Annotations for Countries: Soviet Union

La Nación from Buenos Aires reported that among Campora's first acts upon becoming president and taking control away from the right wing military, was the releasing of political prisoners, the decriminalization of the Communist party, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, relations, which have been broken since 1964 when the US government insisted upon a policy of isolating Cuba. 

The French press service Agence France reports from Havana that, "It is considered here that Argentina's recognition of Cuba will probably considerably strengthen the pro Cuban movement in Latin America. Cuban officials hope this diplomatic gesture will deliver the coup de grâce to the anti-Cuban blockade decreed in 1964 when the US insisted that a sugar cane curtain be constructed around Cuba, similar to the bamboo curtain constructed around China and the iron curtain around the Soviet Union." This from Agence France. 

This week's feature will be a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago paper, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President Dorticos. 

Mr. President, in the past few years in Latin America, there have been several types of revolutionary change, the military nationalism of Peru, the Chilean elections, the semi-peaceful taking of power in Argentina. My question is why do you think the guerrilla tactics which characterized the '60s, as for instance, Che's campaign in Bolivia, have been replaced by other revolutionary tactics? 

I think the guerrilla campaign of the '60s had a direct effect on what is happening now despite the fact that the guerrilla campaign did not result in any military victories. The moral and political strengths of these campaigns is affecting not only those struggling with arms, but all revolutionaries with its example of revolutionary dedication, and this influence is tremendous. The presence of Che, which I saw in my recent trip to Argentina among the people, Che's original homeland, his figure, his thoughts, his humanism, his example is greater now than during his guerrilla campaign. 

To discount the influence of Che's actions on Latin America today is to discount a driving force in the hearts of Latin American people. Of course, this does not mean that all the revolutionary struggles have to follow the tactics of guerrilla's struggle which Che promoted. His greatest influence was his example, his conduct, his revolutionary will, and today, for example, it was with great personal satisfaction and profound emotion that I heard the Argentinian people improvising a slogan which, despite the habituation coming from years of revolutionary struggle, brought tears to my eyes. The slogan which I heard every day in Argentina was, "He is near. He is near. Che is here." This slogan is a perfect example of what I was saying. 

The triumph of the Cuban revolution is definitely a great turning point in the revolutionary process in Latin America. People have said that Cuba can be a showcase or trigger for socialism in Latin America. What is Cuba's role given the current realities in Latin America's revolutionary process? 

Its main contribution is to provide an example, an example of unbending and resolute spirit. 

Mr. President, certain groups have suggested that the friendly relations between the USSR and Cuba are actually a form of dependency. It's true that, in the past, there were differences in the Cuban and Soviet perspectives, differences which today seem to have largely disappeared. We'd be interested in hearing why these differences have disappeared and what is the current state of relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. 

There has been a detente, and the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are better now than they ever have been. To speak of Cuban dependency with respect to the Soviet Union, however, is to make the grave errors of confusing imperialism with cooperation between a developed socialist country and an underdeveloped socialist one. One must look at the economic trade patterns and contrast the way Russia has related to us and the way the United States had related to us. 

If we look at the economic aspects of the relations, we can see that the Soviet Union's aid has been one of the main basis for Cuban development and survival. Looking back to the first few months of the revolution, when we lost the American sugar market, there was the Soviet market to take its place. When the blockade started by the United States cut off the flow of oil from countries aligned with the United States, there was Soviet oil. During these years, regardless of how relations between the two countries were going on, even when there were disagreements, as you mentioned, Soviet economic aid kept coming without interruption. 

Today, this economic aid has qualitatively improved. Entire sectors of our economy have been developed with the economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and, thanks to this aid, new industrial plants will be built, and transportation and energy production will be expanded. These new plants will be Cuban plants, not Soviet ones, not plants indebted to foreign countries. 

In addition, the Russians have made it possible for the development of the nickel and textile industries, the modernization and expansion of our sugar industry and countless other projects, and all this has been done in the context of mutual respect and absolute equality in the political relations between two sovereign governments. 

With reference to the United States, which you've mentioned, what are the changes which Cuba would require before some form of dialogue or negotiations could take place concerning relations between the two countries? 

Before even dialogue can take place, there is one condition, that the imperialist United States government unilaterally end its blockade of Cuba, a blockade which it started and it must end. Until that happens, there won't be even any dialogue. If that occurs at some time in the future, we would then begin discussions of problems common to all of Latin America and the United States. We would not merely discuss bilateral affairs concerning only Cuba and the United States, but we would have to discuss it in the context of US relations to Latin America, generally. 

Looking at things from a purely pragmatic point of view, once the blockade has been unilaterally ended by the United States, we might be interested in a broad range of economic relations, including entrance into the American market and economic and technical cooperation. This in no way would involve Cuba's revolutionary government surrendering its revolutionary principles or giving in on any conditions which it might wish to establish, but we would not limit ourselves to this. For the discussions to be fruitful, we would have to discuss not only Cuba, but Latin America and the end of the United States' jerendent role in Latin America generally. 

One way of uniting Latin America so it could negotiate with the United States might be an organization such as the one which Chile has proposed. In the last OAS meeting, a wholly new Latin American organization excluding the United States was proposed. What is Cuba's position with respect to such an organization? 

First of all, we believe, as we've stated before, that the extant Organization of American States is undergoing a grave and insoluble crisis. Cuba will not return to the Organization of American States. We respect and even feel that some countries' suggestions for reforming the Organization of American States are a positive step, but we feel that the OAS as an institution, with the presence of the United States government in its very heart, is not the ideal means for Latin America to shape its future.

