Annotations for Countries: Guatemala

Argentina, Guatemala, and Venezuela, all of which have territorial disputes with Britain or former British colonies, strongly opposed Britain's application for permanent observer status at the Organization of American States. Venezuela also raised the issue of colonialism, which was criticized by Brazil and Peru on the grounds that other colonial countries such as Portugal have been granted observer status as a matter of routine. They also pointed out that Britain gave regular technical assistance to the OAS.

This week's feature deals with one case study in the controversy between multinational corporations and Latin American nationalist governments, which pose a threat to corporate investments in Latin America. The ITT secret memorandums concerning its interventions in Chile, have made the headlines again recently, calling attention to the strong power these companies wield in Latin America.

Senate hearings in Washington this week have been delving into the activities of ITT's busy Washington office, this time involving its campaign to get Nixon Administration help in protecting ITT properties in Chile from Marxist President Salvador Allende. The Wall Street Journal reports that ITT officials bombarded the White House with letters and visits, called on the State Department, huddled with the US ambassador to Chile, and lunched often with a Central Intelligence Agency spy boss, known as "Our Man." What ITT wanted during this hectic pleading in 1970 and '71, was for Washington to threaten the newly elected Allende government with economic collapse, according to William Merriam, who was then head of the company's Washington office. "If Allende was faced with economic collapse, he might be more congenial toward paying us off", Mr. Merriam told a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. The Chilean government had expropriate the ITT-controlled Chile Telephone Company without, the company says, offering adequate compensation.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to say that the Senate subcommittee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, was created especially to investigate the influence of big multinational companies like ITT on US foreign policy. ITT's involvement in the 1970 Chilean presidential election, was first brought to light a year ago in columns by Jack Anderson, who had obtained a stack of memos, cable grams, and letters between ITT officials. So far, ITT has had little luck protecting its investments in Chile. It claims that the ITT-controlled telephone company that was intervened by the Allende government in September 1971, has a book value of $153 million. ITT has filed a claim for $92 million with the US government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which ensures American property against foreign expropriation. But OPIC has a rule against provocations or instigation by its insurance clients, unless the activity was requested by the US government. So the question of who took the lead in meddling in the 1970 Chilean election, ITT or the CIA, could determine whether the insurance claim is valid.

Mr. Merriam told Senator Church that ITT Chairman Harold Geneen introduced him in July of 1970 to William Broe, the CIA's Latin American Director for Clandestine Services. Mr. Merriam said he was instructed to stay in touch with Mr. Broe in the future. Without saying who initiated this meeting in the Washington Hotel, Mr. Miriam made it clear that the CIA was impressed with political reporting on the Chilean situation by ITT'S operatives in Latin America. He said Mr. Broe sent CIA messengers to his office to get the reports. The September 17th, 1970 cable from Bob Barella and Hal Hendrix, two ITT officials in Latin America, suggested Mr. Allende's election might be headed off with help from we and other US firms in Chile. The cable recommended that advertising funds be pumped into a financially shaky conservative newspaper in Chile. The cable also suggests, concludes the Wall Street Journal account, "that ITT bring what pressure we can on the US information service to circulate the newspaper's editorials in Latin America and Europe."

In a memo dated September 14th, 1970, an ITT operative in Chile wrote that he had spoken with the state department's Latin American advisor to Henry Kissinger. "I told him of Mr. Geneen's deep concern about the Chile situation, not only from the standpoint of our heavy investment, but also because of the threat to the entire hemisphere." The threat to its interest explains in a nutshell why ITT worked so hard in the period between September 4th and November 4th to prevent the Allende government from taking power in Chile. ITT had a great deal to lose in Chile.

Its holdings consisted of six affiliates, employing about 8,000 workers and worth around $200 million. It operated the Chilean Telephone Company, one of ITT's biggest earners abroad, had investments in telephone equipment, assembling and manufacturing, directory printing and international communications, and operated hotels. Among foreign investors in Chile, only the copper holdings of Anaconda and Kennecott exceeded the worth of ITT's Chilean subsidiaries. In 1969, the Frei administration agreed that the telephone company be guaranteed a minimum annual profit of 10%. Profits for ITT have further been augmented by special foreign exchange arrangements for the communications monopolies in Chile.

The following memos illustrate how far ITT was willing to go to keep these investments. They also reveal the close ties between ITT executives and the US government, including the Central Intelligence Agency. And in the relations between ITT and the Chilean right. ITT had access to the centers of Chilean domestic power as well, having recruited prominent Chileans through career and investment ties. The memos expose ITT as a corporate nation on which the sun never sets. As Jack Anderson summarized, "ITT operates its own worldwide foreign policy unit, foreign intelligence machinery, counterintelligence apparatus, communications network, classification system, and airliner fleet with total assets equal to the combined gross national products of Paraguay, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Haiti, Bolivia, and Chile. ITT can wield its power almost at will."

The key memoranda begin on September 17th, 1970, 6 Weeks prior to the historic presidential election, which placed the Allende government in power. ITT field officials, Hendrix and Barella, advised an ITT vice President, E.J. Gerrity about the Chilean presidential campaign, suggesting alternatives which could thwart Allende's election chances.

The report stated that, "The surface odds and foreign news media appear to indicate that Salvador Allende will be inaugurated as president November 4th. But there is now a strong possibility that he will not make it. The big push has begun in Chile to assure congressional victory for Jorge Alessandri on October 24th as part of what has been dubbed the Alessandri formula to prevent Chile from becoming a communist state. Late September 15th, US Ambassador Edward Korry finally received a message from State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible, short of Dominican Republic type action, to keep Allende from taking power."

The report further contended that the Mercurio newspapers are another key factor. "Keeping them alive and publishing between now and October 24th is of extreme importance. They're the only remaining outspoken anti-communist voice in Chile and under severe pressure, especially in Santiago. This may well turn out to be the Achilles heel for the Allende crowd. The Allende effort more than likely will require some outside financial support. The degree of this assistance will be known better around October 1st. We have pledged our support if needed."

Then on September 29th, Vice President Gerrity cabled ITT President Harold Geneen in Brussels, giving more details of the measures being considered to induce economic collapse in Chile. The cable says, "Subsequent to your call yesterday, I heard from Washington and a representative called me this morning. He was the same man you met with Merriam some weeks ago. We discussed the situation in detail and he made suggestions based on recommendations from our representative on the scene, and analysis in Washington. The idea presented is to follow economic pressure. The suggestions follow. Banks should not renew credits or should delay in doing so. Companies should drag their feet in sending money. And making deliveries in shipping, spare parts, etc. Savings and loan companies there are in trouble. If pressure were applied, they should have to shut their doors, thereby creating stronger pressure. We should withdraw all technical help and should not promise any technical assistance in the future.

A list of companies was provided, and it was suggested that we should approach them as indicated. I was told that of all the companies involved, ours alone had been responsive and understood the problem. The visitor added that money was not a problem."

