Annotations for Countries: Cuba

Changes in administrative staff is also reported in the United States, when according to The Miami Herald Latin American staff. The Nixon administration has nominated Jack Kubisch as its next Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. His nomination to the post is viewed by Washington insiders as a triumph for the State Department because Kubisch, unlike Meyer and the other Nixon administration officials, is a veteran diplomat. It's unlikely that Kubisch's nomination will be confirmed in time for the meeting of the Organization of American States to begin in Washington April 4th, but it is at this meeting that he is expected to be reintroduced to the Latin American scene after a two-year absence.

This gathering likely will feature heated debates on the sanctions imposed by the OAS against the Cuban government of Fidel Castro in 1964 when the US first built the sugarcane curtain. It will also serve as a forum for those Latin American nations who want to have the sanctions lifted and Cuba readmitted to the hemispheric group. Kubisch served in Brazil as Director of the United States International Development Agency from 1962 to '65. He was head of the Brazilian Affairs of the State Department in Washington from 1965 to '69. As a result, he has said to have strong emotional ties with Brazil and is considered an admirer of the economic plan used there.

The following feature length article on Panama is from The Guardian. The United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama last March 15th to 20th might mark a turning point in the decline of US domination of South and Central America. The meeting which the Panamanian government has been planning for over a year focused its fire on the main current issues involving US hegemony over the region. In particular, the nationalist Panamanian government of General Omar Torrijos has struggled to overturn the US domination of the canal zone, a 500 square mile area which cuts Panama in half. The zone includes the Panama Canal itself and the surrounding area, which houses no less than 14 different US military bases.Torrijos wasted no time in bringing this issue before the conference. In his keynote address, he denounced US control of the canal zone as "neo colonialism," which he then traced back over the 70-year history of US Panamanian relations. While making few direct references to the United States, Torrijos spoke of the zone as "a colony in the heart of my country," and also said that Panama would never "be another star on the flag of the United States."

In addition, the Guardian continues, Torrijos denounced, with extensive support from other non-aligned nations, the economic sanctions opposed against Cuba by the organization of American states at the demand of the United States. The 10 Latin American ministers present at the meeting, all invited by the Panamanians, included Raul Rojas, Cuban foreign minister.

John Scully, the US's new delegate to the UN had earlier replied to Torrijos on several points, saying that the United States was willing to revise the treaty, particularly its most objectionable clause, which grants control of the zone to the United States permanently. Scully implied the United States would be willing to accept a 50-year lease with an option for 40 years more if engineering improvements were made to the waterway. Panama formally introduced a resolution at the March 16th meeting of the security council, calling for Panamanian jurisdiction over the canal zone and its neutralization. This resolution was supported by 13 members of the 15 member Security Council, but vetoed by the United States vote. Great Britain abstained.

The Guardian goes on to say that the Panamanians carefully and skillfully laid the groundwork for the United Nations meeting, waiting for a time when they not only held a seat on the security council but chaired the proceedings. By the time their proposal for the Panama meeting came up for a vote in January, the United States was so outmaneuvered that the only objection the US could raise to the UN floor was to complain of the cost of the meeting. At the same time in the statement of the press, the UN's delegation made it very clear that its real objection to the meeting was that it would be used as a forum for attacks on US policies towards South America. Once the Panamanians offered a $100,000 to pay most of the UN costs, however, the US resistance collapsed.

But the Panamanians, the Guardian says, never made any secret of their intentions for the meeting whose very site, the National Legislative Building, is only 10 yards from the zone's border.

Until 1903, Panama was not an independent nation, but was part of Colombia. After the Colombians refused to a agree to an unfavorable treaty over the building and operation of the canal by the US, the US engineered a Panamanian Declaration of Independence 10 weeks later. Two weeks after that, the US rammed through a treaty even more onerous than the one rejected by Colombia with a new country now called Panama.

Protests over the US control of the zone led to invasions by US troops on six separate occasions, between 1900 and 1925. Both public and governmental protests in Panama forced the United States to sign a slightly more favorable treaty in 1936, but US attempts to make new gains led to demonstrations in 1947 and again in '58, '59.

In January 1964, when students demonstrated near the border of the canal zone, planning to raise the Panamanian flag within the zone, US troops fired on them, killing 22 Panamanians and wounding more than 300. This is well remembered in Panama.

The canal zone was again involved on October 11th, 1968 when Torrijos then the leader of the country's army, took power. Torrijos overthrew President Arnulfo Arias, who had become unpopular for his weak stand in talks with United States over a new treaty concerning the zone. In his first two years in power Torrijos policies, The Guardian states, were similar to those of many South American military dictators. He savagely suppressed spontaneous as well as organized, popular liberation movements. Even during this period however, the United States was not completely sure of Torrijos loyalty. And while he was in Mexico in 1969, the Central Intelligence Agency supported a group of military officers attempting to overthrow him. The coup failed and the officers were imprisoned by Torrijos. Several months later, they escaped, were given asylum in the canal zone and flown to United States. Then in June 1971, an attempt was made to assassinate Torrijos.

Whether from personal conviction, desire to build popular support for his government or antagonism arising from the coup attempt, Torrijos's direction began to change. He refused to agree to the new treaty. He held elections in August of 1972. He refused to accept the yearly US canal rental of $1.9 million. We note that the US' annual profits from the zone alone, not including the canal itself, over $114 million a year, and Torrijos instituted a program of domestic reforms.

Torrijos also expropriated some larger states while increasing government credit and agricultural investments to aid poor peasants. A minimum wage was introduced and a 13th month of pay at Christmastime, over time, premiums and other benefits. 100 land settlement communities were created with about 50,000 people living on them and working government provided land.

The economic philosophy of Torrijos, The Guardian reports, seems somewhat similar to that of other nationalistic left leading groups such as the Peruvian military junta.

The article goes on to say, but major problems remain for the country. About 25% of the annual gross national product comes from the canal zone, and United Fruits still controls the important banana crop. Panama also continues to invite US investment and offers special treatment for the US dollar and high interest rates for bank deposits. While the government has helped encourage economic development with several public works projects, spending is now leveling off, partly because of Panama's growing international debts and the currency inflation plaguing the country. Because of its debts, it has also suffered a growing balance of payments deficits.

A better renegotiation of the treaty then is of economic as well as of political importance. The Panamanian position on a new treaty asks for termination of US administration in 1994, an immediate end to US control of justice, police tax, and public utilities in the zone, an equal sharing of canal profits, which are estimated to have totaled around $22 billion since its opening, the turning over of 85% of canal zone jobs and 85% of wages and social benefits there to Panamanians and military neutralization of the zone.

The Guardian continues that this last demand is the most disagreeable to the US, especially since it is coupled with the demand for the removal of all US bases from the zone. The US is willing to compromise on money and other issues, but not on the military question. The reason is simple. The Canal Zone is the center for all US military activity in South America, including the Tropical Environmental Database, the US Army School of the Americas, and the US Southern Military Command, which controls all US military activities in South America and the Caribbean, except for Mexico.

The zone also includes missile launching and placements and a new US aerospace cardiographic and geodesic survey for photo mapping and anti-guerrilla warfare campaigns. The special significance of these bases becomes clear within the general US strategy in South America. As Michael Klare writes, in War Without End, "Unlike current US operations in Southeast Asia, our plans for Latin America do not envision a significant overt American military presence. The emphasis in fact is on low cost, low visibility assistance and training programs designed to upgrade the capacity of local forces to overcome guerrilla movements. Thus, around 50,000 South American military officers have been trained in the canal zone to carry out counterinsurgency missions and to support US interests in their countries. In addition, the eighth Army special forces of about 1100 troops specializing in counterinsurgencies are stationed in the zone, sending out about two dozen 30 man mobile training teams each year for assistance to reactionary armies. This whole operation is as important and less expendable than US control of the canal waterway itself."

Thus, The Guardian article concludes Panamanian control of the Zone then would not only be a big advance on the specific question of national independence, but also would strike a powerful direct blow at US hegemony all over the South American continent.

More recent articles carry evaluations of the outcome of the security council meeting. Associated Press copy reports that General Torrijos said that he was not surprised by the US veto of the resolution before the UN security meeting "Because Panama had been vetoed for 60 years every time it tried to negotiate." The General said he was pleased with the seven-day meeting of the security council, the first ever held in Latin America, but even more pleased by the public support Panama received from other members of the Security Council. He said, "I look at it this way, only the United States voted to support its position, 13 other countries voted for Panama."

Torrijos later taped a national television interview in which he praised the Panamanian people for their calmness and civic responsibility during the council meeting, he said, "Violence gets you nowhere, and the people realize this." But General Omar Torrijos also says that he started immediately consulting with regional political representatives to decide what his country should do next in the Panama [inaudible 00:28:57] negotiations with the United States.

Many Latin American newspapers commented this week on the surprising degree of unity displayed at a UN Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA, gathering during the last week of March in Quito, Ecuador. The wire service Prensa Latina reports that the Latin America of 1973 is not the Latin America of 1962. No longer is it Cuba alone that engages in vast economic and social transformations in this hemisphere, and ECLA must be prepared to face this new stage. This was the gist of the statements made by Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, head of his country's delegation to the 15th meeting of ECLA, which took place in Quito. The Cuban minister cited as facts which prove the new situation in Latin America, the process of construction of a socialist economy in Chile, the Peruvian revolutionary process and the results of the UN Security Council meeting held in Panama recently.

Rodriguez said, "We Latin Americans have come to an agreement at least on what we don't want, and that is backwardness, illiteracy, hunger and poverty, which are prevalent in practically every society in the region. Without an ingrained desire for development, without the determination and the will for development of the peoples, development is absolutely impossible," he added. He went on to say that one cannot demand sacrifices from people where 5% of the population receives 43% of the national income and 30% barely received 10 or perhaps 15%.

The head of the Cuban delegation said, according to Prensa Latina, that "accelerated development under the existing conditions implies in investments that the peoples cannot tackle for a lack of resources. After affirming that, here is where international financing comes into play." He said that "As far as the great capitalist economic powers are concerned, their help should not be considered as a gift, but rather as restitution for all the pillage the Latin American peoples have been subjected to." He added, "Such financing will never be obtained without the people struggle." This report from the Latin American wire service, Prensa Latina

Chile's participation in last month's ECLA meeting is reported in the Santiago weekly, Chile Hoy, which said that, "In clear language, the Chilean delegation to ECLA described the causes of the low level of economic development in Chile in recent years. The directions undertaken by the Allende administration, the successes of these strategies, and finally, the obstacles which block this path. In our judgment," said that Chilean delegation, "a number of historical errors were committed during this century in our country, which led to negative results for the Chilean people."

"In summary, we can point out seven fundamental errors. First, the surrender of basic natural resources to foreign capital. Secondly, a narrow base for the national economy with only one industrial potential, copper, generating a national external dependence, financial, commercial, technological, and cultural dependence. Third, land ownership remained in the hands of a few large landowners. Fourth, manufacturing was concentrated in the hands of a few monopolies. Fifth, Chile fell into intense foreign debt, $4 billion through 1970, the second largest per capita debt in the world, behind Israel. Sixth, establishment of a repressive state, which maintained an unequal distribution of income within the framework of only formal democracy. And seventh, the limited economic development was concentrated geographically in the capital of Santiago creating a modern sector while the rural provinces stagnated."

Chile Hoy goes on to say that, "Demonstrating the historical failure of capitalism in Chile, the Chilean delegate showed that in the 1970 presidential elections, two candidates who won over 65% of the votes suggested two different reforms. The Christian Democrat Reform had the goal of a socialist communitarian society, and the popular Unity's goal was the gradual construction of a true socialist economy. Since the popular unity won the election, there have been distinct revolutionary changes in the government's two and one half years in power, the recovery of national ownership of natural resources, the elimination of industrial monopoly through the formation of the area of social property, which is creating the mechanisms for workers' participation, nationalization of the finance and foreign commerce sectors. The Chilean state now controls 95% of credit and 85% of exports as well as 48% of imports. Further changes are that large land holdings have been expiated."

"The reformed sector now represents 48% of arable land, and with the passage of a new law during 1973, the second phase of agrarian reform will begin. Also, changes in international relations shown in the widening of diplomatic and commercial agreements, Chile is less dependent than before, and the diversification of our foreign relations permits us to say with pride that we are no longer an appendix of anyone. In addition, a vigorous internal market has been created raising the buying power of the people redistributing income and increasing national consumption." Chile Hoy further states that, "We are alleviating the burden of the inherited foreign debt. We hope that during 1973, we obtain the understanding of friendly countries in order to relieve our international payments problems." This report on Chile's statement at the ECLA gathering is from the Santiago Weekly, Chile Hoy.

The British News Weekly, Latin America gives a more detailed account of the main issues of the ECLA Conference. "The most remarkable feature of the meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA, which ended in Quito at the end of March, was the degree of Latin American unity. The mutual distaste felt by the governments of Brazil and Central America on the right and Chile and Cuba on the left was no secret, and since development strategy was what the discussion was all about, a good deal of mutual recriminations might have been expected, but mutual interest prevailed. Faced by the economic power of the world's rich and particularly the United States, every Latin American country appreciated the need to stick together. Indeed, there seems to have been a tacit understanding that Latin American governments would not criticize one another. As a result, nearly all their fire was concentrated on the US with a few broad sides reserved for the European economic community."

"In fact," says Latin America, "only the United States failed to vote with the rest, including even the Europeans for the rather gloomy report on Latin America's development strategy over the past decade. One of the reports Chief criticisms was directed at the growth of Latin America's enormous external debt, now estimated at around 20 billion dollars, and it called for refinancing and even a moratorium on payments in certain circumstances. This of course affects the US first and foremost, as did the criticisms of private investment and the financing of foreign trade. But the United States ambassador refrained from the hard line retaliations that had been expected by the Latins. Instead, more in sorrow than in anger. He urged them to look at the advantages of private investment and pointed out that the US imported more Latin American manufactured goods than any in other industrialized country, and instead of voting against the report, he continued himself with abstaining."

Latin America continues commenting that, "The United States was also in the firing line with the resolution denouncing transnational companies for the enormous economic power which is concentrated in them and allows them to interfere in national interest as has happened in some cases. This echoed the resolution approved at the security council meeting in Panama and coincided with the Senate hearings in Washington on the attempt by IT&T to finance a CIA operation against Dr. Salvador Allende in 1970.

There was also considerable interest in the proposal put personally by the Chilean delegate, who emphasized he was not speaking for his government, that the United States and European members of ECLA should be expelled. This proposal is unlikely to be carried through, but is symptomatic of the Latin American desire to have an influential body of their own to look after their own interest without interference. It was notable too that all Latin American governments, whatever their political coloring, felt able to support the recommendation that social development and reforms should accompany economic development, something which would appear to run counter to current Brazilian development strategy," concludes the weekly Latin America.

This week's feature deals with the recent discovery of the Nixon administration's collusion with the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, IT&T, to overthrow the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende. But surfacing also is the discovery that the US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency massively financed efforts, which led to the defeat of Allende's bid for the presidency in 1964.

Further discoveries have shown that the US government is presently working in collusion with the US-based corporation, Kennecott Copper Company, to affect a worldwide embargo on nationalized Chilean copper in an attempt to ruin the Chilean economy and topple the Allende government. The Guardian reports that US Senate hearings on efforts by the Nixon administration and US corporations to sabotage the Chilean government of Salvador Allende have begun to have repercussions. Two weeks ago, Allende announced the suspension of economic talks between Chile and the US In light of revelations during the Senate hearings on the Nixon administration's collusion with IT&T to overthrow Allende's popular Unity government.

The most important new development has been the report that the top level National Security Council allocated $400,000 to the Central Intelligence Agency for propaganda to be used against Allende during the 1970 Chilean presidential election campaign. Other testimony has revealed that IT&T offered a $1 million fund to help defeat Allende. Edward Gerrity IT&T Vice President for Corporate Relations offered the excuse that the fund was to promote housing and agricultural grants to improve Chile's economy, but former CIA director John McCone testified that he had transmitted an IT&T offer of the money to block Allende's victory to the CIA and the White House. Former US ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry refused to comment on this or other questions at the hearings, including IT&T memos, which claimed Korry was instructed by the White House to do all short of military action to prevent Allende from taking office.

The most important new development has been the report that the top level National Security Council allocated $400,000 to the Central Intelligence Agency for propaganda to be used against Allende during the 1970 Chilean presidential election campaign. Other testimony has revealed that IT&T offered a $1 million fund to help defeat Allende. Edward Gerrity IT&T Vice President for Corporate Relations offered the excuse that the fund was to promote housing and agricultural grants to improve Chile's economy, but former CIA director John McCone testified that he had transmitted an IT&T offer of the money to block Allende's victory to the CIA and the White House. Former US ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry refused to comment on this or other questions at the hearings, including IT&T memos, which claimed Korry was instructed by the White House to do all short of military action to prevent Allende from taking office.

The Guardian further states that IT&T is now trying to collect a $92 million claim with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, a US government-sponsored institution designed to reimburse companies which have overseas assets nationalized, but at the subcommittee hearings show that IT&T helped provoke the nationalization. OPIC will not have to pay on the claim. The details of IT&T's 18-point plan designed to ensure that the Allende government does not get through the crucial next six months were exposed in IT&T memos uncovered and released in March, 1972 by columnist Jack Anderson.

At that time, according to both IT&T and the Chilean government, both sides were near agreement on compensation, but the Anderson revelations of IT&T's attempts to overthrow the UP led the Chilean government to break off the talks. The UP government is now preparing to nationalize the Chilean telephone company, in which IT&T owns a major share worth about $150 million dollars. A constitutional amendment allowing for the nationalization is now going through the legislative process, although the government has been operating the company since 1971. In addition to its share in the phone company, IT&T owns two hotels, a Avis car rental company, a small telex service, and a phone equipment plant in Chile.

Talks on renegotiations of the Chilean debt to the US and on the resumption of purchased credits to Chile began last December and resumed in March. The next day the talks were suspended by the Chilean government in response to the latest revelations. Chile owes the US about $60 million for repayments of debt from November 1971 to the end of 1972, out of a total debt of $900 million dollars. Another controversial question, which the Chilean foreign minister says is now holding up an agreement, is the question of compensation for US copper companies whose holdings have been nationalized. Under a 1914 treaty between Chile and the US, the disagreement on copper compensation could be submitted to the international panel for non-binding arbitration. Chile has offered to use this means for arriving at an agreement, but the US refuses. This report is from The Guardian.

But US efforts to thwart the development of socialism in Chile are not a recent phenomenon. In a Washington Post news service feature, the post claims that massive intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department helped to defeat Socialist Salvador Allende in the 1964 election for president of Chile. American corporate and governmental involvement against Allende's successful candidacy in 1970 has been the controversial focus of a Senate foreign relations subcommittee investigation into the activities of US multinational companies abroad.

