is every reason to suppose that most, if not all, Latin American nations will use the occasion to air virtually every major complaint they have against the United States. During a visit to Mexico earlier this month, the Columbian foreign minister said that during the meeting, the countries of this continent must bring to discussion the disparity in the terms of trade, the growing indebtedness, the classic instability of raw material prices and the lack of markets which obstruct industrialization. The question of the 200-mile limit is also likely to be raised."
05:26 - 06:13
Latin America goes on to say, "It is the question of the canal and Panama's relations with the United States that are at the heart of the meeting, and it is here that the United States is most embarrassed. In the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Administration is anxious to follow a less exposed foreign policy and sees playing the world's policemen. It would be happy to make Panama substantial concessions, which if it were a free agent, would doubtless include formal recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and an end to the perpetuity clause of the 1903 treaty; much bigger payments to Panama for the use of the canal; probably a phasing out of the Canal Zone status as a colony of the United States; and perhaps even a gradual disbandment of the huge anti-guerilla training and operational base in the zone.
06:14 - 06:46
Though this would touch upon the sensitive question of continental security although Washington has made some concessions. Last month in a symbolic gesture, it removed the 20-foot-high wire fence separating the zone from Panama proper. The fence against which more than 20 Panamanians were killed in clashes with the United States Army in 1964. The United States ambassador, Robert Sayre, has publicly recognized that the zone is a Panamanian territory, though under United States jurisdiction. This commentary from the weekly Latin America.
LAPR1973_03_29
03:59 - 04:45
Shifting from the diplomatic to the military front, Campainha, a weekly newspaper published by Brazilian exiles in Santiago, Chile, describes with concern the increasing militarization in Brazil. When General George Underwood, commander of the Panama Canal Zone, traveled to Brazil last year to discuss Latin American problems, particularly the internal politics of Peru, Chile, and Uruguay, General Sousa Mellow of the Brazilian military stated, "The General Underwood's visit with us reinforces the spirit of our presidents, who examined together the problems of the world which gave Brazil and the United States responsibilities to maintain the continuation of democracy." The statement by General Mellow demonstrates the purposes of the Brazilian arms race to assume the responsibility along with the United States of "maintaining democracy" in Latin America.
04:45 - 05:41
Campainha continues, "The warlike capacity of the Brazilian armed forces has already far surpassed the necessities of maintaining territorial boundaries. This excess capacity constitutes a danger for other Latin American countries to the extent that it seeks to create conditions to impose its leadership in Latin America. There is reason to believe that this could include intervention in countries that become unreceptive to Brazilian and North American models of development. The Brazilian preoccupation with entering the group of nations, which possess nuclear arms, reflects this objective. An agreement with the German Brazilian Commission of scientific and technical cooperation was signed last November, to further promote research in nuclear energy and the construction of missiles. Also, last year, Westinghouse Electric began constructing the first nuclear power plant in the country with a potential capacity of 600,000 kilowatts."
05:41 - 06:29
Campainha continues, "That the installation of arms factories in Brazil continues rapidly. Dow Chemical had proposed that their Brazilian plants begin producing napalm, which would be used in Vietnam. The so-called end of that war has postponed Dow's production of napalm in Brazil, but for how long?" Campainha asks. Print Latino reported last July that the Italian manufacturer Fiat, was trying to convince the Brazilian government to build a military aeronautics plant in Brazil. A similar offer was received from the French firm Dassault, which tried to sell its patent for the construction of its mirage jets in Brazil. Although in its propaganda, the Brazilian military government insists that the massive arms purchases are only in keeping with their intention to "modernize the army." Realistically, this arms race has one objective, to enable the Brazilian army to repress liberation movements both within and without that country.
LAPR1973_05_03
13:47 - 14:09
The weekly report Latin America from London states that the US government is considering selling surplus stocks of a herbicide used in Vietnam to the governments of Brazil, Venezuela, and Paraguay. The herbicide Agent Orange was withdrawn from military use in Vietnam, because it was believed to damage human and animal fetuses in the womb, resulting in deformed children.
LAPR1973_05_24
15:04 - 15:18
At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.
15:18 - 16:07
There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers.