He indicated, the cable continued, "that certain steps were being taken, but that he was looking for additional help aimed at inducing economic collapse. I discussed the suggestions with Guilfoyle, another ITT vice president. He contacted a couple of companies who said they had been given advice, which is directly contrary to the suggestions I received. Realistically, I did not see how we can induce others involved to follow the plan suggested. We can contact key companies for their reactions and make suggestions in the hope that they might cooperate. Information we receive today from other sources indicates that there is a growing economic crisis in any case."

The Gerrity cable was followed by a memorandum, dated October 9th, from another of the ITT vice presidents, William Merriam to John McCone, Director of the CIA from 1962 to 1965, and now a director of ITT. Merriam concluded that, "Practically no progress has been made in trying to get Latin American business to cooperate in some way so as to bring on economic chaos." GM and Ford, for example, say that they have too much inventory on hand in Chile to take any chances. And that they keep hoping that everything will work out all right. Also, the Bank of America has agreed to close its doors in Santiago, but each day keeps postponing the inevitable. According to my source, we must continue to keep the pressure on business. I was rather surprised to learn that in this man's opinion, the Nixon Administration will take a very, very hard line when and if Allende is elected.

As soon as expropriations take place, and providing adequate compensation is not forthcoming, he believes that all sources of American monetary help either through aid or through the lending agencies here in Washington will be cut off. He assures me that the president has taken, at this time better late than never, I guess, a long, hard look at the situation and is prepared to move after the fact. We had heard previously from the lower level at the State Department that Hickenlooper would not be invoked. This policy has either changed or the lower echelon does not know of this change. This is the first heartening thing that I have heard because with few exceptions, Nixon has paid very little attention to Latin America."

Subsequent memos indicate that, although both ITT and the CIA, gave verbal assurances of material support to Chilean general Roberto Viaux, who was maneuvering inside the army to stage a possible coup in late October. The attempt failed to materialize. None of ITT's efforts were effective in preventing Allende's election on November 4th, 1970. Although the memos indicate that the ITT maneuverings fail, we know that in the one and one half years that have passed since the Popular Unity government assumed power, the Chilean right aided by the US government and US business interests has continued to engage in subversive activity against the Allende government. This activity has taken many forms, including assassination attempts against the Chilean president outright, but abortive military coups, manipulation of food and other resources to exacerbate scarcities and create economic chaos, and of course the withholding of aid and loans as a big stick to whip the government in line. All of these tactics were suggested in the secret memos.

ITT has struggled for a year to ring from the UP a generous compensation for its interest in the Chilean telephone company, Chi Telco, which the Allende government earmarked for expropriation immediately upon its inauguration. Chi Telco was ITT's most profitable Chilean asset. Throughout the first part of 1971, ITT bickered over the terms of the expropriation, and finally on September 30th, 1971, the government took over operation of Chi Telco, claiming its services were highly deficient. Since then, ITT and UP have continued to negotiate over how much the government should pay for ITT's 70% share in Chi Telco. ITT valued the company at $153 million, but the government claimed it was only worth $24 million. Based on its past experiences in other Latin American countries, ITT has every reason to believe that it would be reimbursed. In the past three years, the governments of Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil have all nationalized the ITT-owned telephone companies in their countries on terms extremely favorable to ITT.

The memorandum that cited earlier may destroy ITT's chances for compensation from the Allende government, and may lead to further nationalization of ITT properties in Chile. In order to appropriate a corporation, the Chilean Congress must pass a constitutional amendment in each case. Presumably, these documents are giving the government more fuel in its effort to regain control of Chile's industries from the North American investors. As nationalism grows in Latin America, the threat to US corporations abroad also grows. As the documents make clear, US corporations are urging the US government to take a firm stand against unfriendly acts of expropriation by Latin American government, and are prepared to resist this trend by actively interfering in the internal affairs of other nations to safeguard their interests.

On a practical note, David Belknap of the Los Angeles Times service reports kidnapping for politics or profit or both has created a demand for a new kind of insurance in Latin America, and the latter has lately become available. English underwriters, most of the members of the Lloyds of London Group, now offer kidnapping insurance. Policies that will reimburse the hefty ransoms currently being exacted south of the border by urban guerrilla organizations.

With a present annual average of more than one big money kidnapping a week, Argentina is a prime market for the new insurance, now available everywhere in Latin America according to industry sources here. Besides Argentina, nations with kidnapping problems dating from as long ago as 1968 include Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.

Brokers hesitate to discuss for publication details of the new insurance. Beyond saying that it is available to families and corporations with the name or names of insured individuals specifically mentioned in the policies. That means that if the top five men of a company are mentioned and number six gets snatched, the policy doesn't apply, said one industry source. Blanket coverage isn't available yet, the concept is still too new for blanket premiums to be calculated. This from the Los Angeles Times service. 

At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.

There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers. 

It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand". 

The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later. 

The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers. 

The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.

Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.

In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.

Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.

When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy. 

This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present. 

US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala. 

In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.

An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,

25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program. 

A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.

Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,

The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.

On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.

In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.

The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."

The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:

On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright. 

Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.

Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.

To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio. 

In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."

These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.

In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.

For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."

Miami Herald reports from Guatemala City. Tensions remained high in Eastern Guatemala on Monday, after a gun battle between squatters and troops. At least 17 persons were reported killed. Police and troops surrounded the hamlet of Palo Verde, 72 miles east of the capital, in an attempt to head off further violence, but hundreds of peasants were reported holding onto the land they had seized during the weekend. On Saturday, a group of 1000 landless peasants seized privately-owned agricultural plots outside Palo Verde. Military policemen were sent into the area and started arresting the peasants. The police in the army said the peasants opened fire and authorities said military policemen and 11 peasants were killed.

Area residents said the peasants claim the landowners took their grazing lands many years ago. The army spokesman said, "Many of the peasants received military training in 1954, when the government recruited them to fight rebel army forces". This from the Miami Herald. 

The series of revelations about illegal actions on the part of political and governmental officials in the United States, known as the Watergate affair, has received wide coverage in the Latin American press. Rio de Janeiro's Jornal do Brasil, for example, devotes a full page to it daily. The editorial comment has also been extensive. Today, we will review some of this commentary on Watergate, and also describe how the scandal is having political consequences in one Latin American country, namely Costa Rica.

President Nixon has never been a popular figure in Latin America and the Latin press has shown little sympathy for his plight because of Watergate. Most papers clearly doubt that Nixon knew nothing of the break-in plans or the coverup. Rio de Janeiro's Opinião, for example, asks if Nixon can honestly maintain himself as President. The Weekly sees Nixon retreating from one strategic position to another in his statements as new facts emerge. Opinião concludes by wondering if Nixon's defenses will be strong enough to resist whatever facts are revealed next. 

La Prensa of Lima also sees Watergate as Nixon's Waterloo. If Nixon is getting a bad press in Latin America, the same cannot be said for American institutions. The Congress, courts, and especially the American press, has received wide praise in Latin America for pursuing the investigation. As La Prensa of Lima notes, "This may be Nixon's Waterloo, but nobody is talking about a Waterloo of democracy. It is precisely thanks to democracy," La Prensa continues, "That the secret sins have been unveiled." The Lima daily then concludes that only through a free press and enlightened public opinion can a democracy remain healthy and this is the most positive sign of Watergate.

