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It's hard to see how Panama can fail to achieve its objective of exerting painful diplomatic pressure on Washington through the meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which began last week in Panama City. Such meetings offer the poor nations of the underdeveloped world an opportunity to mobilize international support for their grievances against the rich nations in the glare of world publicity. The following excerpts from a front page editorial in the Panamanian newspaper, La Estrella de Panamá, comments on the current negotiations.

Our foreign ministry has engaged in able, patient and cautious diplomatic efforts since 1961 to serve as host to the meeting of the UN Security Council in Panama. That we have achieved this objective, considering that our only element of pressure was our moral force, constitutes a victory for the constitutional government and for the people that support our sound foreign policy. When the Security Council meets at the Arosemena Palace, our flag will be flown together with those of the 131 members of the United Nations. Panama will never again be alone in the long and painful battle in which it has been engaged since 1903. People everywhere are always fair and freedom-loving. The peoples of the world will be with us this March.

The editorial continues, "In October 1971, Panamanian foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, addressed the 16th UN General Assembly and strongly denounced the existing situation in our country caused by foreign intervention in our sovereign territory." He said, "In 1903, Panama had imposed upon it a treaty that enabled the construction of a canal. A treaty that is humiliating to my country in most of its stipulations. By virtue of that treaty, a foreign territory known as the canal zone was embedded in the heart of our republic with its own government and laws issued from the United States." This from the Panama Daily, La Estrella de Panamá.

A further comment on the Panama situation from the Mexico City daily, Excélsior. "For 70 years", says General Omar Torrijos, "strong man of this country. Panama has provided the bodies and the US has provided the bullets." He's referring metaphorically to the colonial treaty, which is now under consideration of the United Nations Security Council. The 44-year-old General said that the approval of the new treaty can take place only by a plebiscite of the Panamanian people. With complete respect for the sovereignty of Panama, and without the qualifications that it be a perpetual or non-limited agreement.

Torrijos said, "One does not negotiate sovereignty. When we speak of sovereignty, they speak of economics. They say, 'Why are you so scornful of money?' As if money could buy everything. Sovereignty and only sovereignty is the question."

By airplane, car, and on foot, Torrijos toured the north of his country with Excélsior reporters. They observed the drama, the sadness, and the misery of the Panamanian peasants. Torrijos said, "We are subjugated by drought and erosion, as well as by a canal. An agrarian reform was initiated four years ago," and Torrijos said that this has total priority, but the canal by its very nature, is a more international issue.

Generation after generation, we have fought over this canal to change this situation. We haven't got a thing. The US has always insisted on a bilateral treaty and bilateral negotiations. We agreed with this and we're loyal to this until we realize that the canal is a service to the entire world. The world must realize that Panama is more than a canal, and that the canal is more than a ditch between two oceans. Around this ditch is a country, a nation, and a youth ready to sacrifice itself to regain jurisdiction over 1400 square kilometers now fenced off under the control of a foreign government.

Torrijos says that the legislature decided not to continue accepting the payment of $1.9 million so that the world can see that we are not being rented, we are being occupied. Excélsior asked Torrijos under what conditions he would sign a new treaty. The main problem he singled out was the length of time of the commitment. The US had been persistently pressing for an agreement in perpetuity, and their compromise offer of 90 years was evidently also too long for Torrijos. When the interviewer asked, "Do you feel that the other Latin American countries are behind you?" The general replied, "Yes, the sentiment of Latin Americans is almost unanimous." This was from Excélsior, the Mexico City daily.

And finally the London magazine, Latin America interprets the security council meeting in Panama as having important implications for US Latin American relations. Latin America says, "There is every reason to suppose that most, if not all, Latin American nations will use the occasion to air virtually every major complaint they have against the United States. During a visit to Mexico earlier this month, the Columbian foreign minister said that during the meeting, the countries of this continent must bring to discussion the disparity in the terms of trade, the growing indebtedness, the classic instability of raw material prices and the lack of markets which obstruct industrialization. The question of the 200-mile limit is also likely to be raised."

Latin America goes on to say, "It is the question of the canal and Panama's relations with the United States that are at the heart of the meeting, and it is here that the United States is most embarrassed. In the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Administration is anxious to follow a less exposed foreign policy and sees playing the world's policemen. It would be happy to make Panama substantial concessions, which if it were a free agent, would doubtless include formal recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and an end to the perpetuity clause of the 1903 treaty; much bigger payments to Panama for the use of the canal; probably a phasing out of the Canal Zone status as a colony of the United States; and perhaps even a gradual disbandment of the huge anti-guerilla training and operational base in the zone.

Though this would touch upon the sensitive question of continental security although Washington has made some concessions. Last month in a symbolic gesture, it removed the 20-foot-high wire fence separating the zone from Panama proper. The fence against which more than 20 Panamanians were killed in clashes with the United States Army in 1964. The United States ambassador, Robert Sayre, has publicly recognized that the zone is a Panamanian territory, though under United States jurisdiction. This commentary from the weekly Latin America.

The Brazilian weekly, Opinião, reported this week from Rio on the further activities of the Catholic Church in opposing the military government. Brazil's bishops, in their strongest and most detailed declaration of human rights, have denounced various types of discrimination in this country and the limitation on basic freedoms here. According to conclusions of the 13th General Assembly of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops made public last week, "It is the duty of the Roman Catholic Church to inform public opinion of the violations of human rights and to defend those rights." The question of human rights was one of the main topics on the agenda of the General assembly that met in Sao Paulo for 10 days last month. A total of 215 bishops or 80% of the episcopate of the world's largest Catholic country, took part in the meeting.

Opinião continues, "The document is not really an open challenge to Brazilian authorities, but a clear statement of the church's position on the question of human rights, and an offer to work with the authorities to improve the situation. In the last year, individual bishops and groups of bishops have publicly attacked Brazil's military regime on its social policies. In particular, they have denounced police and military authorities for arbitrary and repressive actions which have included torture. They have also attacked civilian authorities for allowing large business interests to exploit rural workers in the name of economic development."

The basic human rights, said by the bishops to be among those least respected, were the right to liberty and physical integrity when faced with excessive repression. The right to political participation, in particular denied to the opposition party. The right to association, especially in regard to labor unions. The right to expression and information. The right to a legal defense, in view of the absence of habeas corpus provision. The right to possess the land on which one works. The right not to be subjected to systematic, political, and social propaganda, and aggressive and indiscriminate commercial advertising. And the right of the church to greater participation in social activities sponsored by the civilian authorities.

Opinião concludes, "The bishops came out even more strongly in denouncing various types of discrimination in Brazilian society. Including discrimination in favor of big landowners and against peasant families. For business management against workers. For whites against blacks. For pro-regime, political parties against the opposition. And for men as opposed to women. The bishop's strongest denunciation was directed against the oppression of Brazil's Indian population. The document charged that about 100,000 Indians were in the process of being exterminated. The document urged that the church make a study of the present condition of the Indians and that all persons engaged and work with Indians join forces to help them." This is from the Brazilian weekly Opinião.

Following upon the recent elections in Chile, election in which President Allende's governing coalition gained strength, we have two reports. On possible changes in the governing coalition of probable significance, Latin America reports from Chile that President Allende has suggested that the ruling coalition, Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), should unite to form a single left-wing party and is to summon a Congress of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) in the near future. There has been speculation that the foreign minister might play a prominent role in any such party if it were formed.

Also, the Latin American news staff of The Miami Herald reports on possible changes in Allende's cabinet. President Salvador Allende will name more communists and more socialists to his cabinet and will retain his military ministers, sources said Friday. The entire 15 man cabinet resigned Thursday night to give the socialists chief executive liberty in forming a new government. The ministers continued as caretakers. The sources said Allende planned to name at least one other communist and an additional socialist to the new cabinet. The socialists hold four portfolios in the cabinet and the communists three. This would reflect the results of the March 4th congressional elections in which both communists and socialists gained strength.

The changes in the Popular Unity Coalition and in the cabinet reflects changes registered in the recent election. One indication of the changes in Popular Support was analyzed by Tricontinental News Service.

An analysis of the women's vote in the recent Chilean elections shows a strong leftward drift among Chilean women who have traditionally voted conservatively. A quarter of a million more women voted for the left coalition in this election than in the 1970 election that brought Allende to power. This was an 8.5% increase. This report was from Tricontinental News Service.

More somber consideration for the ruling leftist coalition were reported from Latin America Newsletter. Chilean negotiators sit down with their opposite numbers in the United States at a conference table again this week to discuss the thorny question of Chile's debt. It is now three months since talks were first held, and in the meantime, the urgency of the issue has intensified for the Chileans. Despite its political boost from recent congressional elections and encouraging upturn in the price of copper, the Chilean government finds itself with an economy in the gravest straits.

The following article on political developments in Peru since the illness of President Velasco Alvarado originated with the Latin America Newsletter. It was reprinted by the Brazilian Daily, Opinião. Peruvian President Juan Velasco Alvarado recovering in a hospital from an operation suffered a setback last Saturday when his doctors had to amputate his right leg above the knee. Official bulletins stressed the normality of such a complication, but there can be no doubt in the political impact of this new operation.

Prime Minister Edgardo Mercado Jarrín is temporarily presiding over government meetings. But until last week, Velasco still had to sign all legal instruments. The problem was partially that the Air Force minister should, in strictly military terms, take precedent. However, Mercado is probably the effective ruler of Peru at this point. Mercado is by no means as committed to radical change as Velasco, although he apparently moved to the left during his years as Peru's foreign minister.

Latin America continues. One of the most difficult tasks facing analysts of the Peruvian process has always been to cut through the revolutionary rhetoric and assess the true ideological commitment of the various generals who try so hard to outdo one another in verbal militancy. But there are interesting indications that the government's efforts to stimulate popular participation in the Peruvian revolution have been successful in awakening a militant consciousness in the workers' movement, which never existed there before. How far the militancy can control this development and how far they really want it to go remain to be seen. But the signs are that popular mobilization may be taking on a dynamism of its own.

The First National Congress of Comunidades Industriales, which entered a fortnight ago, provided some interesting evidence to support this view. A creation of the regime's theorists of social solidarity and inter-class collaboration, the Comunidades form of organization are nonetheless throwing up some radical demands which show that the class consciousness is very much alive and indeed growing. Although government officials who helped arrange the congress stressed all along its complete independence from official manipulation or influence, they were probably not prepared for the vigorous declarations of independence from the floor, which led the representatives of the ministry of industry to withdraw.