But the previously undisclosed scale of American support for Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei against Allende six years early makes the events of 1970 seem like a tea party according to one former intelligence official, deeply involved in the 1964 effort. The story of the American campaign, early in the Johnson administration, to prevent the first Marxist government from coming to power in the Western hemisphere by constitutional means was pieced together from the accounts of officials who participated in the actions and policies of that period.

The Washington Post concludes, "Cold War ideology lingered, and the shock of Fidel Castro's seizure of power in Cuba still was reverberating in Washington. 'No More Fidels' was the guidepost of American foreign policy in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress. Washington's romantic zest for political engagement in the Third World had not yet been dimmed by the inconclusive agonies of the Vietnam War. 'US government intervention in Chile in 1964 was blatant and almost obscene,' said one strategically-placed intelligence officer at the time. 'We were shipping people off right and left.

Mainly State Department, but also CIA, with all sorts of covers.' A former US ambassador to Chile has privately estimated that the far-flung covert program in Frei's behalf cost about $20 million. In contrast, the figure that emerged in Senate hearings as the amount IT&T was willing to spend in 1970 to defeat Allende was $1 million." This from the Washington Post News Service.

The most recent tactic used against the Allende government by the Nixon administration and the US corporations has been an attempt to impose an economic embargo against Chilean copper. The North American Congress on Latin America, NACLA, reports that, "Since the Kennecott Copper company learned of the Allende government's decision to deduct from its indemnification the excess profits Kennecott earned since 1955, the company's position has been that Chile acted in violation of international law. The Allende government determined the amount of excess profits by comparing the rate of profit the nationalized companies earned in Chile to the return on capital invested elsewhere."

NACLA reports that Kennecott first tried to get satisfactory compensation by litigating in Chilean courts. When this failed, it threatened actions abroad in a letter directed to the customers of El Teniente Copper. In essence, Kennecott resolved unilaterally to try to coerce Chile to pay Kennecott for its properties. Kennecott's strategy has transformed a legal issue into a political and economic struggle. The loss of its Chilean holdings inflicted a heavy loss on Kennecott. In 1970, Kennecott held 13% of its worldwide investments in Chile, but received 21% of its total profits from those holdings. The corporation earned enormously high profits from its El Teniente mine. According to President Allende, Braden's, Kennecott subsidiaries, profits on invested capital averaged 52% per year since 1955, reaching the incredible rates of 106% in '67, 113% in '68 and 205% in '69. Also, though Kennecott had not invested any new capital, it looked forward to augmented profits from the expansion of production in its facilities due to the Chileanization program undertaken by the Frei government.

Although Kennecott was hurt a great deal in losing the Chilean properties, it did not lose all. In February '72, Chile agreed to pay $84 million, which represented payment for the 51% of the mines bought under the Chileanization plan. Chile also agreed to pay off the loans to private banks and to the export import bank that Kennecott had negotiated to expand production in the mines. Further, Kennecott has written off, for income tax purposes, its equity interest of $50 million in its Chilean holdings. Generally, such deductions not only mean that the US taxpayer will absorb the company's losses, but also that attractive merger possibilities are created with firms seeking easy tax write-offs.

Nevertheless, the Chilean expropriations came at a particularly bad moment for Kennecott because the corporation was under attack in other parts of the world. Environmentalist questioned Kennecott's right to pollute the air in Arizona and Utah, and other groups attempted to block Kennecott's plans to open new mining operations in Black Mesa, Arizona and Puerto Rico. On the legal front, Kennecott is contesting the Federal Trade Commission's order to divest itself with a multimillion dollar acquisition of the Peabody Coal Company. In all of these cases, Kennecott has taken an aggressive position to protect its interest at home and around the world. In September, 1972, Kennecott's threats materialized into legal action, asking a French court to block payments to Chile for El Teniente copper sold in France.

In essence, Kennecott claimed that the expropriation was not valid because there had been no compensation. Therefore, Braden was still the rightful owner of its 49% share of the copper. The court was requested to embargo the proceeds of the sales until it could decide on the Braden claim of ownership.

The NACLA report continues, "To avoid having the 1.3 million payment embargoed, French dock workers in Le Havre, in a demonstration of solidarity with Chile, refused to unload the freighter. The ship sailed to Holland where it immediately became embroiled in a new set of legal controversies, which were ultimately resolved. Finally, the odyssey ended on October 21st, '72 when the ship returned to Le Havre to unload the contested cargo. Copper payments to Chile were impounded until the court rendered a decision on its competence to judge the legality of the expropriation. Chile was forced to suspend copper shipments to France temporarily. The legal battle spread across Europe when Kennecott took similar action in a Swedish court on October 30th. Most recently, in mid-January 1973, Kennecott took its case to German courts.

NACLA states that, "It is not easy to ascertain the degree of coordination between Kennecott and the US government on their policy toward Chile." The State Department told us in interviews that Kennecott is exercising its legal rights as any citizen may do under the Constitution, but a reporter for Forbes Magazine exacted a more telling quote. When asked if there had been any consultation between Kennecott and the State Department, the State Department spokesman said, "Sure, we're in touch from time to time. They know our position." The Forbes reporter asked, "Which is?" The spokesman replied, "We're interested in solutions to problems, and you don't get solutions by sitting on your hands."

In fact, US government policies and Kennecott's actions fully compliment each other. They share the same objectives and function on the same premises of punitive sanctions and coercive pressures guised in the garb of legitimate legal and financial operations. Kennecott's embargoes will necessarily serve as a factor in the current negotiations between Chile and the US government. Whether or not the government was instrumental in Kennecott's actions, the United States now has an additional powerful bargaining tool. The Kennecott moves were denounced by all sectors of Chilean political life as economic aggression violating national sovereignty.

Other Latin American nations have also condemned Kennecott. Most significantly, CIPEC, the organization of copper exporting nations, Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia, which produced 44% of the world's copper, met in December 1972 and issued a declaration stating they would not deal with Kennecott and that they would refrain from selling copper to markets traditionally serviced by Chilean exports. Such solidarity is important because it undercuts the Kennecott strategy in the present market where the supply is plentiful. Kennecott cannot deter customers from buying Chilean copper if they have nowhere else from which to buy.

Even within the US, the embargo has not proven totally successful. The Guardian reports that there have been some breaks among the US banks, Irving Trust, Bankers Trust, and the Bank of America are carrying on a very limited business with Chile and various companies continue to trade on a cash and carry basis. In a number of respects, US policy has backfired. If the US will not trade with Chile, its Western European competitors will fill the markets formally controlled by US companies. The US pressure has also helped to intensify the anti-imperialist reactions of a number of South American countries within the US and its multinational corporations. The Panama meeting of the UN Security Council is just one example of this.

Every week brings new defeats for the US strategy in South America. At the recent session of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America in Quito, Ecuador, South American countries unanimously condemned US economic policy toward the continent. The resolution was based on a detailed report showing how South America suffers great economic losses because of unequal trade agreements with the US. This report from The Guardian.

Question, what were the Watergate defendants doing 12 years ago?

Answer, invading Cuba.

That from Tricontinental News Service, which reminds us that at 2300 hours on the night of April 16th, 12 years ago this month, the CIA was somewhat involved in the Bay of Pigs invasion. So was Richard Nixon, who was directly involved in the effort while Vice President. So were other now familiar persons. Namely, the man in charge of the actual invasion, was Everette Howard Hunt Jr. One of his planning aids was Bernard L. Barker, a high ranking Central Intelligence Agency officer, and one of the organizers of the invasion was James McCord. Other operatives included Frank Sturgis, Virgilio Gonzalez, and Eugenio Martinez.

Tricontinental continues that, in contrast to Nixon's current well-noted reticence about his relations to these men, Nixon then insisted, in his book, "Six Crises", on taking credit for having a direct and substantial part in planning the Bay of Pigs invasion that was carried out by Hunt, McCord, Sturgis, Barker, and others. That from Tricontinental News Service.

Two comments in the Latin America press seemed to sum up the general feeling on the continent in the wake of the recent organization of American States meeting in Washington DC. Mexico's President Echeverría, when asked by Rio de Janeiro's Opinião about his opinion of the organization was replied, "The OAS? Does it still exist? It is necessary to reconstruct it on different bases. It is necessary to establish a new regional organization which does not exclude anybody, including Canada and Cuba."

In Lima, a newspaper favoring the government, El Expreso, said that the Latin Americans now need a Declaration of independence equal to the one the North Americans gave to England in 1776, and concluded that the organization of American states will not survive if the United States continues to dominate it.

A more detailed view of the OAS (Organization of American States) meeting was given by the British Weekly, Latin America, which said that the general assembly of the OAS ended its meeting in Washington two weeks ago without voting on the question of Cuba's readmission, or the lifting of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the island. Although there was undoubtedly a majority in favor of ending Cuba's isolation, most delegates withdrew from the brink of an outright confrontation with the US, which continued to object to Havana's military links with Moscow, and maintained that despite certain changes, Cuba was still interfering in other countries' internal affairs. A working group was set up to find a compromised solution with both Chile and Brazil among its members representing the most extreme viewpoints on Cuba.

It was also agreed unanimously to form a commission to study the complete restructuring of the OAS, and there was a unanimous vote for ideological plurality in the hemisphere. A resolution approved by 21 votes to none, with only the United States and Honduras abstaining, called on Washington not to sell its strategic mineral reserves in a way that would harm Latin American economies.

Another resolution approved unanimously, except for the abstention of the US, called on Washington to prevent transnational companies from intervening in other countries internal affairs. This report from the weekly Latin America.

For today's feature, we've invited economist David Barkin to discuss the problem of unemployment in Latin America. David's a participant in the conference on US/Mexico Economic Relations this week on the University of Texas campus, is currently teaching economics at the City University of New York, and has traveled widely in Latin America. He visited Cuba for two months in 1969 at the invitation of the Cuban government, has worked with Chilean economists off and on for the past four years, and has done extensive research and has taught economics in Mexico for about five years.

David, someone at the conference the other day stated that unemployment rate in Mexican agriculture is 46%. Could you comment on this figure, and include what efforts are being made by the Mexican government to correct this problem?

The problem of unemployment in Mexico is very serious because of the nature of development, which is leading to the development of commercial agriculture in selected parts of the country. In a few selected parts of the country. And the rest of the agricultural sector is stagnating. People are being forced out of the agricultural sector, but those who remain are finding themselves without the resources and without the government assistance which is necessary for them to become productive members of the society.

The 46% unemployment figure in Mexico is a reflection of the fact that although a lot of people remain in the agricultural economy, many of them are not producing nearly as much as they might produce were resources available for the production of goods which could satisfy the needs of the mass of the people in the population. In the urban sector, the problem is not quite as serious in absolute magnitude, but perhaps in human terms even more serious. The misery associated with urban unemployment is greater than that with rural unemployment. And the slums in the large Mexican cities are growing year after year. The unemployment rate in Mexico City and in other urban areas in the country may be as high as 30 or 40 percent, if you consider what these people could produce if they were working fully in productive occupations, satisfying the basic needs of people, which at the present time aren't being satisfied.

Now, in terms of what the Mexican government is trying to do to solve the problem, they have undertaken a large program of public works projects, and are trying to encourage additional investment both by Mexicans and foreigners. The problem with this program is that it is designed to satisfy the needs of only a small proportion of the Mexican population, perhaps only 30% of the population. 30% of the population with income levels far above those of the other 70% of the population who live at bare levels of subsistence, and many of them living at below the level of what we would consider dignified living levels. It does not seem to me, nor to many of the representatives at the conference that the present development programs of the Mexican government are going to be able to seriously attack and make inroads into the problem of unemployment in Mexico. This is further compounded of course by the high rate of population growth in Mexico, but even if population growth rates were to decline in Mexico, it's not clear that they would be able to solve the unemployment problem with their present approach.

What about the effect of US investments in Mexico on the employment problem?

US investments are particularly injurious to the Mexican people because they're creating a type of industry which is displacing people in favor of machines, for the production of whatever goods are being produced in Mexico. US investments are generally what we would call capital intensive. That is using machinery to replace people in the production of goods. The goods which are produced are the kinds of goods which we, Americans, consume, but which because we are so rich, the middle level American standard of living is so high compared to that in Mexico, the kinds of goods which are produced are only able to be bought by those people in the 30% that I cited, who have sufficient income to buy those kinds of goods. That is they have income like a middle income level person in this country might have. An average person.

As a result, American investment is only heightening the problem in Mexico, creating additional difficulties because they are creating the appearance of modernity and creating a whole gamut of goods which the whole population can see but does not have access to.

What about the Mexicanization regulations that are being discussed now in Mexico in terms of affecting foreign investment? Is that going to solve any of the problem?

The Mexicanization legislation, which is designed to put some curbs on foreign investment is designed to attack a different problem. A problem that American foreign investment is making inroads into the capital equipment, the machinery and the factories which is owned by Mexican entrepreneurs. Until recently, Americans have been going into Mexico and purchasing outright large factories in large parts of the economy owned by Mexicans, and what the new legislation is designed to do is to try to stem this tide. It is not designed to prevent foreign investment, and it is not designed to prevent the sorts of effects which I just talked about, but rather to try to give the Mexican some protection in the face of the large transnational corporations who are trying to get greater control over the Mexican economy.

David, what about unemployment in Chile under the popular Unity government? What is Salvador Allende doing to correct this problem?

Well, unemployment in Chile was a growing problem during the last part of the 1960s. The economy was stagnating and unemployment rates in the city of Santiago, which is the most highly developed part of the country, reached as high as 10 and 12%. Now, that's very serious in an industrial labor force, which was as fully integrated into the modern sector of the economy, as is the case in many of our own North American cities.

10% and 12% unemployment for the group as a whole is very serious, and the Allende government's first problem, first priority when taking over was to do something about this problem. What they did was to redistribute income in a very simple, straightforward way by directing that wages be increased while profits be frozen. This sort of measure led to an immediate reactivation of the economy and an increase in demand by workers and the lower socioeconomic groups in the population, which made it possible for the government to increase employment in firms which it was taking over because private entrepreneurs were not responding to the increase in demand by the lower classes, and in instead trying to shift their resources to production of goods for the upper classes. As a result, in 1972, employment rates had gone down to below 4%. Quite an achievement in a very short period of time.

The Cuban government claims to have created a full employment economy. David, you've visited Cuba and you've written a book about Cuba. From your experience, how has this been accomplished?

Basically, the reason—the way in which unemployment has been eliminated, in fact the employment problem has been changed from one of unemployment to one of over full employment and a shortage of labor, is by a change in the basic assumptions on by which people are asked to participate in the economy.

In an economy based on a market system, people must work, produce sufficient income for an employer in order to provide that employer with a profit. If the person could produce something for the benefit of society, but that production is not profitable for some private entrepreneur, that person is not going to be employed. In Cuba, a person who could produce for the benefit of society, even if it doesn't go to the benefit of one individual in the society, can and must be employed.

In fact, during the first years of economic reorganization in Cuba, people were absorbed into the economy through a vast educational effort in 1961, a vast medical effort, and the expansion of production in every sector of the economy. Social services and productive services were expanded so that by the late 1960s the problem in Cuba was not how to find work for people, but rather how to encourage people who previously did not consider themselves part of the workforce to join the workforce, and now old people who were previously retired are performing useful social tasks for the society, people who are in schools, children and young people are being asked to join as part of their regular school program in productive tasks, and women and disabled people are also being fully incorporated into the economy.

I'd like to go on though and explain the nature of the unemployment problem and the way in which the Cubans solve it differently than say the Mexicans. Sugar cane cutting is a very difficult task and it requires in the pre-revolutionary era, about 300 to 400,000 people during four months a year, working 12 hours a day and sometimes as much as seven days a week during four months a year to cut the sugar cane. During that period they were paid sufficient income to live on for 12 months, but only at the very, very miserable levels of subsistence, which prevailed in Cuba at that time. Most of them didn't have access to meat and milk, for example. But they were unemployed for eight months of the year.

In the post-revolutionary government era, it's impossible to conceive of people being idle for eight months a year because of the very, very serious needs of people throughout the whole economy to solve productive problems, and to increase production in agriculture and industry and in services. As a result, most of these people who were working in sugar were incorporated into other activities. Reorganization of agriculture, livestock industry, and things like that. As a result, they were not available full-time during the sugar harvest for cane cutting.

When cane cutting needs were great, the entire population was recruited for sugar cane cutting on a voluntary basis. And people worked in brigades based on workplaces, and went into voluntary areas, and people at the factories remaining at the productive jobs and in the bureaucracy were expected to do the work of other people, to cover their jobs while they were absent. As a result, a technical problem, the cutting of sugarcane is solved in present day Cuba not by allowing people to be unemployed, which is the case of our migrant farm workers and of migrant farm workers all over the hemisphere, but rather by getting brigades of voluntary workers to achieve this task in a collective way.

This I think has great lesson for us in America, because we assume that people must be employed only at a specific task, and if that task is not available, then they're going to remain unemployed, as is the case of migrant farm workers. When we cannot create sufficient jobs because of specific political policies, policies of the government, we are in a quandary. We don't know how to provide these people with sufficient income and still remain with the incentive system to encourage them to work when we need them to work at low wages. As a result, we have a technical problem which translates itself into a social problem. The social problem of poverty, and widespread un- and underemployment, with the impossibility of many groups in our population finding work at all. Especially women and some third world groups.

The technical problem could be solved in our country, but not under the assumption that people must work to provide a profit for a small group of employers. It's only if they could work by satisfying social needs that we're going to be able to attack the basic underlying problem of poverty.

Other types of police activity of the United States also received attention in the Latin American press. Excélsior, the Mexico City Daily, comments that the Watergate scandal has shown that in violent clashes against anti-war demonstrators in the US, the attackers have not always been US citizens who support the war, but frequently Cuban refugees drafted by the CIA. These counter demonstrators use typical storm trooper tactics. Their clumsiness and immorality are a well-known disgrace.

But in the US, it is aggravated by taking advantage of former exiles who are all ready to do what is requested of them, not only to assure their own refuge, but as a repayment of gratitude. Publicly, little has been said of the government officials who recruited the Cuban exiles. One of the Cuban witnesses in the Watergate affair described how upon being apprehended by the police while in the act of assaulting an anti-war demonstrator, he pointed to his recruiters and was immediately set free. It is clear that the Cuban youth were recruited to commit an illegal act, guaranteed impunity by the same authorities whose job it is to prevent and punish such crimes.

Another comment on US police. A Brazilian exile publication Frente printed in Chile, has made public a letter from the late FBI boss J. Edgar Hoover, praising his agents who took part in the 1964 coup against Brazilian President Joao Goulart. Directed to a Mr. Brady, the letter read, "I want to express my personal thanks to each of the agents posted in Brazil for service rendered in the accomplishment of Operation Overhaul." Hoover continued, saying that he felt admiration at the dynamic and efficient way in which you conducted such a large scale operation in a foreign country and under such difficult circumstances. "The CIA people did a good job too. However, the efforts of our agents were especially valuable. I am particularly pleased the way our role in the affair has been kept secret," Hoover concluded. This is from Frente.