16:07 - 16:37
It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand".
16:37 - 17:19
The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later.
17:19 - 17:49
The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers.
17:49 - 18:19
The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.
18:19 - 18:44
Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.
18:44 - 19:13
In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.
19:13 - 19:36
Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.
19:36 - 19:56
When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy.
19:56 - 20:28
This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present.
20:28 - 21:13
US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala.
21:13 - 21:52
In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.
21:52 - 22:19
An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,
22:19 - 22:53
25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program.
22:53 - 23:28
A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.
23:28 - 23:42
Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,
23:42 - 24:10
The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.
24:10 - 24:28
On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.
24:28 - 24:54
In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.
24:54 - 25:11
The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."
25:11 - 25:39
The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:
25:39 - 25:58
On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright.
25:58 - 26:27
Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.
26:27 - 26:46
Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.
26:46 - 27:20
To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio.
27:20 - 27:45
In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."
27:45 - 28:07
These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.
28:07 - 28:34
In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.
28:34 - 28:56
For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."
LAPR1973_07_26
09:39 - 10:13
A complex series of electronic devices similar in nature to the ill-fated McNamara Line in Vietnam is being implanted along the 2000-mile border between the United States and Mexico, according to sources in the border patrol and immigration and naturalization service. The Mexican government has asked the United States for an official explanation of the new border security program, which the US apparently plans to begin soon. The Mexican chancellor said in an interview with the Mexican daily Excélsior that his government voiced certain points of disagreement with the plan and that he expects a prompt reply from the US.
10:13 - 10:47
Employed sophisticated military technology, the detection units contain noise sensors which are to be buried underground. The only thing showing will be a small antenna, which can detect footsteps at a range of 38 feet. There will also be infrared sensors to detect human body heat as well as metal detectors to register the appearance of money, keys or other items which might be in the pockets of illegal entrance. Although the sensors will not cover the entire border, they will be installed at commonly used entry points and will be moved frequently.
10:47 - 11:24
The new detection system comes in the wake of statements by immigration service officials that the border situation has gotten out of hand. The director of the Chula Vista office of the Immigration Service said recently that, "The situation grows worse every year because there is no law to prevent American companies from hiring illegal Mexican immigrants." In testimony before a special grand jury in San Diego, federal officials said that they had evidence which showed direct ties between groups dealing in illegal immigrant labor and certain industrial enterprises in southern California which employ day laborers. The proceeding story from Excélsior of Mexico City.
11:24 - 11:58
Reaction to the electronic fences has not been universally favorable. Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, Democrat from Texas, was quoted as saying, "The concept of a barrier is repugnant to me because I felt there would be some inherent international psychological repercussions that should be evaluated before any commitment is made. I believe techniques now available such as helicopter surveillance and other normal procedures would be more than adequate if the Border Patrol is staffed at a sufficient level, which it hasn't been."
LAPR1973_10_25
06:36 - 07:12
The following letter distributed by Tri-Continental News Service in New York was written by Beatriz Allende, daughter of the slain Chilean president, on October 5th, 1973 in Havana, Cuba, "To the progressive people of the United States, I address myself to you in these dramatic moments for my country, the Republic of Chile, which since September 11th has not only been suffering but fighting resolutely against the fascist military Junta that overthrew the constitutional president, Salvador Allende."
07:12 - 07:43
"The coup of September 11th can only be comprehended in its full magnitude when one understands that even before the Popular Unity took up the reins of government, U.S. imperialist monopolies and Chilean reaction were conspiring against the U.P. They tried to prevent first the U.P.'s ascension to the presidency and later the completion of its program of social and economic transformation, which the country demanded and the government was carrying out."
07:43 - 08:07
Ms. Beatriz Allende's letter continues that, "For the moment, the fascists have achieved their goal of blocking the revolutionary process by assassinating the president and overthrowing the democratically elected government. They countered on military men, traitors to their country, trained in U.S. military academies, and on the financial backing of U.S. monopolies and on the political and diplomatic support of the United States government."
08:07 - 08:23
"Today, Chile fuels its institutions swept away, its culture destroyed, its progressive ideas persecuted, its finest sons tortured and murdered, its working-class districts and universities bombed, repressing the workers throughout the length of the nation."