The ministry's Office of Labor Communities was also accused of lacking revolutionary consciousness and a unanimous vote accensure led to the abrupt departure of the ministry observers. Just for good measure, the Ministry of Labor was criticized for provoking industrial conflicts and the umpteenth call made for its complete reorganization.

Latin America's analysis on the Peruvian situation continues noting, although no open attacks were made on the government policy as such, a number of motions go considerably further than the official stance on such key matters as agrarian reform, nationalization, and workers' participation in decision making. The Communeros called for acceleration of land distribution programs without compensation for exppropriated landowners, complete nationalization of national resources and more active intervention by workers at all levels of management, not just on company boards. Other motions called for the immediate introduction of social ownership of the principle sector of the economy and the Comunidade organization in sectors where it does not yet exist.

From the Congress debates, it seems that despite official exhortation working class leaders persist in viewing the Comunidade as an instrument in their struggle against the capitalistas. A series of demands called for the takeover of firms which tamper with the balance sheets or to declare themselves in liquidation to frustrate the growth of the Comunidade. Other proposals are to exclude the landowners, the owners, and the executives from controlling counsel of the Comunidade and to exclude them also from the annual profit share out. Finally, delegates voted for a strengthening of the unions on the motion that they "constitute the main instrument of class struggle and defense of the workers."

To a certain amount of teaching can bring about a change in consciousness was shown by the experience of the big Northern Sugar cooperatives where, although they are a relatively privileged sector of the Peruvian working class, the field and factory workers directed their fire against the perpetuation of "capitalist attitudes among the managers and technicians." Something similar seems to be happening in industry which was previously a small and weak sector, but which is bound to grow enormously as a result of the government's accelerated industrialization programs.

The government by its no doubt well-intentioned encouragement of participation has opened the door to a militant class consciousness, which is not precisely what it intended. Although as the government is well aware, the Comuneros make up only a tiny and again privileged minority of Peru's working class, they could well become its vanguard. Unless an unexpected change of direction takes place at the top, the newfound self-confidence and independence of spirit among the leading sectors of the working class can only lead to an important radicalization of the Peruvian situation. The above analysis was from Latin America.

The following feature length article on Panama is from The Guardian. The United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama last March 15th to 20th might mark a turning point in the decline of US domination of South and Central America. The meeting which the Panamanian government has been planning for over a year focused its fire on the main current issues involving US hegemony over the region. In particular, the nationalist Panamanian government of General Omar Torrijos has struggled to overturn the US domination of the canal zone, a 500 square mile area which cuts Panama in half. The zone includes the Panama Canal itself and the surrounding area, which houses no less than 14 different US military bases.Torrijos wasted no time in bringing this issue before the conference. In his keynote address, he denounced US control of the canal zone as "neo colonialism," which he then traced back over the 70-year history of US Panamanian relations. While making few direct references to the United States, Torrijos spoke of the zone as "a colony in the heart of my country," and also said that Panama would never "be another star on the flag of the United States."

In addition, the Guardian continues, Torrijos denounced, with extensive support from other non-aligned nations, the economic sanctions opposed against Cuba by the organization of American states at the demand of the United States. The 10 Latin American ministers present at the meeting, all invited by the Panamanians, included Raul Rojas, Cuban foreign minister.

John Scully, the US's new delegate to the UN had earlier replied to Torrijos on several points, saying that the United States was willing to revise the treaty, particularly its most objectionable clause, which grants control of the zone to the United States permanently. Scully implied the United States would be willing to accept a 50-year lease with an option for 40 years more if engineering improvements were made to the waterway. Panama formally introduced a resolution at the March 16th meeting of the security council, calling for Panamanian jurisdiction over the canal zone and its neutralization. This resolution was supported by 13 members of the 15 member Security Council, but vetoed by the United States vote. Great Britain abstained.

The Guardian goes on to say that the Panamanians carefully and skillfully laid the groundwork for the United Nations meeting, waiting for a time when they not only held a seat on the security council but chaired the proceedings. By the time their proposal for the Panama meeting came up for a vote in January, the United States was so outmaneuvered that the only objection the US could raise to the UN floor was to complain of the cost of the meeting. At the same time in the statement of the press, the UN's delegation made it very clear that its real objection to the meeting was that it would be used as a forum for attacks on US policies towards South America. Once the Panamanians offered a $100,000 to pay most of the UN costs, however, the US resistance collapsed.

But the Panamanians, the Guardian says, never made any secret of their intentions for the meeting whose very site, the National Legislative Building, is only 10 yards from the zone's border.

Until 1903, Panama was not an independent nation, but was part of Colombia. After the Colombians refused to a agree to an unfavorable treaty over the building and operation of the canal by the US, the US engineered a Panamanian Declaration of Independence 10 weeks later. Two weeks after that, the US rammed through a treaty even more onerous than the one rejected by Colombia with a new country now called Panama.

Protests over the US control of the zone led to invasions by US troops on six separate occasions, between 1900 and 1925. Both public and governmental protests in Panama forced the United States to sign a slightly more favorable treaty in 1936, but US attempts to make new gains led to demonstrations in 1947 and again in '58, '59.

In January 1964, when students demonstrated near the border of the canal zone, planning to raise the Panamanian flag within the zone, US troops fired on them, killing 22 Panamanians and wounding more than 300. This is well remembered in Panama.

The canal zone was again involved on October 11th, 1968 when Torrijos then the leader of the country's army, took power. Torrijos overthrew President Arnulfo Arias, who had become unpopular for his weak stand in talks with United States over a new treaty concerning the zone. In his first two years in power Torrijos policies, The Guardian states, were similar to those of many South American military dictators. He savagely suppressed spontaneous as well as organized, popular liberation movements. Even during this period however, the United States was not completely sure of Torrijos loyalty. And while he was in Mexico in 1969, the Central Intelligence Agency supported a group of military officers attempting to overthrow him. The coup failed and the officers were imprisoned by Torrijos. Several months later, they escaped, were given asylum in the canal zone and flown to United States. Then in June 1971, an attempt was made to assassinate Torrijos.

Whether from personal conviction, desire to build popular support for his government or antagonism arising from the coup attempt, Torrijos's direction began to change. He refused to agree to the new treaty. He held elections in August of 1972. He refused to accept the yearly US canal rental of $1.9 million. We note that the US' annual profits from the zone alone, not including the canal itself, over $114 million a year, and Torrijos instituted a program of domestic reforms.

Torrijos also expropriated some larger states while increasing government credit and agricultural investments to aid poor peasants. A minimum wage was introduced and a 13th month of pay at Christmastime, over time, premiums and other benefits. 100 land settlement communities were created with about 50,000 people living on them and working government provided land.

The economic philosophy of Torrijos, The Guardian reports, seems somewhat similar to that of other nationalistic left leading groups such as the Peruvian military junta.

The article goes on to say, but major problems remain for the country. About 25% of the annual gross national product comes from the canal zone, and United Fruits still controls the important banana crop. Panama also continues to invite US investment and offers special treatment for the US dollar and high interest rates for bank deposits. While the government has helped encourage economic development with several public works projects, spending is now leveling off, partly because of Panama's growing international debts and the currency inflation plaguing the country. Because of its debts, it has also suffered a growing balance of payments deficits.

A better renegotiation of the treaty then is of economic as well as of political importance. The Panamanian position on a new treaty asks for termination of US administration in 1994, an immediate end to US control of justice, police tax, and public utilities in the zone, an equal sharing of canal profits, which are estimated to have totaled around $22 billion since its opening, the turning over of 85% of canal zone jobs and 85% of wages and social benefits there to Panamanians and military neutralization of the zone.

The Guardian continues that this last demand is the most disagreeable to the US, especially since it is coupled with the demand for the removal of all US bases from the zone. The US is willing to compromise on money and other issues, but not on the military question. The reason is simple. The Canal Zone is the center for all US military activity in South America, including the Tropical Environmental Database, the US Army School of the Americas, and the US Southern Military Command, which controls all US military activities in South America and the Caribbean, except for Mexico.

The zone also includes missile launching and placements and a new US aerospace cardiographic and geodesic survey for photo mapping and anti-guerrilla warfare campaigns. The special significance of these bases becomes clear within the general US strategy in South America. As Michael Klare writes, in War Without End, "Unlike current US operations in Southeast Asia, our plans for Latin America do not envision a significant overt American military presence. The emphasis in fact is on low cost, low visibility assistance and training programs designed to upgrade the capacity of local forces to overcome guerrilla movements. Thus, around 50,000 South American military officers have been trained in the canal zone to carry out counterinsurgency missions and to support US interests in their countries. In addition, the eighth Army special forces of about 1100 troops specializing in counterinsurgencies are stationed in the zone, sending out about two dozen 30 man mobile training teams each year for assistance to reactionary armies. This whole operation is as important and less expendable than US control of the canal waterway itself."

Thus, The Guardian article concludes Panamanian control of the Zone then would not only be a big advance on the specific question of national independence, but also would strike a powerful direct blow at US hegemony all over the South American continent.

More recent articles carry evaluations of the outcome of the security council meeting. Associated Press copy reports that General Torrijos said that he was not surprised by the US veto of the resolution before the UN security meeting "Because Panama had been vetoed for 60 years every time it tried to negotiate." The General said he was pleased with the seven-day meeting of the security council, the first ever held in Latin America, but even more pleased by the public support Panama received from other members of the Security Council. He said, "I look at it this way, only the United States voted to support its position, 13 other countries voted for Panama."

Torrijos later taped a national television interview in which he praised the Panamanian people for their calmness and civic responsibility during the council meeting, he said, "Violence gets you nowhere, and the people realize this." But General Omar Torrijos also says that he started immediately consulting with regional political representatives to decide what his country should do next in the Panama [inaudible 00:28:57] negotiations with the United States.

April 1st was the anniversary of the 1964 military coup in Brazil, which has resulted in a military government to the present time. This anniversary was treated very differently by two newspapers. The Jornal do Brasil in Rio noted the ninth anniversary of the 1964 Brazilian Revolution and in its editorial commended President Médici for emphasizing the social aspects of the Revolutions program. Médici in his address to the nation mentioned the construction of housing for low income groups, the multiplication of schools and plans for sanitation as the great accomplishments of the government installed by a military coup in 1964. These social developments are based on the economic progress of the country since '64 and will eventually lead to the complete modernization of Brazilian society and a mature political system. The Jornal do Brasil feels this is already happening and points to this year's local elections where the government party received large majorities as proof of Brazil's political development.