In Brazil, currently ruled by a right-wing military organization, an editorial headline, "Brazil Will Have The Bomb", the pro-government Rio weekly Manchete said Brazil would put into operation a "great power policy" sooner than anyone imagined. Referring to the recent purchase of French Mirage jets, Manchete said, "No one should be surprised if after the mirages, in an almost inevitable progression to cover the next decade, they'll come Phantoms, F-111s, modern tanks, Polaris nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, satellites, rockets, and the atomic bomb itself." The Weekly said that the Brazilian military power would not be used against anyone, but rather as a "persuasive force," but the atomic bomb is as they say, perhaps a military necessity for Brazil. Manchete generally reflects the thinking of the Brazilian military government.

In a more peaceful vein, an article from Latin American Newsletter, entitled "Bears Like Honey", reports that a major deal with the Soviet Union seems likely to follow the journey of the head of Brazil's sugar industry to Moscow. Neither the Brazilians nor the Russians seem anxious to give the negotiations the prominence they deserve. The Cuban government sent a discreet protest to Moscow last week manifesting Havana's concern at the official welcome accorded by the Soviet authorities to the president of Brazil's Instituto de Azucar.

The officials' trip during the week before Easter was deliberately played down by the authorities so as not to attract attention. The reasons are clear, Moscow did not wish to offend Havana and the Brazilians are always sensitive to possible reactions from Washington. The overt purpose of the trip was to exchange views on matter of mutual interest ahead of this week's conference in Geneva, where a new international sugar agreement is to be discussed. That from Latin America Newsletter.

La Nación of Buenos Aires reports that in Montevideo, Uruguay, all eight daily newspapers have closed, three under government decree and the others by a strike protesting the government action. President Juan Bordaberry on Friday ordered La Mañana, Ahora and El Popular shut down for three days starting Saturday for allegedly publishing state secrets. One of the editors was temporarily detained by the police. Excélsior of Mexico reports that thousands of students participated in the funeral procession for four of their companions killed in May Day clashes with the police. The funeral ceremonies held May 3rd went off without incident following two days of disturbances. The violence was touched off May Day when police tried to stop 300 students in a building of the autonomous University of Puebla from joining a downtown May Day demonstration.

Receiving front page coverage in the US press was the kidnapping of US Consulate General Leonhardy, Mr. Leonhardy was safely released May the 7th in exchange for the kidnapper's demands.

The Christian Science monitor notes that the terrorist kidnapping of the United States Consulate General in Guadalajara, Mexico's second city, could hardly come of a more difficult time for President Echeverría. Fresh back from a month-long world trip designed to enhance Mexican global prestige, the Mexican leader this past week has been faced with mounting student unrest spotlighted by the killing of four students in Puebla.

Moreover, the continuing activity of guerrillas in the mountains south of Mexico City is causing new concern. And now comes the abduction of Consul General Terrance G. Leonhardy, coupled with the terrorist demands that the Echeverría government released 30 political prisoners in exchange for consul. The government quickly agreed to the release and the 30 were flown to Havana in a Mexican Air Force plane. The secondary and tertiary demands, namely reading of the kidnapper's public message and a ransom of one million pesos were also met in the government's concern to protect the consul general's life. This from the Christian Science Monitor.

The London News Weekly Latin America reports that the dramatic new initiatives launched by President Nixon in Europe and Asia this year and last are not to be matched in the region nearest to the United States, Latin America. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Latin American section of his annual policy review to Congress last week, which was significant for what it did not say than for what it did. The only major positive move to be announced was that the president himself is to make at least one trip to Latin America this year, preceded by his Secretary of State, William Rogers. In the light of the Watergate scandal and of the current bad relations between the US and Latin America, it may be doubted whether President Nixon's trip would be any more successful than his disastrous tour of Latin America as General Eisenhower's vice president in 1958.

Latin America continues, certainly, there is little enough in the policy review for Latin Americans to welcome. An assertion of the president's desire to underscore our deep interest in Latin America through closer personal contacts was not accompanied by any concession to Latin American interests or aspirations. Only, perhaps, the Mexicans can find some satisfaction in Nixon's promise of a permanent, definitive and just solution to the problem of the high salinity of Colorado River waters diverted to Mexico, but there was no give it all in the United States position on many of the other broader disputes with Latin America. On the Panama Canal issue, he appealed to Panama to help take a fresh look at this problem and to develop a new relationship between us, one that will guarantee continued effective operation of the canal while meeting Panama's legitimate aspirations.

Panama's view, however, is that its effort to persuade Washington to take a fresh look at the problem had been frustrated for so long that its only recourse was to make this matter an international issue at the United Nations Security Council. On this, President Nixon merely noted disapprovingly that an unfortunate tendency among some governments and some organizations to make forums for cooperation into arenas for conflict, so throwing the blame back on Panama.

Latin America's report continues that, in a clear reference to the dispute with Chile over compensation for the copper mines taken over from United States companies, the president said adequate and prompt compensation was stipulated under international law for foreign property nationalized. There was no sign of any concessions there nor did Nixon envisage any reconciliation with Cuba, which he still saw as a threat to peace and security in Latin America. Furthermore, his proposal that any change of attitude towards Cuba should be worked out when the time was ripe. With fellow members of the Organization of American States, OAS, came at a moment of deep disillusion with the OAS on the part of many Latin American governments. The review displayed no understanding in Washington of why nearly all Latin American and Caribbean governments sympathize with Chile and Panama and many, if not most, want to reestablish relations with Cuba.

Nixon's undertaking to deal realistically with Latin American governments as they are, providing only that they do not endanger peace and security in the hemisphere, merely begs the question that Latin Americans have been posing for years nor did the review reflect in any way the Latin American feeling expressed with a unanimous vote at last month's meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA, in Quito that the countries of the region are helping to finance the rise in United States' standard of living at the cost of their own impoverishment.

Latin America concludes that there is some satisfaction at President Nixon's call to Congress to revise the legislation that imposes penalties on countries which arrest United States' fishing vessels in territorial waters the USA does not recognize, but many Latin Americans see this merely as a recognition that the existing policy hurts United States' interests, but the failure of Washington to appreciate Latin America's views may not be the main feature of the United States' policy towards Latin America this year. Unless the White House can overcome the Watergate scandal and revive its decision-making process, the United States will be quite unable to react to the new Peronist government in Argentina or exert any influence over the selection of Brazil's new president. This report was taken from the London News Weekly Latin America.

From Santiago, Chile Hoy reports the May 1st speech of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in which Castro stated that there will not be any improvement in the relations between the United States and Cuba as long as the US tries to be the policeman with respect to the people of this Latin American continent. Cuba reasserts its rights to Guantanamo and, until it is returned, there will not be a dialogue with the United States. This speech was reported in Chile Hoy, The Santiago Weekly.

The Miami Herald this week commented on the effect that the May 4th kidnapping of a US consul in Mexico has had on the Mexican people. The dramatic kidnapping of a US diplomat has suddenly thrust an unheard of guerilla organization into prominence in Mexico. Almost overnight, the name FRAP has become a commonplace. It stands for Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People. Up to now, Mexico had been relatively free of the urban guerrilla activity that has swept Latin America in recent years. Anti-government groups have sprung up and died out here without the spectacular publicity of the Tupamaros in Uruguay or the underground groups in Brazil.

But FRAP succeeded by kidnapping US consul, Terrence G. Leonhardy in Guadalajara on May 4th and holding him until the government released 30 prisoners and arranged a ransom of $80,000. In all Leonhardy was in guerilla custody for 76 hours. He was not harmed. The prisoners were flown to Cuba and given asylum. FRAP in the meantime, won wide publication of a manifesto assailing the Mexican government and emphasizing what it termed the injustices against Mexico's poor. Never before in Mexico's turbulent history has a single anti-government group put its political philosophy before so many people so rapidly.

The FRAP manifesto was very much to the political left and called on the poor to join in an armed fight against social ills by overthrowing the government. Authorities in the interior ministry, which deals with political matters and subversion say they know little about FRAP. Who its members are, where it is headquartered, or who directed the abduction of Leonhardy. The manifesto was well written and well reasoned. Leonhardy reported being asked questions apparently prepared by someone with more education than the men who handled the actual abduction and guarded him.

The manifesto touched on some sore points in Mexican society. It noted the huge gap between rich and poor, charged exploitation of rural and urban poor by landowners and industrialists, accused the establishment of failing to provide educational opportunities to the poor, and claimed that both the poor and poorly educated are mistreated by police and politicians. It accused the government of trying to convince Mexicans that guerrillas are common criminals, cattle thieves, hired killers, enemies of the country, people who work against Mexicans and other such things.

FRAP said it and other guerrilla groups had entered the armed fight because they feel it is necessary to put an end to this privileged caste, which for hundreds of years has been enriching itself at the cost of the sweat under subhuman conditions of the laborer, the farmer, and all workers in exchange for a miserable salary, which is barely enough for bad food.

The manifesto apparently met with much sympathy in Mexico. It expressed what the Mexican middle and lower middle classes discuss in their homes. Through radio and television the manifesto reached millions of illiterate poor. It's said that the poor are no better off than before this country's 1910 agrarian revolution, aimed at ending the oppression of the rural dwellers. Mexico has a population of close to 50 million. Its per capita income is among the highest in the developing world, a bit more than $600 a year, but 13 million Mexicans live on less than that. About half a million campesinos or peasants earn no more than 16 cents a day. 

A factory worker in Mexico City probably earns the minimum daily wage allowed by law, $2 and 52 cents a day. The contrast between rich and poor is evident throughout Mexico. Lavish homes are walled off from tin and cardboard hovels. Multi-million dollar luxury hotels in Acapulco are within walking distance of abject poverty. This report from the Miami Herald. 

Also from Prensa Latina. The Uruguayan government has sent Congress a bill considerably curtailing trade union rights. According to the government, the bill is designed to depoliticize union activities. It enjoys the support of the Junta of Armed Forces Chiefs who described as legitimate any action that the president might undertake in that sphere. The Powerful Trade Union Federation with almost half a million members in a country whose total population is two and a half million oppose this attempt to curtail union rights.

Congress will also vote on the dangerous state law, which includes up to six years imprisonment for sympathizing with the Tupamaro guerrillas and which sets forth a series of offenses that in the view of one opposition lawmaker amounts to the civic death of Uruguay. This report from Prensa Latina.

The British Newsweekly, Latin America continues on the Uruguayan situation. The attempt by military justice to lift the parliamentary privileges of Senator Enrique Erro seemed unlikely to succeed in the Senate this week, and the military were quite unable to resist the Senate committee's demand to interview the guerrilla prisoners who informed against Erro. It remains evident that the military did not win an outright victory last February. The limits of military power and authority have not yet been properly tested, and they may require a new institutional crisis to indicate where the frontier runs.

On Monday, Amodio Perez, a former leader of the Tupamaros who defected last year, was brought before the Senate committee, which is considering the Erro case and repeated his charge that the Senator had sheltered Tupamaros. The appearance of Amodio Perez still evidently in military custody was really more interesting than his evidence, as it had been widely rumored that he was enjoying the fruits of his defection in Paris or some other European capital.

But outside the further uncovering of bureaucratic scandals, the military seemed to be right behind President Juan Maria Bordaberry's hard line on labor and social questions. While nationalists all over Latin America still cherish hopes that the Peruanista faction and the Uruguayan armed forces will emerge victorious, the Cuban News Agency, Prensa Latina this week voiced Cuban disgust with the way things are going, citing continuing arrests, systematic torture of detainees and new repressive legislation. This from Latin America. 

At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.

There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers. 

It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand". 

The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later. 

The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers. 

The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.

Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.

In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.

Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.

When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy. 

This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present. 

US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala. 

In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.

An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,

25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program. 

A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.

Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,

The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.

On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.

In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.

The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."

The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:

On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright. 

Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.

Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.

To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio. 

In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."

These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.

In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.

For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."

We begin with a number of reports from Argentina where on May 25th, elected President Hector Campora assumed the office of president after what has been a suspenseful transfer of power from a military dictatorship.

The Miami Herald reports from Buenos Aires that Hector J. Campora, fulfilling a campaign pledge, began freeing political prisoners Friday within hours after assuming the presidency of Argentina, and ending seven years of military rule.

The new president himself had been a political prisoner when he was briefly jailed in 1955 after a military coup overthrew the labor-based government. Campora now 64, read a three-hour acceptance speech denouncing foreign imperialists and the outgoing military government.

Representatives of 82 governments attended the ceremonies, unique in the annals of protocol. Campora had President Salvador Allende of Chile and Osvaldo Dorticós of Cuba sign the pact of transmission of power. Campora in his speech argued that his predecessors sold out to foreign banks and multinational corporations, and quoting repeatedly from Peron, Campora outlined goals of redistribution of wealth, worker participation in industries, free health service and state built housing. "Argentina will seek close relations with all nations," he said, "but the closest will be with the countries of the third-world and particularly those of Latin America." That report from the Miami Herald. 

La Nación from Buenos Aires reported that among Campora's first acts upon becoming president and taking control away from the right wing military, was the releasing of political prisoners, the decriminalization of the Communist party, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, relations, which have been broken since 1964 when the US government insisted upon a policy of isolating Cuba. 

The French press service Agence France reports from Havana that, "It is considered here that Argentina's recognition of Cuba will probably considerably strengthen the pro Cuban movement in Latin America. Cuban officials hope this diplomatic gesture will deliver the coup de grâce to the anti-Cuban blockade decreed in 1964 when the US insisted that a sugar cane curtain be constructed around Cuba, similar to the bamboo curtain constructed around China and the iron curtain around the Soviet Union." This from Agence France. 

This week's feature is a published interview with a member of an Argentinian guerrilla organization called The People's Revolutionary Army. Unlike last week's feature, it provides a rather critical examination of Peronism and of Argentina's new Peronist government. 

Much attention has been paid recently in the World press to the March 11th election and May 25th inauguration of Dr. Hector Campora, a Peronist, as Argentina's new president. In the first election permitted by the Argentine military since their 1966 coup, the Peronist Coalition, which claims to be based upon strong, popular support of the labor movement, won the popular support of the Argentine people. Since Campora's inauguration, his government has released more than 600 political prisoners, most of whom had been jailed for terrorist activity against the military dictatorship, and has lifted the bans on communist activity. Also, he established diplomatic relations with both Cuba and Chile, expressed some verbal solidarity with the guerrilla movement, and requested a truce between the government and then guerrillas. 

The world press has paid special note however, to activities and proclamations of a guerrilla organization, which calls itself the People's Revolutionary Army, which has stated that it will not join in the Peronist Coalition and will continue armed guerrilla warfare within Argentina. Tagged by the World press as Trotskyists, the People's Revolutionary Army claims that the tag is insufficient. They are the "Armed Organization of the Revolutionary Workers Party of Argentina", and their organization encompasses Argentine patriots and nationalists of many different political ideologies. In a rare interview with staff members of Chile Hoy prior to Campora's inauguration, the People's Revolutionary Army describe the reasons for their non-support of the new Peronist government. 

We think that this unusual interview illuminates some of the political and economic dynamics, the manifestations of which seem to be keeping Argentina on the front pages of the world newspapers. In as much as the spokesman for the guerrilla organization uses Marxist economic terminology, his usage of the following terms should be noticed. "Capitalist" is the class name given to those people who own or who control for-profit the means of production. That is the factories, the banks, the transportation facilities, often the land, et cetera. In poor and underdeveloped countries, many of the capitalists are foreigners, North Americans, and increasingly Western Europeans or Japanese, hence the term "Imperialist". 

On the other end of the economic and power scale are the working people, or as the Marxists refer to them, "the masses" or "the people", who own only their own labor power and sell this to the capitalists. These constitute, of course, the majority of a population. The "Bourgeoisie" are the capitalist, and as the term is used in this article, also those people who, while not themselves the super rich nevertheless, do have their interests sufficiently aligned with the capitalists so that they support capitalist institutions and capitalist societies. Here then is the interview:

A question? How do you characterize the Peronist Coalition and the Campora government in particular? 

We are not unaware that in the heart of Peronism there are important progressive and revolutionary popular sectors that make it explosive, but we don't feel this should fool anyone, because what predominates in Peronism and even more in the coalition is its bourgeois character. For in its leadership as in its program and its methods, the next parliamentary government of Campora will represent above all the interests of the bourgeoisie and of the capitalists. 

A question, how is this massive popular vote for the Peronist coalition to be explained then? 

For us, it reflects at the same time the repudiation of the military dictatorship, which was very unpopular and the persistence of the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie. It is necessary to remember that the masses were only able to choose from among the different bourgeois variants in the electoral arrangement that the dictatorship structured. And among the bourgeois candidates the majority of the working class opted for the Peronist coalition, which had based its campaign on a furious and productive confrontation with the military government, and on pro-guerrilla arguments. 

What then are the true purposes of the Peronists in the current government? 

Their leaders and spokesmen have explained them quite clearly. They say that they are to reconstruct the country, to pacify it by means of some social reform. This along with the maintenance of "Christian style of life", a parliamentary system, private enterprise, and a continuation of the competition of foreign capital. All of the elementary measures for a true social revolution, namely agrarian reform, the expropriation and nationalization of big capital, urban reform, a socialist revolutionary government, all of these are completely absent in the plans and projects of the coalition. The bourgeois sectors of Peronism dominate the government. 

Another question. Apparently the Peronist coalition cannot be considered a homogeneous whole, as there are different tendencies within it, some of them revolutionary and progressive, which produces contradictions within the whole. How does the People's Revolutionary Army respond to this? 

Truly, as we indicated earlier, in the heart of the Peronist front government and in the parties which compose it, they will have to be developed an intense internal struggle, led fundamentally by the revolutionary and progressive sectors within Peronism, that even as a minority must struggle consciously for a program and for truly anti-imperialist and revolutionary measures.

The People's Revolutionary Army will actively support these sectors of Peronism in their struggle, and will insist upon a coalition of the progressive and revolutionary Peronist organizations and sectors with the non-Peronist organizations, both in their work to mobilize the masses for their demands, and in the preparation for the next and inevitable stage of more and new serious confrontations between the people in the bourgeoisie.

Another question. We imagine that the Campora government will not be the ideal government envisioned by the military. Can we then disregard the possibility of a coup d'état? 

It is certain that this parliamentary government will not enjoy the complete confidence of the military, which has accepted the Campora government as the lesser evil, and as a transition to try and detain the advance of revolutionary forces. But we think that the military coup will remain latent, with coup intentions however, growing in direct proportion to the success in broadening mass mobilizations. 

In the case of a military coup, where will the People's Revolutionary Army be? 

Of course, we'll be shoulder to shoulder with progressive and revolutionary Peronism, in order to confront any attempt to reestablish the military dictatorship. 

In recent declarations, the president-elect Hector Campora, has asked the Argentine guerrilla organizations for a truce in their activities beginning May 25th in order to, "Prove whether or not we are on the path of liberation and if we are going to achieve our objectives." You have given a partial acceptance of this request. What is the basis for that decision of yours? 