Siempre! Of Mexico City says one of the characteristics of a representative democracy is that the authorities are not immune to punishment for crimes which they commit in the performance of their duties. Siempre! sees Watergate as proof that American institutions function well. Opinião of Rio de Janeiro also sees the scandal as a sign of the strength of American institutions. However, some of the revelations which have come from the Senate investigations have infuriated Latin Americans. This is especially true in Mexico since the congressional hearings have revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency has been operating there. 

Excélsior of Mexico City notes that the White House asked the FBI not to investigate certain aspects of the transfer of campaign contributions from Mexico because it would lead to disclosures of clandestine operations of the CIA. Excélsior thinks that fact deserves Mexico's protest and immediate change in United States policy, which flagrantly violates the principle of nonintervention. Excélsior continues the participation of the CIA in the internal affairs of Chile, the sending of Green Berets to Bolivia to combat Che Guevara, the aggression against the Dominican Republic, the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the invasion of Guatemala in 1954 to overthrow the Arbenz regime, are only some of the precedents of the intervention of Watergate in the affairs of Latin America.

Excélsior continues by noting that the CIA, a White House spokesman, and President Nixon himself have denied any connection of the CIA with Watergate in Mexico, but all have implicitly admitted that the CIA previously carried out operations there. Excélsior concludes that the Mexican government may not make a formal protest because of the friendship which unites the United States to Mexico. However, it will be necessary to employ firmness to demand that Mexico's political sovereignty is no longer violated by the CIA. While secret CIA activities are highlighted in the Mexican press, a different sort of problem faces the government of Costa Rica, which has been splashed with some of the mud of the Watergate scandal. 

Latin America reports that several days ago serious charges were leveled at the President of Costa Rica, Jose Figueres, claiming that $325,000 had been deposited in his New York Bank account through a Vesco-linked company. Vesco, a wealthy Wall Street financier, has recently been indicted of embezzlement and has been linked to the Watergate scandal. The Costa Rican President vigorously denied the allegations and defended Vesco's conduct saying that in Costa Rica, if nowhere else, it had been honest. As in so many other areas of the Watergate scandal, a great deal of questions concerning the high level involvement remained to be answered, this from the British News Weekly Latin America. 

Chile Hoy reports from Uruguay. "Few of the diplomatic appointments of the Nixon administration will be as significant as that of Ernest Siracusa, a veteran ambassador who will be taking over the US Embassy in Montevideo. Siracusa has served in various Latin American countries; Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. In Bolivia, he arrived just as a military coup had opened up possibilities of a nationalistic takeover. In this latter case, he seems to have performed well. Bolivian workers organizations attribute a very influential role to him in the defeat of progressive forces and the setting up of a military dictatorship. It has been suggested that he is linked less to the Department of State than to the CIA." 

Whatever the exact nature of his ties, his next assignment will be Uruguay. Chile Hoy predicts that his mission in Uruguay will be largely to convince certain military leaders that nationalist politics are not appropriate to Uruguay, and encourage the rightist generals that the Brazilian model of military control and close alliance with the United States is desirable. 

Meanwhile, Chile Hoy continues, "In Santiago, a committee formed of certain leftist Uruguayan groups gave a conference last month in which they documented repression in their country. Since 1968, when the constitutional government was transformed into a type of military civilian dictatorship, the Army has had a free hand in dealing with dissenters." 

"The statistics are impressive. In less than a year, the joint armed forces killed 43 men and four women. The form of death was typically sinister. Four died from excessive torture. One was thrown off a four-story roof. There were two suicides of people anticipating more torture, 21 were merely riddled with bullets, and the rest were finished off in various armed confrontations. The estimated number of political prisoners is more than 4,000. In a country of less than 3 million inhabitants, this comes down to one political prisoner per 750 citizens." This report from Chile Hoy, a Santiago weekly. 

Tri-Continental News Service in New York reported this week on the expanding market in human blood, which Tri-Continental calls the ultimate commodity. The shortage of blood plasma in this country has provided some enterprising US businesses with a profitable new commodity and has created a new source of misery for the poorest people in America. Donations of blood in the United States cover only about 60% of the annual need. The deficit, about two and a half million pints, comes from people who sell their blood in order to survive. The going rate in urban slums and poor southern states of the United States is from five to $15 a pint, which the companies then sell to hospitals for up to $35. 

Now, United States companies have found an even cheaper source of this strategic raw material. They have set up blood banks in half a dozen Latin American capitals, where unemployment rates of up to 50% assure a virtually unlimited supply of people willing to open up their veins for these merchants. The plentiful supply of blood has driven the price down, and prices are from $2 to $3 a pint are common. 

The blood exporting countries include Haiti, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Columbia, and Brazil. A recent survey carried out by the Department of Experimental Surgery at the Autonomous University of Mexico estimated that the export of blood from Mexico alone was a $10 million annual business. Latin American blood is sent to West Germany and Israel in addition to the United States. 

Tri-Continental claims that many of the people who sell their blood are undernourished and anemic, and yet they will come in week after week to make their sale. The companies, which are not licensed or controlled by medical authorities, are not concerned with the loss of iron, which often results in the slow death of the chronic blood donor. 

Tri-Continental suggests that the reason why such practices persist is government corruption. When defense minister Luckner Cambronne was dismissed from his post in Haiti in November 1972, it was learned that he had been a partner in Hemo Caribbean, a US controlled blood company that also has branches in the Dominican Republic. Similar financial connections have been revealed between Carlos Arana Osorio, president of Guatemala, and the Sedesa company, which exports blood from that country, and in the case of the Samosas family's holdings in blood exporting companies in Nicaragua. This report from New York's Tri-Continental News Service.

Our feature this week is a commentary on Latin American art, taken from a recent book by Jean Franco called "The Modern Culture of Latin America".

An intense social concern has been the characteristic of Latin American art for the last 150 years. Literature and even painting and music have played a social role, with the artists acting as teacher, guide, and conscience of his country. The Latin American has generally viewed art as an expression of the artist's whole self, a self which is living in a society and which therefore has a collective as well as an individual concern. On the other hand, the idea of the moral neutrality or the purity of art has had relatively little impact. 

In countries like those of Latin America, where national identity is still in the process of definition and where social and political problems are both huge and inescapable, the artist's sense of responsibility towards society needs no justification. Generally, movements in the arts have not grown out of a previous movement, but have arisen in response to factors external to art. A new social situation defines the position of the artist, who then improvises or borrows a technique to suit his purpose. 

Ms. Franco's book is a careful study of these changes in the artist's attitude to society and the way that this is expressed in literature and, to some extent, the other arts. She begins her analysis with the year 1888, the year of the publication of an influential volume of poetry by Ruben Dario, the leader of Latin America's first native artistic movement, known as modernism. 