08:23 - 08:50
"The fascists are mistaken. They have not won. Alongside the fascist brutality arises popular resistance, which taking its inspiration from the example of President Allende is ready to fight and to win. The Chilean people today fighting in the streets, factories, hills and mines call on the solidarity of all progressive people throughout the world and especially the people of the United States."
08:50 - 09:18
The letter continues that, "We know that the U.S. government does not necessarily represent the real people the United States and that in our fight we can count on them as did the Vietnamese. We can count on the solidarity of the workers, the national minorities, students, professionals and other popular groupings which condemn the imperialist policy of the United States government and which at the same time support the revolutionary processes of those countries fighting for full sovereignty and social progress."
09:18 - 09:24
"With revolutionary greetings, signed Beatriz Allende", who is daughter of the late President Salvador Allende.
LAPR1974_05_09
02:08 - 02:50
International Bulletin reports that US Senate opposition to the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty is rekindling an old and potentially explosive conflict between the United States and Panama. A coalition of 35 conservative Senate Democrats and Republicans, dead set against returning the waterway and the Canal Zone to Panama, is prepared to block ratification of a new treaty. The nationalist government of Omar Torrijos is equally determined to regain sovereignty over the territory ceded in perpetuity to the US in a 1903 treaty. "If negotiations fail," says Torrijos, "we will be left with no other recourse but to fight."
02:50 - 03:36
After 70 years of ownership and control of the 550 square mile Canal Zone, last February, the US, under pressure from the United Nations and Latin American foreign ministers, acknowledged Panamanian sovereignty over the canal and the adjacent strip of land and agreed to work out a timetable for their return. The US made this historic promise in an eight point statement of principles signed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack. "There is opposition in both our countries to a reasonable resolution of our differences," Kissinger acknowledged. But he predicted that this was the first step toward a new era in inter-American affairs, says International Bulletin.
03:36 - 04:22
So far, the only Panamanian opposition to the agreement has come from right-wing business leaders in the National Civic Movement, which includes the Kiwanis Club, the Lions Club, and the Chamber of Commerce. The majority of the country's one and a half million people, including the National Student Federation, the unions, and the National Guard have expressed strong support for the agreement and the campaign to eradicate what they view as a colonial enclave in their country. But in the United States, where the canal dispute has attracted little public attention, the Panama Canal lobby in congress has rejected the Kissinger-Tack Agreement. A number of conservative senators and congressmen expressed dismay that Kissinger had signed away Teddy Roosevelt's canal.
04:22 - 05:04
Representative Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania called the agreement a sellout and surrender. And Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and John McClellan of Arkansas have put together a coalition of 35 senators, capable of defeating ratification of any new treaty, that would abrogate US rights and interests in the zone. Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, who introduced a countermeasure to the Thurmond-McClellan resolution, states, "The opposition is serious in terms of its sentiment and emotionalism, but none of it was addressed to the facts in the case. Rather, it was an appeal to Teddy Roosevelt and the days of the Rough Riders and the digging of the canal, that episode in our history."
05:04 - 05:46
Senator Thurmond said that he is against any treaty revision that would, "sacrifice United States sovereignty." "Under the 1903 treaty, we obtained sovereignty and perpetuity over the property," he said. "We bought it and paid for it. It's ours, and I don't favor giving it away." However, critics of the 1903 treaty say that Roosevelt stole the canal by gunboat diplomacy. After arranging a revolution in Panama, sending in the United States Marines and signing a treaty with the United States created government, Roosevelt bragged, "I took the canal while Congress was still debating what to do."
05:46 - 06:21
His Secretary of State John Hay admitted that the treaty was not so advantageous to Panama. Thurmond also claims that the canal would not be safe in the hands of the Panamanians. "Panama has such unstable governments," he said, "that, if the canal ever got in their hands, we don't know whose hands it would be in the next morning." He added, "They've got some unreasonable people down there, and the government is far to the left. And I think it'd be dangerous for this canal to get in the hands of anyone else. It ought to stay in the hands of the United States."
