Annotations for Countries: Nigeria

African liberation struggles and the oil crisis will soon be felt in Latin America. And from Latin America, a British weekly journal, comes a report by an African diplomat who said that in deciding to mount a common front against Zionist expansions and colonial racism in Africa, the organization of Arab Unity has planted the basis for a nationalist movement for the colonial peoples, which will transcend the frontiers of Africa and the Middle East. 

The same diplomat said that the Arab states, which were not members of the OAU, had requested that Nigeria deal on its own account with the question of oil supplies to Brazil, since Brazil was outside the limits of the African continent. In the view of some African diplomats, Nigeria's position as a leader of the OAU and at the same time, the world's eighth-largest exporter of oil must inevitably lead it into conflict with the Brazilian government. 

Brazil is one of the largest importers of Nigerian oil and one of the biggest investors in the development of the Portuguese colonial territories in Angola and Mozambique. Last year, not only did Brazil negotiate still closer economic ties with Portugal, but the Bank of Brazil also opened branches in Portugal's African possessions. Some observers believe that Nigeria is now on the verge of giving an ultimatum to Brazil. Either Brazil openly proclaimed support for the national liberation movements in Africa, including the recognition of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau proclaimed on 24th of December. 

Or Brazil will be included in the oil embargo against Portugal and the other colonialist countries. The Brazilian foreign ministry has already indicated its concern at the decisions taken at the OAU meeting and their implications for Brazil. Last week, government sources in Brasilia warned of increases in the price of petroleum derivatives and Petrobras included increased the price of petrol by 10%. 

The result of an oil embargo for Brazil in the view of most observers could be to bring current development plans to a complete stop. Although a large part of Brazil's energy demands are met by hydroelectric power, it has no other effective energy sources. Its coal reserves are comparatively small and of poor quality. While the development of a nuclear energy is still in its infancy. With the switch away from prospecting for local oil reserves to dependence on foreign supplies, Brazil appears to have placed itself in a highly vulnerable position. 

The whole of the current development program is to a greater or lesser extent dependent upon petroleum, and the loss of Nigerian oil could not be easily made up from other sources. If Nigeria does give Brazil an ultimatum, the Brazilians might find themselves having to consider reversing their well-established policy of support for Portugal. In view of the blood ties that exist between the two countries, the implications of such a decision could be profound and cause even more dissatisfaction within Brazil. 

According to the British News weekly, Latin America, Brazil's growing interest in black Africa was clearly revealed by the visits earlier this year to that continent by the Brazilian foreign minister. In the view of most observers, this sudden interest had been forced upon Brazil by the urgent need for more markets for Brazil's manufactured products and a reasonably reliable and cheap source of raw materials for its industries. 

On the face of it, the more advanced countries of black Africa, such as Nigeria, offered ideal prospects, but these are marred by Brazil's extremely close ties with Portugal and its African territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, and by a rapidly growing commercial relationship between Brazil and South Africa. 

In all its negotiations with Africa, Brazil has maintained an equally distant position between the interests of black Africa and of the colonial powers of Portugal and South Africa. The reason is not far to seek. Brazil's relationship with Portugal is long and very close, and the large Portuguese element in the Brazilian population is an ever present pressure group. More important, Portugal provides a gateway to Europe for Brazilian products by the back door and through its African colonies, a gateway to Africa. 

Although Brazil's relations with South Africa are a very recent origin, they have been strengthened fast. Trade between the two countries has passed the $90 million mark, which is more than Brazil's trade with all of the countries of black Africa combined. Direct air services between the two countries have recently been initiated and a firm invitation for South Africa to invest in Brazil was extended by Brazil's foreign minister at this year's session of the United Nations General Assembly. That report on British interests and black Africa from the British News Weekly, Latin America. 

Our feature this week is on Brazilian economic expansion in the context of US Latin American relations. Sources included are the Mexico City daily, Excélsior, the British news weekly, Latin America, and the Brazilian weekly, Opinião.