Modernist is a term used to characterize many diverse writers, such as Nicaraguan Ruben Dario, the Cuban Jose Marti, and the Colombian, Jose Silva. All of these writers had a great deal in common. The type of society the modernist hated above all was contemporary bourgeois society. This may seem strange, since Spanish America was only at the margin of industrial and capital expansion.

Yet the poets did not have to see dark satanic mills on their doorsteps to realize that a new and disturbing force was looming over them. The cash nexus, destructive of all other human relations, was what the artist most feared. Indeed, many of the prose pieces written by the modernists are in the nature of allegories about the relation of the artist to a materialist society. The poet's hatred of the materialism of his age was often to remain exclusively verbal.

But there were very many different shades of social involvement. From Dario's aloofness to the militant commitment of Jose Marti, a dedicated fighter for Cuban independence, nothing could be further from an elite attitude than these words of Marti. "Poetry is the work both of the bard and of the people who inspire him. Poetry is durable when it is the work of all. Those who understand it are as much its authors as those who make it. To thrill all hearts by the vibrations of your own, you must have the germs and inspirations of humanity. Above all, you must live among a suffering people." 

After this early period, characterized by a real or symbolic rebellion, came an intense concern with culture rather than politics. A new influential movement known as Arielism took its name from an essay by Uruguayan Rodo, in which he emphasized the spirituality of Latin American culture, especially when contrasted with the vulgar neighbors to the north, the United States. There was an emphasis on original native culture and efforts to revive the memories of heros of the past. 

After the first World War, the Latin American intellectuals began to seek some roots in the cultures of the Indian and the Negro, and in the land itself, alternative values to those of a European culture, which seemed on the verge of disintegration. Literature about Indians and Latin America was to have two distinct functions. One was to fulfill a direct social purpose by arousing a general awareness of the plight of submerged sections of the population. The other was to set up the values of Indian culture and civilization as an alternative to European values. 

This tenancy found its best expression in Mexico, where the world famous muralists Diego Rivera, Orozco, Siqueiros, and O'Gorman revived mythological Indian figures with very beautiful and innovative techniques. The Negro tradition expressed itself in the 1920s within Cuba and fostered a great deal of literature, as well as music. This trend towards more native emphasis in Latin America was a very important stage of development. At its most superficial, it was a gesture of defiance towards Europe and the United States. At its best, it did justice to hitherto ignored, if not disparaged segments of the population. 

In the 1920s, the world gradually began to divide into the hostile political camps of communism and fascism. Political concern was almost unavoidable. Whether such concern would be reconciled with the pursuit of art was another matter. Some intellectuals became militants and abandoned their painting or poetry. Some put their art to the service of a message. A few attempted to find a form of art which would universalize their political concern. 

In Latin America, many communists and socialist parties were founded and run by the artists and intellectuals. The most outstanding example was the Mexican Communist Party, which had, at one time, no less than three painters, Rivera, Siqueiros, and Guerrero on its executive committee. In Peru, the socialist party was founded by an intellectual, Mariategui. In 1936, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War drew many more writers and artists into the left-wing ranks, and prompted middle-class intellectuals to join with workers and peasants. 

Of all the poets and authors involved in this political reawakening, Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, succeeded most in bringing political elements into poetry without sacrificing originality or creative depth. While arguing that poetry should not be separated from everyday life, but rather should be impure, as he put it, "corroded as if by an acid, by the toil of the hand, impregnated with sweat and smoke, smelling of urine and lilies". He still managed, as is obvious from the quote, to use very striking and beautiful imagery. 

The novelists of the early 20th century also show political concern, but are preoccupied with such philosophical and ethical issues as authenticity. Carlos Fuentes and Juan Rufo in Mexico both struggled with the problems of the Mexican consciousness. Ms. Franco writes, "In the modern novel, revolution is no longer seen as a total solution. At best, it is only an essential first step. The real battle, it has suggested, is now within the human mind and particularly within the minds of the upper and middle classes, whose failure to construct a reasonable society is one of the tragedies of Latin America." 

For a century and a half, the republics of Latin America have been following different paths. Mexico has undergone a social revolution. Paraguay has lived under a series of dictators. Argentina's population has been transformed by immigration from Europe. Obviously, such factors have their repercussions in the continent's literature, which besides common Latin American features, has also specifically Argentinian, Mexican, or Paraguayan characteristics. 

These local variants are not necessarily political. The incidents of illiteracy, the presence of a large rural population also affect the artistic environment. This does not mean that socially underdeveloped countries do not produce good literature, but simply that in such places the artist's task is lonelier and more difficult. 

Most countries in Latin America have experienced political oppression during the present century, and in many, the condition has been constant. Contemporary literature abounds with the personal testimonies of men who have been imprisoned and persecuted by dictators. In many countries, the problem of oppression is much wider than the immediate physical consequences. The writer suffers from the much slower torments of frustration, lack of freedom to write as he wishes, and a crushing intellectual environment. To be born and grow up in a Latin American dictatorship is, to use the words of Asturias, "to be born into a tomb". 

Two outstanding writers, Augusto Roa Bastos and Miguel Angel Asturias, the first from Paraguay and the second from Guatemala, have succeeded in gaining an international reputation, despite the inhibitions of their background. Asturias' book, Men of Corn, traces the dispossession of the Indians and the commercialization of agriculture. Roa Bastos' short story, "The Excavation", presents a nightmare of frustration in which those who rebel against the status quo are shamelessly murdered. The works of such writers as Asturias and Roa Bastos only serve to emphasize the tragic waste of human potential inherent in a dictatorship. These problems are particularly relevant to the Brazilian situation today, where a censorship of all printed and electronic media is unlimited. 

Latin American intellectuals have always been intrigued with the subject of revolution. The Mexican experience of 1910 is very prominent in the literature and art of the last decades. The Cuban Revolution has also had a great effect on national cultural life. Although the changes in the political and social life of Cuba are still too recent for a solid judgment to be formed, the revolution of 1959 changed the social structure of Cuba. Most of the upper class and many of the middle and professional classes left the island.

A vigorous campaign against illiteracy has brought into being a new amass readership, encouraged to write and help to publish by the official Union of Artists and Writers, and by the prizes offered by the Casa de las Americas, which acts as a cultural clearinghouse. Book production has enormously increased, and there are now available cheap editions of many Cuban and Latin American classics.

In a 1961 speech to intellectuals, Castro guaranteed freedom of literary expression, declaring, "Within the revolution, everything, outside the revolution, nothing," a guarantee that was repeated by other leading intellectuals and which has allowed a remarkable variety of styles. Unlike Soviet writing, realism has not been the only permitted style. Science fiction, fantasy, and black humor are all common. Within the first 10 years, the struggle in Cuba has not meant the sacrifice of spontaneity and variety. It'll be interesting to see whether, in time, totally new art forms will emerge. 

To declare one's self an artist in Latin America has frequently involved conflict with society. In the 19th century, the artist was divided from most of his fellow countrymen because of his culture and upbringing. As we have seen, the majority of 19th century reformers were also political fighters dedicated to reforming their society. It was only towards the end of the century, with modernism, that it was even suggested that art might be more important than the political struggle. 