We do not belong to this organization, and we feel that a Latin American organization must be created with the participation also of the English-speaking Caribbean nations, which could then collectively form a united front to negotiate with the United States and defend Latin American interests with respect to American imperialism.

Does it seem to you that Nixon, if he survives Watergate, will be able to initiate such discussions at some time in the future, or do you feel that it will be necessary to continue to exercise revolutionary patience? 

We should not speak of speed or hurrying. Revolutionary theory teaches us to be patient and also impatient, and knowing how to reconcile the one with the other is what constitutes a tactical wisdom of a revolutionary. 

The diplomatic blockade of Cuba is falling apart. It has even been suggested that other governments such as Venezuela's, for example, might establish relations with Cuba in the near future. This could present an apparent contradiction with the internal policies of these countries. What is the Cuban position with respect to this problem, that is, with respect to reestablishing relations with governments which defy imperialism, but which do not have progressive policies at home and which may even repress their own people? 

We have made it clear before that we are not interested in having relations with the countries of Latin America for the mere sake of having relations. However, we feel that reestablishing relations with Latin American countries can be useful since we agree on the principle of demonstrating our sovereignty with respect to imperialism. 

You mentioned the hypothetical possibility of a government assuming a dignified international position with respect to imperialism while at the same time, in its internal affairs, oppressing or even repressing its people violently. To begin with, it is very hard for me to see how a country could have a correct anti-imperialist position, a dignified international position and at the same time oppress or violently repress its people whether or not revolutionary struggle was occurring.

That is because an anti-imperialist position cannot be maintained by a government without some changes in internal policies. Thus, internal policies are inevitably linked to international policies, as I have said, regardless of whether or not the country is in the midst of some kind of major change.

We understand that Prime Minister Castro in his last Mayday speech reaffirmed Cuba's solidarity with revolutionary movements. 

If we didn't reform our solidarity with revolutionary movements, we will be violating our own principles. 

Based on an analysis of the results of the 1970 sugar harvest, the Cuban economy has made great progress. What are the changes which have produced such progress? 

It would take an awfully long time to list all of the changes in our economy, and we should not exaggerate. Our economic growth is of necessity limited due to the underdevelopment of our economy which we inherited, the lack of energy sources, and the difficulties an underdeveloped country has dealing with developed countries, problems such as unequal exchange, which have been mentioned in the economic literature, but obstacles in the way of rapid economic growth. 

What have been the achievements since the 1970 harvest? Some figures can quantitatively measure these achievements. For example, in 1972, the economy grew by 10%. This is an extremely high rate of growth for the 1970s, and this growth rate was achieved despite a poor sugar harvest which resulted from two years of drought and organizational problems galore. 

Despite this and despite the important role sugar plays in our economy, we reached the 10% growth figure. Of course, that means that some sectors of our economy grew even more rapidly. Construction, for instance, was up 40%. Industry, not including sugar refining, was up 15%. For 1973, we have set a goal, which we may or may not achieve, of 17% growth. Looking at the third of this year, we find that the growth rate was 16%. Production of consumer goods has increased, and this has been one of the major factors leading to the financial health of the nation. 

Well, how has it been possible to achieve such growth? 

Basically, it has been possible with the better organization, better planning and, above all, with the help of lots of people. This is not an abstract statement. It is a concrete reality which can be observed in every sector of the economy even where there have been administrative problems or a lack of the proper technology. The workers' efforts have always been present and production quotas have been met and, in some cases, surpassed under conditions which are not at all optimum due to a lack of technicians or materials. These shortages resulted from our distance from the European markets we are forced to trade with. 

Despite our support from socialist countries, they cannot physically supply us with all the capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods that we need. Thus, we have to make large purchases from capitalist countries, with the resulting heavy loss of foreign exchange. Of course, our foreign exchange depends on our exports, which are limited, sugar, nickel, tobacco, fish and a few other lesser items. We are basically dependent on agriculture which is affected by climate changes. 

Thus, in response to your question, it is the incorporation of the workforce into the economic struggle at a higher level and the awareness of the need for such an effort and then the carrying out of these tasks, often through extraordinary efforts, which have led to this economic growth since Castro's call in his May 1st, 1970 speech..

Calls have gone up many times before for higher production. Why did the people respond more energetically this time than before? 

In the first place, it was due to the fact that it was crystal clear to many people that efforts had to be made in every sector of the economy and not just in sugar production. In the second place, it was due to the greater participation of mass organizations in economic decisions, in economic process. Finally, it was due to a growth in revolutionary consciousness which now has gone beyond the mere limits of revolutionary emotion and has matured into an awareness of the necessity of building socialism in our country if we want to get what we want. 

According to some analysis, this new economic growth is due to the abandonment of certain principles which the revolution was previously based upon. 

I don't think that's true. What principles are you referring to? 

Well, for instance, the replacement of the principle that consciousness should motivate workers instead of economic incentive in order to increase efficiency. 

It should be made clear that the importance we attribute to revolutionary consciousness has in no way been diminished, but we have noted that certain related factors such as, for example, tying salary to productivity cannot only serve as a material stimulus, but also serves to create and help people understand what is happening. Why does this occur? Because in a socialist society, which is not one of abundance, from the point of view of revolutionary justice, one must conclude that it is immoral and, thus, it does not help create consciousness if one who works less earns the same as one who works more. 

When you pay a worker according to what he has produced, that is, in relation to his productivity, this is both just and consciousness-raising. This is because, through his salary, the worker is being evaluated morally and he is being told that he was socially responsible, will have more than he was not socially responsible. It would be demoralizing and would prevent the raising of consciousness if a worker who worked less, a loafer, earned as much as a good worker. Thus, we are not cutting down the role which revolutionary consciousness should play, but we're aiding and adding new ways of raising revolutionary consciousness. 