Traditionally, Latin Americans have resented what they call "Yankee Imperialism". They see the United States, a rich, powerful industrial country, extracting Latin America's raw materials to feed US industry, but leaving Latin America underdeveloped. As a result, their economies have been oriented to producing raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Not only does this prevent any great expansion of Latin American economies, but it puts Latin American countries in an ever worsening trade position since the price of manufactured goods increases faster than the price of raw materials. 

When the United States has extended loans to Latin America to help them develop their industry, there have always been political strings attached. If a country's politics become too radical, if they threaten foreign investment, the loans are shut off. 

Besides acting as a political lever, United States loans also open Latin American investment opportunities to United States capital. By pressuring creditor countries to accept informed investment and providing the funds necessary for the development of an infrastructure that the foreign enterprises can use, loans have won easy access for United States capital into Latin America. The consequence of this is a significant loss of national sovereignty by Latin American countries. 

Recently it appears that one Latin American country, Brazil, has assumed the role of imperial power. Using resources gained from its close friendship with the United States, Brazil has made considerable investments in raw material production in neighboring Latin American nations, as well as African countries. Investments include oil in Columbia and Nigeria, cattle in Uruguay, cattle and maté in Paraguay, as well as the hydroelectric plant and rights to Bolivia's tin.

The Brazilian government has also extended loans, and more importantly, exerted political pressure in favor of the right wing coups. Brazil's totalitarian military regime has, at the cost of civil liberties and social justice, brought stability. It has also attracted a flood of foreign loans and investments through its policies. In 1972 alone, more than $3 billion in loans were pumped into their economy. Foreigners are invited into the most dynamic and strategic sectors of the economy.

Brazil's friendliness to foreign capital has led them to be, in Richard Nixon's opinion, the model for Latin American development. It has also brought them, by far, the greatest chair of loans to Latin America. The deluge of foreign exchange has led Brazil to look abroad for investment opportunities and raw material sources. A recent article in Mexico's Excélsior describes Brazil's new role in its neighbors, economies, and policies. 

When Simón Bolivar struggled to liberate the Spanish colonies in South America, the great liberator dreamed of two nations on the continent. He never imagined that the Spanish and Portuguese halves of South America could ever be united. 

Today, however, unification of the continent is being affected by the gradual expansion of Brazilian political and economic influence over the Spanish-speaking half of South America. Whether South America's term the expansion the new imperialism, or a natural manifest destiny, it is most pronounced in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, three of Brazil's smaller neighbors. And recently, the shadow of the green giant has been hovering over Chile too. 

One important side effect of Brazil's growing influence has been the isolation of Argentina, her chief rival for supremacy on the continent. By removing Argentina's influence from their neighbors, Brazil has sharply reduced her status as a power in Latin America, both politically, and more importantly, economically. 

Although she did mass troops on Uruguay's border, her gains of recent years were achieved through diplomacy, trade packs, and the judicious use of money. Paraguay was Brazil's first success. Paraguay, a wretchedly poor nation of 2.5 million people, was offered credits. Her military rulers recorded and her major export, cattle, was given a good reception. 

In exchange, Brazilians have been permitted to buy vast tracks of Paraguayan land, make other important investments, and open Paraguay's markets to Brazilian products. Today, many young Paraguays are working in increasing numbers for Brazilian farmers and industrialists. The Brazilian cruzeiro is becoming a power in Paraguay. 

Last year, the promise of more cruzeiros led Paraguay's government to grant Brazil rights over major rivers for the construction of massive hydroelectric power systems. Brazil needs more electric power for her booming industry. The Argentines complained bitterly about the diversion of the benefit of those rivers from their territory, but they felt they could not protest too loudly because Brazilians are becoming the important customers of Argentine commerce. 

Bolivia is another triumph for the Brazilian foreign ministry. By winning over key military men, the Brazilians helped install General Hugo Banzer as president of Bolivia in 1971. When Hugo Banzer tried to sell more of his country's oil and natural gas to Argentina rather than Brazil a few months ago, he was almost toppled from power. His fate was widely discussed in Brazil and Argentine newspapers at the time, but Brazil's surging economy needs the oil and gas and the outcome was never in doubt. 