This did not mean that they had given up on social programs. On the contrary, the modernist ideal of society was the exact contrary of the vulgar materialism, which they regarded as the symptom of the age, and their way of life was a protest against those who were uncritical of bourgeois values. Without abandoning ideals of culture and refinement, the Arielist generation saw itself as moral leader. The artist put his faith in education and in the written word as a means of changing society. 

However, ultimately, neither the written word or education was effective. The Arielist generation was overtaken by a rising tide of unrest, by the shattering impact of world events such as the Russian and Mexican revolutions and the First World War. The post-war generation was no longer in a position to feel superior. The masses had become a power to be reckoned with. The intellectual was therefore obliged either to regard himself as an ally of the masses, a helper in their cause, or if he could not do this, he tended to stand aside, proclaiming that politics and social reform belonged to a world of appearances. 

At any rate, there are many signs that Latin American literature has come of age. Two Nobel Prizes in the last five years have gone to Latin Americans, Miguel Angel Asturias of Guatemala, and Pablo Neruda of Chile. The work of these two men effectively summarizes many of Ms. Franco's points about Latin America and the artist's social concerns. Asturias' most famous series of novels deals with the role of foreign banana companies in his native country, and Neruda's verse is an enthusiastic witness to the success of the new Chilean regime. 

The fact of undeclared war in Guatemala is being openly admitted. Despite the grand public relations campaign being waged on his behalf, General Laugerud, the official presidential candidate, was recently forced to admit that everyone in Guatemala knows that the country is in an undeclared state of war, which began 13 years ago. The violence is increasing and the government and its handpicked candidate for the 1974 election had been trying to use that violence as a political issue by claiming that it is a part of a plot to discredit the government in the pre-electoral period. 

The fact that violence is increasing was demonstrated dramatically one week in June when one landowner, two farm administrators and a rightist congressman were murdered all by people with no clear ties to organized political groups. A wealthy landowner, businessman and former president of the US sponsored Penny Foundation was killed by several peasants whose land he was trying to take over. Congressman Hector Soles Juarez, a renowned right-winger was killed after two unsuccessful assassination attempts, but no group on the left has claimed responsibility for the act. 

Guatemala Report continues saying, "During the past year the government's main overt efforts to control the situation aside from direct armed confrontations have been aimed at maintaining a continuous high level of fear in the population and a constant awareness of the strength of the repressive forces." 

This tactic has been most apparent in the so-called Cleanup Operations carried out without obvious provocation in different parts of the country, but primarily in Guatemala City. These cleanup maneuvers are ostensibly designed to rid the country of common criminals, and as the elections approach, are increasingly focused on combating marijuana, an issue which the government is trying to use to distract attention from these serious problems facing the country. 

In recent months, there are indications that the government, unable to totally pacify the country, may now be trying to use political violence and organized subversion as an issue in the election. According to Laugerud, the government cannot control the situation because it is fighting organized violence, manifested in the repetition of similar acts all over the country in which landowners, farm administrators, military commissioners, and policemen have been killed. 

Several army officers have recently acknowledged that despite massive pacification efforts, the problem of political violence and concretely of the guerrilla, has not been liquidated. Despite the general level of censorship, the press has also reported the existence of armed groups in the northern part of the country. 

These developments make it clear that the government no longer feels obliged to maintain a liberal political image and that the election will bring no moratorium on official and semi-official violence. Thus, any lull in the government's undeclared war must be seen as tactical and temporary rather than as the beginning of peace, tranquility, and stability. This critical view of the undeclared war in Guatemala is presented by the Guatemala Report. 

The Puerto Rican weekly, Claridad, also reports from Guatemala City that the death toll of peasants shot down by the army troops here now totals 67. A May dispatch published in the New York Times reported 17 dead, adding that the death toll could go higher because all the bodies of those slain might not have been discovered. More than 3000 peasants participated in the land occupations that led to the massacre in the region near the town of Sanarate.

Landowners called on the army to oust the invaders from the land, which in most cases is owned by absentee landlords and often not cultivated. This region was also the scene of agrarian reform measures taken by the government of Jacobo Árbenz, overthrown by the CIA in 1954. Much of the land distributed to small farmers was returned to the landlords after the oust of Árbenz. The massacre, in which three students and a union leader were also killed, emphasized the determination of the government to continue the terrorist campaign that was first launched against the Guerrilla movement and which has claimed 1000 lives a year since 1966.

Meanwhile, the government has begun to campaign for the March, 1974 presidential elections. Official candidates tour the country under heavily armed military escort. The main theme of the campaign was founded recently by the military man chosen to succeed current President Carlos Arana. "My historic mission," intoned the official candidate, "Is to carry out the second phase of the pacification of the country by wiping out the left." This from the Puerto Rican weekly, Claridad.

The military Junta seems firmly in control in Chile after staging a successful overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende on September 11th. The following report on recent events in Chile and world reaction to the coup is compiled from the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Miami Herald, the Mexico City daily, Excélsior, NACLA, Prensa Latina, and The Guardian. 

The Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet issued a communique recently in which he said that the armed forces were searching the country to put down extremist forces. The military said they would expel from the country all of the Latin American leftists who had taken refuge there during Allende's rule. At the same time, relations were broken with Cuba and the entire Cuban diplomatic mission was put in a plane to Havana.

The Junta's interior minister, General Óscar Bonilla said the military took over the government because more than 10,000 foreign extremists living in Chile, including exiled guerrillas from Uruguay and Brazil, posed a threat to the country. The armed forces had to intervene in order to safeguard the destiny of the country, seriously threatened by extremist elements, Bonilla said.

Organizations in the United States, which have been expressing concern about the fate of the foreign exiles in Chile, also estimated their number at 10,000. Other sources have indicated that an equal number of Chileans were left dead in the wake of the coup. The military said that many Chileans and foreigners were being detained at the Ministry of Defense, the Military Academy, various military posts, and the dressing rooms of the national soccer stadium. A television station broadcast films of 60 prisoners in the dressing rooms, their hands clasped behind their heads. 

There were widespread reports that could not be confirmed that many former officials and supporters of Allende's popular Unity Coalition had been executed by the military. The North American Congress in Latin America, NACLA, a research group on Latin American affairs in the United States, monitored reports from Cuba and Inter Press News Service. They said that these sources and ham radio reports from Santiago all reported widespread fighting and the execution of many of Allende's associates and supporters. NACLA quoted Inter Press Service as saying that at least 300 foreign exiles were killed during and after the military takeover. 

NACLA also said the coup was an attack not only on the popular government of Chile, but the entire anti-imperialist movement in Latin America. Censorship was imposed on the Chilean media and foreign journalist dispatches. The Junta announced that 26 newspapers and magazines were told to suspend publication indefinitely because they were opposed to the Junta's goal of depoliticizing Chile. 