Given the larger amounts of goods being offered, do some individuals have more access to these goods than others? 

Yes. They have greater access to un-rationed goods, but everyone gets the same amount of ration to basic goods. 

Why is it that some individuals get more on rationed goods? 

This is related to the remarks I just made linking productivity, the quality and quantity of work to salary, and this is tied to the salary scale. 

You have been listening to a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticos.

The Mexico City Daily, Excélsior, reports from the United Nations, Mexico, Switzerland, and Brazil vehemently attacked the United States and the Soviet Union, who continue to conduct underground nuclear testing despite the fact that they signed a treaty 10 years ago to bring such nuclear testing to an end. There is particular concern over a new type of nuclear weapon known as the mini nuke, which is a small-tonnage nuclear weapon. It can be aimed with absolute precision and has a small concentrated effect. Critics feel that its production could easily lead to a new and dangerous arms race.

A United Nations representative pointed out that the nuclear potential of the superpowers is already equivalent to 15 tons of TNT for every single inhabitant of the planet. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the Swedish representative, said that the majority of nations who do not possess nuclear arms consider continued testing a breach of promise and an insult to the will of the majority of nations at the United Nations Assembly. Meanwhile, in Lima, Peruvian doctor, Louis Patetta declared that French nuclear testing in the Pacific had raised the incidences of respiratory, eye and skin diseases. He also claimed that radioactivity in Lima had reached alarming proportions. This from Excélsior. 

Our feature today is an article on the world food situation from the August 73 issue of Science Magazine, the American Association for Advancement of Science Publication. Last July, for almost the first time in living memory, the crop report prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture rated a spot on the CBS evening news. To consumers perplexed by rising food prices, the prediction of record crops was doubtless welcome, if maybe deceptive news. To economists concerned about the world food situation, the relief was of a different order. A poor harvest in the United States could mean disaster for some countries that depend on American food exports. 

The world food situation is more serious now than at any time since 1965 to '67, when an armada of American grain shipments saved perhaps 60 million Indians from possible starvation. The immediate cause is a bout a freakish weather that has visited droughts on some parts of the world, floods on others, and given the 1972 harvest much worse results than was expected. All countries except India have now bought enough grain, though often at ruinous prices, to cover their immediate needs, but the world's grain stocks are down to their lowest level in 20 years, and whether or not there will be enough food to go around next year depends on the success of crops now in the ground. 

The omens so far are that crops will be good around the world as long as the weather stays favorable and epidemics hold off. But the touch and go nature of events has rekindled anxieties about the world food situation. Beyond the immediate question of whether this year's crop will produce enough food to avoid major price disturbances, political instabilities and famines, there is concern that the present alarms and scarcities may reflect not just last year's bad weather, but a fundamental deterioration in the world food situation. Already, there are those who foresee a period of food scarcity in which those with food to sell will have a useful political weapon in their hands. 

Governments of developing countries will find this year that the soaring prices of food grains and freight rates have driven their imported food bills up by 60%, or roughly $2 billion, and a drain on foreign reserves of this could, if it should continue, threaten to retard economic development and make the gap between rich nations and poor nations grow faster still.

Much besides the threat of famine therefore hinges upon the ability of developing countries to make crop yields grow faster than people. The salient fact about the world food situation is that for the past 20 years, food production has increased at a rate just slightly faster than population. A fact that, were it not for major inequities in resource and income distribution, could translate into a very slight improvement in per capita diet.

Yet even disregarding the uneven rates of consumption, this average diet is precariously close to subsistence, and those even slightly below it are undernourished. The present extent of malnutrition in the world is a matter of debate because of arguments about how it should be measured, but according to the Food and Agricultural Organization, the FAO of the United Nations, perhaps 20% of the population of developing countries, or 300 to 500 million people, are undernourished, in that they receive less than the recommended intake of calories, not to mention protein. Alan Berg, World Bank deputy director for nutrition, estimates that of the children born today in developing countries, roughly 75 million will die before their fifth birthdays for malnourishment or associated illnesses. 

The article continues, "Regarded from a gross overview, the world's situation over the last two decades appears tolerable, if not precisely ideal. Countries with a food deficit have been able to buy cereals at reasonable and stable prices from the grain exporting countries." In short, the remarkable feature of the world food situation in retrospect has been its general stability. Perceptions of it, however, have followed a strangely erratic course over the last decade, lurching from pessimism to optimism and now back towards gloom again. 

In the mid 1960s, doom saying was the fashion. The USDA forecast that the concessional food needed by developing countries would eventually exceed what the United States had available to give away. Strikingly enough, the date calculated for this dire event turned out to be 1984. The USDA projections formed the basis for Famine 1975, a well-written and widely-read track by brothers William and Paul Paddock. The Paddocks took the USDA's figures, but assumed a slightly faster rate of population increase, and concluded that the famine era would arrive nine years ahead of time in 1975. 

The famine talk of the mid-1960s suddenly lost credence in the face of a new phenomenon, part-agricultural and part-public relations. The Green Revolution, with its wonder wheat and miracle rice, swept the headlines like wildfire, but they swept the wheat and paddy fields of Asia at a rather slower rate. 

Developed at an agricultural research center in the Philippines and Mexico, the new strains of rice and wheat did indeed produce yields many times greater than native varieties under certain conditions. The promising performance of the new strains in India and Southeast Asia suggested that the rate of food production could be increased from 2% to 4% or 5% within a few years.