06:21 - 06:55
Congressman Flood, who has led the fight to protect US military and economic interests in the Canal Zone for over 20 years, went further, charging that Panama's Foreign Minister is a communist as red as your blood. Flood says, "Juan Tack is the devil in the peace, the brains behind the operation. Tack is palsy walsy with Castro and the Reds, and he will do anything the Soviets tell him to do." Flood lashed out at the Kissinger-Tack agreement, calling it "a blueprint for an abject surrender and a piece of diplomatic trickery."
06:55 - 07:38
Thurmond and McClellan would like to see the United States investment in the zone increased. Thurmond thinks the United States could build a free trade port on Panama's Atlantic Coast, as an inducement to discourage the Panamanian drive for sovereignty. "It is to Panama's advantage, really, that the United States should maintain control. Panama has fared very well from it. It has improved their economy and raised their standard of living. We pay big salaries down there," said Strom Thurmond. The United States pays Panama about $2 million a year for use of the canal, though the US takes in over 100 million annually in shipping revenue.
07:38 - 08:00
According to International Bulletin, the waterway is not all that is at stake in the battle over who controls the Canal Zone. The Pentagon has turned the entire zone into a virtual military garrison, complete with 14 bases, a Green Beret school, a counterinsurgency training center for pro-US Latin American military units, and 11,000 US troops.
08:00 - 08:25
Panama wants the US military out, except for those military installations absolutely necessary for the defense of the canal. The eight point agreement supports the Panamanian position, and so does Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin, who said his staff was told by a State Department official that the only justification for the Southern Command, headquartered in the zone, is for an intervention force in the Western Hemisphere.
08:25 - 09:07
"The last thing in the world we'd need to do", said Aspin, "is to start intervening militarily in the internal affairs of Latin American countries." Aspin has called for abolition of the entire Southern Command. Senator McGee voiced, "The Senate liberal position that the US military presence in the zone is overblown, but that there is a realistic national security interest in the canal, even after closing down old France Field, there are 14 to 15 military installations in the area. That is much too much," says McGee. McGee concluded, "Most of the military installations there are going to be the subject of negotiation with the thought of retaining only those that are basic to the international defense of the canal."
09:07 - 09:37
The right wing opposes any decrease in the overwhelming United States military presence in the zone. McClellan said he thinks it is important, not only to the defense of the United States, but to the defense of the whole Western Hemisphere. Thurmond concurred, "It is vital to our national defense. Most of the goods that went to Vietnam by boat, 80% of them went through the Panama Canal. It is vital to the free world that the United States keep control of the canal."
09:37 - 10:26
In 1964, says International bulletin, US troops shot and killed 20 Panamanian demonstrators and wounded more than 200, when they tried to raise their flag on Canal Zone territory. McGee and Mars fear a repetition of the incident, if a new treaty cannot be hammered out. Kissinger and his State Department want to avoid a confrontation with Panama that might jeopardize US ties with Latin America. Although critics have also suggested that Kissinger may be using right wing congressional opposition as a bargaining lever in the negotiations. Kissinger and liberals in Congress, like McGee, are prepared to acknowledge Panamanian sovereignty over the canal and zone, but they want to delay the actual date of the turnover as long as possible and to maintain as many US facilities in the zone as they can.
10:26 - 11:16
Foreign ministers from 24 Latin American countries told Kissinger, in Washington last month, that Senate efforts to go back on the eight point agreement are unacceptable. Thurmond, Flood, and McClellan all say they won't be affected by the OAS policy or Panamanian blackmail. Even Senate liberals, like McGee, don't like the foreign heat. "I don't think the OAS stand will influence the course of events here quite so much," McGee said. "I think sometimes we're set back a little bit here by too many speeches in Latin America, that are publicly directed towards the Congress, but it was only after international pressure was brought to bear on the United States, beginning in 1973, that Washington moved to resolve the smoldering canal conflict."
11:16 - 11:49
Panama's Chief of State Torrijos summed up Panamanian US relations this way, "70 years of colonialism, 10 years of negotiations, five years of nationalist revolution. Result? No hits, no runs, no errors." He says, this is, "the last chance for a peaceful settlement to the canal dispute and that the time has come for the US to recognize the basic Panamanian right to self-determination." This report on the US Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaty from International Bulletin.