Bolivian politics is now an arena for open conflict between military leaders who are either pro Brazil or anti Brazil. Those who favor closer ties to Brazil cite the economic benefits that result from the commercial investments pouring into Bolivia from her neighbor. 

Those who oppose becoming Brazil's 23rd state want their country to remain fully independent. They believe Bolivia's potentially wrench in minerals, and that should be used for her needed development. Few people in South America have any doubt about which side is going to prevail. 

Uruguay is a prime example of Brazilian expansionism. Uruguay, after years as a beacon of democracy, but as an economic laggard, was taken over last June by her military men in the Brazilian manner. Labor unions, the press, and democratic processes have since been scrapped or repressed 

Nationalists in all three countries, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, are lamenting the fact that their long awaited economic boom comes at a time when their people are losing control over their own economies. Last September's rightest revolution in Chile, another former democratic bastion in South America, opened that country to Brazilian political and economic domination. 

Brazil is also looking to Africa as a source of raw materials and a field for investment. There have been numerous indications recently that Africa looms large in Brazil's future trade plans. Africa has important resources such as petroleum, copper, and phosphates, which Brazil needs. Closer economic and diplomatic relations which African nations will guarantee Brazil access to these raw materials. Closer relations with Africa also fit into Brazil's strategy to become a spokesman for the Third World. An article in Brazil's weekly, Opinião, discusses the signs of increased Brazilian interest in Africa's raw materials and consumer markets. 

It is possible that in the near future students of international relations will cite the joint declaration of friendship of the Brazilian and Nigerian chancellors as an important step in strengthening Brazil's political and economic ties to Africa. The visit of Nigeria's chancellor, an important public figure in Africa, is a sign of the closer relations to be expected in the future between Africa and Brazil. 

It is not surprising that Nigeria is the first African country with whom Brazil is trying to affect closer relations. Aside from being the most populated country in Africa, with one fifth of the continent's total population, Nigeria also has a second largest gross national product in Africa. Between 1967 and 1970, it registered an annual growth rate of 19%, which was second only to Zaire. Thanks particularly to its large increase in petroleum production, which compensates for Nigeria's under development, primitive agriculture, and internal political divisions, Nigeria's on the verge of becoming the African giant. 

Presently Africa's second leading petroleum producer, it will shortly overtake Libya for the lead in Africa. By 1980, Nigeria is expected to surpass Kuwait and Venezuela and become the world's fourth largest petroleum producer. Nigeria is an ideal partner in the Brazilian grand strategy of closer relations with Africa. Even in a superficial analysis, trade between Brazil and Nigeria appears promising. Nigeria has a potentially vast market with a large population, and, relative to the rest of Africa, a sophisticated consumption pattern. 

Furthermore, Nigeria can offer Brazil an excellent product in return petroleum. It also is undergoing import substitution industrialization, which favor Brazilian inputs. The two countries, both ruled by military governments, have obvious immediate interests in common. Probably most important is maintaining the price of raw materials, such as cocoa, for example. In addition, Brazil's desire to weaken its dependence on Middle Eastern oil because of its obedience to the wishes of United States diplomacy makes the Nigerian source even more inviting. 

Although Brazil is a new customer to Nigeria, trade between the two countries reached $30 million last year. This total is expected to mount rapidly in the next few years. Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs has already drawn up a list of over 200 goods and services, which can be absorbed by Nigeria. Numerous Brazilian industrialists and officials are going to Africa to study the potential market for sales and investments. 

In recent days, there have been indications that Brazil will increase her trade with countries in what is known as Black Africa. The first of these was the announcement that Brazil might form binational corporations with African countries to exploit the great existing phosphate reserves of the continent, some of which are still virgin. The formation of binational corporations with African countries would guarantee the importation of increasing volumes of phosphates. When one realizes that Brazil imports 85% of the nutrients in the fertilizers it uses, the importance of such corporations is obvious. 