Aided by favorable weather conditions, the new Mexican wheats produced bumper crops. India announced she would become independent of all foreign grain imports by 1973, and the Philippines pinned to become a major exporter of rice. And in the general euphoria, even the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization began to talk as if the real food problem would be one of surpluses, not scarcities. But from this high point, enthusiasm about the Green Revolution has slowly subsided, dipping occasionally into positive vilification.

The basis of the criticisms lies essentially in the fact that modern agricultural technology is no quicker or less painful to apply in the developing world than it has been in the advanced nations. High-technology farming in the underdeveloped world generates massive rural unemployment, as it did in the United States. The new strains of wheat and rice, which are the spear point of Western agriculture, require fertilizer, irrigation and the learning of new skills, all of which rich farmers can acquire more easily than the poor. The scarcity of land capable of this highly-specialized farming also greatly restricts its general applicability. 

The high-yield strains are also extremely sensitive to disease, a problem that the advanced countries themselves have yet to successfully cope with. After the optimism about the Green Revolution began to appear overblown, it required only a few bad harvests to set the pendulum swinging back toward despair.

The strange events of 1972 have done just that, although bad weather and an unlikely combination of circumstances were the principal cause, the resulting havoc was quite disproportionate, demonstrating the system's possible fragility. First, the Soviet Union had another bad harvest. The Russians bought 30 million tons of grain on the world market. The amount was enough to set grain prices soaring to historic heights, and to double world freight rates.

Other countries too were in the market, Indonesia and the Philippines for rice, India for grains. Drought in the countries bordering the southern edge of the Sahara caused a bonafide famine, which has affected between one and 10 million people. The Peruvian anchovy industry failed almost completely last year, and may be permanently damaged because of overfishing. And since the anchovies were the source of much of the world's supply of fishmeal, livestock owners turned heavily to grains and soybeans to feed their animals. 

The outcome of these various demands was dramatic rises in international market prices. In the short-term, it looks as if the scarcities that followed in the wake of the 1972 harvest will ease off, stocks will be rebuilt, and prices will subside to near their normal levels. The longer term prospects for the world's food situation depend on the viewer's perspective. If the optimists have the better record in the debate so far, they also have the harder case to make now. The optimist position is essentially the economic thesis that agricultural production can expand to match demand. 

But their critics respond, "Demand represents only what people can afford to buy, not what they need." On this view, the income of people in developing countries is likely to be the primary constraint on food intake for the foreseeable future, and the production will match up to whatever the market can afford. One analyst, Anthony S. Royko, says, "The United States could double or triple food production if the price was right. However, a review of the dynamics of underdevelopment in a capitalist system does not leave one massively optimistic when considering the cost to underdeveloped nations in increasing their immediate purchasing power." 

Moreover, the article continues, "US food surpluses, whether sold or given away, may help to avert shortages in particular countries, but can cover only a fraction of the expected increase in food needs of the developing countries. These nations must meet the major part of the food requirements themselves." Unfortunately, it is in predictions of likely agricultural productivity increases in the developing world that the professionals become more pessimistic. Among the reasons most commonly argued are the following. 

First, the Indicative World Plan, drawn up by the Food and Agricultural Organization, postulated that there could be slight improvement in the world's diets by 1980 if the agricultural production of developing countries met certain specified goals. So far, the progress made in meeting even the very modest goals of the FAO's plan offers little cause for enthusiasm. Between 1962, the base year of the plan, and 1975, agricultural production in developing countries was supposed to increase at a rate of 3.4% per year. In fact, the average growth rate between 1962 and 1970 has been only 2.8% per year, dropping to 2% in 1971 and to 1% last year. 

One of the few goals successfully met is that for farm machinery, which has been considerably exceeded, this since it adds to rural unemployment is a mixed blessing. Modern agricultural techniques used in the context of a developing capitalist economy not only increase the gap between rich and poor farmers, but are more likely to reduce jobs than to create them. Yet, rural areas in which the bulk of the population increase is to occur are where jobs are most needed. 

The high-yield strains of rice and wheat could cause a disaster for the populations they support because they are genetically more uniform than the native strains they replace and hence more susceptible to an epidemic. The plant breeders who devise the new strains are well aware of the problem, but are nowhere near a solution. 

Prevention and control of such epidemics is a hard enough task for the United States, and requires skilled manpower that developing countries using the new seeds may not possess. Although the trend of agricultural production in developing countries has been steadily upward, there is no guarantee that it will continue to rise. Future gains may be harder than those already made, the best land has already been put under plow, the most convenient water sources already tapped. Production of protein especially seems to be bumping up against certain constraints. 

The article continues, "This year's projections by the USDA Economic Research Service forecast that the world's capacity for production of cereals at least will increase faster than consumption, but projections explicitly assume normal weather conditions. The weather may not be so obliging." 

Whatever the real extent of malnutrition in the world and maldistribution of existing resources, there seems to be no certain prospect of substantial improvement, and the fair chance of degradation in the immediate future. Protein has become a seller's market. In recent months, there has been a clear trend of richer countries pulling protein away from the poor.

A similar dynamic exists inside the underdeveloped countries themselves, where economic elites' demands for meat may well price grain out of the poor man's mouth, given that it takes about seven pounds of grain to produce one pound of beef. The article concludes cautiously, stating that, "For the moment, the general world food situation seems stable, if a little precariously so." Most experts are agreed that 1972 was probably just a bad year, not a turning point.

In the longer term, the world's agricultural capacity is clearly not yet stretched to its limit, and any deterioration in diet on this account is likely to be gradual. However, any real immediate improvement or deterioration in the average diet is more likely to be linked to social and economic structure than to natural phenomena. 