An opposite view was given the anniversary by Campainha, a weekly newspaper published by Brazilian exiles in Chile. Campania says, "Nine years ago on April 1st, 1964, there was a military coup in Brazil. The national and international patrons shook hands and mobilized their troops to block the struggle of the people. Today completes nine years of dictatorship, nine years of superexploitation, misery, repression, and torture. Some of the achievements of the Brazilian generals are: the working class lost the right to demonstrate or to strike. The wage control law of 1965 states that wages can only rise in accordance with the cost of living. The result of this is the decline in value of real wages by 36% between 1958 and 1969. Because of wage controls over time is obligatory. Factory workers must work 10 hours a day. The awful working conditions and long hours are responsible for more than a million and a half industrial injuries in 1971 alone."

Campainha concludes, "Nine years after the coup, we have in front of us the same task; to organize the resistance to the dictatorship, to stop the disintegration of popular struggles, to organize the resistance in each factory, in each farm, in each university, in each workplace, Chilean workers, Latin American workers. What happened in Brazil is called totalitarian. It is called superexploitation and oppression. This is what the Brazilian military dictatorship wants to export to all of Latin America. To stop this from happening, there exists only one path: to organize the Latin American working class against the Brazilian dictatorship and their sub-imperialist politics. This comment from the Brazilian Exile Newspaper, Campainha.

The ecology movement has recently captured the public's attention in industrialized countries. As the deterioration of the environment becomes more evident and the scientific evidence on the dangers of pollution accumulates, it is to be hope that Western Europe, Japan, and the United States will begin to implement policies to protect the ecosystem, but the programs proposed while popular at home are being seen as a threat to development in many parts of the world.

Some underdeveloped countries view ecological concerns as yet another obstacle created by the developed countries to their economic growth and are refusing to defer their dreams of industrialization because of the dangers to the ecology. The conflict between industrialized nations and the Third World over ecology is in its early stages, but important political, legal and moral questions have been raised, and these questions are of such a fundamental nature that there is some doubt as to whether they can be solved peacefully. Today we will describe the position Brazil took at the United Nations Conference on the human environment in Stockholm last year and then discuss some of the implications of their position. Though we feel that the issues advanced are of extreme importance, ironically, it seems to us that it will not be Brazil, but other poorer countries that will find themselves immersed in these conflicts.

Brazil's position in Latin America is most unique. Brazil has neither been resigned to the status of a non-developing satellite of the developed world, but neither is it moving in the direction of attaining development according to socialist models, nor is it moving towards an economics of cooperation with other underdeveloped nations. Instead, Brazil's governing military group is attempting rapid growth in industrialization similar to the developed mental methods followed by Western capitalist countries earlier in their histories. Brazil is one of the few Third World countries, perhaps the last, that has a chance of making it into the ranks of the so-called developed countries under this model of western, i.e. Capitalist development. Brazil's development seems to look favorably upon by the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and it will presumably assume a place alongside these economically, politically and militarily.

We do, however, in the more general case, agree strongly with these articles' concerns over impending conflicts between developed and undeveloped nations over the usage of world resources. For given the disproportionately enormous resource usage patterns of the developed capitalist countries, it is reasonable to speculate that the development of most of the Third World will indeed be opposed by the economic elites of the developed nations as these powerful nations vie for control of limited resources. The following then is the Brazilian administration's arguments for its right to develop without regard to ecological considerations. The arguments are those developed in a series of articles from Brazil's daily Journal do Brazil, and it's weekly, Realidad.

The Brazilians were unusually blunt in Stockholm, arguing that the worst form of pollution was human poverty and that the industrial nation's concerns about the quality of air and water were luxuries the poor countries could not afford. Brazil's Minister of the Interior told the Assembly on Environment that quote, "For the majority of the world's population, the bettering of conditions is much more a question of mitigating poverty, having more food, better clothing, housing, medical attention and employment than in seeking atmospheric pollution and its reduction."

Brazil's Minister of the interior's argument is open to criticism because rapid industrialization in the Third World without income redistribution often does not improve conditions for the vast majority of the population. Certainly the so-called Brazilian economic miracle has caused widespread suffering among the lower classes. In fact, it has decreased the proletarian share of goods because capital accumulation for industrialization is being achieved by a reduction in workers' real wages. In fact, the situation is so appalling that even Brazil's President Médici remarked publicly last year that, "The economy is doing well and the people are doing poorly."

Yet the Brazilians press on with their policies, justifying them with the convictions that at some point in the future, industrialization will indeed produce great benefits for all classes. This may or may not be true, but from an ecological viewpoint, the important thing is that urgent attempts to industrialize will continue under this model of development.

Basically, the issue as Brazil sees it, revolves around how new ecological concerns will affect their rates of development. Brazilians want to close the enormous and widening gap between themselves and the industrialized nations. While they recognize that ecological problems are not illusory, they feel that a concern for the environment is a trap which may frustrate their desires for rapid development, and they cite three reasons for that fear.

First, devices to reduce chemical and thermal pollution will be expensive and may in addition require lowering production to levels where the environment can absorb the waste generated. It's also observed that precious investment funds would become tied up in non-productive anti-pollutant devices which do not generate new capital. Perhaps most importantly, an anti-pollution campaign would increase the prices of each item produced. The consequences of a jump in prices would be disastrous for a developing economy because it would reduce the already small market for manufactured goods and create a structural block to any further economic growth. Therefore, the Brazilians do not want to take on the economic burdens of protecting the environment. They argued in Stockholm that the rich nations never had such a burden during the 19th century when they were industrializing, and that if the Third World is ever to catch up, it must now have all the advantages the developed world once did.

A second fear expressed by the Brazilians was that the issue of ecology will be used by the industrialized nations as a rationalization to block the Third World's development. They are afraid that rich consumer countries unable or unwilling to control pollution at home and conscious of rendering resource supplies will use these as a justification for keeping a large percentage of the species in underdevelopment and poverty. Ecological concerns have already had an effect, in fact on loan practices from the developed world. As Kalido Mendez, a delegate to the Stockholm Conference pointed out, "It is no accident that the only contributions from the industrialized world that have not declined in the past few years have been military funds and funds designated for population control."

Kalido Mendez's fears, "Namely that the developed countries will act to block development of most of the Third World, seem very real to us. It is however, our perception of the political map that Brazil's development will be permitted even aided by the first world in an effort to make her a partner in maintaining the current power distribution."

The third fear Brazil expressed in the Stockholm conference was that the ecological issue may sometime be used as an entering wedge by the industrialized nations to interfere in the internal affairs of the Third World. While this possibility seems remote at the moment, the situation could become extremely explosive if there were an ecological crisis, such as an oil shortage. Brazilians are especially sensitive to any infringement on their sovereignty because of a developing conflict over their usage of the Amazon River basin and a not dissimilar argument with Argentina over the Parana river. Both of these questions were raised at Stockholm.

The particulars of the Amazonian basin argument are as follows, the consequences of tampering with the ecology of the Amazon may have a very serious ramification for all people. Some scientists estimate that as much as one half of the world's oxygen supply may be generated by the foliage of this huge tropical forest. Also, that the tropical forest ecosystem is a very fragile one. Misuse of the areas such as caused by heavy mining and timbering and the concomitant erosion could convert that area of extremely thin soil layers into a desert within a generation. This may be an overstatement, but it is clear that the area plays a very important role in the world's ecosystem.

The Brazilians, on the other hand feel that for their successful development, they need to be able to exploit these frontier lands much as the United States used the West as a vast reservoir of untapped natural resources for population relocation and to be meted out as incentives for investment. Thus, through expensive governmental programs like the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway and grants of millions of acres to multinational corporations, the Brazilians are trying to develop the virgin area quickly. Brazilian army engineers have cut huge swaths through the jungle to open roads.

The international corporations, mostly United States based, have begun to exploit timber and mineral resources and plan to turn thousands of square miles of forest into pasture land. All of this is being done very rapidly with only a superficial knowledge of the Amazon's ecosystem and with the hope that these disruptions of the forest will not touch off an ecological disaster.

It should be noted as an important aside that the involvement of multinational corporations are an aggravating element in this conflict between rapid development and ecological soundness. Because they remit large profits to their headquarters, usually in the United States, they increase the extent of ecological exploitation necessary to produce the desired level of development for Brazil itself. Finally, international corporations seem to be beyond the control of any nation and try to maximize profits without regard for the wellbeing of any single country. It appears doubtful that these companies will adopt policies which follow sound ecological principles.

When Western environmentalists criticize the opening of the Amazon because it is being done too quickly without sufficient consideration for ecological consequences. The Brazilians answer quite simply, the Amazon is theirs and they will broke no interference, or to state the matter more sympathetically to the Brazilians, they have no intention of maintaining the Amazon as a pollution free zone so that the industrial nations can keep their industrial economies and consumption levels at the current high polluting levels. In effect, the Brazilians are claiming the right to develop at the cost of nature as the US did and continue to do so.

A similar and equally unbending position is taken by the administration on the question of an enormous hydroelectric plant it's building on the Parana River, the Argentinians through whose country this river also flows, argue that the project will wreck havoc with the ecology of the entire area harmfully affecting fishing and farming. The Argentinians during the conference in Stockholm unsuccessfully lobbied for an agreement that would've required a nation to supply information to its neighbor about any project which might cause damage to the neighboring country.

Argentina is not in good economic or political shape at this time, so a military confrontation over the Parana does not seem likely. However, the problem certainly illustrates the explosiveness of the entire question of developmental projects and their effects on the ecology of neighboring countries. One can imagine, for example, how the US might react if the Canadians set about implementing a developmental plan that affected the entire Mississippi Valley. Argentina believes it is facing just such a situation now, and most other Third World nations will probably be in similar positions in the coming decade as competition for materials, energy, and the use of the environment increases.

In this report, we have emphasized the fears that underdeveloped nations feel about the ecological issue, and how it might slow their development and compromise their sovereignty. There is no doubt that if they followed the industrialized country's advice and took better care of the environment, their rate of development would be slowed. Furthermore, their assertion that the rich nations industrialized without considering the ecological balance is historically accurate, and it is also correct to say that almost all pollution comes from Europe, Japan, and the United States, but all the arguments in the world do not change certain grim realities, which must be faced by rich and poor nations alike, for there is an ecological crisis and it does involve all of humanity.

If there is a solution at all to this problem, it must fly with the richer nations. It was the industrialized nations which created the environmental crisis in the first place through decades of dumping waste into the biosphere. It was their non-rational, indeed wasteful usage of energy and natural resources that hastens us towards scarcity. The developed countries have accustomed themselves to using grossly and equitable shares of the world's limited resources, and it is a continuance of this policy, which will absolutely prohibit Third World development and make clashes between poor and rich nations over resource usage inevitable. As these practices continue, it is hardly realistic to ask the undeveloped world, not to pollute and to remain undeveloped while the developed world continues it's high pollution and consumption rates.