Another indication of Brazil's African strategy is the arrival of Zaire's first ambassador to be sent to Brazil. The ambassador expressed interest in increasing trade between the two countries, stating, "The Brazilian experience with building roads and applying scientific research to agriculture and industry can be of much more value to Zaire than the experience of European countries because Zaire and Brazil share the same climate." 

At present, commerce between the two countries is almost negligible. Zaire buys a small number of cars and buses from Brazil and sells a small amount of copper. However, this situation is expected to change radically in view of the negotiations, which will be carried out when Zaire's president visits Brazil in 1974. 

Plans to increase trade with countries in Black Africa are made without prejudice in Brazil's regular commerce with South Africa and Rhodesia, by opening important sectors of her economy to foreign interests and keeping her dissidents in poor under control, Brazil has been able to accumulate foreign exchange and expand into the economies of fellow Third World countries. Along with an economic tie, such as commerce, investments, and loans comes political influence. That influence has already manifested itself in the right wing coups in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. It remains to be seen whether Brazil's African partners will succumb to the Brazilian rightist pressure. 

This has been a feature on Brazilian economic expansion, including excerpts from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior, the British News Weekly, Latin America, and the Brazilian Weekly, Opinião. 

The British weekly Latin America reports that the recent coup in Portugal has helped resolve some policy differences between Portugal and Brazil. Portugal and Brazil had previously split on the issue of African colonialism. Barely 24 hours after General António de Spínola's coup in Portugal, Brazil recognized the new Portuguese government. Brazil's quick recognition of General Spínola reflects her basic agreement with the new Portuguese colonial policy. Unlike his predecessor, Portugal's new leader seeks a political rather than a military solution to the wars in Portugal's African colonies. Brazil has urged such a political settlement on Portugal for some time. 

Latin America mentions two reasons for Brazil's advocacy of a peaceful solution in Africa. First, a mission of high-ranking Brazilian military officers visited the Portuguese colonies in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde towards the end of 1972. The Brazilian officers concluded that no military victory was possible for the Portuguese troops against the independence movements. The second reason Brazil supports a political solution in Africa stems from her need of African markets and natural resources.

When the oil crisis hit, the Brazilians became anxious to secure oil agreements with Nigeria and Libya. The Brazilians feared a possible African and Arabian oil boycott if Brazil continued to support Portugal's African colonial policy. To guarantee herself oil sources, Brazil repudiated African colonialism earlier this year. It could well be that Brazil's policy shift actually helped to precipitate the Portuguese political crisis. This from the British Weekly Latin America. 

The British weekly Latin America reports that the recent coup in Portugal has helped resolve some policy differences between Portugal and Brazil. Portugal and Brazil had previously split on the issue of African colonialism. Barely 24 hours after General António de Spínola's coup in Portugal, Brazil recognized the new Portuguese government. Brazil's quick recognition of General Spínola reflects her basic agreement with the new Portuguese colonial policy. Unlike his predecessor, Portugal's new leader seeks a political rather than a military solution to the wars in Portugal's African colonies. Brazil has urged such a political settlement on Portugal for some time. 

Latin America mentions two reasons for Brazil's advocacy of a peaceful solution in Africa. First, a mission of high-ranking Brazilian military officers visited the Portuguese colonies in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde towards the end of 1972. The Brazilian officers concluded that no military victory was possible for the Portuguese troops against the independence movements. The second reason Brazil supports a political solution in Africa stems from her need of African markets and natural resources.

When the oil crisis hit, the Brazilians became anxious to secure oil agreements with Nigeria and Libya. The Brazilians feared a possible African and Arabian oil boycott if Brazil continued to support Portugal's African colonial policy. To guarantee herself oil sources, Brazil repudiated African colonialism earlier this year. It could well be that Brazil's policy shift actually helped to precipitate the Portuguese political crisis. This from the British Weekly Latin America.