The request of Dr. Campora arose as a consequence of various guerrilla actions. We understood that the request of the president-elect implied the total suspension of guerrilla activities. We believe that the Campora government represents the popular will, and respectful of that will, our organization will not attack the new government while it does not attack the people or the guerrillas. Our organization will continue, however, combating militarily, the great exploiting companies, principally the imperialist ones and the counter-revolutionary armed forces, but it will not attack directly the governmental institutions nor any member of President Campora's government.

With respect to the police that supposedly depend on executive power, although in recent years, they have acted as an axillary arm of the present army, the People's Revolutionary Army will suspend its attacks as long as the police do not collaborate with the army in the persecution of guerrillas, and in the repression of popular demonstrations.

What are the factors determining your less than total acceptance of the truce? 

We have stated them too in our reply to Campora. In 1955, the leadership of the political movement that Dr. Campora represents, advise the country to, "Not let blood be spilled, avoid civil war and wait." The military took advantage of this disorganization and disorientation of the working class and of people in general to carry out their coup and were able to overwhelm progressive organizations. The only blood that wasn't spilled was that of the oligarchs and the capitalists. The people on the other hand, witnessed the death through massacre and firing squad of dozens and dozens of the finest of their young. 

In 1968, the same leadership advised the nation to vote for Frondizi and this advice when followed prepared the way for the military takeover. In 1966 the same leadership then counseled the nation to, "Reign back until things become clear." And this action when followed, allowed freedom of action to the new military government. 

So when I reply to Dr. Campora, we specifically stated, our own Argentinian experience has shown that it is impossible to have a truce with the enemies of the nation, with its exploiters, with an oppressive army, or with exploitative capitalist enterprises. To hold back or to diminish the struggle is to permit its enemies, to reorganize and to pass over to the offensive. 

What sort of relations does the People's Revolutionary Army maintain with other armed Argentinian groups? 

Since our creation, we have made and continue to make an appeal for a unified effort of all the armed revolutionary organizations with the idea of eventually forming a solid, strong, and unified People's Army. In such an organization, they would undoubtedly be both Peronists and non-Peronists, but all would be unified by a common methodology, namely prolonged revolutionary war and a common ideal, the building of socialism in our country. We have many points of agreement on fundamental issues, so we maintain fraternal relations with all of our fellow armed groups. 

A final question. You have explained the policy to be followed after May 25th, as laid out in your reply to Campora. What will be the policy of the Revolutionary Workers Party and the People's Revolutionary Army in relation to labor union policy, legally permitted activities, the united front and so on? And how do you contemplate combining legally and non-legally permitted activities? 

Our legally permitted activities will be oriented towards the consolidation and the development of an anti-imperialist front, in common with progressive and revolutionary sectors. We will concentrate all our immediate activity in mobilizing popular opinion towards the release of all political prisoners, repeal of all repressive laws, legalization of all political organizations of the left and the press, and an increase in the real wages of the working class. In relationship to the army, we propose the development of an active educational campaign among draftees, calling upon them not to fire upon the people, nor to participate in repression, encouraging desertion of soldiers and calling upon them to join the People's Revolutionary Army. 

In relationship to the popular front, the Peronist front, we call upon all of the left, all labor, popular progressive and revolutionary organizations to close ranks, to give each other mutual support, and to present an organized common front to the political, ideological, and military offensive of the bourgeoisie, not only in its repressive form, but also in its current populous diversionary one. 

As concerns the relationship between legally and non-legally permitted operations, we wish to carefully maintain the clandestine cell structure of the People's Revolutionary Army and of the Revolutionary Workers Party, so as to assure the strict carrying out of security measures and ensure their safety. But we wish to amplify to the maximum, the legally permitted activities of the organization and that of those groups on its periphery. And through this combination of legally permitted activities and illegal ones, we will attempt to procure the greatest advantage from the potential, which the vigor of the popular support gives to our organization. 

To sum up as far as your organization is concerned, what is the watch word for the present situation? 

We'll make no truce with the oppressive army and no truth with exploitative enterprises. We will seek immediate freedom for those imprisoned while fighting for freedom. Also an end to oppressive legislation and total freedom of expression in organization. We will try to build unity among the armed revolutionary organizations who we will struggle or die for the Argentine. 

Thank you. Our feature today has been a published interview with a member of an Argentinian guerrilla organization called The People's Revolutionary Army. The interview was published in the Chilean newspaper, Chile Hoy. The People's Revolutionary Army is known as the strongest and most effective guerrilla group operating in Argentina and was able, for instance, on the mere threat of a kidnapping, to force Ford Motor Company to give $1 million to various children's hospitals in Argentina. 

The growing feeling of nationalism in every country he visited is the most significant impression reported after a 17-day trip to Latin America by Secretary of State William P. Rogers. "We do not see why we can't cooperate fully with this sense of nationalism," he said. Rogers, who recently returned from an eight-country tour, said that, "Contrary to some news reports, the nationalistic feelings apparent in the countries he visited carry no anti-American overtones." The secretary said that there was not one hostile act directed at him during his trip. Rogers said the United States will participate actively in efforts to modernize the organization of American states and emphasized United States willingness to encourage hemispheric regional development efforts. This from the Miami Herald. 

There were several comments in the Latin American press concerning Secretary of State Rogers' visit to the continent. Secretary Rogers' trip was ostensibly aimed at ending paternalism in the hemisphere. However, Brazil's weekly Opinião found little change in the fundamental nature of United States policy. While Rogers' words were different from those of other US officials, his basic attitudes on things that really matter seemed the same.

Opinião points to two specific cases, what it considers an intransient and unreasonable United States position on the international coffee agreement, something of vital importance to Brazil. Second, Rogers promised favorable tariffs on Latin American goods, but failed to mention that the US would reserve its right to unilaterally revoke these concessions without consultation. Opinião in short found Rogers' promise of a new partnership in the hemisphere to be the same old wine in new bottles.

La Nación of Santiago, Chile was even more caustic. It accused the Nixon administration of talking about ideological pluralism and accepting diversity in the world while at the same time intensifying the Cold War in Latin America by maintaining the blockade of Cuba and reinforcing the anti-communist role of the Organization of American states. La Nación concludes that the United States is the apostle of conciliation in Europe and Asia, but in Latin America it is the angel of collision, the guardian of ideological barriers.

La Opinión of Bueno Aires was less critical of Rogers' trip. It felt that the US Secretary of State was in Latin America to repair some of the damage done to Latin American US relations by Washington's excessive admiration for the Brazilian model of development, and also to prepare the way for President Nixon's possible visit, now set tentatively for early next year.

Rogers showed some enthusiasm for the wrong things, according to La Opinión, such as the Colombian development, which is very uneven and foreign investment in Argentina, which is not especially welcome. Rogers also ignored many important things such as the Peruvian revolution, but La Opinión concludes, "Even if Rogers' trip was not a spectacular success, something significant may come of it in the future." This report from Opinião of Rio de Janeiro, La Nación of Santiago, Chile, and La Opinión of Bueno Aires.

Latin America also reports on the ideological and economic developments in the Peruvian Revolution. Peru's military rulers have come under pressure recently, which they, at any rate, seem to feel threatens their image as the independent inventors of a new development strategy that is neither communist nor capitalist. There has been a spade of declarations by senior officers emphasizing the Peruvian Revolution's peculiar characteristic and last week the Prime Minister declared, "It is very easy to copy, to imitate, but very hard to create."

The government's revolutionary credentials have come under doubt, not least because of recent labor troubles. Suspicions on the left were also aroused by some interpretations of last week's visit to Lima by the United States Secretary of State Rogers. This has been seen in some quarters as the first sign of warmer relations between the two countries, particularly as it coincided with confirmation that the Inter-American Development Bank was ending its long boycott of Peru with a $23.3 million loan for agricultural development.

Further doubts have been aroused by the government's decision to postpone its proposed petroleum comunidades which would have brought into the petroleum industry the kind of workers' participation it is trying to develop for mining and industry. The well-informed Peruvian Times suggested that this was due to the dismay among the petroleum companies working here as contractors. This would clearly be particularly unwelcome to the government when it is on the verge of signing new contracts with foreign oil companies.

Latin America continues the foreign business fraternity however, is currently deeply suspicious of the government's intentions as a result of the nationalization of the fishing industry earlier this month. Uncertainty is being expressed about the part reserved by the government for foreign investors and the private sector as a whole in the country's development. In fact, public investment in the economy rose by 22.4% overall in 1972 while private investments were down by 8.9%, according to official figures.

Government spokesman continued to express their faith in the compatibility of predominant state and social property sectors with a reformed private sector in a new kind of mixed economic model. However, the figures seemed to indicate that the private sector is no more keen on being reformed by way of comunidad laboral than the unions are by being supplanted by participation devices dreamed up by the government.

An economy in which the private sector competes freely with the state and social sectors is quite contrary to the advice given by foreign experts on workers' control who do not believe in the viability of such a mixed formula or in the predominance of wage labor, which is at the very root of the present government's economic reforms. To make their scheme work, the Peruvian military authorities and their civilian theoreticians will either have to produce prodigious feats of persuasion or else modify one or more of its components. Some observers believe this modification may now have come about with the state takeover of the anchovies fishing industry.  

That the takeover has taken the form of state rather than workers control signifies a political triumph for the Minister of Fisheries, General Vanini, a brilliant shirt-sleeves populist and one of the recent Peruvian pilgrims to Cuba. The state company is clearly seen as preferable to self-managing units, which would certainly have resisted the forthcoming rationalization program. This hardly makes the government look like left wing extremists. This from Latin America.

A short from the Miami Herald reports on yet another step in the continuing breakdown of the blockade against Cuba. From Caracas, Venezuela, according to official government announcement, Cuban and Venezuelan officials have begun exchanging impressions on educational matters. A delegation from the Ministry of Education in Cuba met with a Venezuelan group headed by the Venezuelan Minister of Education who said, "The meeting will serve to strengthen the mutual cooperation between both countries in cultural, educational, and sports matters." It should be noted that the meeting had special significance since it was Venezuela, which, under US pressure, introduced the motion to the Organization of American States to blockade Cuba in the first place. 

In its continuing coverage of the Watergate affair and the ensuing investigations, the Mexican daily Excélsior has shown special interest in linking Watergate conspirators to clandestine activities in Latin America. Excélsior reported last week that John Dean, Counsel to the President until April 30th of this year, and a prime witness in the ongoing Senate Watergate investigation, revealed to news sources a plot to assassinate the Panamanian chief of state Omar Torrijos. According to Dean, Howard Hunt, convicted Watergate conspirator, was in charge of organizing an action group in Mexico for the purpose of assassinating the Panamanian general. The plot was apparently in response to Torrijos' lack of cooperation in revising the Panama Canal Treaty with the US and to his alleged involvement in drug traffic. 

Dean said that the certain operation was discussed at government levels beneath the presidency. He did not reveal exactly when the assassination plot had been under discussion, but he made it clear that it had not been approved, although Hunt and his group were apparently ready and waiting in Mexico. 

In the course of the investigations of the Watergate scandal, several witnesses, among them former CIA members, declared that on at least one other occasion Hunt was involved in clandestine CIA operations in Mexico, presumably around the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. This from Excélsior in Mexico City. 

The principal inter-American organization is now undergoing close scrutiny by its members. At the last general meeting of the Organization of American States, or OAS, held earlier this year, all observers agreed that the organization was in trouble. It no longer commanded respect in the hemisphere and was deeply divided on ideological issues. The major criticism was directed at the United States for wielding too much power in the OAS and for trying to impose a Cold War mentality on the organization. 

In late June, a special committee to reform the OAS convened in Lima, Peru. The Mexican Daily Excélsior reports that the Argentinian delegation to the conference has taken the lead in demanding radical reforms in the OAS. The Assistant Secretary of State of Argentina urged delegates to form one single block against the United States in Latin America. This block would fight against foreign domination of the southern hemisphere. 

According to Excélsior, the Argentine then told the meeting that any idea of solidarity between the United States and Latin nations was a naive dream. He suggested that the delegates create a new organization which does not include the United States. "Any institution which included both Latins and Yankees," he said, "would lead only to more frustration and bitterness." Finally, the Argentine diplomat asked the committee to seek Cuban delegates, who are formally excluded from the OAS at this time. 

Excélsior continues. Argentina's delegation has denied reports that it will walk out of the OAS if its demands are not met. They have made it clear, however, that they are very unhappy with the US dominated nature of the organization. 

Chile's delegation is taking a different position during the meetings in Lima. "We have never thought about excluding the United States from the OAS," explained Chilean representative. "We believe a dialogue is necessary." He added, however, that the OAS must be restructured to give the organization equilibrium, something which does not exist now. 

The committee to reform the OAS has until November to formulate suggestions for change. At this point, it is impossible to say how far-reaching the changes will be. If the OAS is to survive at all however, the United States will have to play a much less dominant role in the future. This report from Excélsior of Mexico City. 

The Peruvian government of General Velasco Alvarado, according to the Manchester Guardian, is presently facing its most serious internal challenge since its seized power in 1968. Both the Guardian and the British Weekly Latin America report that there have been several confrontations over the past months between the government and organized labor. There is general dissatisfaction among the working classes with regard to the newly instituted pensions law, which substitutes retirement at age 60 for the previous arrangement of retiring after 25 years of work. Another reason for general labor unrest is the government's attempt to dissolve the various political trade unions into a single union controlled by the regime. 

Both British weeklies view the current crisis as a consequence and a test of the particular brand of nationalism implemented by this military regime in their attempt to institute a revolution from above and to steer a course between capitalism and communism. Chile Hoy offers a discussion of the current director of the Peruvian CAEM agency, which provides historical and interpretive background to the current Peruvian military regime in an attempt to explain why its policies sometimes baffled the left and the right alike. 

A government which has nationalized the US controlled international petroleum company, a government which has instituted the most comprehensive agrarian reform on the continent since the Cuban Revolution, and which is the first country in Latin America to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba, is also a government which continues to offer attractive concessions to foreign business investors and encourages foreign control of many sectors of the economy. The contradictions of such policies are apparent. 

What kind of transformation did the Peruvian armed forces undergo to make possible the particular approach of the present nationalist government? The Peruvian official quoted in Chile Hoy traces the preparation for change back to a realization after World War II that the capacity of a nation to guarantee its own security depends on the degree of its development. A country whose economic interests are subordinate to another country is not truly sovereign. But any attempt to reach a solution to the problem of Peru's underdevelopment inevitably involved the adoption of far-reaching institutional changes. 

There was an awareness that the armed forces as an institution must divest itself of the traditional myths of its apolitical nature, its conservative character, and the strict definition of its professional sphere of action. The formation in the 1950s of CAEM, the Center for Advanced Military Studies, was to have a profound impact on every subsequent generation of Peruvian military men. Over half of the members of the present ruling Junta share the common experience of attending special courses at the center. 

Chile Hoy's Peruvian analyst views the social origins of the Army's officer corps as a secondary factor in explaining the break with traditional alignments between the military and the Peruvian oligarchy. Because of their ethnic mixture of Indian and Spanish blood, and their provincial origins, Peruvian officers were far removed from the traditional centers of economic and political power. The policy of rotation exposed the officers to several different parts of the country during their career, giving them a direct acquaintance with the particular problems of each region. Finally, the political impact of the guerrilla movements brought the true nature of Peru's structural problems to light and demonstrated the need to alleviate the situation before the existing tensions were unleashed in violent revolution. 

In 1962, the Army took control of the government for 10 months to ensure elections. Then, in 1968, convinced that no other group was qualified to accomplish the task at hand, they instituted themselves as Peru's existing government. A balance sheet of the first five years indicates increased concessions to the interest of foreign investors, a slowing down of the agrarian reform, a waning of initial popular support, and an increase in repressive measures against dissenting sectors of the population. 

Current political tensions in the country are explained by some commentators as the result of Velasco Alvarado's recent absence from government due to a leg amputation. Other observers, however, see the current tensions as an expression of the contradictions which this type of nationalist capitalist experiment must inevitably incur. They see the Peruvian government's inability to find an adequate solution as a warning to other Latin American countries who are set on a similar course. This report from the Manchester Guardian, Latin America, and Chile Hoy. 

At a recent meeting, the Organization of American States survived some vehement criticisms and emerged relatively unscathed. Argentinian diplomats reflecting the new leftist Argentinian regime objected strongly to the exclusion of Cuba from the discussions. It was also suggested that the Organization of American states be replaced by a new and specifically Latin American body. Such sentiments have also been voiced by Peru. 

However, the United States still has several strong supporters on the continent. Brazil and Bolivia proved their allegiance by warning against destruction of the organization of American states. Nevertheless, even they could not agree with the US ambassador's speech, which claimed that the Organization of American States successfully served to avoid domination by any one member. This from the British News Weekly, Latin America. 

This week's feature will be a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago paper, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President Dorticos. 

Mr. President, in the past few years in Latin America, there have been several types of revolutionary change, the military nationalism of Peru, the Chilean elections, the semi-peaceful taking of power in Argentina. My question is why do you think the guerrilla tactics which characterized the '60s, as for instance, Che's campaign in Bolivia, have been replaced by other revolutionary tactics? 

I think the guerrilla campaign of the '60s had a direct effect on what is happening now despite the fact that the guerrilla campaign did not result in any military victories. The moral and political strengths of these campaigns is affecting not only those struggling with arms, but all revolutionaries with its example of revolutionary dedication, and this influence is tremendous. The presence of Che, which I saw in my recent trip to Argentina among the people, Che's original homeland, his figure, his thoughts, his humanism, his example is greater now than during his guerrilla campaign. 

To discount the influence of Che's actions on Latin America today is to discount a driving force in the hearts of Latin American people. Of course, this does not mean that all the revolutionary struggles have to follow the tactics of guerrilla's struggle which Che promoted. His greatest influence was his example, his conduct, his revolutionary will, and today, for example, it was with great personal satisfaction and profound emotion that I heard the Argentinian people improvising a slogan which, despite the habituation coming from years of revolutionary struggle, brought tears to my eyes. The slogan which I heard every day in Argentina was, "He is near. He is near. Che is here." This slogan is a perfect example of what I was saying. 

The triumph of the Cuban revolution is definitely a great turning point in the revolutionary process in Latin America. People have said that Cuba can be a showcase or trigger for socialism in Latin America. What is Cuba's role given the current realities in Latin America's revolutionary process? 

Its main contribution is to provide an example, an example of unbending and resolute spirit. 

Mr. President, certain groups have suggested that the friendly relations between the USSR and Cuba are actually a form of dependency. It's true that, in the past, there were differences in the Cuban and Soviet perspectives, differences which today seem to have largely disappeared. We'd be interested in hearing why these differences have disappeared and what is the current state of relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. 