So the industrialized nations must cease polluting and bear the economic burden for cleaning up their own territories. More importantly, the general high level of industrial activity must be controlled. To achieve this, the richer nations must stop expanding their economies so rapidly. In other words, the industrialized nations must be willing to reduce their standards of resource use and energy use, while helping to raise the economies of other countries out of their current conditions of abject poverty. They must make a serious attempt to redistribute their wealth, which would allow the Third World countries to be industrialized in an environmentally sound way.

Unfortunately, we do not expect this to happen because we see no way it could be done given the present political, economic, and military structures of the richer nations. Perhaps an ecological disaster will be necessary to awaken people to the need for fundamental change on a global scale. Our hope is that such a disaster will not do irreparable harm to the biosphere. Perhaps wars for the control of natural resource and the usage of energy will be inevitable before people become enlightened as to the consequences of so, does equal a distribution of the world's wealth. Here to, we can only hope and plead that somehow reason and a sense of human solidarity can spare humanity this sort of bloodbath.

There's increasing concern in Latin America with what is considered distorted press coverage of the area by United States Media. Chile Hoy reports with obvious interest on the work of a Rutgers University sociologist analyzing US press coverage of Salvador Allende. Dr. John Pollock, whose work has also been cited by Mexico City's Excélsior, did a detailed analysis of US press reportage of the Chilean president's visit to the United States last December. In an article published in The Nation, he claimed that a mission of important information is systematic, and includes even the most basic data. For instance, the New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Miami Herald, and Los Angeles Times all failed to mention the fact that Allende had been received triumph fully and enthusiastically in Peru and Mexico on his way to the US. In addition, Pollak singled out phrases such as, "Acrobat," "Wiley fox," and, "Skillful juggler," as prejudicing news reports. This from Chile Hoy in Santiago.

La Nación from Buenos Aires reports on the current US-Chile negotiations. If the United States insists on compensation for certain North American properties that have been nationalized, Chile will invoke a 1914 treaty, which calls for an international commission of five members to arbitrate discussion in case of stalemate. Because of disagreements as to the extent of compensation, Chile has been unable to refinance its external debt with the United States, which consists of $1,200,000,000. Vital lines of public and private credit have been cut, and Chile faces difficulties in obtaining goods from North American suppliers. This report from La Nación in Buenos Aires.

La Prensa of Lima comments about internal political struggles in Chile. The revolutionary leftist movement in Chile directed strong criticisms against the reformists, intensifying the struggle between the radical left and the government of President Allende. In a public declaration, the organization denounced a reprimand, which the president had addressed to some radical groups who were involved in the attempted takeover of some businesses. The radicals termed Allende's speech alarmist and accused him of threatening the workers. Later on radio and TV, Allende said he would go to any lengths necessary to prevent illegal action. "The rights of workers are one thing," he said, "But hasty, demagogic and spontaneous acts are another." The radicals replied that it was an objective fact that workers and peasants throughout the country had been mobilized by inflation and lack of supplies and not by extremists. This from La Prensa, the Peruvian Daily.

The pro-government press in Chile has accused the opposition of launching a campaign to discredit the armed forces, and in particular, the commander in chief and former interior minister, General Carlos Pratts. The opposition evening paper, La Segunda, alleged that Pratts had told a meeting of 800 officers that he supported the process of change being carried out by President Allende. Other opposition papers have alleged that several senior officers have been prematurely retired because of their opposition to the government's education reform bill.

For today's feature, we've invited economist David Barkin to discuss the problem of unemployment in Latin America. David's a participant in the conference on US/Mexico Economic Relations this week on the University of Texas campus, is currently teaching economics at the City University of New York, and has traveled widely in Latin America. He visited Cuba for two months in 1969 at the invitation of the Cuban government, has worked with Chilean economists off and on for the past four years, and has done extensive research and has taught economics in Mexico for about five years.

David, someone at the conference the other day stated that unemployment rate in Mexican agriculture is 46%. Could you comment on this figure, and include what efforts are being made by the Mexican government to correct this problem?

The problem of unemployment in Mexico is very serious because of the nature of development, which is leading to the development of commercial agriculture in selected parts of the country. In a few selected parts of the country. And the rest of the agricultural sector is stagnating. People are being forced out of the agricultural sector, but those who remain are finding themselves without the resources and without the government assistance which is necessary for them to become productive members of the society.

The 46% unemployment figure in Mexico is a reflection of the fact that although a lot of people remain in the agricultural economy, many of them are not producing nearly as much as they might produce were resources available for the production of goods which could satisfy the needs of the mass of the people in the population. In the urban sector, the problem is not quite as serious in absolute magnitude, but perhaps in human terms even more serious. The misery associated with urban unemployment is greater than that with rural unemployment. And the slums in the large Mexican cities are growing year after year. The unemployment rate in Mexico City and in other urban areas in the country may be as high as 30 or 40 percent, if you consider what these people could produce if they were working fully in productive occupations, satisfying the basic needs of people, which at the present time aren't being satisfied.

Now, in terms of what the Mexican government is trying to do to solve the problem, they have undertaken a large program of public works projects, and are trying to encourage additional investment both by Mexicans and foreigners. The problem with this program is that it is designed to satisfy the needs of only a small proportion of the Mexican population, perhaps only 30% of the population. 30% of the population with income levels far above those of the other 70% of the population who live at bare levels of subsistence, and many of them living at below the level of what we would consider dignified living levels. It does not seem to me, nor to many of the representatives at the conference that the present development programs of the Mexican government are going to be able to seriously attack and make inroads into the problem of unemployment in Mexico. This is further compounded of course by the high rate of population growth in Mexico, but even if population growth rates were to decline in Mexico, it's not clear that they would be able to solve the unemployment problem with their present approach.

What about the effect of US investments in Mexico on the employment problem?

US investments are particularly injurious to the Mexican people because they're creating a type of industry which is displacing people in favor of machines, for the production of whatever goods are being produced in Mexico. US investments are generally what we would call capital intensive. That is using machinery to replace people in the production of goods. The goods which are produced are the kinds of goods which we, Americans, consume, but which because we are so rich, the middle level American standard of living is so high compared to that in Mexico, the kinds of goods which are produced are only able to be bought by those people in the 30% that I cited, who have sufficient income to buy those kinds of goods. That is they have income like a middle income level person in this country might have. An average person.

As a result, American investment is only heightening the problem in Mexico, creating additional difficulties because they are creating the appearance of modernity and creating a whole gamut of goods which the whole population can see but does not have access to.

What about the Mexicanization regulations that are being discussed now in Mexico in terms of affecting foreign investment? Is that going to solve any of the problem?

The Mexicanization legislation, which is designed to put some curbs on foreign investment is designed to attack a different problem. A problem that American foreign investment is making inroads into the capital equipment, the machinery and the factories which is owned by Mexican entrepreneurs. Until recently, Americans have been going into Mexico and purchasing outright large factories in large parts of the economy owned by Mexicans, and what the new legislation is designed to do is to try to stem this tide. It is not designed to prevent foreign investment, and it is not designed to prevent the sorts of effects which I just talked about, but rather to try to give the Mexican some protection in the face of the large transnational corporations who are trying to get greater control over the Mexican economy.

David, what about unemployment in Chile under the popular Unity government? What is Salvador Allende doing to correct this problem?

Well, unemployment in Chile was a growing problem during the last part of the 1960s. The economy was stagnating and unemployment rates in the city of Santiago, which is the most highly developed part of the country, reached as high as 10 and 12%. Now, that's very serious in an industrial labor force, which was as fully integrated into the modern sector of the economy, as is the case in many of our own North American cities.

10% and 12% unemployment for the group as a whole is very serious, and the Allende government's first problem, first priority when taking over was to do something about this problem. What they did was to redistribute income in a very simple, straightforward way by directing that wages be increased while profits be frozen. This sort of measure led to an immediate reactivation of the economy and an increase in demand by workers and the lower socioeconomic groups in the population, which made it possible for the government to increase employment in firms which it was taking over because private entrepreneurs were not responding to the increase in demand by the lower classes, and in instead trying to shift their resources to production of goods for the upper classes. As a result, in 1972, employment rates had gone down to below 4%. Quite an achievement in a very short period of time.

The Cuban government claims to have created a full employment economy. David, you've visited Cuba and you've written a book about Cuba. From your experience, how has this been accomplished?

Basically, the reason—the way in which unemployment has been eliminated, in fact the employment problem has been changed from one of unemployment to one of over full employment and a shortage of labor, is by a change in the basic assumptions on by which people are asked to participate in the economy.

In an economy based on a market system, people must work, produce sufficient income for an employer in order to provide that employer with a profit. If the person could produce something for the benefit of society, but that production is not profitable for some private entrepreneur, that person is not going to be employed. In Cuba, a person who could produce for the benefit of society, even if it doesn't go to the benefit of one individual in the society, can and must be employed.

In fact, during the first years of economic reorganization in Cuba, people were absorbed into the economy through a vast educational effort in 1961, a vast medical effort, and the expansion of production in every sector of the economy. Social services and productive services were expanded so that by the late 1960s the problem in Cuba was not how to find work for people, but rather how to encourage people who previously did not consider themselves part of the workforce to join the workforce, and now old people who were previously retired are performing useful social tasks for the society, people who are in schools, children and young people are being asked to join as part of their regular school program in productive tasks, and women and disabled people are also being fully incorporated into the economy.

I'd like to go on though and explain the nature of the unemployment problem and the way in which the Cubans solve it differently than say the Mexicans. Sugar cane cutting is a very difficult task and it requires in the pre-revolutionary era, about 300 to 400,000 people during four months a year, working 12 hours a day and sometimes as much as seven days a week during four months a year to cut the sugar cane. During that period they were paid sufficient income to live on for 12 months, but only at the very, very miserable levels of subsistence, which prevailed in Cuba at that time. Most of them didn't have access to meat and milk, for example. But they were unemployed for eight months of the year.

In the post-revolutionary government era, it's impossible to conceive of people being idle for eight months a year because of the very, very serious needs of people throughout the whole economy to solve productive problems, and to increase production in agriculture and industry and in services. As a result, most of these people who were working in sugar were incorporated into other activities. Reorganization of agriculture, livestock industry, and things like that. As a result, they were not available full-time during the sugar harvest for cane cutting.