While the extent of resistance in Chile is uncertain due to conflicting reports, much of the rest of the world has raged in protest. An estimated 30,000 protestors filed past the Chilean embassy in Paris, brandishing red flags and banners and shouting "Coup makers, fascists, murderers!" and "Down with the murderers in the CIA!" Thousands of demonstrators marched in Rome, where a group calling itself the International Militant Fellowship claimed responsibility for a pre-dawn fire bombing of the Milan office of Pan-American World Airways. The group said the attack was in retaliation for participation in the coup by US imperialists. 

The West German government withheld recognition of the new Chilean regime for the time being, and in protest of the coup, canceled credits of 35 million marks, which it had agreed to extend to Chile. The World Council of Churches asked the Junta to respect the rights of political exiles in Chile, and the secretary general of that organization expressed the council's concern over the brutal rupture of Chilean democratic traditions. 

In Latin America, reactions were much stronger. The Argentine government declared three days of national mourning for the death of President Allende, and 15,000 marched in a demonstration in that nation's capital protesting the coup. Telecommunications workers in Buenos Aires staged a one-hour strike in solidarity with the Chilean workers who were killed by the troops of the military Junta.

Also in Buenos Ares, the movement of third-world churches condemned the coup and exhorted all Christians to fight the military dictatorship. Juan Perón, who will soon be elected president of Argentina, said that while he does not have the evidence to prove it, he believes that the United States engineered the coup. Venezuelan president Raphael Caldera called the military takeover a backward step for the entire continent.

In Costa Rica, thousands of students marched in protest of the coup and in solidarity with Chilean resistance fighters. While the Costa Rican government offered political asylum to Chilean political refugees. One of the loudest protests came from Mexico City where 40,000 joined in a protest march shouting anti-US slogans and burning American flags. 

An indictment of the type of economic colonialism, which had Chile in its yoke was voiced by Osvaldo Sunkel, a noted Chilean economist when he appeared last week before a United Nations panel investigating the impact of multinational corporations. The panel was created largely because of Chile's charges that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had tried to block the election of Dr. Allende in 1970. United Nations officials maintained that there was a strong sentiment for such an inquiry apart from the ITT case. 

In his remarks, professor Sunkel charged that foreign corporations were bent on siphoning off resources of the developing countries. He heatedly disputed testimony by five corporate officers that their concerns had contributed to the health and welfare of the countries where they operated. He said, "I get scared, really scared when I hear such individuals speak of social responsibility. Who has appointed a small group of individuals to decide the fate of so many?"

Sunkel said, "The government of President Allende made an attempt at changing the structure of underdevelopment and dependence in Chile. It may have had many failings and committed many errors, but nobody can deny that it attempted to redress the unjust economic and social structure by fundamentally democratic means."

While much of the anger and protest around the world seems directed at the United States, State Department and White House officials have consistently denied that the US was involved in the coup in any way. Nevertheless, critics of the Nixon Administration's policy in South America blamed the United States for helping create the conditions in which military intervention became an ever stronger likelihood. Joseph Collins of the Institute for Policy Studies said the tactics were economic chaos.

Collins said that Chile had become the first victim of the Nixon-Kissinger low profile strategy in which credits are withheld while military assistance continues to pro-American armed forces. Military assistance to the Chilean regime continued throughout the three-year presidency of Allende, however development loans were halted. Collins said US companies had put pressure on their subsidiaries and on foreign associates not to sell vitally needed equipment and spare parts to Chile.

The following commentary on the role of the United States in the Chilean coup comes from The Guardian. "US involvement could be seen on several levels. US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis went home to Washington per instructions September 6th, returning to Santiago September 9th, only two days before the coup. Davis was a high-ranking advisor in the National Security Council from 1966 to '68 and later served as US Ambassador to Guatemala during the height of the pass pacification program against leftist forces there.

When Davis came from Guatemala to Chile in 1971, he brought a number of aides with him who had helped run the repression there. The State Department trains people for special jobs, and Davis seems to have specialized in these kinds of operations," says The Guardian.

According to The Guardian, Davis's philosophy of international relations was expressed in a speech in Guatemala in 1971. "Money isn't everything," he said, "love is the other 2%. I think this characterizes the US' policy in Latin America." The New York Times reported that the US was not at all surprised by the coup and that US diplomats and intelligence analysts had predicted a coup would come three weeks earlier.

"In another interesting possible prediction," claims The Guardian, "the State Department called back four US Navy vessels, which had been heading into Chilean waters for annual naval maneuvers scheduled to begin September 13th. The State Department claims that this was done when news of the revolt came, but some sources say that the order came before the beginning of the coup indicating prior knowledge."

The Guardian claims that US corporations were clearly pleased by Allende's overthrow. When news of the coup came, copper futures rose 3 cents on the New York Commodity Exchange, but the US government is cautioning against too optimistic a view on the part of expropriated companies since a too rapid return of nationalized properties would only heighten antagonisms and further reveal the coup's motivation. The preceding report on recent events in Chile was compiled from the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Miami Herald, the Mexico City Daily Excélsior, NACLA, Prensa Latina, and The Guardian. 

According to Marcha of Montevideo, Uruguay, many Latin American officials are dismayed at the Nixon administration's choices for ambassadors to Mexico and Argentina. Two of the most critical posts in Latin America, both men, Joseph Jova appointed ambassador to Mexico and Robert Hill appointed to Argentina have been criticized for their close connections with the CIA, the Pentagon and the United Fruit Company. 

Hill, a close friend of President Nixon recently chose to resign from his post as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs rather than comply with a Senate order to sell his extensive defense industry stock holdings 

According to Marcha, Hill's political career began in the State Department in 1945 when he was assigned to US Army headquarters in New Delhi, India. His job actually served as a cover for an intelligence assignment for the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA. Throughout the rest of his career, he continued to work closely with the US intelligence community, including the CIA. Marcha describes his biography as a satirical left-wing caricature of a Yankee imperialist. A former vice president of WR Grace and a former director of the United Fruit Company, Hill personally helped organize the overthrow of the Nationalist Arbenz's Government, which threatened United Fruit's investments in Guatemala.

As Marcha details, "Ambassador Hill is particularly criticized for his participation in the CIA instigated overthrow of President Arbenz in 1954." The history of that coup centers to a large extent on the United Fruit Company. Arbenz and his predecessor worked hard to change the inequalities in Guatemala's social structure. Free speech and free press were established. Unions were reorganized and legalized. Educational reforms were enacted.

One of the most wide-sweeping and inflammatory changes was the Agrarian Land Reform Program, which struck directly at the interest of the United Fruit Company. The program called for the expropriation and redistribution of uncultivated lands above a basic acreage, while exempting intensively-cultivated lands. Compensation was made in accord with the declared tax value of the land. The appropriated lands were then distributed to propertyless peasants. 