There has been a detente, and the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are better now than they ever have been. To speak of Cuban dependency with respect to the Soviet Union, however, is to make the grave errors of confusing imperialism with cooperation between a developed socialist country and an underdeveloped socialist one. One must look at the economic trade patterns and contrast the way Russia has related to us and the way the United States had related to us. 

If we look at the economic aspects of the relations, we can see that the Soviet Union's aid has been one of the main basis for Cuban development and survival. Looking back to the first few months of the revolution, when we lost the American sugar market, there was the Soviet market to take its place. When the blockade started by the United States cut off the flow of oil from countries aligned with the United States, there was Soviet oil. During these years, regardless of how relations between the two countries were going on, even when there were disagreements, as you mentioned, Soviet economic aid kept coming without interruption. 

Today, this economic aid has qualitatively improved. Entire sectors of our economy have been developed with the economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and, thanks to this aid, new industrial plants will be built, and transportation and energy production will be expanded. These new plants will be Cuban plants, not Soviet ones, not plants indebted to foreign countries. 

In addition, the Russians have made it possible for the development of the nickel and textile industries, the modernization and expansion of our sugar industry and countless other projects, and all this has been done in the context of mutual respect and absolute equality in the political relations between two sovereign governments. 

With reference to the United States, which you've mentioned, what are the changes which Cuba would require before some form of dialogue or negotiations could take place concerning relations between the two countries? 

Before even dialogue can take place, there is one condition, that the imperialist United States government unilaterally end its blockade of Cuba, a blockade which it started and it must end. Until that happens, there won't be even any dialogue. If that occurs at some time in the future, we would then begin discussions of problems common to all of Latin America and the United States. We would not merely discuss bilateral affairs concerning only Cuba and the United States, but we would have to discuss it in the context of US relations to Latin America, generally. 

Looking at things from a purely pragmatic point of view, once the blockade has been unilaterally ended by the United States, we might be interested in a broad range of economic relations, including entrance into the American market and economic and technical cooperation. This in no way would involve Cuba's revolutionary government surrendering its revolutionary principles or giving in on any conditions which it might wish to establish, but we would not limit ourselves to this. For the discussions to be fruitful, we would have to discuss not only Cuba, but Latin America and the end of the United States' jerendent role in Latin America generally. 

One way of uniting Latin America so it could negotiate with the United States might be an organization such as the one which Chile has proposed. In the last OAS meeting, a wholly new Latin American organization excluding the United States was proposed. What is Cuba's position with respect to such an organization? 

First of all, we believe, as we've stated before, that the extant Organization of American States is undergoing a grave and insoluble crisis. Cuba will not return to the Organization of American States. We respect and even feel that some countries' suggestions for reforming the Organization of American States are a positive step, but we feel that the OAS as an institution, with the presence of the United States government in its very heart, is not the ideal means for Latin America to shape its future.

We do not belong to this organization, and we feel that a Latin American organization must be created with the participation also of the English-speaking Caribbean nations, which could then collectively form a united front to negotiate with the United States and defend Latin American interests with respect to American imperialism.

Does it seem to you that Nixon, if he survives Watergate, will be able to initiate such discussions at some time in the future, or do you feel that it will be necessary to continue to exercise revolutionary patience? 

We should not speak of speed or hurrying. Revolutionary theory teaches us to be patient and also impatient, and knowing how to reconcile the one with the other is what constitutes a tactical wisdom of a revolutionary. 

The diplomatic blockade of Cuba is falling apart. It has even been suggested that other governments such as Venezuela's, for example, might establish relations with Cuba in the near future. This could present an apparent contradiction with the internal policies of these countries. What is the Cuban position with respect to this problem, that is, with respect to reestablishing relations with governments which defy imperialism, but which do not have progressive policies at home and which may even repress their own people? 

We have made it clear before that we are not interested in having relations with the countries of Latin America for the mere sake of having relations. However, we feel that reestablishing relations with Latin American countries can be useful since we agree on the principle of demonstrating our sovereignty with respect to imperialism. 

You mentioned the hypothetical possibility of a government assuming a dignified international position with respect to imperialism while at the same time, in its internal affairs, oppressing or even repressing its people violently. To begin with, it is very hard for me to see how a country could have a correct anti-imperialist position, a dignified international position and at the same time oppress or violently repress its people whether or not revolutionary struggle was occurring.

That is because an anti-imperialist position cannot be maintained by a government without some changes in internal policies. Thus, internal policies are inevitably linked to international policies, as I have said, regardless of whether or not the country is in the midst of some kind of major change.

We understand that Prime Minister Castro in his last Mayday speech reaffirmed Cuba's solidarity with revolutionary movements. 

If we didn't reform our solidarity with revolutionary movements, we will be violating our own principles. 

Based on an analysis of the results of the 1970 sugar harvest, the Cuban economy has made great progress. What are the changes which have produced such progress? 

It would take an awfully long time to list all of the changes in our economy, and we should not exaggerate. Our economic growth is of necessity limited due to the underdevelopment of our economy which we inherited, the lack of energy sources, and the difficulties an underdeveloped country has dealing with developed countries, problems such as unequal exchange, which have been mentioned in the economic literature, but obstacles in the way of rapid economic growth. 

What have been the achievements since the 1970 harvest? Some figures can quantitatively measure these achievements. For example, in 1972, the economy grew by 10%. This is an extremely high rate of growth for the 1970s, and this growth rate was achieved despite a poor sugar harvest which resulted from two years of drought and organizational problems galore. 

Despite this and despite the important role sugar plays in our economy, we reached the 10% growth figure. Of course, that means that some sectors of our economy grew even more rapidly. Construction, for instance, was up 40%. Industry, not including sugar refining, was up 15%. For 1973, we have set a goal, which we may or may not achieve, of 17% growth. Looking at the third of this year, we find that the growth rate was 16%. Production of consumer goods has increased, and this has been one of the major factors leading to the financial health of the nation. 

Well, how has it been possible to achieve such growth? 

Basically, it has been possible with the better organization, better planning and, above all, with the help of lots of people. This is not an abstract statement. It is a concrete reality which can be observed in every sector of the economy even where there have been administrative problems or a lack of the proper technology. The workers' efforts have always been present and production quotas have been met and, in some cases, surpassed under conditions which are not at all optimum due to a lack of technicians or materials. These shortages resulted from our distance from the European markets we are forced to trade with. 

Despite our support from socialist countries, they cannot physically supply us with all the capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods that we need. Thus, we have to make large purchases from capitalist countries, with the resulting heavy loss of foreign exchange. Of course, our foreign exchange depends on our exports, which are limited, sugar, nickel, tobacco, fish and a few other lesser items. We are basically dependent on agriculture which is affected by climate changes. 

Thus, in response to your question, it is the incorporation of the workforce into the economic struggle at a higher level and the awareness of the need for such an effort and then the carrying out of these tasks, often through extraordinary efforts, which have led to this economic growth since Castro's call in his May 1st, 1970 speech..

Calls have gone up many times before for higher production. Why did the people respond more energetically this time than before? 

In the first place, it was due to the fact that it was crystal clear to many people that efforts had to be made in every sector of the economy and not just in sugar production. In the second place, it was due to the greater participation of mass organizations in economic decisions, in economic process. Finally, it was due to a growth in revolutionary consciousness which now has gone beyond the mere limits of revolutionary emotion and has matured into an awareness of the necessity of building socialism in our country if we want to get what we want. 

According to some analysis, this new economic growth is due to the abandonment of certain principles which the revolution was previously based upon. 

I don't think that's true. What principles are you referring to? 

Well, for instance, the replacement of the principle that consciousness should motivate workers instead of economic incentive in order to increase efficiency. 

It should be made clear that the importance we attribute to revolutionary consciousness has in no way been diminished, but we have noted that certain related factors such as, for example, tying salary to productivity cannot only serve as a material stimulus, but also serves to create and help people understand what is happening. Why does this occur? Because in a socialist society, which is not one of abundance, from the point of view of revolutionary justice, one must conclude that it is immoral and, thus, it does not help create consciousness if one who works less earns the same as one who works more. 

When you pay a worker according to what he has produced, that is, in relation to his productivity, this is both just and consciousness-raising. This is because, through his salary, the worker is being evaluated morally and he is being told that he was socially responsible, will have more than he was not socially responsible. It would be demoralizing and would prevent the raising of consciousness if a worker who worked less, a loafer, earned as much as a good worker. Thus, we are not cutting down the role which revolutionary consciousness should play, but we're aiding and adding new ways of raising revolutionary consciousness. 

Given the larger amounts of goods being offered, do some individuals have more access to these goods than others? 

Yes. They have greater access to un-rationed goods, but everyone gets the same amount of ration to basic goods. 

Why is it that some individuals get more on rationed goods? 

This is related to the remarks I just made linking productivity, the quality and quantity of work to salary, and this is tied to the salary scale. 

You have been listening to a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticos.

On July 26th of this year, Cuba celebrates the 20th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada army barracks. This insurrection led by a young lawyer named Fidel Castro was by any military standards a failure. More than half of the 167 attackers were killed during the attack or as a result of the tortures to which they were later submitted. Almost all the survivors, including the leaders, went into prison and when released into exile. 

It was from their exile in Mexico that some of them returned three years later to begin the guerrilla actions in the mountains of Cuba's easternmost province. A guerrilla campaign in which small victories alternated with severe setbacks until popular support increased. The fronts multiplied and the tide of victory mounted. On New Year's Day 1959, Batista's hated regime was replaced by revolutionary government. 

During its brief 14 years of power, that revolutionary government has transformed the face of Cuba and has transformed the Cuban people as well. One of the major goals of the Cuban Revolution has been to incorporate all its citizens into active participation in national life. Development of rural areas has been encouraged in preference to urban centers as a means of eliminating the marginalization of the peasant sector of the population. 

Another front in the battle to break down the distinction between city and countryside has been the policy of bringing the cultural advantages of the city to the rural peasantry. The first campaign of this nature continues to be the most famous. The literacy campaign of 1961 reduced illiteracy from 27% to 2% in the space of one year. In Cuba, universal literacy was seen as a prerequisite for revolutionary change because it set the stage for the spread of revolutionary culture throughout the entire country. 

Any appraisal of revolutionary culture in Cuba should look at three areas of artistic production. First, the performing arts, music, dance, theater, and especially film. Second, the plastic arts, poster, design, painting, sculpture, and architecture. The third category that of literary production is too vast to be included in this brief survey. 

It should be noted however that there has been a virtual explosion in Cuban letters since the revolution, in the novel and short story, poetry, essay and creative nonfiction, as well as in the publication of many influential periodicals. In fact, the literary coming of age apparent throughout Latin America is attributed by many literary critics to the inspiration and example of the Cuban Revolution. 

Even during colonial times, the island of Cuba was famous for its music, for its seductive blend of African and European rhythms. For the style and verb of its tropical dancers, alongside this showy strain, which to some extent came to be associated with the vice and exploitation that flourished when Cuba was the brothel of the Caribbean.

There also existed a more intimate folk song tradition derived from the Spanish than the African. It was these popular folk musicians, for example, who set Jose Martí verses to a traditional melody, thus creating the well-known "Guantanamera". Both the Afro-Cuban rhythms and the simpler folk melodies still coexist in revolutionary Cuba, but it's primarily the latter that has been recruited into the service of the revolution.

Carlos Puebla, Cuba's best known songwriter, composes songs celebrating the lack of discrimination in the revolutionary society, satirizing the organization of American states, which expelled Cuba from its membership, urging the Cubans to cut that cane and eulogizing Che Guevara. Cuba has organized festivals of popular and protest music enabling musicians and singers from all over Latin America to share their music and learn from one another. 

The island famous for the Rumba and the Mamba also boasts one of the world's leading ballerinas, Alicia Alonso. Now almost completely blind, she continues her dancing and continues to direct Cuba's ballet troop as they perform in Cuba and countries around the world. 

Cuban theatrical companies are semi-autonomous collectives of varying styles and aims all operating out of the National Cultural Council. Like the other art forms in Cuba, the theater remains very open to influences from abroad in content as well as technique, but they managed to impart a particularly Cuban flavor to everything they produce. Cuba has produced several excellent playwrights since the revolution, but the playbills boast names of plays all over the modern world, including the US. 

Some companies have their home base in rural areas on the theory that the troops should interact with the segments of the population least contaminated or deformed by capitalist culture. All theatrical performers spend two years performing in the countryside in lieu of military service, and most companies make annual tours to the rural areas. 

It is, however, the Cuban film industry, which is generally credited with having developed the greatest revolutionary art form. The Cubans believe that of all the 20th century art forms, cinema is the most significant with the greatest revolutionary potential. Within that medium, the revolution is striving to develop its own forms and cultural values to free itself from the techniques and values which commercial interests have placed on film. 

Film in Cuba, before the revolution, has a long and not so exciting history. In the early part of the century, when the film industry was in the infancy, Cuban entrepreneurs imported films from France and Italy, but with the advent of the talkies, US influence began. The attempts of early Cuban filmmakers to develop a national cinema drawing from Cuban history and folklore were overpowered by the efforts of those interested in films for quick exploitation and profit. 

From 1930 until the Triumph of the Revolution in 1959, the Cuban film industry mimicked US models incorporating Cuban music and dance into the thin and melodramatic plots of musicals and detective stories. Because of the setup of international film production and distribution chains, Cuba had no access to an international audience except through co-production with Mexico or some other country. 

Domestic audiences preferred films from the US or Mexico, anyway. So on the eve of the revolution, the Cuban film industry was primarily dedicated to the production of commercial advertising shorts, technical and scientific films, and newsreels for domestic consumption. 

In the course of the guerrilla struggle against the dictatorship, a few newsreels and documentaries were made by revolutionaries in the Sierra and the Urban Underground. Though of rudimentary film quality, these films were a concrete step in the process of converting a traditional tool of the dominating classes into a tool for the defeat of those classes. One of those bearded filmmakers in fatigues was Alfredo Guevara. Fidel called on him shortly after the triumph of the revolution to draft a law founding the Cuban Film Institute. 

In March of 1959, only two months after the revolutionaries came to power, the first law in the field of culture was proclaimed. It founded the ICAIC, Cuban Institute of Film, Art and Industry. In effect, the Institute is sort of a ministry of film with Alfredo Guevara as its head. It oversees all aspects of the Cuban film industry, the training of film students, the production of newsreels, documentaries, and features, the supervision of Cuban theaters, the import and export of films. 

Cuba has some 500 movie theaters, but 25% of them are concentrated in Havana. In deciding upon its economic priorities, the Cuban Film Institute has invariably sacrificed sophisticated equipment which would improve the technical quality of their films in favor of what they see as more necessary expenditures. 

The first priority was consistently been securing the necessary equipment and operators to expose the widest possible audience to the experience of film. Cuban now has over 100 mobile theaters, redesigned trucks equipped with 16 millimeter projectors, and driven by a single projectionist who wanders through the remote Cuban countryside, giving free film showings on the spot. 

These shows invariably consist of a newsreel, a feature, and one or more documentaries. One of the most engaging Cuban documentaries called "Por Primera Vez", For the First Time, simply records the joyful response of a peasant audience as they view a moving picture for the first time. 

Despite several technical and financial limitations, Cuban documentaries span a wide geographical and cultural range. The most famous of the Cuban documentary filmmakers, Santiago Alvarez, uses montages of still photographs, pen and ink drawings and cartoons to compose brilliant film essays on the Indochina War, events in the US, and the Third World, as well as Cuban topics. 

It was not until 1968 that Cuban feature film production really began to flourish. That year saw the release of two of the finest Cuban feature films to date. "Memories of Underdevelopment" views the revolution through the eyes of an intellectual of upper middle class background whose family and friends have fled to Miami. 

The film and the novel on which it is based both confront the problems of creating a revolutionary consciousness in a culture long convinced of its own inferiority and imitative of the dominating culture imported from the US. "Lucia", another award-winning Cuban feature looks at three revolutionary periods in Cuban's history through the lives of three Cuban women. 

The current rate of feature film production in Cuba indicates a new period of growth. The success of one particular film, "The Adventures of Juan Quin Quin", may spark a trend towards more humorous films, which explore revolutionary themes in a lighthearted vein. Others forecast a greater use of third world solidarity themes and a new look at contemporary revolutionary conflicts. 

Painting sculpture as traditional plastic arts have undergone relatively little change in Cuba since the revolution. Architecture and poster design, on the other hand, have changed significantly for economic as well as ideological and social reasons. In architecture, as in the other arts in Cuba, there has been a continuing dialogue as to the responsibility of the architect in answering and shaping the needs of the new revolutionary society. The fact of socialism in the country, de-emphasizes large private houses in favor of community centers, apartment complexes, group recreational facilities, schools, and the like. 

Entire community complexes called micro cities, which include necessary public services and recreational facilities are springing up in the countryside further, helping to break down the distinction between urban and rural areas. Like other less substantial art forms, revolutionary Cuban architecture too is compelled to innovate because of the shortage of building materials produced by the US sponsored blockade. The blockade doesn't succeed however, in keeping out inspiration from various sources around the world. 

In the field of the plastic arts, it is the work of the graphic artists that has received the greatest acclaim. Before the revolution, poster art like the film, was virtually non-existent in Cuba. It has now come to be along with the film, one of the two primary revolutionary art forms. With a demise of the profit system in Cuba, advertising as it has been known, becomes instantly obsolete. But instead of disappearing, billboards and wall posters began to multiply. Instead of exhorting consumers and sparking private appetites, Cuban poster art concentrates on building shared ideals, sympathies and responsibilities. 

The posters testified to Cuba's current struggle to claim her place in history among the self-determining nations of the world. They commemorate Che's death in Bolivia, urge solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Indochina, encourage Cubans to get polio vaccinations and join volunteer work brigades, announce films and other cultural events, and spark public debate on such issues as whether or not to raise the price of rum and cigarettes.

The Cuban artists are not purists. They borrow images from everywhere, never hesitating to expropriate, the most recent produce of Bourgeois culture, if it can be turned to meet their needs. For a government attempting to revolutionize the consciousness of its people to fundamentally alter human nature and create a new man, all of society is transformed into a school, and posters are an important method of public education.

As even this brief summary indicates Cuba possesses a rich national culture, diverse, and developing. The economic and ideological blockade against Cuba has had no visible success in stunting Cuba's cultural growth. In fact, in cultural terms, the principle result of the US blockage has been the cultural impoverishment of the American public. US citizens who are interested in contemporary Cuban literature find that Cuban books are only available here after the lengthy process of being reprinted in Spain or another Latin American country. Cuba's world renowned ballet troop will never dance before North American audiences as long as the blockade continues to stand. 

Film goers find it impossible to see Cuban films of international acclaim and the few films which managed to enter this country are subject to mysterious disappearance or illegal confiscation. More important still, as long as the blockade continues, there can never be any sustained and open exchange between culture workers from Cuba and the United States; painters, graphic artists, architects, poets and novelists, teachers, critics, songwriters, and popular musicians, all those people whose work and existence helps build national and international culture. 