When cane cutting needs were great, the entire population was recruited for sugar cane cutting on a voluntary basis. And people worked in brigades based on workplaces, and went into voluntary areas, and people at the factories remaining at the productive jobs and in the bureaucracy were expected to do the work of other people, to cover their jobs while they were absent. As a result, a technical problem, the cutting of sugarcane is solved in present day Cuba not by allowing people to be unemployed, which is the case of our migrant farm workers and of migrant farm workers all over the hemisphere, but rather by getting brigades of voluntary workers to achieve this task in a collective way.

This I think has great lesson for us in America, because we assume that people must be employed only at a specific task, and if that task is not available, then they're going to remain unemployed, as is the case of migrant farm workers. When we cannot create sufficient jobs because of specific political policies, policies of the government, we are in a quandary. We don't know how to provide these people with sufficient income and still remain with the incentive system to encourage them to work when we need them to work at low wages. As a result, we have a technical problem which translates itself into a social problem. The social problem of poverty, and widespread un- and underemployment, with the impossibility of many groups in our population finding work at all. Especially women and some third world groups.

The technical problem could be solved in our country, but not under the assumption that people must work to provide a profit for a small group of employers. It's only if they could work by satisfying social needs that we're going to be able to attack the basic underlying problem of poverty.

For our feature today, we'll be talking with Mary Elizabeth Harding, an American citizen who worked for 14 years in Bolivia with the Roman Catholic Order of Maryknolls Sisters. Mary was arrested on December 5th in Bolivia and charged with belonging to a terrorist organization. International press coverage and protests were credited for securing her release this last January 14th. Mary, how did you happen to go to Bolivia in the first place and what kind of work were you doing?

Well, I went to Bolivia in 1959 as a Maryknoll sister. I was assigned there and I worked for about four years with children in a little parish school in Cobija, Bolivia. Then I went up to La Paz, which is the business center and the political center of the country, and I began to see through my work with public school children there, how very difficult life was for working class people in Bolivia. I was aware that the religious community was more accepted by the people who owned the business, the people who owned the factories and in La Paz than the working class people. I began to question my commitment to the religious community, and in 1970 I asked to be released from Maryknoll. That time I was working in a factory. I stayed on working in the factory until about a year later, then I began teaching English to support myself.

What kind of factory was it?

It was a plastics factory. Came this little factory where we made a plastic tooling and bagging and little plastic artifacts, little kitchen utensils, spoons, cups, saucers, things would be stamped out of these hydraulic machines.

What were the working conditions there and wages?

It was a pretty difficult place to work. The machinery was very old, very unreliable. Accidents were frequent, and when I say accidents, I mean bad accidents because remember, these machines close under tons of pressure. Now when they don't open again, then until they're ready, and if you got a hand or your fingers caught in the machine, it meant you lost that part of your hand.

What were the circumstances of your arrest and how were you finally released?

Shortly after I went to La Paz, I began to question the role of my religious community as being an agent in bringing about the kind of changes that I felt were needed in Bolivia. I began to develop a friendship with many young people in the country who also had reached this level of questioning how much longer we could go on. The way we saw it, we were putting band-aids on a completely sick, corrupt body, and we felt that to really put Bolivia back in the hands of Bolivians would mean a drastic, a radical change in her whole economic and political system. I really consider it an honor to have met some of these young people. Most of them are no longer alive. One fellow died in the guerrilla focal that took place in 1970.

I became very concerned about the question of the conditions of the people who were arrested in the country. I was very concerned for the political prisoners and I was very active in a group. See, there was actually a committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Bolivia, which had a recognized charter from the United Nations. But the situation was so tense and has been so tense and so difficult since August of 1971 when Hugo Banzer Suarez came into power, that we were literally afraid to reactivate this committee, to organize a committee which would try to defend the human rights of people arrested for political reasons in Bolivia. We set up kind of a network of reaching the prisoners with supplies, with food or clothing or medical things. Then they in turn let us know of the condition of the people in the prisons and who had been arrested and where they were. It was the only way the families of the prisoners could keep in touch with the people in the prisons.

You were arrested last December?

I was arrested on the 2nd of December, and I was released on the 14th of January. I was arrested by these secret agents that are used by the police now. They're not uniformed men. They carry no identification. You're transported in automobiles that have no license plates. I was taken to the Ministry of the Interior and I was pretty badly treated there for a few days, and I think that's quite significant. I don't know if people realize, I think some people think that the brutal treatment or the torturing of political prisoners goes on kind of around the fringes of the government, that the government doesn't really have the responsibility for, can't really control it. That's not true. No, I know in my own case, I suffered several beatings right there in the Ministry of the Interior. I know the case of a 67-year-old woman, Delfina Burgoa, who was arrested and taken to the Ministry and beaten, terribly tortured for information.

I remained in the Ministry for about 12 days, and then I was taken to the police station where I stayed in solitary confinement for four weeks, and then I think it was a accumulation of pressures. People here in the States were writing letters to me in care of the president of the country. People were writing letters to Senator Kennedy because I'm from Massachusetts and to Senator Church because they knew that—Well, he had made some very interesting observations about American economic assistance, which were picked up in the Bolivian newspapers, and I had sent those clippings to him and kind of maintained a contact with him. So those people put on the pressure that they could, and my friends in La Paz were continually visiting the consul and the Minister of the Interior.

Is your case unusual in Bolivia, or are there many people in Bolivia who are in prison for political reasons?

There must be a thousand people right now in prison in Bolivia. That might not impress you terribly when you think of 200,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. But when you remember that there's—the Bolivian population is 4 million and some. The people who would be politically aware, the people who live around the cities, who would be more conscious of what's going on, what was involved in the change of government, that wouldn't be more than maybe 300,000 people. When you take into consideration the fact that periodically 20 or 30 people are released from jail and sent out of the country, and then another 20 or 30 take their places in the jail, the number of a thousand becomes very relative.

Are most of these political prisoners people that are involved in organized subversion of the government or—It seems like that would be harder.

Subversion is a very good term. It's pretty hard to define what subversion is all about. This particular government, the government of Hugo Banzer Suarez, considers any criticism or any offering of alternative solutions for Bolivia's problems as subversion. The people in the jails in Bolivia are many students, professional people, there are many women in prison. No respect is made for a woman's condition. I know of several cases of women who were expecting children when they were arrested and pretty badly beaten up. I know of a case of a Bolivian intellectual, a man who founded the Partido Indio in Bolivia. He was accused of criticizing the government and these secret agents went to his house to arrest him, but they didn't find him. The only one in the house was his nine-year-old grand-nephew, so they took that child. He was later released among the men who escaped from Quati back in November of '72.

There were many young fellows in that group, 15, 16 year old boys. I know people who have been murdered. I know people who have suffered very serious consequences as a result of the treatment they received in prison. Now, no one who's in jail in Bolivia who's considered a political prisoner has ever passed to the judiciary process. No one has ever had a trial. The right to habeas corpus is not respected. This guarantee is written into the Constitution, but General Bond said, wrote it right out by a supreme decree, and the Association of Professionals challenged the president on that. They challenged the constitutionality of that, and when they did, their leader, the man who was the head of the Association of Professionals, was arrested.

Mary, there's a lot of criticism of US support of military dictatorships in, for instance, Brazil, Argentina, and other Latin American countries. What's the US policy toward the Bolivian government?

The United States policy is very clear towards the present Bolivian government, and it was very clear towards the government that just preceded General Hugo Banzer Suarez. The man who was in office before, he was in office for some 10 months, and he received $5 million worth of economic assistance. The American company, the construction company, Williams Brothers, that was building the pipeline to pipe out the natural gas just couldn't complete its contract. They couldn't complete the construction of that pipeline under General Torres, but it was miraculously completed under Hugo Banzer Suarez and the amount of economic assistance to the General Suarez was–in the first six months of Suarez' period, he received nine times what Torres had received in a year—in 10 months.

The United States has very direct economic interests in Bolivia. Bolivia has very rich mineral reserves. Everyone's heard of Bolivian tin. Well, Bolivia also has deposits of zinc, tungsten, radioactive materials, and a real wealth of petroleum resources. The Denver Mining Corporation is now investing some $10 million dollars in exploiting the tungsten outside of Aruro and the Union Oil Corporation of California has been given the franchise to develop the oil reserves down in the Santa Cruz area. Bolivia right now represents a very good place to invest capital from the United States of America.

Mary, what do you think North Americans can do to help the Bolivians in their struggle against repression?

I think the best thing North Americans can do for Bolivians or other Latin Americans, other third world people, is to become politically aware and conscious of what's going on here right in their own country. When we talk about economic assistance and how that's used to manipulate the internal politics of countries like Bolivia, there's a long history of this in Bolivia, we're talking about dollars and cents that we as American citizens pay into in the form of taxes. I think we have to become conscious of the fact that this money that we kick in is used then to manipulate other countries.

The United States government, state department officials who are represented in the embassies of foreign countries are, they are not to let the Bolivians know how the United States, how American citizens feel for them and are really anxious to see them develop their own country. They're there for the specific reason of protecting the investments of United States' economic interest. Like the Oil Corporation of California that we mentioned, Gulf had tremendous money invested in Bolivia and received some seven times more in profits than she lost in that famous $80 million loss when Gulf was nationalized.

Thank you, Mary. We've been talking today with Mary Elizabeth Harding, a former Maryknoll sister who spent 14 years working in Bolivia, was arrested last December by the Banzer government in Bolivia, and finally released in January of this year.

Le Monde continues saying that the Christian Democrats who, on occasions, have flirted with the idea of a dialogue with the government, seemed to have fallen back on a policy of unreserved hostility. This particularly, since Mr. Allende publicly referred to a Washington Post article stating that Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democrat candidate, had received $20 million from the CIA and from US-based multinational corporations to finance his 1964 electoral campaign.

The Christian Democratic Party appears determined to go to war against the social sector of the economy by introducing a reform bill meant to repeal the entire policy of nationalization. The rightist National Party will obviously go along with the Christian Democrats.

Faced with the growing threat to the government, the workers have again expressed solidarity and readiness to mobilize as in October to defend their factories and offset the rightist inspired violence, Le Monde continues. One hundred thousand workers living in the southwest industrial belt of Santiago have declared a state of general alert. Despite all government efforts to prevent the situation from taking too dramatic a turn, the entire nation wonders anxiously whether Chile is engaged in an electable course towards civil war. That from Le Monde.

Another article, this time from Latin American Newsletter and postdating the above story, reports subsequent developments in the crisis. The article begins, "After street riots in which a pro-government worker was killed, tension has raised to the level of last October and relations between Popular Unity and the Christian Democrats are worse than ever. Unidad Popular, the governing coalition, is blaming the death on the Christian Democrats since the shots which killed the worker appeared to come from the party's building, outside which the pro-government demonstration was held."