From Chile itself comes the word of the death of Nobel Prize-winning poet Pablo Neruda on September 23rd. Neruda's death came just 12 days after the coup, which resulted in the death of Neruda's close friend, Salvador Allende. Neruda had been suffering from cancer. 

At Neruda's funeral on Tuesday in Santiago, a crowd of almost 2000 cheered the Chilean Communist Party, sang "The Internationale", and chanted, "With Neruda, we bury Salvador Allende". The daring left-wing demonstration was in direct defiance of the military junta. Yet even the risk of arrest could not stop the crowd from chanting, despite the heavy contingent of soldiers stationed around the mausoleum. 

Meanwhile, the New York publishing house of Farrar, Straus, and Giroux announced Thursday that the manuscripts of the poet's memoirs, as well as a number of unpublished poems written before Neruda's death, are missing. Neruda's home in Santiago has been ransacked and all his books seized. The military junta has denied responsibility and called the incident regrettable. Yet it is popularly believed that military police sacked the house in search of leftist literature and arms. 

Pablo Neruda's activism was as stronger as his lifelong commitment to poetry. Neruda's career as a poet officially began in 1924, when he published "Twenty Love Poems and a Song of Despair" at the age of 20. Following a tradition of long-standing, the Chilean government sent the young poet on a series of consular missions. In 1934, he was appointed counsel to Madrid. There he published the first and second series of his enormously successful work, "Residents on Earth". 

When civil war broke out in Spain in 1936, Neruda made no secret of his antifascist convictions. He used his post as counsel in Madrid to aid the Spanish loyalists. Finally, the Chilean government recalled him when his partisan behavior became simply too embarrassing. 

From then on, Neruda became progressively involved in politics. His poetry reflected the direction in which his entire life was moving, and he became a very controversial figure. Neruda later wrote of this time in his life, "Since then, I have been convinced that it is the poet's duty to take his stand along with the people in their struggle to transform society, the trading to chaos by its rulers into an orderly existence based upon political, social and economic democracy." 

After serving as counsel on Mexico for several years Neruda returned to Chile in 1943, he joined the Communist Party and decided to run for a seat in the National Senate. He was elected to the Senate in 1944 and served for five years until the conflict between the Chilean government and the Communist Party reached its peak. The party was declared illegal by an act of Congress, and Neruda was expelled from his seat. 

He made his way secretly through the country and managed to slip across the border. He lived in exile for several years traveling through Mexico, Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. In 1950, he published his "General Song". 

Neruda returned to Chile in 1953 and in that same year was awarded the Stalin Prize. He became the leading spokesman of Chile's left while continuing to write poetry prolifically. He also wrote exposes of Chilean political figures, and articles condemning US foreign policy in Latin America. In 1954, he published "The Grapes and the Wind", which contained a great deal of political verse. 

In 1971, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for poetry. Neruda strongly condemned US economic policies in Latin America. He felt that the United States used its dominance over the Latin American countries to finance US national security ventures and to supply US industrial needs, all at great cost to the Latin American countries themselves. 

The British weekly, Latin America, and the Cuban publication, Grama, report on the irritation provoked in Panama by the detention of Cuban and Soviet ships by canal zone authorities. Acting under a U.S. federal court order, the U.S. officials detained the two merchant ships on their way through the canal. The court ruling was made after an application from the Chilean military government, which complained that the ships in question had failed to deliver the cargos contracted and paid for by the previous Allende administration, according to Grama. 

Latin America noted that the ensuing explosion of wrath in Panama was virtually unanimous. Condemning the detentions as ambushes, the Foreign Ministry pointed out that even the hated 1903 treaty firmly stipulated that the canal must be neutral, unaffected by political disputes and capable of providing a free, open and indiscriminate service to all international shipping. The canal was equivalent to the high seas, the Ministry said, and its authorities had only limited jurisdictional rights, specifically linked to the operation of the canal. Furthermore, United States federal courts had no jurisdiction over such matters in the canal zone, which was formerly Panamanian territory. 

The British weekly, Latin America, continued that the incidents threw a shadow over the rising tide of optimism over the renewal of negotiations on a new canal treaty. Panamanian hopes have in fact been rising ever since Ellsworth Bunker was appointed Chief United States Negotiator three months ago, and expectations were further stimulated by sympathetic words from Henry Kissinger on his appointment as Secretary of State last month. Unless quick action is now forthcoming from Washington, the atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations will have been badly polluted, according to Latin America. 

From the internal point of view, however, the issue is not altogether inconvenient to General Omar Torrijos, the country's strongman. Following government moves to open a second sugar cooperative and for the public sector to enter the cement manufacturing business, private enterprise has been bitterly attacking the administration.

The pressure of inflation, though not likely to reach more than 10% this year, according to government sources, has caused some discontent which could be exploited by the government's opponents, and conservatives have attacked agrarian reform schemes which they say have caused a drop in food production. There was also criticism of the government's low-cost housing program, which would benefit small rather than large contractors, and there were even attacks on the National Assembly voted into office in August last year as undemocratic.

Latin America's coverage of Panama continues to note that a planned 24-hour strike by business and professional people for the beginning of last week, timed to coincide with a new assembly session, was called off at the last moment, and the situation is now somewhat calmer. But it was noted in Panama that the Miami Herald published an article entitled, "Will Panama Fall Next?", speculating that after the Chilean coup, Panama might be the next objective of local forces that seek return to a previous form of government. 

If any such emergency were likely to arise, a renewed dispute with the United States over the canal would be a good rallying cry. That report on Panama from the London Weekly Latin America, and from Grama of Cuba. 