The Guardian reports from Uruguay that the Uruguayan dictatorship of President Juan Bordaberry is desperately attempting to destroy its left opposition before it can fight back effectively. 

The Guardian article says that attacks have been launched against leftist political parties, trade unions, and universities. University autonomy was ended August the 1st. Four days earlier, the government passed new union regulations aimed against the Communist Party led National Workers Confederation, which led a two-week-long general strike immediately following the military coup that dissolved the Parliament. The National Workers Confederation itself was declared illegal June the 30th, three days after the coup.

The union has 500,000 members out of the country's total population of nearly three million. A union leader who escaped government repression and reached Cuba, told the press conference there last week about developments during the strike. The union leader, who asked to remain anonymous, said that within an hour of Bordaberry's dissolution of Congress, the National Workers Confederation was able to paralyze 80% of the country's economy. The strike was supported by students, teachers, and after the first week, by the Catholic Church. 

"Because the general strike began just before payday," the Guardian article says, "Workers did not have much money, but block committees were organized for food distribution". The National Workers Confederation leader said that some elements in the Navy and Air Force supported the strike and refused to participate in the repression against it. At one point, sailors saluted striking dock workers in Montevideo. About 200 officers were arrested for disobeying orders, some of them after trying to hold a protest meeting. 

At Uruguay's only oil refinery, though, soldiers did aim rifles at workers and held them as hostages to ensure the arrival of the second shift, forcing them to work. Sabotage forced the closing of the refinery 48 hours after workers damaged a chimney. At a power plant, workers through a chain against the generator, destroying it. Technicians from the power plant hid to avoid being forced to repair it, but were captured by the military after two days. 

Several workers were killed and many were injured during the demonstration in Montevideo. By June 11th, however, the National Workers Confederation said that the workers were exhausted and out of funds. The Confederation directed them back to work, without, however, gaining any concessions and with 52 of their leaders still in prison. 

A number of opposition leaders still remain in jail, including retired General Liber Seregni, the leader of the leftist Broad Front, and Omar Murda, national director of the liberal National Party. The Broad Front and the National Party, along with the communist and socialist parties, have formed a united front against the dictatorship. Those groups, together with the National Workers Confederation, called a one-day general strike for August the 2nd. 

In another important development, the Tupamaros, a guerrilla group, released a statement at the end of July calling for a people's war against the dictatorship. This was the first public statement issued by the Tupamaros since large scale repression began against them in April of 1972. The Tupamaros said the general strike had shown that revolution is a possibility in their country.

The organization also made a self-criticism that it had underestimated the enemy, which had much more power than they had earlier realized. And on the other hand, they said they did not give proper evaluation to the tremendous capacity for struggle of the people, and they confined themselves too much to their own forces. "Without the participation and the leadership of the working classes," they said, "No revolution is possible."

Uruguay is currently being run by the National Security Council created by the military last February. The organization consists of the chiefs of three military services, president Bordaberry, and the ministers of interior, foreign relations, defense, and economy. The council is being aided by the military intelligence service. The military intelligence service has the main responsibility of counterinsurgency against the Tupamaros and repression of political opposition, including torture of political prisoners. The Guardian article concludes that although the workers are well organized and fought hard, they see ranged against them not only the power of the Uruguayan military, but also that of Brazil and US supporters.

The last country we will look at today is Brazil. While Brazil has not experienced the political turmoil of other countries in this broadcast, developments in Brazil are important, simply by virtue of the importance of Brazil on the continent. The single most important event in Brazil this year was the announcement in June that the current military president, Emilio Médici, will be succeeded next March by another general, Orlando Geisel.

In this analysis, we will look at developments in three main areas dealing with Brazil and attempt to foresee what changes, if any, can be expected when Geisel assumes power. First, we will examine Brazil's economic development and its effects. Next, we'll look at Brazil's foreign policy and its role in Latin America, and finally, we will deal with recent reports of torture by the Brazilian government.

The military has been in power in Brazil since 1964, when a military coup toppled left liberal president João Goulart. Since then, Brazil has opened its doors to foreign capital, attempting to promote economic development. In some ways, results have been impressive. Brazil's gross national product has grown dramatically in recent years, and it now exports manufactured goods throughout the continent, but this kind of growth has not been without its costs. The Brazilian finance minister received heavy criticisms from his countrymen this March for two aspects of Brazilian economic development. 

The first was the degree of foreign penetration in the Brazilian economy. For example, 80% of all manufactured exports from Brazil come from foreign owned subsidiaries. The second problem brought up was the incredible mal distribution of income in Brazil. The essence of the critic's argument is that the top 5% of the population enjoys 40% of the national income while the top 20% account for 80% of the total, and moreover, this heavily skewed distribution is becoming worse as Brazil's economy develops.

Many of these same criticisms were raised again in May when Agricultural Minister Fernando Cirne Lima resigned in disgust. He said it would be preferable to cut down Brazil's growth rate to some 7% or 8% in the interest of a more equitable distribution of income. He also said, "The quest for efficiency and productivity has crushed the interests of Brazilian producers of the small and medium businessman to the benefit of the transnational companies."

Whether any of these policies will change when Geisel comes to power next March or not is uncertain. Some feel that he is an ardent nationalist who will be cold to business interests. Others point out though that the interests which have maintained the current military regime are not likely to stand for any radical changes. Brazil has sometime been called the "United States Trojan Horse" in Latin America.

The idea is that Brazil will provide a safe base for US corporations and then proceed to extend its influence throughout the continent, either by outright conquest or simply economic domination. Brazil has, to be sure, pretty closely toed the line of US foreign policy. It has taken the role of the scourge of communism on the continent and has been openly hostile to governments such as Cuba and Chile, and there's no doubt that American corporations do feel at home in Brazil.

Brazil, of course, discounts the Trojan Horse theory and instead expresses fears of being surrounded by unfriendly governments. But whether for conquest or defense, Brazil has built up its armed forces tremendously in recent years. In May of this year, Brazil signed a treaty with neighboring Paraguay for a joint hydroelectric power plant opposition groups within Paraguay called the treaty a sellout to Brazil, and it is generally agreed that the treaty brings Paraguay securely within Brazil's sphere of influence. In fact, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister said recently Paraguay will not involve itself in any project with any other country without prior agreement of Brazil.

The treaty was viewed with dismay by Argentina, which has feared the spread of Brazilian influence from the continent for many years, especially in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. A Brazilian military buildup along its Uruguayan border caused some alarm last year and this spring and Uruguayan senator said he had discovered secret Brazilian military plans for the conquest of Uruguay. According to the plan, Uruguay was to be invaded in 1971 if the left wing Broad Front Coalition won the Uruguayan elections.

While these developments seem to point to an aggressive program of Brazilian expansion, some observers feel that Brazil may be changing its policy in favor of more cooperation with its Latin American neighbors. They point to the Brazilian foreign minister's recent diplomatic tour in which he spoke with representatives of Peru and Chile as evidence, but if Brazil's attitude towards its neighbors is beginning to thaw, it will be sometime before many countries can warm up to Brazil's ominous military regime. 

Since the military regime came to power in Brazil, there have been increasing reports of torture of political prisoners. In recent months, the Catholic Church has risen to protest such occurrences with surprising boldness. In April, 24 priests and 3000 students held a memorial mass for a young man who died mysteriously while in police custody. The songs in the service, which was conducted in a cathedral surrounded by government troops, were not religious hymns but anti-government protest songs. The real blockbuster came though a month later when three Archbishops and 10 Bishops and from Brazil's northeast issued a long statement, a blistering attack on the government.

The statement which because of the government's extreme censorship, did not become known to the public for 10 days after it had been released, is notable for its strongly political tone. The declaration not only attacked the government for repression and the use of torture, it also upheld it responsible for poverty, starvation, wages, unemployment, infant mortality, and illiteracy. In broader terms, it openly denounced the country's much vaunted economic miracle, which its said benefited a mere 20% of the population. While the gap between rich and poor continued to grow, there were also derogatory references to the intervention of foreign capital in Brazil. Indeed, the whole system of capitalism was attacked and the government accused of developing its policy of repression merely to bolster it up.

Such a statement could hardly have occurred in the view of many observers without the green light from the Vatican, something which gives Brazil's military rulers cause for concern. The government up to now has been able to stifle dissent through press censorship, but with the prospect of statements such as these being read from every pulpit and parish in the country, it would appear that the censorship is powerless. Whether by design or pure force of circumstances, the church is on the verge of becoming the focal point of all opposition, whether social, economic or political to Brazil's present regime, perhaps because of pressure from the church. The government recently admitted that torture had occurred in two cases and the offending officers are awaiting trials. 

In the view of some observers the mere fact of these two trials is an admission by the government that torture is being used in Brazil and this in itself is a step forward. It is being seen as an indication of new and less repressive policies to be introduced when General Ernesto Geisel takes over their presidency next year, but others are less optimistic. They point out that these cases relate only to common criminals and that this cannot be taken as an indication of any easing of repressive measures against political prisoners. 

This week's feature has been a summary and background of important events in the past six months in two Latin American countries; Argentina and Brazil. These analyses are compiled from reports from several newspapers and periodicals, including the London weekly, Latin America, the Mexican daily, Excélsior, the Chilean weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Uruguayan weekly, Marcha.

In a report of historical and contemporary interest concerning US relations with Latin America, the aviation writer for the Miami Herald writes that Southern Air Transport, a charter airline with extensive service in the Caribbean and Latin America, is controlled and subsidized by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rumors of CIA involvement, which have abounded for years, have been formalized for the first time in official hearings before the Civil Aeronautics Board. Competitors have charged that Southern Air Transport has been controlled and subsidized by the CIA, and that the Civil Aeronautics Board should abolish Southern Air's operating certificate and reject a proposed sale of the firm.

The competitors claim that the past ownership changes have not been reported accurately to conceal involvement by the CIA, and they question whether Southern Air's operating certificate should be continued, since its financial base may be the result of an input of federal funds, thus making the Civil Aeronautics Board's approval of its operations a sanction for illegal acts, namely the control of a certified supplemental airline by an agency of the Federal Government, the CIA.

Commenting on the activities of Southern Air, former CIA official, Victor Marchetti, said that the sole existence of Southern Air is that the CIA is ready for the contingency that someday it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war. The competitors charge that Southern Air has been controlled by the CIA at least as early as the US invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

In 1960, under the Eisenhower Administration, when Nixon was the White House coordinator for the planning of the Bay of Pigs, Southern Air was purchased by Percival Brundage, who was director of the bureau of the budget under Eisenhower, and Perkins McGuire, who was assistant secretary of defense, and by Stanley Williams, current president of Southern Air, who is trying to buy out the other owners.

Also, Southern Air has had connections with Air America, an airline operating mainly in Southeast Asia, admittedly controlled by the CIA. For example, the airport space at the Miami International Airport is leased in the name of Agnes Technology Incorporated, whose assets are largely loans to Southern Air, and whose liabilities are largely loans from Air America. Also, in 1966, Southern Air won a hotly-contested case in which it was granted authority to operate in the Pacific over a host of competitors.

The ruling so astounded the Independent Airlines Association that it protested the ruling, but according to a former association president, they were told not to expect any help since the airline was controlled by the CIA. The competitors have said that even if the federal examiner hearing the case rules in favor of Southern Air, they may appeal their case to the Civil Aeronautics Board and even to President Nixon. That report from the Miami Herald.

Excélsior also reports that Algeria was converted into the capital of the Third World last week when it became the seat of the fourth conference of the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries. Statement from the Latin American countries of Cuba, Peru, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad-Tobago, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina joined heads of state from more than 70 other Third World countries. Mexico, Panama and Ecuador and Venezuela participated only as active observers. 

The organization represents a major front of underdeveloped nations against today's superpowers. Since 1970, when the Non-Aligned Movement began relating its position to the realities of the global economic system, its conferences have become increasingly relevant and outspoken. It is the first such event at which Latin Americans will have a dominant impact. Latin America's reluctance to identify itself with the movement in the past in part had to do with its ignorance of African and Asian struggles and its willingness to identify its future development with that of Europe and the United States. Another powerful force was the fact that Latin America could scarcely be defined as non-aligned since the Monroe Doctrine. 

The Non-Aligned Countries' fundamental objective of unifying the struggle against colonialism and racism was sounded in these generally approved recommendations. The right to sovereignty over their own national resources, the regulation of developmental investments, common rules of treatment for foreign capitalists, regulations over exporting of foreign profits, and concrete means to control the operations of multinational corporations. 

The struggle for the economic nationalism was a dynamic theme enunciated by the Latin Americans. Chile exhorted the Third World to form a common front to restrain the excesses of multinationals and affirm their rights to nationalize foreign corporations when necessary for the public interest. 

Peru advocated the adoption of a worldwide plan to give coastal countries a 200-mile jurisdiction over their ocean shores as a means of affirming maritime rights. Panama reiterating its stand against imperialism harshly attacked the United States for its possessions in the canal zone. The idea proposed by the Peruvian Prime Minister Jarrin that the US-Russian detente signifies a solidarity of terror, threatening the Third World with economic aggression was generally approved. 

Also met with hardy acceptance was Castro's announcement that he has broken diplomatic relations with Israel. He condemned Israel for its continued occupation of Arab lands. At the same time as they unified their struggle against new forms of dominance and exploitation, the Third World countries agreed to the necessity of assuming their own responsibilities, analyzing their weaknesses and strengthening their countries in order to defend themselves against the imperialist and economic aggression. That from Excélsior. 

The military Junta seems firmly in control in Chile after staging a successful overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende on September 11th. The following report on recent events in Chile and world reaction to the coup is compiled from the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Miami Herald, the Mexico City daily, Excélsior, NACLA, Prensa Latina, and The Guardian. 

The Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet issued a communique recently in which he said that the armed forces were searching the country to put down extremist forces. The military said they would expel from the country all of the Latin American leftists who had taken refuge there during Allende's rule. At the same time, relations were broken with Cuba and the entire Cuban diplomatic mission was put in a plane to Havana.

The Junta's interior minister, General Óscar Bonilla said the military took over the government because more than 10,000 foreign extremists living in Chile, including exiled guerrillas from Uruguay and Brazil, posed a threat to the country. The armed forces had to intervene in order to safeguard the destiny of the country, seriously threatened by extremist elements, Bonilla said.

Organizations in the United States, which have been expressing concern about the fate of the foreign exiles in Chile, also estimated their number at 10,000. Other sources have indicated that an equal number of Chileans were left dead in the wake of the coup. The military said that many Chileans and foreigners were being detained at the Ministry of Defense, the Military Academy, various military posts, and the dressing rooms of the national soccer stadium. A television station broadcast films of 60 prisoners in the dressing rooms, their hands clasped behind their heads. 

There were widespread reports that could not be confirmed that many former officials and supporters of Allende's popular Unity Coalition had been executed by the military. The North American Congress in Latin America, NACLA, a research group on Latin American affairs in the United States, monitored reports from Cuba and Inter Press News Service. They said that these sources and ham radio reports from Santiago all reported widespread fighting and the execution of many of Allende's associates and supporters. NACLA quoted Inter Press Service as saying that at least 300 foreign exiles were killed during and after the military takeover. 

NACLA also said the coup was an attack not only on the popular government of Chile, but the entire anti-imperialist movement in Latin America. Censorship was imposed on the Chilean media and foreign journalist dispatches. The Junta announced that 26 newspapers and magazines were told to suspend publication indefinitely because they were opposed to the Junta's goal of depoliticizing Chile. 

While the extent of resistance in Chile is uncertain due to conflicting reports, much of the rest of the world has raged in protest. An estimated 30,000 protestors filed past the Chilean embassy in Paris, brandishing red flags and banners and shouting "Coup makers, fascists, murderers!" and "Down with the murderers in the CIA!" Thousands of demonstrators marched in Rome, where a group calling itself the International Militant Fellowship claimed responsibility for a pre-dawn fire bombing of the Milan office of Pan-American World Airways. The group said the attack was in retaliation for participation in the coup by US imperialists. 

The West German government withheld recognition of the new Chilean regime for the time being, and in protest of the coup, canceled credits of 35 million marks, which it had agreed to extend to Chile. The World Council of Churches asked the Junta to respect the rights of political exiles in Chile, and the secretary general of that organization expressed the council's concern over the brutal rupture of Chilean democratic traditions. 

In Latin America, reactions were much stronger. The Argentine government declared three days of national mourning for the death of President Allende, and 15,000 marched in a demonstration in that nation's capital protesting the coup. Telecommunications workers in Buenos Aires staged a one-hour strike in solidarity with the Chilean workers who were killed by the troops of the military Junta.

Also in Buenos Ares, the movement of third-world churches condemned the coup and exhorted all Christians to fight the military dictatorship. Juan Perón, who will soon be elected president of Argentina, said that while he does not have the evidence to prove it, he believes that the United States engineered the coup. Venezuelan president Raphael Caldera called the military takeover a backward step for the entire continent.

In Costa Rica, thousands of students marched in protest of the coup and in solidarity with Chilean resistance fighters. While the Costa Rican government offered political asylum to Chilean political refugees. One of the loudest protests came from Mexico City where 40,000 joined in a protest march shouting anti-US slogans and burning American flags. 

An indictment of the type of economic colonialism, which had Chile in its yoke was voiced by Osvaldo Sunkel, a noted Chilean economist when he appeared last week before a United Nations panel investigating the impact of multinational corporations. The panel was created largely because of Chile's charges that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation had tried to block the election of Dr. Allende in 1970. United Nations officials maintained that there was a strong sentiment for such an inquiry apart from the ITT case. 

In his remarks, professor Sunkel charged that foreign corporations were bent on siphoning off resources of the developing countries. He heatedly disputed testimony by five corporate officers that their concerns had contributed to the health and welfare of the countries where they operated. He said, "I get scared, really scared when I hear such individuals speak of social responsibility. Who has appointed a small group of individuals to decide the fate of so many?"

Sunkel said, "The government of President Allende made an attempt at changing the structure of underdevelopment and dependence in Chile. It may have had many failings and committed many errors, but nobody can deny that it attempted to redress the unjust economic and social structure by fundamentally democratic means."

While much of the anger and protest around the world seems directed at the United States, State Department and White House officials have consistently denied that the US was involved in the coup in any way. Nevertheless, critics of the Nixon Administration's policy in South America blamed the United States for helping create the conditions in which military intervention became an ever stronger likelihood. Joseph Collins of the Institute for Policy Studies said the tactics were economic chaos.

Collins said that Chile had become the first victim of the Nixon-Kissinger low profile strategy in which credits are withheld while military assistance continues to pro-American armed forces. Military assistance to the Chilean regime continued throughout the three-year presidency of Allende, however development loans were halted. Collins said US companies had put pressure on their subsidiaries and on foreign associates not to sell vitally needed equipment and spare parts to Chile.

The following commentary on the role of the United States in the Chilean coup comes from The Guardian. "US involvement could be seen on several levels. US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis went home to Washington per instructions September 6th, returning to Santiago September 9th, only two days before the coup. Davis was a high-ranking advisor in the National Security Council from 1966 to '68 and later served as US Ambassador to Guatemala during the height of the pass pacification program against leftist forces there.