In the confused situation prevailing, no firm evidence has been found as to who actually fired the shots, but the Christian Democrats at first denying the responsibility, then said that they had to defend themselves because the demonstrators were about to attack their headquarters and the government had deliberately left them without proper police protection."

Latin American Newsletter goes on to say that relations between both sides are now so bad that most observers are discounting any prospect of functional compromises or cooperation in congressional work, which it is thought President Allende was seeking with the Christian Democrats.

To block any such synthesis would certainly be in the interest of the right, indeed, some people in the government side are saying that the current wave of violence is a deliberate right-wing provocation. Certainly, there is evidence of right-wing thugs egging on opposition student demonstrators who clashed with pro-government students last week.

Latin American Newsletter goes on to observe that with the church still showing signs of withdrawing its tacit support of the government, especially over the new education program, and the army also appearing to be reserving its position, Allende is undoubtedly in trouble. Moreover, this is occurring simultaneously with a difficult congressional struggle with the opposition of nationalization. The above article was from Latin America Newsletter.

An even later article, this time from the American Daily at the Miami Herald, reports that the Marxist blood government decreed a state of emergency on May 5th in the province of Santiago, banning public gatherings and putting the military in charge of public security. The undersecretary of the interior said the mild form of martial law was imposed, "in the face of a state of social agitation troubling Chile." An anti-government demonstrator was shot and killed, and four others were wounded Friday night in an anti-government protest in Santiago.

In Concepción, a major city in another province, thousands of anti-government demonstrators protesting the shooting, battled police Saturday for two hours. The state of emergency declared May the 5th affects three and a half million people in Chile's largest province, where about one third of the country's population lives. Last October, the government similarly declared a state of emergency in most Chilean provinces to deal with widespread disturbances and strikes by truck owners, shop owners, and some professionals. The demonstration in Concepción on Saturday was organized jointly by the Christian Democratic Party and by the right-wing Fatherland and Liberty organization.

This week's feature is on Mexico and we're happy to have Robert Hedner with us who has been a correspondent to Mexico for some time. What can you tell us given the recent kidnapping of the American consulate about the guerrilla movements in Mexico?

Well, first of all, due to the attitude of the government and the controlled press, little is really known about the guerrilla movement. The government either denies their existence or claims that they have just been destroyed or alternatively says they're only a matter of thieves and assassins anyway and they can be dealt with by the local police. The press complies by relegating all reports of guerrilla activities to the crime pages. So, it would seem that the Mexican authorities would prefer that Mexico be known as the country with the highest crime rate in the world rather than having foreign investors and tourists and most importantly their own population suspect that a widespread popular movement may be developing.

How widespread would you say that movement is?

Well, I think first of all, we have to speak of various local movements rather than a national movement. There doesn't seem to be evidence that there's any national coordination among these various local movements. The strongest movement is undoubtedly that of in Guerrero, which is in the state and the southeast of—excuse me, the southwest of the country and is headed by Lucio Cabañas. Judging from the repression there, the movement seems to be very strong indeed. There's been two to three years of repeated search and destroy missions in Guerrero. The former leader of the movement, Genaro Vázquez, was murdered by the police about a year and a few months ago, has now become a national hero.

Napalm has apparently been used, American helicopters, CIA-trained counterinsurgency teams, but all of this has failed to diminish the growing movement. Growing in any case, if we can measure it by the attacks on military camps, army convoys and the repeated kidnappings of the past year and a half, which now have been reported in the newspapers. There's also mass repression in Guerrero, reports of mass arrests in the slums of Acapulco and the other major cities in Guerrero, and also reports of what the Mexicans call "Vietnam villages", which are what we call strategic hamlets, villages surrounded by barbed wire in order to control the rural population.

So, that apparently, Lucio Cabañas, his group is not just a guerrilla band, but a popularly supported movement, not just in the countryside but in the cities of Guerrero and not just in Guerrero, but also in neighboring southern states. There have been many reports of other guerrilla movements such as in Sinaloa, in Tlaxcala, in Chiapas, and in various other parts of the republic.

Are there any reports of activities in some of the major cities?

Yes. There have been numerous reports of urban guerrillas, particularly in Monterey and Acapulco, in Mexico City, but in almost all the main cities of Mexico. And in all of them, you find now that the banks have details of soldiers outside them guarding them. Usually these guerrillas demand the freeing of political prisoners, and this suggests that the Mexican jails are once again overflowing with them. I think the most important urban guerrilla movement has been that of in Chihuahua. In January of '72, a number of the downtown banks were expropriated, as the guerrillas put it. Some of the guerrillas were then arrested. There were reports of there being tortured and even of murders in jail.

In the face of these reports, a popular assembly was called Foreign Chihuahua and 15,000 people turned out for the first one. Subsequently, a popular tribunal was formed to judge first the local repression, but then finally the repression on a national scale to judge the whole regime and it's a permanent political organization, and there now have been popular assemblies in other cities in Mexico, including Puebla and Monterey. So that there seems to be a connection and certainly a great impact between the guerrilla movements, the underground and clandestine movements and these popular movements. But in some, again, I would say that there's no national coordinated movement with a national program, but rather growing local guerrilla actions and then generally, a growing political movement despite sophisticated and very violent repression in Mexico.

Guerrilla movements sound rather strange to us. I was wondering if you could explain some why there are guerrilla movements and why these movements seem to be growing.

Well, I think the fundamental and root cause is the distribution of the social product in Mexico, a distribution which despite, or rather really because of Mexico's wanted economic growth in the past 20 or 30 years is very, very uneven. The 50% at the bottom of the social scale received 15% of the national income and the 15% at the top, those have been benefiting from this economic growth now receive 60% of the national income. This of course after American corporations have subtracted their part.

Why is the income so concentrated or so uneven?

Well, as in all societies, control of the means of production determines how the product will be distributed. In Mexico, which is a dependent capitalist society, the means of productions are controlled by the foreign monopolies in alliance with a local big bourgeoisie. Together, they have pursued an economic policy, which they call import substitution, which is finally responsible I think for the nature of the distribution of the social product there.

This particular policy of import substitution, what is that? Can you describe that?

Yeah. I think there are two ways of looking at it. One, from the point of view of the Mexican and the other from the point of view of the multinational corporations. The Mexicans, and for the underdeveloped countries in general who undertake this kind of policy, it means the substitution of products previously imported from the metropolitan countries, almost always manufacturing, manufactured products, substituting for these imports by making the products at home, by importing the means of production to make them. That is, instead of importing commodities, you import machinery and you make the products at home.

Where did they get the capital for that? How is that arranged?

Well, the capital comes from multinationals. And from the point of view of the multinational corporations, this is a very attractive policy. Rather than export to Latin America manufactured items made by expensive American labor, you export your youth machinery and you get the super exploited Latin American worker to produce the products. And in exchange for this flexibility, you get a guaranteed monopoly in the national market and tax concessions from the local bourgeoisie anxious to share in the profits from foreign capital investment.

However, this process does create serious problems. The one thing, it's based on an existing and given market, that is all it does is substitute where the product is made, and since this foreign investment is attracted by low wages, it's very difficult to expand the market. What happens is to the extent that the market is expanded is it is expanded by deepening it, the 15% or so who are benefiting from this process by more, television sets and automobiles, let's say. So, that capital moves from one branch, which has been substituted such as textiles to another branch, such as television sets, and then when this branch is saturated, when the market has been used up or can't expand anymore, capital has shifted into another branch such as now petrochemistry, or intermediate production goods in general.

But what happens is that the population remains underfed and underclothed and 15% of the population, which benefits from the process continues to benefit and the gap grows wider. It also causes balance of payment problems because the whole process is finally dependent on foreign loans to pay for the importation of machinery from the metropolitan countries.

Given this economic situation, what are the multinationals in the Mexican government planning to do?

I think basically they're planning to follow the Brazilian model, the model that Brazil has followed since 1964, which is to emphasize exportation, to try to solve the balance of payment problems by exporting manufactured items principally to the regional markets in Latin America. However, this also creates problems, perhaps even more serious problems. In order to participate in the world market, the Mexican industry must become more efficient. It's now been protected by 30 years of high tariffs in this import substitution policy, so that it is very inefficient. Therefore, productivity has to be increased, machinery has to be bought, the industry has to be modernized.

Well, it's obvious that the companies which can afford to buy machinery will be the big ones, the monopolies, the foreign monopolies particularly, so that those companies which will benefit from the process will be the North American companies, who will continue to penetrate the Mexican market even more so. The small businessman will be the one who will suffer. He's been protected by this import substitution policy, but now tariffs are being lowered again to raise the efficiency of Mexican industry.

And finally, since the whole process is based on increasingly sophisticated machinery, technological unemployment will rise. The only thing that the president of Mexico, Echeverría, has done to deal with these contradictions, particularly among the smaller businessmen, is to present his policy as a very nationalistic anti-imperialist policy that Mexico will grow greater and begin to export. In fact, it is anything but an anti-imperialist policy and Echeverria is perhaps the new model of the anti-imperialist imperialist statesmen.

How would you see then the future of this development that would seem that the income distribution is already severely strained and that the possible growth plans for the economy would emphasize exports rather than improvement of the mass standard of living at home, that would only seem in the long run to make things worse?

Yes. I think that on the one hand, there will be some attempt to co-opt the working class as they have been to some extent the unionized working class co-opted since World War II. But they haven't been so much co-opted, as had their trade union organizations controlled and dominated. But they will try to create a kind of labor aristocracy in Mexico, but it'll be very, very difficult in the face of falling wages.

I think the only thing that would really be left for the government is what they're already doing, which is massive repression of any kind of political descent, mass descent movement. There will be increasing political prisoners and the left will be faced with the job of really implementing the worker, peasant, student and unemployed alliance that they have been talking about. I think a great deal will depend on the working class movement. If the working class movement, which has arisen in the past few years and has threatened the control of the trade unions in the past two or three years, if this movement becomes more than a syndicalist reformist movement and begins to become a revolutionary movement to align with the campesinos, to align with the unemployed and with the students, then I think Mexico will be entering into a pre-revolutionary, even a revolutionary period.

And the whole, I think an interview in El Punto Crítico, which is the finest magazine in Mexico for this kind of information, an interview with one of the guerrillas, one of the Chihuahua guerrillas perhaps summarize what we can expect in Mexico in the next few years. This prisoner was in jail and heard that one of his compañeros, one of his associates had been captured. He later heard the next day that there had been a shootout in the jail and that someone was killed. He was told that. When he asked who it was that was killed, he received no answer and was just left wondering what had happened to his compañero.