In anticipation of Henry Kissinger's upcoming visit to Latin America, several Latin American political figures and diplomats have been speaking out on US-Latin American relations, especially economic ties. One thing which has sparked commentary is newly released figures on Mexican trade in the first 11 months of 1973. The Mexico City daily, Excélsior, reports that the bright side of the story is that Mexican exports increased by more than 6 billion pesos to a high of 27 billion pesos. However, overall, the trade picture worsened.

While money coming into the country from these exports increased by that same 6 billion pesos, money going out of the country for imports increased by some 13 billion pesos, leaving an increase in the country's trade deficit by 7 billion pesos. Excélsior concludes that if Mexico's foreign commerce did grow in 1973, its commercial imbalance grew even more. 

While from Caracas, Excélsior reports that Venezuelan president-elect Carlos Andres Perez recently revealed that his coming administration will propose a conference of Latin American countries to plan a protectionist strategy for the continent's raw materials. Perez noted, while meeting with Central American economic ministers, that, "The developed countries have been exercising an economic totalitarianism that more and more oppresses our economies and our development possibilities." The Venezuelan president-elect added that it is imperative that the developed countries pay a just price for their natural resources. That will be the only way of compensating for the prices which the underdeveloped countries have to pay for the manufactured goods and the costly technology which they are sold. 

And on the same subject, the Mexican ambassador to the United States, speaking at Johns Hopkins University near Baltimore, reported that the Latin American trade deficit in 1973 paid for some two thirds of the US balance of payment surplus. The ambassador, after pointing out that he was working with data supplied by the US Department of Commerce, noted that in 1973, the US exported to Latin America goods valued at eight million and one quarter dollars, while it imported from that region less than $7 billion worth of products. These figures indicate that Latin America contributed at least $1 billion to the US trade surplus, which was 1.7 billion in 1973. 

The ambassador went on to say that the situation is worsening. In 1960, Latin America had a deficit of $49 million. But while the price of raw materials only rose 8% in the last decade, that of North American finished goods climbed 22%. He condemned the monopoly or virtual monopoly position of capital and technology that the industrialized countries enjoy. The ambassador warned that economic coercion can produce an opposite reaction from that intended, giving as an example the disruption caused by the increase in petroleum prices. In the same statement, the ambassador analyzed in general terms North American aid to Latin America, and he emphasized that 60% of US aid must be repaid. That is, it is called aid, but actually amounts to loans of money at commercial interest rates. 

The Mexican ambassador concluded by commenting that the coming visit of Latin American ministers with Henry Kissinger, "Will be an excellent opportunity to open a continuing dialogue on the problems that the Latin American countries face." The meeting with Kissinger to which the Mexican ambassador referred is the Conference of Ministers of the Organization of American States, scheduled to be held in Mexico City at the end of the month. On its agenda will be included cooperation for development, protection and trade embargoes, solution to the Panama Canal question, restructuring of the inter-American system, international trade, the world monetary system, and the operations of multinational corporations. 

According to Latin America, Kissinger's aim is to stabilize the situation in Latin America, as he has attempted to do in other parts of the world. Traditionally, the continent has provided the United States with primary products and raw materials at relatively low cost. Now, prices on the world market are soaring, to the extent that the United States is thinking officially of endorsing long-term agreements between producer and consumer organizations. Since Kissinger took over at the State Department, Venezuela has begun to develop a petroleum policy which makes a distinction and a difference in price between the industrialized countries and the countries of Latin America. In 1973, the world price of sugar and coffee, let alone other products, broke all previous records. 

Latin America says that in spite of regional rivalries and local crises, there does exist a common philosophy among political leaders in Latin America toward the United States. However wide the political gulf that has separated past and present Latin American leaders, all agreed on a number of fundamental points. First, that the problem of US intervention, call it imperialist or paternalist, is perennial. Secondly, that Washington's policy towards Latin America has generally been aimed at securing the interests of US business. 

Thirdly, the countries of Latin America ought to take protectionist measures, regulating the repatriation of profits, taxing luxury imports, selecting the areas for foreign investment, and increasing in volume and price the export of primary products and manufactured goods. Finally, local armed forces, or part of them, have been systematically used as instruments of the foreign policy of the United States in Latin America ever since the beginning of the Cold War. Military assistance, the conferences and exchange programs and the training programs have all helped to overthrow constitutional parliamentary governments and to replace them by militarist or Bonapartist regimes. 

In diplomatic and political circles in Latin America, there is a sense of considerable expectation with regard to Kissinger. The impression of Latin American diplomats is that Kissinger now speaks for a consensus of Congress, Vice President Gerald Ford and of President Nixon himself. Add to this the fact that Kissinger can count on the support of the Soviet Union, the Chinese, and is respected, if not loved, by Europe and Japan, and it is not surprising that, in the words of a Brazilian diplomat, he should now be seen in the role of a planetary [inaudible 00:07:06]. This report has been compiled from Excélsior, The Mexico City Daily, and the British weekly and economic and political journal, Latin America. 

Our feature this week is an analysis of the recent turbulent events in Argentina taken from the Cuban, Prensa Latina and the Mexico City daily, Excélsior. 

Juan Perón is probably the best known political figure in Latin America since his appearance on the Argentine political scene in 1943 when he came to power in a military coup. He solidified his power base by building a huge political party whose main program was the support of this one man. At the same time, he took advantage of workers' unrest and constructed a huge trade union bureaucracy, also under his control. 