When Davis came from Guatemala to Chile in 1971, he brought a number of aides with him who had helped run the repression there. The State Department trains people for special jobs, and Davis seems to have specialized in these kinds of operations," says The Guardian.

According to The Guardian, Davis's philosophy of international relations was expressed in a speech in Guatemala in 1971. "Money isn't everything," he said, "love is the other 2%. I think this characterizes the US' policy in Latin America." The New York Times reported that the US was not at all surprised by the coup and that US diplomats and intelligence analysts had predicted a coup would come three weeks earlier.

"In another interesting possible prediction," claims The Guardian, "the State Department called back four US Navy vessels, which had been heading into Chilean waters for annual naval maneuvers scheduled to begin September 13th. The State Department claims that this was done when news of the revolt came, but some sources say that the order came before the beginning of the coup indicating prior knowledge."

The Guardian claims that US corporations were clearly pleased by Allende's overthrow. When news of the coup came, copper futures rose 3 cents on the New York Commodity Exchange, but the US government is cautioning against too optimistic a view on the part of expropriated companies since a too rapid return of nationalized properties would only heighten antagonisms and further reveal the coup's motivation. The preceding report on recent events in Chile was compiled from the New York Times, the Associated Press, the Miami Herald, the Mexico City Daily Excélsior, NACLA, Prensa Latina, and The Guardian. 

Cuba has made headlines in the Latin American press recently due to Fidel Castro's participation in the Non-Aligned Nations Conference in Algiers last month, and to Cuba's loud protest to the Chilean coup in the United Nations. The Mexico City Daily Excélsior reports that Henry Kissinger has announced that the US will begin consultations with other member countries of the Organization of American States to determine the possibility of reestablishing relations with Cuba.

Kissinger stated that the US will not act, as he put it, "unilaterally", but in accordance with the other member countries. He has not, however, stated when and in what form the first steps will be taken. Seven members of the OAS have already broken with the US supported attempt to isolate Cuba. They're Mexico, which never accepted the decision of rupture, Chile until the overthrow of the government there, Peru, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina. A number of these countries maintain that the OAS should allow its members the liberty to decide in diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Fidel Castro's Summit meeting two weeks ago with four leaders of the independent Commonwealth Caribbean is part of Cuba's continuing effort to eliminate any possible threat from its immediate neighbors. The British News Weekly Latin America reports that although it lasted barely three hours and was a stopover en route to the non-aligned nations conference in Algiers, Fidel Castro's meeting with four prime ministers of the English-speaking Caribbean was highly significant for an area still divided and ruled as efficiently as ever by the great powers. The four meeting Castro at Port of Spain's airport were Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, Forbes Burnham of Guyana, Michael Manley of Jamaica, and Errol Barrow of Barbados. 

It is too early says Latin America to say what park Cuba would be willing to play in the region's economic and other groupings, but since the four independent Anglo-Caribbean states opened diplomatic relations with Havana 10 months ago, the Cubans have worked steadily to build up contacts. Cuban sugar technicians have visited the islands to offer advice and aid about the commodity which dominates the economies of all of them. Cuban fisheries experts will soon go to Guyana under an agreement signed two weeks ago. Ministerial delegations from all four states have been to Cuba and Castro's journey from Havana to Trinidad via Guyana inaugurated a regular air service between Cuba and the islands. 

Apart from the basic wisdom of making friends with one's smaller neighbors when under threat from the US only 90 miles away, the four states could be a source of economic relief to Havana. The recent major oil strikes off Trinidad and the prospect of others off the coast of Guyana would be a useful way to lessen dependence on Eastern Europe, which currently supplies all Cuba's oil needs. As for regional solidarity, Cuba might be instrumental in encouraging more effective use of bauxite as a weapon against the rich nations. 

Latin American newspaper concludes that even in Central America, traditionally the hardcore of the right wing, pro-Washington resistance to Cuba, Honduras became the first country of the group formally to renew trade relations with Havana by signing a $2 million agreement to buy Cuban sugar. But all these advances have been overshadowed by Argentina's billion dollar credit to Cuba to buy machinery and other equipment. This is the most important step so far towards reducing Cuba's dependence on the Soviet block. This from the weekly Latin America. 

Because of the continuing public interest in the current situation in Chile. For today's feature, we've asked Father Charlie McPadden, a Maryknoll missionary born in Ireland, who recently returned from spending three years in missionary work in Chile, to talk with us about the work of the church under the Allende government and church policies toward the current military regime. Father McPadden, what did your work in Chile consist of actually? 

Ken, I work in a parish in Southern Chile. Most of our people live in a city of 130,000 people. It's called Chillán. We also have a lot of area in the callampa. But my work in the parish consisted of—Really, I was very involved with the social program of our parish, because we had a large number of people who lived in callampa areas. We had seven different poblaciones in our parish, which I began working with. And later on, I was asked to work with 30 and all. So, I spent quite a bit of my time with these people, the people in the callampas.

Mm-hmm. What were you actually doing with them? 

Well, we tried to do many things to uplift their standard of living, to cooperate with the programs of the government, and to be a Christian presence in that ambiente. 

Mm-hmm. What was the political orientation of the community where you worked? And were people very politically active there? 

Yes, of necessity they had to be, because the government, President Allende had made promises to build houses for the poor. And about one person in five in Chile is involved with this problem of lack of housing. One person in five lives in a callampa area, a shantytown area. So, in order to qualify to get houses, they had to belong to the UP, Unidad Popular. So, of necessity, the people had to be political. The Chileans are very sophisticated politically. And the poor especially who were the basis of power of the Allende government were continually being taught, being trained, being indoctrinated, if you will, in the programs of the government, and how to carry them through, how to bring about the necessary social changes. 

What was the position of the church toward Allende, toward the advent of socialism in Chile? 

Well, to explain that Ken, I think where it would be well to compare the church in Cuba when Castro took over from the oppressive regime of Batista in '59, I believe it was. And what happened when Allende came to power in 1970. In 1959, when Castro declared himself a Marxist, the church immediately published a pastoral letter condemning communism.

And at that time, the church and the leftist of the Castro's couldn't see any possibility of coexisting or cooperating. The church viewed these people as being prosecutors of the church, being atheistic, of being violenistic. And of course as well, the communists—the church has been against communism, has been reactionary, has been preaching pie in the sky, not putting themselves really on the side of progress or trying to make the brakes necessary in order to help the poor.

But, that's how it was at that time. But in the short interval of 14 years or so, 14 or 15 years, between Cuba and Allende, between Castro and Allende, traumatic changes have taken place in Latin America and in the church in general. A great maturing process has taken place apparently, both on the part of the church, and on the part of the leftist groups in Latin America.

Because, in the meantime, we've had Pope John who has asked the church in general, especially the church in Latin America, to put itself very firmly and positively, and make every effort to bring about social change, to correct the injustices which exist in Latin America. Vatican too followed, and it gave a mandate to the church to help Latin America, to help the poor in Latin America. They changed the miserable conditions which exist there for many millions of people.

So, also in the meantime, the church in Latin America has been called by the poor, the church of the rich. And this, in part is true. Many of the hierarchy and the church have come from the wealthy who haven't been too inclined to be on the side of the poor, let's say. But, the leftist people have also been working there, and in a very dedicated manner, they began by bringing many facts on the forces which are affecting very much the economies and the conditions of life of the people of Latin America.

So the progressive people in the church saw that really what the leftists were trying to do, that their goals were very Christian goals, and that, they showed this other possibility, the advisability of cooperating in these same programs. So communication began, understanding began, they ceased to criticize one another so much. And, in that way, many things have been happening. Many things have been done in a cooperative fashion to help the poor.

So when we came to Chile, when Allende took over, you didn't have any immediate repression of the church. Castro had expelled many of the foreign priests from Cuba when he took over. He had closed the parochial schools, because he said they were promoting the status quo in the country. But when Allende took over, the church responded in a very mature manner, by having an ecumenical service in the cathedral in Santiago, and the prayer for the success of Allende's government. Allende himself said that he was given complete freedom to all the different faiths in Chile. And, he hasn't tried in any way to repress them. He looks upon the church as an ally. 

I think, from the beginning, I should say that, within the Chilean church that there has been somewhat of a division from those who back almost completely the programs of the Allende government, to those who are somewhat scared still of the generalizations, socialism, and communism. So, I think, the church in general, its attitude has been one of understanding and cooperation, bringing about needed social change and bringing about changes in the social structure. In the meantime—Or meanwhile, I think, maintaining an attitude of constructive criticism. 

The church has spoken out various times against threats to human rights when this has appeared necessary to do, because it was evident that with the growing economic chaos in the country, where food stops became very scarce, where there seemed to be a growing polarization among the different groups, the church has had to speak out on the danger of violence, the danger of mixing politics with Christianity. But in general, I would say the church has enjoyed complete freedom under the regime of President Allende.

It hasn't been hampered in any way. It has been looked upon by most church people as a great challenge, because Allende's people and his parties have worked in a very dedicated fashion, with much opposition always to the programs. But I think that I would say that the church has given this government every chance and every cooperation to make its programs work, as far as the poor are concerned.

Were there sections of the parts of the church that worked actively for socialism, worked actively on behalf of the UP government? 

Yes. There was, in the beginning, a group of 80 priests who were called the "80 for Socialism". And they almost completely sanctioned the programs of Allende's government. They didn't get the backing of the hierarchy, because I think the hierarchy's position was that socialism under Allende, the radical groups, at least in his government, were believed indiscriminate revolution, which the church could not back. 

Father McPadden, was the church subject to any of the repression initiated by the military after the coup last month? 

I think the position of the church at the moment would be this that, Cardinal Silva, the Cardinal in Chile, before the coup, had been very active in trying to get the different groups, the Christian Democrats and the socialists together to work out some compromise, rather than to permit the country to end up in civil war. And he made every effort on their behalf, on behalf of the country to do that, up until the very end.

The Christian Democrats didn't want to compromise in any way with the government of President Allende. They were in favor, I believe, of what they call, a "white coup". That is a bloodless takeover by the military, because they believe that the country at the moment was in complete chaos politically and economically, that there was a growing polarization, growing threat of violence, and that the only solution was for a military takeover.

But now that that did occur, a very bloody takeover, the Cardinal, his position at the moment, I believe, is that he offered cooperation to the military leaders to cooperate in the reconstruction of the country. But as time goes along, it's become more evident that these military leaders are acting in a very heavy-handed manner, and using a lot of repression, going against the constitution of Chile. It has expelled many foreign priests from the country. At least two priests have been killed, I believe.

It has arrested all of the native Chilean priests and warned them, detained them for some time, and warned them not to engage in politics. It has been especially repressive to the foreign priest in the country. And the church in general is very disillusioned with, again, the repression of political parties, and the repression of freedoms, and the violence, the bloodshed, the atrocities taking place in Chile under the military regime.

Were there very many church people among the estimated 10 to 15,000 political exiles from other countries present in Chile at the time of the coup? And if so, what's been their fate? 

I don't really know much more than what I read in the papers. I read the newspapers every day, because it's very difficult to get much information out of Chile. It's perhaps filtered. And I know there's a great effort being made by the church from all areas to intercede for these prisoners. 

Thank you, Father McPadden. Today we've been talking with Father Charlie McPadden about the church in Chile. Father McPadden is a Maryknoll missionary who recently returned from spending three years in missionary work in Chile. 

Mexico's Excélsior also reports that on October 15th, the band of urban guerrillas known as The 23rd of September League had freed Anthony Duncan Williams, honorary British consul, after holding him captive for five days. The group announced that they freed Williams after a guerrilla tribunal determined that he did not belong to the exploiting class and that he was poor. No mention was made of Luis Fernando Aranguren, the industrialist who was kidnapped along with Williams on Wednesday, October 10th. 

Shortly after the kidnappings, the guerrilla left a statement in a mailbox in Mexico City saying that Williams and Aranguren had been condemned to death by a guerrilla tribunal for being representatives of the bourgeoisie. The group listed several conditions to be met in order to prevent the carrying out of the sentence, including the release of 51 political prisoners, an airplane to transport the released prisoners to North Korea, $200,000 ransom, and distribution of the guerrillas' message by all the major news media. The Cuban ambassador was designated as intermediary by the kidnappers. 

The government apparently refused to release any political prisoners, but agreed to provide safe conduct out of Mexico for the kidnappers along with the $200,000. After his release, Williams told the story of his kidnapping to the press. Shortly after 8:00 AM on Wednesday, he was taken from his home by five armed men who blindfolded him and forced him to lie in the rear seat of his own car. After driving for a while, the group abandoned Williams' car and transferred him to a light truck. Williams was then taken to a home, presumably in the country, where he was kept in the small room while wallpapered with newspaper to keep him from identifying his surroundings later. 

The kidnappers provided him with good food and his favorite kind of brandy. They told him that they were familiar with his habits because they had kept him under surveillance for the last six months. His captors told him that a guerrilla tribunal had sentenced him to death for being rich and belonging to the class that oppresses and exploits people. Their plan was to use Williams and Aranguren to secure the release of political prisoners held by the Mexican government. They said that Williams' status as a diplomat would ensure the government's cooperation. 

Williams explained to them that his position as consul was merely an honorary one and paid nothing. He promised to relinquish his position if released, insisting that he had to work for a living. After several days of interrogation, the guerrilla informed him that he would be released. Immediately after being freed, Williams resigned his position as consul. According to the police, the 23rd of September League is a band of urban guerrillas formed by the remaining members of several other leftist groups, including the Armed Revolutionary Movement and Zapatista Urban Front. That from Excélsior. 

The following letter distributed by Tri-Continental News Service in New York was written by Beatriz Allende, daughter of the slain Chilean president, on October 5th, 1973 in Havana, Cuba, "To the progressive people of the United States, I address myself to you in these dramatic moments for my country, the Republic of Chile, which since September 11th has not only been suffering but fighting resolutely against the fascist military Junta that overthrew the constitutional president, Salvador Allende." 

"The coup of September 11th can only be comprehended in its full magnitude when one understands that even before the Popular Unity took up the reins of government, U.S. imperialist monopolies and Chilean reaction were conspiring against the U.P. They tried to prevent first the U.P.'s ascension to the presidency and later the completion of its program of social and economic transformation, which the country demanded and the government was carrying out." 

Ms. Beatriz Allende's letter continues that, "For the moment, the fascists have achieved their goal of blocking the revolutionary process by assassinating the president and overthrowing the democratically elected government. They countered on military men, traitors to their country, trained in U.S. military academies, and on the financial backing of U.S. monopolies and on the political and diplomatic support of the United States government." 

"Today, Chile fuels its institutions swept away, its culture destroyed, its progressive ideas persecuted, its finest sons tortured and murdered, its working-class districts and universities bombed, repressing the workers throughout the length of the nation." 

"The fascists are mistaken. They have not won. Alongside the fascist brutality arises popular resistance, which taking its inspiration from the example of President Allende is ready to fight and to win. The Chilean people today fighting in the streets, factories, hills and mines call on the solidarity of all progressive people throughout the world and especially the people of the United States." 

The letter continues that, "We know that the U.S. government does not necessarily represent the real people the United States and that in our fight we can count on them as did the Vietnamese. We can count on the solidarity of the workers, the national minorities, students, professionals and other popular groupings which condemn the imperialist policy of the United States government and which at the same time support the revolutionary processes of those countries fighting for full sovereignty and social progress." 

"With revolutionary greetings, signed Beatriz Allende", who is daughter of the late President Salvador Allende.

The British weekly, Latin America, and the Cuban publication, Grama, report on the irritation provoked in Panama by the detention of Cuban and Soviet ships by canal zone authorities. Acting under a U.S. federal court order, the U.S. officials detained the two merchant ships on their way through the canal. The court ruling was made after an application from the Chilean military government, which complained that the ships in question had failed to deliver the cargos contracted and paid for by the previous Allende administration, according to Grama. 

Latin America noted that the ensuing explosion of wrath in Panama was virtually unanimous. Condemning the detentions as ambushes, the Foreign Ministry pointed out that even the hated 1903 treaty firmly stipulated that the canal must be neutral, unaffected by political disputes and capable of providing a free, open and indiscriminate service to all international shipping. The canal was equivalent to the high seas, the Ministry said, and its authorities had only limited jurisdictional rights, specifically linked to the operation of the canal. Furthermore, United States federal courts had no jurisdiction over such matters in the canal zone, which was formerly Panamanian territory. 

The British weekly, Latin America, continued that the incidents threw a shadow over the rising tide of optimism over the renewal of negotiations on a new canal treaty. Panamanian hopes have in fact been rising ever since Ellsworth Bunker was appointed Chief United States Negotiator three months ago, and expectations were further stimulated by sympathetic words from Henry Kissinger on his appointment as Secretary of State last month. Unless quick action is now forthcoming from Washington, the atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations will have been badly polluted, according to Latin America. 

From the internal point of view, however, the issue is not altogether inconvenient to General Omar Torrijos, the country's strongman. Following government moves to open a second sugar cooperative and for the public sector to enter the cement manufacturing business, private enterprise has been bitterly attacking the administration.

The pressure of inflation, though not likely to reach more than 10% this year, according to government sources, has caused some discontent which could be exploited by the government's opponents, and conservatives have attacked agrarian reform schemes which they say have caused a drop in food production. There was also criticism of the government's low-cost housing program, which would benefit small rather than large contractors, and there were even attacks on the National Assembly voted into office in August last year as undemocratic.

Latin America's coverage of Panama continues to note that a planned 24-hour strike by business and professional people for the beginning of last week, timed to coincide with a new assembly session, was called off at the last moment, and the situation is now somewhat calmer. But it was noted in Panama that the Miami Herald published an article entitled, "Will Panama Fall Next?", speculating that after the Chilean coup, Panama might be the next objective of local forces that seek return to a previous form of government. 

If any such emergency were likely to arise, a renewed dispute with the United States over the canal would be a good rallying cry. That report on Panama from the London Weekly Latin America, and from Grama of Cuba. 

This week's feature is an article by Ana Ramos, who works with the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina. It is a feminist view on recent developments there concerning women. In her traditionally Latin and religious machismo society, men have had the dominant role in Cuba for at least a century. However, in working for their goal of a society of equality, the Cubans are making major efforts to change the formally second class situation of women in Cuba. The following is a report on the revolution of Cuban women. 

In Cuba, prior to the revolution, foreign ownership of enterprises, a stagnant economy, unemployment and hunger, combined to produce great hardships for many women. With the triumph of the revolution, a new spectrum of possibilities in education and productive work opened up to women changing their position in Cuban society. Purchases nevertheless still persist. In an underdeveloped country, one must struggle on every front to overcome backwardness, not only economic, but also cultural. 