A few hours later, the subdistrict attorney came in and the interview goes on and says, "He told me that the dead man was Raul Diaz," his campanero. I answered him. I said to him, "Revolutions are made with the barbarity of some and the sacrifice of others. And I think this is what we can expect will continue to be the case in Mexico, and even more so in the next few years. Barbarity on the one hand and enormous sacrifice on the other."

Excélsior reports from Mexico City that, on May 1st, while workers' demonstrations were taking place in all parts of the republic, mass political murder again struck the Mexican democratic struggle. The scene was Puebla, traditional bastion of the Mexican right, noted traditionally for its numerous churches and, more recently, for its ferocious politics.

According to Excélsior, five students were gunned down and a dozen others, including four police, were injured when members of the student movement attempted to distribute leaflets at the local Mayday parade. According to police, the students had attempted to alter the direction of the parade. The official statement of the student organization claimed that the students were killed at a meeting called to discuss and protest the imprisonment of students passing out literature to the workers. Police open fired at the meeting from nearby rooftops and a number of students were shot down.

Excélsior continues, the following day, as President President Luis Echeverría ordered an investigation of the incident, Puebla's governor stated that the killings ought to be a lesson to the students. Days later, the governor himself was in turn deposed due to a growing nationwide reaction, including a national university protest strike and numerous protests from students and worker organizations.

Puebla industrialists and businessmen organize a transportation and service stoppage to protest the deposition of the governor, while students and workers attempted to organize a mass meeting, later prohibited, to protest the stoppage. 20,000 sympathizers attended the funeral of the murdered students.

According to Punto Crítico, Puebla has been the scene of political assassination for nearly a year now. Ever since the student movement under left wing, including communist party, leadership attained a strong measure of influence in university affairs in 1972. The students attempted to carry out reforms widening the social base of the university. They set up service brigades to supply medical aid, social services, and general information to local peasants and workers unemployed in the crisis-ridden textile industry of Puebla.

In July, a young architect and director of the Free People's High School was gunned down in the streets of Puebla apparently by members of a national fascist political organization. Despite demands for a thorough investigation and government promises to comply, to this date, no one has been accused of the crime. In October, the right organized an anti-communist and pro-religious demonstration. Amid growing labor and peasant solidarity and demonstrations of support from other universities, the reaction continued to grow. Last winter, the organizer of the service brigades was also killed in Puebla. According to reports, this investigation has also gone un-investigated by the authorities.

As Punto Critico and Siempre! describe it, Puebla is at the heart of an attack on the universities by organized elements associated with industry and the labor union bureaucracy who wish to discourage mounting student participation in the worker and peasant movements growing noticeably since 1968. The university have recently been the scene of what the government calls an educational reform designed to depoliticize the university. Puebla has now become the symbol to many of this policy. During the weeks, students in Mexico City attempted to demonstrate in solidarity with the Puebla victims. The demonstration was prohibited by government officials, and those students who persisted were violently dispersed according to Excélsior. As yet, no one has been arrested for the murders in Puebla. This report on Puebla was from Excélsior, Siempre!, and Punto Critico.

Excélsior reports more details on the recent kidnappings of the American consulate in Mexico. Suspects were rounded up in the kidnapping of American Consulate, Terrence Leonhardy, in Guadalajara. The kidnappers released Leonhardy unharmed after four days of detention in exchange for the freeing of 30 political prisoners from seven Mexican jails around the country, along with the ransom of $80,000. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People, branded as nothing more than common criminals by President Echeverría, forced the government to publish their political statement in major Mexican newspapers, radio and television.

The statement printed in Excélsior read in part, "With all the means of communication at its disposal, the government of the wealthy tries to hide the true significance and origin of the bank robberies, kidnappings and acts of justice realized by revolutionary groups who operated all over the country. They have unleashed a propaganda offensive trying to convince the people that we are common criminals, paid assassins, thieves, enemies of the country. Today, for the first time and not voluntarily, the means of communication serve the proletarian cause. We direct ourselves to our exploited brothers, to all the working people so that they may know why we struggle, why we choose the path of armed struggle as the only one through which it is possible to defeat the wealthy and their government of exploiters."

The statement of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People goes on to say that, "As long as one privilege social class exploits and enriches itself with the work of other classes, the class struggle will necessarily continue to exist and, with it, violence, the violence of the exploiters to maintain their economic and political interest and the violence of the exploited to liberate themselves to win the right to enjoy the product of their labor. The concentration of the country's wealth in the hands of a very few, the suctioning off of great quantities of this wealth to the exterior, the exploitation of the workers and peasants by wealthy nationals and foreigners are the fundamental causes of the poverty of the working people. The wealthy in power, not satisfied with the hundreds of billions that they have accumulated, thanks to the exploitation of the workers and peasants, have delivered the country to foreign capital. Factories, industries, the best land, mineral deposits are all in the hands of foreigners, principally wealthy North Americans."

The statement went on to outline a revolutionary strategy led by Vanguard Proletariat utilizing many forms of struggle. This statement appeared in Excélsior and other Mexican newspapers. Excélsior also reported later that all suspects arrested have been released.

This week's feature taken from The Guardian provides the historical background to the inauguration of Peronist Hector Campora as president of Argentina on May 25th.

Argentina's struggle for national independence spans 150 years. The Argentinian people fought first against the Spanish colonialist, later against the British and, finally, against US domination. The victory of the Peronist presidential candidate, Hector Campora, in the March 11th elections is an integral part of that struggle and an important step forward for it. After almost two decades of oppression and anti-Peronist propaganda, the majority of the Argentinian people have continued to support the nationalist and anti-imperialist ideals of Peronism.

To understand this, it is necessary to analyze the political economic program of Peronism in its first period of power, 1944 to 1955, the developmentalist or demo-liberal politics that overthrew him and the continuing struggle of the workers' movement against the pro-imperialist military and civilian governments that followed.

The Guardian goes on to say that the rise of Peronism took place at a time of important structural changes in the Argentine economy. During the 1930s, under the control of the most conservative groups, industrialization of the country began. The coming to power of the military in 1943 marked the end of Argentina's dependency on British capitalism which had been based on its exploitation of the country's raw materials. A new era, accelerated by World War II, consolidated a new kind of economic dependency based on control by multinational corporations of industry and control of Argentina's domestic markets.

Peron participated in the 1943 military coup and gained popularity through his position as minister of labor and welfare, but the very activities which made him popular with the people, his support of their struggles, brought him the antagonism of the more conservative forces in the government which demanded his resignation and imprisonment. They were faced, however, with an unheard-of situation, the mobilization on October 17th, 1945, of thousands of Argentinian workers. The main organizer of this march was Maria Eva Duarte, later, Peron's wife and the key figure in Peron's election to the presidency one year later.

In office, according to The Guardian, Peron's policies were characterized by programs to regain the national wealth, to strictly control the agro exporting sector of the economy, to institute protectionist policies, to encourage the development of Argentinian industries, to improve the salary and working conditions of the country's workers, and to generally heighten the national consciousness.

As a result of Argentina's large volume of exports during World War II, Argentina's gold reserves had increased considerably. Peron utilized these funds in order to promote industry and, since Great Britain refused to pay its war debts immediately unless Argentina would accept used war materials, the Peronist government opted for nationalizing the railroads, telephone and transportation systems throughout the country to pay the debt. The politics of state investment enabled the country to build up a merchant fleet and a commercial air fleet and the improvement of social services, gas and electricity and, had it not been interrupted by the reactionary 1955 coup, the metallurgical and oil policies of the government would've put Argentina in a position to meet its own national needs.

"In 1950," says The Guardian, "the Peronist government faced the beginnings of several crises, a shortage of funds for capital investment, crop failures and declines in exports, underlying these problems with a growing strength of US influence in South America and the decision of a large sectors of the national ruling class to abandon their alliance with a working class and to join the monopolies and foreigners in opposition. This was prompted by a number of factors. One was the limitations placed by the government on corporate profits through its full employment policy and support for high wages and unionization. A law on foreign investment enacted in 1953 sought the decline of foreign investments in the auto, petrochemical, and other industries. A shortcoming of this law was that it forced Argentinian capitalists to invest in industries not particularly suitable for the Argentinian economy."

The military's second coup attempt in its September 1955 succeeded in overthrowing the government with their liberating revolution. The triumph of this coup brought about a factional struggle within the military which led in November 1955 to the victory of the most reactionary wing led by General Aramburu. A period of repression ensued against loyal Peronist. Hundreds of people were imprisoned, assassinated or driven into exile. Progressive social laws were abolished. Political parties were dissolved, and workers' rights were removed, but the popular opposition to the government, the resistance period, had only begun. Much of the working class was still loyal to Peronism. The Peronist government had represented an important experiment, an anti-imperialist government, which supported mass mobilizations and had given a tremendous amount of political consciousness to the Argentinian workers.

"After 1955," The Guardian continues, "the anti-national and anti-pop forces held the reins of government, an alliance of those most closely tied to imperialism, the big companies and those involved in the export industry and those sectors of the national ruling class most hostile to the pro-working class reforms of the government. Once the constitutional Peronist government was overthrown, the armed forces and the civilian governments that followed put forward two solutions to the problem of Argentina, developmentalism and demo-liberalism. Demo-liberalism is the expression of those economic sectors which are the most conservative and powerful. It seeks monetary stability and maintenance of the status quo. The developmentalist model prefers development to monetary stability and, in order to achieve its ends, it supports the massive participation of foreign monopoly capital. Both schools recommend unemployment as a means of increasing profits."

Between 1955 and 1958, the armed forces ruling, through Aramburu, concentrated on destroying the defenses against foreign penetration implemented during the Peronist government and followed the developmentalist economic policies. Foreign investment was again encouraged. The political economy of this period was primarily based on the Prebisch plan which had two main objectives. Through the manipulations of statistics, it tried to discredit the Peronist government. Secondly, it put forward a reconstruction program for the Argentine economy, the transfer of large amounts of national income to the agricultural sector by increasing agricultural prices, by the removal of foreign controls and the freezing of all salaries. It also emphasized foreign investment. This plan was formulated mainly in response to the demands of US-controlled organizations, particularly the International Monetary Fund.