Immediately afterwards, the McCarthyite storm burst over Guatemala. Arbenz was accused of being a communist agent and as such was thought to be a danger to the power of America and the security of the Panama Canal. The plan to overthrow Arbenz was concocted by the CIA. A Guatemalan colonel, Castillo Armas, was found to head up a rebel force in Honduras, in Nicaragua, and was supplied with United States arms. Marcha says that at the time of the coup, Hill was ambassador in Costa Rica and formed a part of the team that coordinated the coup. In 1960, he was rewarded by being elected to the board of directors of United Fruit. 

Hill has long enjoyed close relations with President Nixon, and in 1972 he returned from Madrid, Spain where he was serving as ambassador to work on the campaign for Nixon's reelection. Joseph Jova, the appointee as ambassador to Mexico, also shares with Hill a spurious background. The Mexican paper El Dia accused Jova of deep involvement in a successful 1964 CIA campaign to prevent the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile. Jova was deputy chief of the United States Embassy in Santiago, Chile at the time. This report on the new United States ambassadors to Mexico and Argentina has been compiled from Marcha of Montevideo Uruguay and Mexico City's Excelsior.

The recent appointment of John Hill as United States Ambassador to Argentina, has drawn criticism in several Latin American nations. According to La Opinión of Argentina, the assignment has been condemned by the foreign minister of Venezuela, as well as by numerous political groups in Argentina. The Argentine coordinator of youth groups issued a statement last week, labeling Hill as an agent of the CIA with a well-known record of participating in military coups in other Latin American countries. 

According to a release from the Cuban News Agency, Prensa Latina, Hill has followed a political career, particularly as a foreign service officer, while maintaining close contacts with corporate interest back home. Hill began as a clerk in the US Foreign Service in 1943, but was quickly promoted to vice counsel at Calcutta, India. In 1945, he worked with the rank of Captain as a State Department representative assigned to the US Army Headquarters and the China Burma India Theater at New Delhi. Actually, this job served as a cover for an intelligence assignment for the Super Secret Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA. Throughout the rest of his career, he continued to work closely with the US intelligence community, including the CIA. A fact confirmed in a report in the congressional record, July 14th, 1970. 

In 1949 continues Prensa Latina, Hill left government service to do a four-year stint as assistant vice president at the New York headquarters of W.R. Grace and Company, a US corporation with operations in 12 Latin American countries. In 1953, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles appointed Hill as US Ambassador to Costa Rica. The following year, he was transferred to the same post in El Salvador. While stationed in Costa Rica, he did his best to protect the vast land holdings and related operations of the United Fruit Company.

In 1953, according to Prensa Latina, he personally took part in the negotiation of a contract between a United Fruit subsidiary and the Costa Rican government. He also helped organize the 1954 CIA overthrow of the Nationalist Arbenz' government, which threatened United Fruit's investments in Guatemala. In 1960, he was rewarded for his efforts by being elected to the board of directors of the United Fruit Company. He also served as a consultant for the company on international affairs.

Hill served briefly as assistant Secretary of State for congressional relations, 1956 to '57, during the height of the Cold War and the last years of the McCarthy period. He was then reassigned to the Foreign Service as ambassador to Mexico where he remained until 1961.

In Mexico, Hill developed a reputation for his anti-communism, accusing Castro of being a communist agent as early as 1958. Hill put on a sustained public relations campaign to bolster pro-US sentiment, but his efforts were set back when the Cuban Revolution found widespread support among Mexicans. In 1960, he forced the Mexican government to deny oil sales to Cuba. In return, he proposed to cut Cuba's sugar export quota to the United States and to raise Mexico's quota. Cuba's quota was cut shortly thereafter.

Hill left the Foreign service with the beginning of the Kennedy administration, according to Prensa Latina, and became involved in New Hampshire state politics. He took the lead from his close friend Richard Nixon and used this apparent retirement from political life to strengthen his business and political base. He became a director of United Fruit, Northeast Airlines, various mutual funds and other large corporations with substantial investments in Latin America.

Hill's expertise in international issues prompted his appointment in 1965 to the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee Task Force on foreign policy, which operated as a think tank for policies to be implemented later under the Nixon administrations. In 1968, he also joined the task force on national security. In May 1973, Hill was appointed by Nixon as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. This biography of the new U.S. ambassador to Argentina was compiled from the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina and the Argentine daily La Opinión.

In a strange marriage of civilian democracy and military power, all three candidates in the recent Guatemala presidential elections have been high ranking army officers. 

The unusual formula was worked out by Guatemala's three political groupings after the armed forces indicated privately that they would not accept a civilian successor to President Carlos Arana Osorio, a general who cannot seek reelection. 

As a result, this Central American republic with its long tradition of political violence between civilian factions has enjoyed one of the quietest election campaigns in its history, but even with three army officers, two generals, and a colonel running a close race for the presidency, the armed forces are still in a position where they can either uphold or reject the choice of the voters. 

Since 1966, Guatemala has experienced considerable political tension. Thus, in recent years, hundreds of leftists and even moderate opponents of the government have been killed. Some have died in direct confrontations with United States trained army. Many have been murdered by a right wing terrorist group known variously as "The White Hand" and "An Eye for an Eye". In September 1972, the government was also blamed for the disappearance of the entire central committee of the Guatemalan Communist Party. Recently, however, political violence has sharply declined. Many Guatemalans attribute this to the growing strength of the army as an independent political force that has succeeded in controlling extremist civilians within the ruling coalition. 

Violence may be on the increase. However, now that the Guatemalan government has fraudulently declared its candidate the victor, after long unexplained delays in the publication of election returns, the government controlled electoral registry suddenly announced completion of final results. The national opposition front disputes the percentages. 

But the government is warned that it is subversive to give out misleading information on the election results and has already closed down three radio stations that insisted on broadcasting a protest message from General Ríos Montt. 

This report from the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor. 

El Día of Mexico City reports that the furor, following the March presidential elections in Guatemala, seems to have died down. The government's candidate is ready to take power, but most authorities consider the results to be fraudulent. The election pitted General Eugene Laugerud, the candidate of the current right wing authoritarian regime against General Rios Montt, representing a slightly more moderate party. The government announced that its candidate won, but according to election returns, the opposition candidate won not only Guatemala City, but also 20 of the 23 provincial departments. 

Many Guatemalans were angry about the election fraud, and in the days following the election, students clashed violently with police. The National Opposition Front, which supported General Montt also called for protest strikes, but only sporadic strike action occurred. The defeated opposition candidate explained, "There was no massive reaction to the fraud because there are no genuine popular organizations in Guatemala. We simply were not well enough organized to paralyze the country." "Such a statement is not surprising," says El Día, "considering the amount of political repression practice by the right wing Guatemalan regime." The government is well known as one of the most authoritarian in Central America. 

Mexico City's Excélsior had this editorial comment on the Guatemalan election. The businessmen's dictatorship in Guatemala doesn't seem as if it will end soon. By its cynical and deadly acts, it has proved its intention to stay in power regardless of the will of the Guatemalan people. The regime's recent violations in its election sham, in its attempt to legitimize its oppression are consistent with other acts it has committed including outright murder. On March 11th, the regime murdered Edward Guerra, a former guerrilla who had decided to work legally to change the system. Deeds such as this were committed before the elections, and now they will surely continue. That editorial from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior. 