But these institutions were not the only factors which kept Perón in power. Immediately after World War II, world beef prices were high in a booming world economy and Argentine beef was bringing big export earnings for that country. Perón forced cattle raisers to sell their beef to a state corporation at a low price, and the government used the export earnings to begin industrializing the country and also to construct a welfare state apparatus to maintain Perón's political base. By the early fifties, though, world beef prices had begun to fall from the post-war boom. Also, Perón's manipulation of the cattle-raising industry had seriously damaged this important sector of the economy. As a result, Perón's almost hysterical support among Argentine masses fell off slightly. 

There was still another factor which undermined Perón. Perón had always maintained a nationalistic foreign policy and was particularly unfriendly to the United States. By the early fifties, many United States investors were interested in establishing operations in Argentina and no doubt would not have objected to a change in government. 

Finally, in 1955, Perón was overthrown in a right-wing military coup. In the following years, the military allowed some elections to take place, but the Peronist party was always banned from participating. The Peronists, however, always managed to show their strength by casting blank votes in the elections. 

These elections always showed that, whether in Argentina or not, Perón was still the strongest political figure in Argentine politics. Throughout the long years of Perón's absence, the Peronist party came to include many diverse political tendencies. The trade union movement came under the control of the more conservative wing of the party, and as a result has been somewhat passive and pressing for workers' demands. Meanwhile, the more leftist elements of the party, led primarily by the Peronist Youth Group, agitated strongly for Perón's return, and early this year, the military consented. After 17 years of exile, Perón was once again allowed to return to Argentina. 

Last September, Perón ran for president and won by a landslide. Yet his return has not turned Argentina into a sunny paradise. Social conflict has sharpened tremendously. Nor has Perón been able to maintain his position as the unchallenged leader of the Argentine masses. While most of the older trade union officials remain loyal to Perón's dictates, the sharpening economic and political crisis of the past few years has produced new political forces, rooted in an important section of the industrial working class who owe Perón little and put worker demands ahead of the aging politician's almost mystical personal appeal. 

When the military dictatorship headed by general Alejandro Lanusse last year invited Perón to return to the helm of Argentine politics after 17 years of Spanish exile, they were confessing their inability to cope with an increasingly revolutionary situation. The worsening economic crisis together with the junta's brutal and ineffective repression gave rise to over 500 strikes involving more than 5 million workers, a high tide in workers' struggle. While urban guerrilla organizations continued raids and kidnappings with virtual impunity. The Lanusse regime viewed Perón as the only political figure who, they hoped, could stabilize the situation. 

In terms of the class forces within Argentina today, says Cuban Prensa Latina, the invitation extended to Perón represented an attempt at a compromise by big property owners whose careers and fortunes are tied to the United States. About a third of Argentina's foreign debt, the largest single portion, is owed to US banks, while nearly another fifth is held by international institutions and banking syndicates such as the World Bank and the Paris Club, in which the US plays a dominant role. The pro-US group, while it makes up probably the biggest sector of the Argentine business community as a whole, is probably also the one with the narrowest popular base, due to the general unpopularity of US business interest in Argentina. 

Unable under Lanusse to keep its grip on the Argentine situation, this section of the business and industrial community, by inviting Perón to return, offered to share power with other sectors of the Argentine business community who have a Yankee nationalist orientation. There are actually two main sections of this community in Argentina today. The first, led by Perón, prefers to build economic relations with Western Europe and Japan as well as China, while restricting relations with the United States.

It sees both the US and the USSR as superpowers threatening to Argentina's independence, also influential, but still weaker than the first is a pro-Soviet sector of businessmen centering around a number of Argentine corporations with Soviet affinities and controlling the newspaper El Mundo and a television channel in Buenos Aires. The current economics minister, José Gelbard, is a representative of this group.

While the precise concessions to be made by the pro-US elements to other interests are the objects of a continuing struggle, the role and vision for Perón has been made amply clear. While attacking Yankee imperialism, he is to engineer a social truth to bring the workers' movement under control so as to raise the profits and rescue the power of Argentine industrialists as a whole. 

Has Perón kept his part of the bargain? A series of purges directed against the left-wing of the Peronist movement soon after Perón's return, using the assassination of a rightist leader by an urban guerrilla group as provocation, together with a series of anti-democratic regulations within the trade union machinery have identified Perón as allied with the right-wing faction in the party. The right-Peronist trade union hierarchy appears to have the green light to control or suppress the left. 

Nevertheless, despite measures of repression bearing Perón's signature, the aged leader's image is so tied up in Argentine eyes with popular and national aspirations that his return has been taken by the majority of the employed workers, the semi-employed poor, and peasants as a signal to redouble their struggle. The focus has turned from urban terrorism to mass organization in the factories. 

While the 62 national unions and the General Confederation of Workers are still controlled by the old line rightist Peronist hierarchy, millions of workers within these organizations have become involved in a struggle to democratize them and make them responsive to the rank and file. Agitation among agricultural proletarians in the plantations and of poor peasants has also accelerated. In the enormous ghettos of misery of the cities, the fight for a better life and decent conditions has grown into an important mass movement. Not least the students have been reorganizing and their movement expanding. 

Since his return to the helm of Argentine politics last year, Perón has been repeatedly threatened by the Argentine rightists whose inclinations toward a military coup are well-known. Whether or not Perón and more generally Perónism can stay in power, depends greatly on his ability to convince these men that he alone retains the overwhelming support of the masses of Argentine people. 

Crucial in this endeavor is the Peronist trade union hierarchy, which constitutes Perón's most important permanent organizational underpinning. This machinery, however, long ago forfeited claims to representing the material demands of the massive workers, which it once could boast of. It is an increasingly goon-ridden apparatus whose operations alienate the rank and file of the unions more than they attract them. It is no wonder, therefore, that the new left-wing organizations which arose during the military dictatorships prior to Perón have not merged themselves unconditionally into the Peronist movement since Perón's return, but have rather maintained their independence. 