In March of 1962, during a conference on educational and social-economic development in Santiago, Chile, the Cuban Minister of Education compared Cuba with other countries in Latin America. He noted that the promoters of the Alliance for Progress had offered a loan of $150 million a year to 19 countries with a total population of 200 million people. In contrast, one country, Cuba, with 7 million people, has been able to raise its educational and cultural budgets to $200 million annually without having to reimburse anyone or pay interest on loans. That represented a quadrupling, approximately, of the financial support of education and culture in our country. 

The greatest beneficiaries have been women. Since the burden of the budget falls on less than a third of the population, the workforce, women workers are essential to the economy. In 1958, an estimated 194,000 women in Cuba were doing productive work, in 1970, 600,000. 

Many women want to see how a socialist revolution changed the situation of Cuban women. Years of frustrating struggle around such issues as birth control for those who want it, and daycare for working mothers, makes one wonder if any society anywhere has begun to confront the special oppression of women. Before the success of the revolution in Cuba in 1959, the Cuban women looked forward to a lifetime of hard labor by cooking in kitchens that did not have enough food, washing clothes that could not be replaced when worn out, and raising children who would probably never see a teacher, a doctor, or hold a decent job in Cuba's underdeveloped economy of the time. 

Now, women's lives have been changing. Women have begun to organize themselves to help each other by developing cooperative, mutual support to solve their problems and overcome the difficulties created by underdevelopment. 

For this express purpose, the Federation of Cuban Women was formed in 1960 for women between the ages of 15 through 65. Over and over, women described their excitement about being independent contributors to society. One woman from Oriente explained, "Before the revolution I had 13 kids and had to remain at home. Now, I work in a cafeteria in the afternoon and study at night." The mass freeing of women from the home for socially necessary labor began the transition from a capitalist domestic economy in which each woman individually carried out the chores of childcare, washing and cooking, to a socialist one where society as a whole will take on these responsibilities. 

Centers for free daily or weekly childcare, Círculos Infantiles, have been established all over the country. 

In these centers, children as young as two months can be fed, clothed, educated and entertained. Schools, factories and experimental communities offer free meals. Moreover, in a few communities and in all voluntary complements, free laundry services are now available. Even though there are not yet enough of these facilities, nearly every girl and woman is confident that these centers will be available in the future. 

From the first years of the revolution in Cuba, many projects brought new mobility and independence to the women. Night courses for self-improvement were organized for domestics. In a few months, the students had acquired a trade. In 1961, a well-known literacy campaign was begun, 56% of those who became literate were women. Of the women volunteers in the campaign, 600 were selected to enter the Conrado Benitez School of Revolutionary Instructors.

The school, the first created for scholarships students, trained teachers and directors of children's nurseries. It furnished the guiding concept for the system of self-improvement on the island. It has been stated that women ought to study and learn from those women who know more, and in turn teach those who know less.

In the same year, the revolution began the Ana Betancourt program for peasant women. The president of the Cuban Federation of Women in an article in the magazine Cuba, in January of 1969, recalled that there were 14,000 of these women. They came from very distant places all over the island, where people were acquainted neither with the revolution nor with civilization. "It was very interesting," she said, "They took courses for no longer than four months and returned to their homes, we can say, almost as political cadres." 

Presently, 10,000 women enroll annually in the program, where they take courses not only in ensuing, hygiene and nutrition as in the beginning, but also in elementary and secondary education. Many are enrolled in university programs. 

Why these special programs for women? In underdeveloped areas it is characteristic for the cultural level of women to be lower than that of men. After the initial inequality has been eliminated, these programs will disappear in the same manner in which the night schools for domestics are no longer necessary. More than a decade after the seizing of power in Cuba, the ratios of females to males in elementary school, 49% are girls, and secondary school, 55% are young women, indicate an advance. 

Even more significant is the percentage of women in higher education. 40.6% of all university students are women, and their distribution among the scientific and technical disciplines, which traditionally have had little female enrollment in all Latin American countries. Now, there are in all sciences, 50% women, biochemistry and biology, 60%, and in medicine, 50%. 

The scholarship program, or over, benefits over 70,000 girls and women at all levels of learning and provides housing, food, clothing, study supplies, and a monthly allowance for personal expenditures. "The society has the duty to help women," Fidel Castro said in 1966, "But at the same time, in helping women, society helps itself because more and more hands are able to help with production of goods and services for all the people." The Cuban system seeks to bring women into the labor force through the extension of opportunities. In contrast, other Latin American countries feel that the more social benefits are increased, that will reduce the participation of women in the labor force. 

Cuban legislation prohibits women from certain activities that are excessively rough, unhealthy, and dangerous, but at the same time reserves occupations for them. "These fixed positions include jobs of varied responsibilities in services such as administration, poultry raising, agriculture, light industry, basic industry, and so on," says Ms. Ramos. 

Both laws should be interpreted in the light of the need for collective effort and the distribution of workers throughout the economic system. Still, there are times when administrators reject female labor for male labor, since men don't face problems of child-rearing, and so on, which often translate themselves into absenteeism. What is needed, has been argued, is to employ five women where there were four men, and have women available as substitutes and permit those men to go out and occupy a position where they are needed more. 

In September of the same year, the Board of Labor Justice dictated instructions that regulated licenses as leaves of absence without wages for women workers who find themselves temporarily unable to continue work due to child care needs. If the worker returns to work within three months, she has the right to her same job at the same salary. If she returns within six months, she will have some job reserved for her, but at her former salary level. Finally, if she returns within one year, she will be assigned some position, but at the salary corresponding to that position. 

Only when more than a year has passed without her having returned to work will work ties be considered dissolved. The aforementioned measures are only some of the measures that the government has proposed. It is to increase the entrance of women into productive tasks and diminish absenteeism and interruption as much as possible. 

Between 1964 and 1968, the female labor force increased by 34%. More than 60,000 women were working, and they were represented 23% of the labor force. Nevertheless, many Cuban women are still not fulfilling a positive productive role. During 1969 the Federation of Cuban Women visited approximately 400,000 women who had still not joined the workforce. The results were significant, for out of every four visits came a new worker who stepped forward as Cuban women called the decision to work. 

In Cuban society there are prejudices against women working outside the home. During 1969 the Secretary of Production of the Federation of Cuban Women commented, "We spoke directly with women house by house. We spoke to the men in the assemblies and the factories. Among the women, we always encountered openness and enthusiasm. The men have a certain resistance, but when they understand that the revolution needs women's work, the majority change their mind." 

Cuban leaders have said that agricultural programs should never have been conceived without the participation of women, which began on a large scale in 1964. Women's role in the sugar harvest has little by little increased in importance, both in agricultural processes and in the industrialization of sugar. 

In Pinar del Río, the entire tobacco crop is under the responsibility of a woman. In Oriente, women represent half the labor force working in coffee. 

As for industry, 20% of the industrial labor force is female. They are 49% of the workers in the Ministry of Light Industry, 52% in tobacco work, and 33% in the plastic and rubber factories, 77% in the textile industry, 90% in the Cuban artisan enterprises, and 34% in the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art. Women technicians outnumber men almost six to one in the plastic and rubber factories. 

Women are still scarce in certain physically demanding jobs in construction, fishing, agriculture, and industry. 

Women in Cuba have the freedom to use birth control and to obtain abortions. In one of the hospitals in a rural area of Oriente, it was explained that birth control by diaphragms and IUDs, as well as all other forms of medical and dental care, are not only available, but free on demand. However, no campaign urging women to use birth control is waged, since the question of birth control is considered to be a private family decision. 

North American women will also be interested to know that natural childbirth is the norm in Cuba. Although proud of their new role in production, Cuban women feel it important not to lose their femininity. Beauty is not the money-making industry at once was, since everyone can afford such previously considered luxuries. Cuba's revolution, despite its problems, was a great freeing force setting the basis for the ongoing liberation of women, showing it was possible even in a traditionally machismo society for women to make strides in defining their own lives. 

You have been listening to an article by Ana Ramos, who is with the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina. 

One of the international effects of the military coup in Chile is the subject of a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor. Chile's military leaders have dealt a serious blow to efforts at bringing Cuba back into the hemisphere fold. In fact, it now becomes apparent that the movement toward renewing diplomatic and commercial ties with Cuba, that was gaining momentum during the first part of the year, has been sidetracked and has lost considerable steam.

Based on surveys of Latin American attitudes, there is a broad consensus that Cuba's return to good graces in the hemisphere will be delayed because the Chilean coup eliminated one of Cuba's strongest supporters in the hemisphere. 

In seizing power, says the Christian Science Monitor, the Chilean military quickly broke off diplomatic and commercial relations with the government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro, relations that had been established by the late President Allende in 1970. 

In breaking ties with Cuba, the Chilean military leaders claimed that Cuba had involved itself in internal Chilean affairs and had been supplying the Allende government with large quantities of arms and ammunition, which were being distributed to a vast illegal paramilitary apparatus aimed at undermining traditional authority in Chile. 

According to the Christian Science Monitor, under Dr. Allende, Chile had been a leader in the movement toward reincorporating Cuba into the hemisphere system. Chile had become the driving wedge in the movement is how one Latin American diplomat put it. Now, the drive has been blunted and the pro-Cuba forces are temporarily stalled and re-gearing. 

Christian Science Monitor continues, saying that most Latin American observers are convinced that Cuba will, within time, return to the hemisphere fold and that the island nation will be accorded diplomatic recognition by the more than 20 other nations in the hemisphere, but there is still a strong feeling of antagonism toward Cuba on the part of quite a few nations, including Brazil, the largest of all. 

Before the Chilean coup, however, there was a clear indication that enough nations supported a Venezuelan initiative to end the mandatory embargo on relations with Cuba, in effect since 1964, to bring about a change in official hemisphere policy. 

At least 11 nations supported the move, just one short of a majority in the 23-nation Organization of American States, or OAS. It had generally been felt in OAS circles that Venezuela, which had been largely responsible for getting the embargo in the first place, would be able to find one more vote to support its proposal. 

Now, says the Christian Science Monitor, with Chile clearly in opposition, Venezuela's task is more difficult, and the general feeling is that Venezuela will not bring the issue before the OAS General Assembly when it meets in Atlanta next April, unless circumstances change. This from the Christian Science Monitor. 

Our feature this week is a historical account of the development of the oil industry in Venezuela compiled from Peter Odell's recently published study, "Oil and World Power", as well as some other news sources. Most US attention has been focused on the Middle East as a source of petroleum. However, Venezuela has been and continues to be an important supplier of oil. In 1971, 566 million barrels were exported to the United States. 

Recently, such exports have been dropping, but energy shortages in this country may eventually bring about changes, such as increased exploration for oil in Venezuela and surrounding areas. If so, it should be interesting to observe how various South American governments respond to this. 

The history of Venezuela parallels that of the Middle East in that national governments have taken a more active role in recent years. This trend, of course, reached its climax in the Arab oil reductions during the recent war in the Middle East. The question of sovereignty over natural resources will probably become more and more important, since minerals crucial to industrial growth are finite and seem to be concentrated in underdeveloped countries. 

This is one reason why it is interesting to review the evolution of relationships between the Venezuelan government, the oil companies, and the US government. 

Venezuela was the first nation to undergo a meteoric rise to significance as a major producer and exporter of oil. After 20 years of halfhearted exploration there, the big oil companies were finally galvanized into an urgent flurry of activity by their expropriation and expulsion from Mexico, where the oil industry was brought under national ownership in 1938. 

For 28 years, a succession of governments in Mexico had always seen such action as the ultimate outcome of the conflict between the state and companies, but since it had been avoided for so long, the companies had come to believe it would never happen. 

The promising prospects for oil exploitation in the Maracaibo Basin and in other parts of Venezuela now benefited from the company's need to find or quickly to replace the 15 million tons or so per year they had been lifting from their Mexican fields, mainly for sale overseas. This important stimulus to Venezuelan oil development was soon supplemented by a second, even more important one, the petroleum needs of a rapidly expanding wartime US economy. 

These wartime demands proved too great a strain on the US domestic oil industry and gave companies still greater incentives to seek new resources in Venezuela. 

As a result, oil production there rose rapidly from only 20 million tons in 1937 to some 30 million tons in 1941 and to over 90 million tons by 1946, by which time the country was the world's most important petroleum-producing nation outside the United States. Since almost all the oil was exported in contrast with the mainly domestic use of American oil, Venezuela became the world's most important oil exporter, a position which it has just held on to in 1970, but which it lost to Iran and Saudi Arabia in 1971. 

In the post-war world, which had an energy shortage as a result of dislocations in many of the most important coal-producing areas, the demand for energy from other sources grew rapidly. The political economic environment was also highly favorable to foreign investment in Venezuelan oil because the dictatorial regime there welcomed such investment as a means of amassing private fortunes for those individuals close to the regime. 

These two factors ensured the continuation of the growth of Venezuelan oil production throughout the rest of the 1940s and up to 1957. 

This 20-year period of growth was marked by only one short interlude of restraint. The few months in 1948 when a government came to power under the leadership of a political party, Acción Democrática, whose electoral manifesto called for the nationalization of the country's oil resources and whose leaders in exile had lived mainly in Mexico, where oil was already nationalized. The reaction of the oil companies to this new government was immediate and very blatant. 

Investment virtually ceased, development came to a halt and production was stabilized, while the managers of the companies concerned attempted to decide how far they would be able to work within the framework of the policies likely to be adopted by the new regime. As it turned out, their fears were short-lived. For after a short period of democratic rule, the country reverted to a military dictatorship, a reversion which was almost certainly only made possible with the active help of at least some of the oil companies concerned. 

In 1958, the conflict between the government and the oil companies seemed inevitable, as Acción Democrática still had proposals for the nationalization of the industry in its manifesto and took early action increasing taxes on the industry and giving its support to the oil unions pressure for greatly increased wages and fringe benefits, which seemed to indicate that a head-on clash was but a matter of time, but after 1958, Acción Democrática did not treat its nationalization commitments seriously, and certainly made no move in this direction. 

In fact, by this later date, Venezuela was so completely dependent economically on the oil industry that no government, and certainly not one as anxious as Acción Democrática to achieve its country's economic progress, could afford to think of action which would essentially close down the oil sector of the economy. 

No other sector could avoid repercussions from such action, and the consequent unemployment and distress would certainly undermine the government's political strength. The government's freedom of action in economic terms was thus heavily constrained, and even in political terms, there was little to be said for action which, no matter how immediately popular, seemed likely to create such stresses and strains in the system that the instigators of it were unlikely to survive. 

But if by 1958, the government's ability to act out its basic philosophical beliefs was constrained, then so was that of the oil companies. By now, they were under pressure from the US State Department to achieve an agreement with the Venezuelan government, which was believed by the United States to be the government which provided the key to the stability of the whole Caribbean area, but stability in Venezuela, particularly in the period following Fidel Castro's success in Cuba, demanded an expanding economy. 

This in turn depended upon the continuing development of the country's oil industry, which accounted for something like 25% of the country's gross national product, provided the government will over 60% of all its revenues and accounted for over 90% of the nation's total exports. 

The companies, therefore, though powerful in the Venezuelan context, had to reorientate their attitudes and policies to the even more powerful force of the foreign policy of the United States, which required that the oil industry make it possible for Venezuela to achieve its objectives of continued economic advance. 

This demanded their willing cooperation with a government which they certainly disliked and probably distrusted, but for which there was no acceptable alternative and which, therefore, they could certainly not think of overthrowing, as they had in 1948. 

Economic and political necessity, therefore, as interpreted by the United States, produced a situation in which the international oil companies, dedicated to the idea of as little government intervention in industry as possible and a government devoted in theory at least to socialist planning, had to work together. 

This development, concludes, Odell, unusual, for its time has since been paralleled in both oil-producing and oil consuming nations, as the companies have been obliged to recognize the validity and permanence of governmental concern over oil and oil policies. 

The expansion in Venezuelan oil production since 1958, states Odell, has by no means been as rapid as in the earlier post-war period, but advances have taken place and some investment has continued. Government revenues from oil have been increased, all in spite of the fact that over the period since 1958, Venezuelan oil has become increasingly uncompetitive in many markets of the world as a result of rapidly expanding lower-cost oil output from countries in the Middle East and, more recently, in North and West Africa. 

Moreover, falling costs of transporting oil across the oceans, as larger and larger tankers were brought into use, helped to eliminate 10 as well as competitive edge in markets in close geographical proximity to it than to other main producing areas. This was particularly important with respect to the US market, which had hitherto been considered the particular preserve of Venezuelan oil, but to which Middle Eastern and other oil was now attracted. 

From the interplay of all these economic and political forces, says Odell, Venezuela has since 1958 achieved an average annual growth rate in oil production of less than 3%, compared with 10% per year achieved over the previous 15 years, in spite of the fact that the closure of the Suez Canal since mid-1967 has given Venezuela oil a temporary boost in markets west of Suez, particularly in the United States. 

Though the Cuban crisis and resultant pressures by the United States Department can be seen as the main factors which have saved the Venezuelan oil industry from a serious decline in the last 10 years or so, one must also note the impact of the growing professionalism of the Venezuelan government in dealing with the companies. In earlier days, the expertise was all on the side of the oil companies, which had to respond only to the political pressure of the government. 

Since 1958, the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons in Venezuela has built up a team able to urge, in technical and economic terms, with advice as to exactly how much pressure should be put on the companies to make concessions, particularly as regards taxation arrangements. 

Thus, the government has been able to increase its share of total profits on several occasions and to collect taxes in arrears the liability for which the company's challenged. This has had the effect of increasing the revenues which the country collects on every barrel of oil that is exported. This is now more than $7 per barrel, compared with less than one-tenth this amount when Acción Democrática came to power. 

By virtue of these actions, government revenues from oil have continued to grow at a rate high enough to finance requirements of the economic and social development program, the main short-term aim of the government in its oil policy. 

The government does not accept the idea of the concession system as a means of producing the nation's natural resources, except as a short-term expedient for ensuring the continued flow of oil, and in the light of external pressures, to allow the existing concessions to work their agreed areas. Since 1958, therefore, there have been no new concessions and, as a result, Venezuela's proved oil reserves will be used up in about 13 years at the current rate of production. 

If this situation continues, Venezuelan oil output must soon start to decline, and by the time the concessions are legally relinquished in 1983, it seems likely that Venezuela would be little more than a minor producer. 

In line with its philosophy, Acción Democrática has sought to resolve this issue through the establishment of a state oil company which has been given responsibilities for working any concession areas which might be relinquished by private companies and for negotiating joint arrangements to work as yet unexplored areas of Venezuela with oil potential. 

It now has producing capacity amounting to about 9 million tons per year, and in 1969 accepted offers from a dozen or so petroleum companies for joint operations in the southern part of Lake Maracaibo. 

Whether it will enable Venezuela to exercise more influence in the development of the world oil market is doubtful unless consuming countries also decide to put the oil industry under national control and then conduct their negotiations for supplies directly with other state entities in producing countries. This account of the development of the oil industry in Venezuela was compiled from Peter Odell's recently published study, "Oil and World Power", as well as some new sources.