In recent weeks, there have been two new presidents installed in Latin America, namely in Brazil and Venezuela, and the contested Guatemalan election of early March has brought considerable commentary from the international press. A columnist from the Mexican Daily, Excélsior had this to say about these political power shifts. 

The recent Guatemalan elections were far from an example of representative democracy. Three military officers contested the presidency and one of them General Montt, a Christian Democrat claims victory in spite of the fact that General Laugerud, of the Conservative Nationalist Coalition, officially won. It is not strange that the Guatemala electoral process was dirty and deceptive. If one remembers that Guatemala has been submerged in a wave of violence that is similar to the one which rocked Colombia in the 1950s.

Right wing paramilitary groups and left wing guerrilla organizations have been at war in Guatemala for many years. In 1971, under the Arana government, there were close to 1000 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings, and 190 disappearances. The majority of these committed by right-wing terrorists with no visible attempt by the government to control them. 

Excélsior continues pointing out that the more conservative sectors of our continent have been more pleased with the March 15th presidential change in Brazil. General Ernesto Geisel has been designated, not elected, president of that country. He is the fourth general to occupy this post since 1964, the year in which the military overthrew the civilian Goulart administration.

The outgoing president Medici noted the non-partisan character of the Brazilian regime, perhaps implying that the military rule has been institutionalized, that the Brazilian government has become a military counterpart to the Mexican PRI, where the individuals rotate power, but where the regime remains intact.

The Brazilian inauguration ceremony was cold and calculated, says Excélsior. Crowds of people were not present, the streets deserted, demonstrating that the regime is not interested in establishing even an appearance of popularity. On the other hand, the Brazilian inauguration attracted what might be called the Fascist Club of Latin America. Attending the inauguration were Pinochet of Chile, Bordaberry of Uruguay, and Banzer of Bolivia.

The leadership of this club belongs, of course, to the so-called non-partisan regime of Brazil, which represents the best alternative that US Foreign Policy offers to progressive attempts in other directions, such as the former Allende government in Chile.

Excélsior points out that the Brazilian model boasts an 11% annual growth rate in its economy, but over half its population earns only about $100 a year and suffers chronic malnutrition. The Brazilian politicians emphasize the economic growth rate, but hide the figures on the distribution of that wealth. This editorial from Mexico City's, Excélsior. 

Excélsior also reports that the Bertrand Russell Tribunal declared last week in Rome that the governments of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia were guilty of repeated and systematic violations of human rights. The president of the tribunal added that the accused governments constitute a continuing crime against humanity. 

The current Bertrand Russell Tribunal on repression in Brazil, Chile, and Latin America is a descendant of the Russell Tribunal on United States War crimes in Vietnam, which convened during the 1960's. The tribunal is an international jury composed of prominent intellectuals from Europe, Latin America, and the United States, including Jean Paul Sartre, former Dominican President, Juan Bosch, and Colombian writer, Gabriel García Márquez. During last week, it considered evidence presented by political refugees from Latin America. 

The tribunal concluded that civil law has been unknown in Brazil since the military coup in 1964, that there was political repression in Bolivia and that the Uruguayan military government used torture on its opponents. Concerning Chile, the tribunal's verdict labeled the current military government illegitimate. 

The tribunal stated that the Uruguayan regime has lost all respect for human rights and has arrested people without charge in order to terrorize the population. For example, the tribunal cited the case of banning the newspaper Marcha and the arrest of the prize-winning writer, Juan Carlos Onetti. 

The tribunal also affirmed that multinational companies, as well as what it called ruling classes in countries which are aligned with these firms are the major beneficiaries of these four regimes. The tribunal issued an appeal to the governments around the world to cut off all military and economic aid to these four South American countries and it urged a coordinated international campaign for the liberation of political prisoners. The tribunal will convene its next jury later this year to examine the role of the US government and multinational companies in Latin America, as well as to investigate cases of torture in other countries such as Paraguay, Guatemala, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. 

In addition to the findings of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, Mexico City's Excélsior reports the following on similar actions taken by the London-based organization, Amnesty International. At its April 1st general meeting in the British capital, the group called on General Ernesto Geisel, the recently installed president of Brazil to free all of Brazil's political prisoners. 

Amnesty International is a prestigious organization which has defended political prisoners in both communist and non-communist countries throughout the world. Amnesty International's letter to President Geisel was made public on the 10th anniversary of the military coup in Brazil, which facilitated the present regime's assumption of power. The letter also asks that Geisel will release information on some 210 political prisoners who died under what was termed mysterious circumstances following their arrest. 

Amnesty International, continues Excélsior, has long defended in any country, political prisoners that have not employed acts of violence in opposing their governments. The London group recently presented the same list of prisoners to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In closing its session, Amnesty International affirmed that it would continue to collect documentation, which would prove that the torture of political prisoners is still being carried out by the new Brazilian regime. That from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior.

In a recent article entitled "Central America: Made Martyr by The Big Fruit Company", La Opinión, an Argentine newspaper reports on the US-based Standard Fruit Company. Standard Fruit unilaterally suspended its import of bananas from Honduras in reprisal for an agreement Honduras made establishing an export tax on bananas of $1 per case. According to Standard Fruit, the agreement will bring Honduras unemployment and cause a drop in wages, as well as affect banana production in all of Latin America's other banana-producing nations. The decision, reports La Opinión, was made public by Standard Fruit following an interview which several of the corporation's highest officials had with Honduran President López Arellano. 

Officials spokesmen have stated that Honduras remained firm in defense of its recent agreements, reached collectively with Panama, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Colombia. Standard Fruit alleged in a press statement that the rise in the export price of bananas will diminish North American banana consumption, thus making it necessary to adjust the supply in order to compensate for the new situation.

Standard Fruit announced its intention to take such action at a recent meeting of Latin American banana producers held in Honduras. During the meeting, a Standard Fruit official warned all of the various representatives that it would suspend all banana shipments out of Honduras if the $1 tax was agreed upon. The threat, which would hurt, especially Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras, was ignored by all of the representatives present. 

Following the meeting, a Costa Rican newspaper, Latin, reported on the reaction to Standard Fruits actions by Costa Rican President José Figueres. Figueres labeled Standard Fruit's operations colonialist. The Costa Rican President also said that Standard Fruit was the only foreign fruit company which had refused to pay the $1 export charge. Addressing his country in a national television broadcast, Figueres stated, "It is a typically colonialist attitude and has caused us great difficulty. However, we will not alter our approach and we'll do what must be done." 

Standard Fruit's hardline policy, reports La Opinión, is due to two chief factors. Standard Fruit fears that competitors will move in and capture its market when its prices rise. The company also fears that the banana producers, if not dealt with firmly, will pursue with greater interest their recent tendency towards trade with Socialist nations. 

This report on the banana trade in Central America was taken from the Argentine daily, La Opinión, and the Costa Rican paper, Latin.