The most important of the relatively new forces on the scene is the Revolutionary Communist Party, CPR, created in a split from the Communist Party in 1967. The CPR spent its first five years in illegality and has grown considerably in the past year. In the student movement in Cordoba to cite one example, they grew in a year from 40 members to 300. Their newspaper, New Hour, has been appearing regularly for six years. 

There are also at least five urban guerrilla groups in Argentina. Despite the fact that guerrilla groups made a temporary peace with Perón, recent events may bring about drastic changes in the situation. Excélsior of Mexico City recently reported that a strong guerrilla attack on the Army has brought relations between Juan Perón and much of the Argentine left to the breaking point this month. About 70 members of the People's Revolutionary Army, ERP, dressed in government military uniforms, and traveling in stolen army trucks entered the garrison at Azul, 125 miles south of Buenos Aires, January 20th, and held the command post for seven hours.

The attackers killed the commander of the 2000 man tank regiment, his wife, and a sentry before fleeing, taking the deputy commander as hostage, two guerrillas were killed. Thirteen suspected participants in the raid were arrested a few days later for questioning. It was the first large scale attack by a guerrilla group on elements of the Argentine government as distinct from targets belonging to foreign corporations, which have been frequent targets for several armed groups.

The raid provoked an immediate and furious reply by President Perón appearing on nationwide television in his general's uniform. Perón equated the attack on the garrison with an attack on himself. He appealed to the trade unions, the youth movement, and all other organizations to cooperate with police and army forces in the fight against the guerrillas. To annihilate as soon as possible this criminal terrorism is a task to which everyone must commit himself, he said. It is time to stop shouting Perón and to defend him. 

One of Perón's first steps in the anti-guerrilla campaign was to sack the governor of Buenos Aires province, Oscar Bidegain, who was considered a progressive by the Peronist left wing. Three or four other provincial governors of a similar character are also expected to be fired. It has become evident from the purges that the raid on the Azul garrison is being used by the Perón government as a provocation to further suppress the Argentine left, whether sympathetic to the ERP or not.

Another step in the repression was the police confiscation and burning of an edition of El Mundo, the left Peronist newspaper in Buenos Aires. Perón, reversing the liberalization moves enacted when he first returned to power, has also pushed through the Argentine parliament a stiff anti-terrorist law, which would virtually suspend civil liberties. This action aroused the opposition of nearly the entire left, Peronist or not.

It is quite possible that the guerrillas hoped to drive Perón into the arms of the hard line military, thus exposing him as the right-winger they have always said he is, leaving no room for leftists within Perónism. Such a situation would seriously alter the balance of power in Argentina. 

This report on Argentina was taken from the Cuban, Prensa Latina, and the Mexico City daily, Excelsior. 

Excélsior of Mexico City also reports that Jose Toha, ex Minister of the Interior and Defense for the former Allende government in Chile, died March 16th while imprisoned by the military dictatorship. The government claims that Toha committed suicide, but sources close to the deceased believe that suicide was impossible. 

According to Excélsior, Allende's former press secretary explained Toha's death as an assassination, not a suicide. She said that Toha suffered from a severe stomach disorder and that he required a special diet. Toha was imprisoned in a concentration camp on Dawson Island off the coast of Southern Chile, along with other former officials of the Allende administration. There he was not provided with his special diet and thus lost 50 pounds before he was transferred to a military hospital in Santiago. 

The military claims that Toha was found hanged in a closet of the Santiago Hospital, but hospital workers say that when he was admitted to the hospital, Toha was so weak that he could hardly move. The former press secretary thus says that there is no way that Toha could have committed suicide when he did not have the energy to move a limb. She claims that the military deliberately left Toha to die of starvation. She added that this is not the first time that the military hospital has refused treatment to political prisoners. 

While military officials in Chile claimed that Toha committed suicide by hanging himself with his own belt in a closet, general Pinochet head of the military junta, who was visiting Brazil at the time, had a different version. Pinochet claimed that Toha took advantage of an opportunity while being alone in a shower to hang himself. No explanation has been offered as to the discrepancies between the two supposedly official stories of Toha's death, but Excélsior points out it is well known that people throughout Chile are mourning Toha's death, including sectors of the armed forces. 

Reports of brutal treatment by the Chilean junta also appeared at the other end of the continent recently. The Argentine daily El Mundo published excerpts from an inclusive interview with a well-known Chilean journalist who spent time in military prison in the days following the bloody coup last September. The Argentine daily also reported that the Chilean newspaper La Prensa has been closed by the military censors because of a story it ran on the Soviet author, Alexander Solzhenit︠s︡yn. The article contrasted the treatment the Russian author received with the treatment received by political prisoners in Chile.

The newspaper said of Solzhenit︠s︡yn, "The writer has not been jailed, nor has he disappeared. He has not been tortured either physically or mentally. No one has committed hostilities against him, and his family continues to receive news about him. Such treatment stands in sharp contrast to the cruel tortures described by this Chilean journalist." That from the Argentine daily El Mundo. 

And finally, the British news weekly, Latin America, reported recently that General Pinochet has told the Chilean miners that political activities within the unions are strictly forbidden. "This is not a decision for three or four years, but forever," he said. "It is a question of cleaning up the mines of workers and stepping up production." Not to be outdone, another Junta member, General Mendoza said that the Junta will remain in power "for an unlimited period and will keep right wing parties on ice indefinitely." That from the British news weekly, Latin America.