"In 1958," explains The guardian, "when the military decided to return to civilian rule, the Peronist supported the developmentalist politician Arturo Frondizi. The developmentalists, as opposed to the demo-liberals, believe that rapid economic development is preferable to the maintenance of the status quo, but the developmentalists also favor large-scale use of foreign aid and investment. This led to rapid inflation, international debt and greater US control. Important in this process was a 1958 law which put forward the following points, that foreign capital would have the same rights as national capital, that the investments would be used in building new plants and expanding old ones and, finally, that the profits could be taken out of the country although only under certain conditions. As far as the military was concerned, though Frondizi's mistake was that he allowed the Peronist to operate with some freedom. After a Peronist won a gubernatorial election, the army again took power and began a new wave of repression."

With the Peronist and the masses again safely suppressed, the military again organized elections in 1963, and Arturo Illia became president. The civilians were unable, however, to stabilize the situation to the satisfaction of the foreigners, besides mass pressure had forced the government to take some nationalistic acts. At the end of 1963, Illia nullified oil contracts favorable to international monopolies at the expense of Argentinian companies. The next year, the central bank increased restrictions on the export of profits by multinational companies, forcing them to reinvest. These measures, along with the revival of the mass movement, provided the military with the excuse for their 1966 coup.

"Since then," The Guardian points out, "the military has ruled Argentina under General Juan Carlos Ongania in 1966 to '70, Roberto Levingston in 1970 and Alejandro Lanusse in 1970 to the present. The monopolies and foreign companies were again brought to power. Ongania's economic minister, for example, was Krieger Vasena, who was a director of more than 12 US subsidiaries. Vasena instituted many pro-foreign measures, a 40% devaluation, wage cuts for workers, reduction of import taxes by up to 50%, and denationalization of some state-owned companies. With such policies, nearly 3,000 Argentine companies became bankrupt during 1970 alone."

But resistance developed on a stronger basis than ever before. One of the most important of the popular struggles of 1964 was the uprising in Córdoba over inflation and the freezing of workers' wages. The conflict began in the northeastern city of Corrientes where students, campus workers and faculty protested against increases in food prices in the student cafeteria. Two days later, in Rosario, the struggle was escalated, and police killed a student. The agitation spread to Tucuman and Córdoba.

The two union confederations existing at that time joined forces and waged an effective general strike. Army units in Córdoba were harassed by snipers who utilized barricades and rooftops, the most important aspects of the uprising called the Cordobazo. With a mass participation of the working class and the establishment of real unity between the workers and students, the people supported the actions with food for strikers, providing refuges for pursued demonstrators and by harassing the army and the police.

The Guardian states that, "As a result of the uprising, Minister Vasena, the architect of the government's economic program, was removed from office and General Ongania had to resign. This period also saw the beginning of the present armed urban groups like the Peronist Montoneros who kidnapped former Director General Aramburu who was executed in May 1970. The Montoneros and other Peronist groups also participate politically within the Peronist movement itself in which they formed part of the left wing. Even with repression, armed actions continued. The Revolutionary Armed Forces, another Peronist group occupied the town of Garin, only 43 miles from Buenos Aires. A platoon of 46 people occupied police, railroad and telecommunication stations, isolating Garin from the rest of the country, carrying out political meetings and broadcasting information of the resistance."

The continuation of the popular struggle forced Lanusse to begin negotiations with Peron who understood the corner in which the military found itself. While Peron took his time talking, Lanusse desperately juggled ministries and plans. While agricultural prices went up 25%, wages were cut and meat was rationed. Caught between the escalating actions of the armed groups and the collapse of Argentina's economy, Lanusse was forced to meet most of Peron's terms in calling the March 11th elections this year. The Peronist coalition received 52% of the votes compared to the radical party, the ruling class' major hope, which won only 21% of the vote.

The Guardian continues, "The task of the new Campora government will certainly not be an easy one because of the poor economic condition that Argentina finds itself in today. While the annual inflation rate has run at 70%, wages have increased by only 42%. While large amounts of resources are transferred to the agricultural and exporting sectors of the economy, the country's purchasing power is constantly declining. There are an estimated 1 million people unemployed with an equal number of underemployed. While production went up 44% between 1960 and 1969, employment increased by only 13% and the relative wealth held by the working class decreased. Finally, official statistics indicate that Argentina has a foreign debt of about $6 billion dollars, of which almost half will have to be paid this year."

The Campora government's plans in dealing with these problems will be shaped largely by the way the Peronist movement overcomes internal contradictions In its coalition. The Peronist left consists of the most militant unions and workers, the youth movement and the armed organizations. They're opposed particularly by the union bureaucrats and politicians. Peron, while maintaining his position of overall leader of the movement, has sided with the left on a number of occasions recently. One of the most important questions facing the government will be whether it will conduct mobilizations of the workers and peasants or whether it will take a mildly reformist top-down route.

The Peronist left and many of the country's independent radicals believe that they must participate within the context of this developing struggle. As a document of the Peronist Youth Group of Córdoba stated, we have to create the conditions that will enable us to implement the government that we won through the ballot. The government's long-term strategy should become clear shortly after Campora's inauguration. As Peron himself has said, "We will first take the presidency and, a month later, we will assume power."

The Miami Herald this week commented on the effect that the May 4th kidnapping of a US consul in Mexico has had on the Mexican people. The dramatic kidnapping of a US diplomat has suddenly thrust an unheard of guerilla organization into prominence in Mexico. Almost overnight, the name FRAP has become a commonplace. It stands for Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People. Up to now, Mexico had been relatively free of the urban guerrilla activity that has swept Latin America in recent years. Anti-government groups have sprung up and died out here without the spectacular publicity of the Tupamaros in Uruguay or the underground groups in Brazil.

But FRAP succeeded by kidnapping US consul, Terrence G. Leonhardy in Guadalajara on May 4th and holding him until the government released 30 prisoners and arranged a ransom of $80,000. In all Leonhardy was in guerilla custody for 76 hours. He was not harmed. The prisoners were flown to Cuba and given asylum. FRAP in the meantime, won wide publication of a manifesto assailing the Mexican government and emphasizing what it termed the injustices against Mexico's poor. Never before in Mexico's turbulent history has a single anti-government group put its political philosophy before so many people so rapidly.

The FRAP manifesto was very much to the political left and called on the poor to join in an armed fight against social ills by overthrowing the government. Authorities in the interior ministry, which deals with political matters and subversion say they know little about FRAP. Who its members are, where it is headquartered, or who directed the abduction of Leonhardy. The manifesto was well written and well reasoned. Leonhardy reported being asked questions apparently prepared by someone with more education than the men who handled the actual abduction and guarded him.

The manifesto touched on some sore points in Mexican society. It noted the huge gap between rich and poor, charged exploitation of rural and urban poor by landowners and industrialists, accused the establishment of failing to provide educational opportunities to the poor, and claimed that both the poor and poorly educated are mistreated by police and politicians. It accused the government of trying to convince Mexicans that guerrillas are common criminals, cattle thieves, hired killers, enemies of the country, people who work against Mexicans and other such things.

FRAP said it and other guerrilla groups had entered the armed fight because they feel it is necessary to put an end to this privileged caste, which for hundreds of years has been enriching itself at the cost of the sweat under subhuman conditions of the laborer, the farmer, and all workers in exchange for a miserable salary, which is barely enough for bad food.

The manifesto apparently met with much sympathy in Mexico. It expressed what the Mexican middle and lower middle classes discuss in their homes. Through radio and television the manifesto reached millions of illiterate poor. It's said that the poor are no better off than before this country's 1910 agrarian revolution, aimed at ending the oppression of the rural dwellers. Mexico has a population of close to 50 million. Its per capita income is among the highest in the developing world, a bit more than $600 a year, but 13 million Mexicans live on less than that. About half a million campesinos or peasants earn no more than 16 cents a day. 

A factory worker in Mexico City probably earns the minimum daily wage allowed by law, $2 and 52 cents a day. The contrast between rich and poor is evident throughout Mexico. Lavish homes are walled off from tin and cardboard hovels. Multi-million dollar luxury hotels in Acapulco are within walking distance of abject poverty. This report from the Miami Herald. 

The Brazilian Weekly Opinião reports that in the first public disagreement over economic policy within the government in over three years, Brazil's Minister of Agriculture resigned in protest last week. In his letter of resignation, the minister complained of the continuing low income levels in rural areas despite increases in all farm prices. His letter stated, "Unfortunately, governmental policy has favored the industrial sector and the commercial export sector, both of which are increasingly foreign owned." 

The letter went on to note that the smaller, medium-sized Brazilian industrialist and farmer have suffered from governmental policies while the multinational corporations have prospered. This is the first time a high official of the Brazilian government has stated that the much praised Brazilian economic miracle has actually been detrimental to the Brazilian people. The minister's letter was printed in Opinião of Rio de Janeiro. 

On the same subject. The Washington Weekly Times of the Americas commented that it has long been widely assumed that President Medici is strong enough in military circles to name his successor when his term ends next year, but his agriculture minister's resignation serves to raise some doubts. 

At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.

There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers. 

It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand". 

The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later. 

The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers. 

The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.

Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.

In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.

Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.

When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy. 

This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present. 

US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala. 

In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.

An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,

25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program. 

A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.

Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,

The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.

On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.

In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.

The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."

The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:

On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright. 

Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.

Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.

To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio. 

In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."

These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.

In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.

For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."

This week's feature is a published interview with a member of an Argentinian guerrilla organization called The People's Revolutionary Army. Unlike last week's feature, it provides a rather critical examination of Peronism and of Argentina's new Peronist government. 

Much attention has been paid recently in the World press to the March 11th election and May 25th inauguration of Dr. Hector Campora, a Peronist, as Argentina's new president. In the first election permitted by the Argentine military since their 1966 coup, the Peronist Coalition, which claims to be based upon strong, popular support of the labor movement, won the popular support of the Argentine people. Since Campora's inauguration, his government has released more than 600 political prisoners, most of whom had been jailed for terrorist activity against the military dictatorship, and has lifted the bans on communist activity. Also, he established diplomatic relations with both Cuba and Chile, expressed some verbal solidarity with the guerrilla movement, and requested a truce between the government and then guerrillas. 

The world press has paid special note however, to activities and proclamations of a guerrilla organization, which calls itself the People's Revolutionary Army, which has stated that it will not join in the Peronist Coalition and will continue armed guerrilla warfare within Argentina. Tagged by the World press as Trotskyists, the People's Revolutionary Army claims that the tag is insufficient. They are the "Armed Organization of the Revolutionary Workers Party of Argentina", and their organization encompasses Argentine patriots and nationalists of many different political ideologies. In a rare interview with staff members of Chile Hoy prior to Campora's inauguration, the People's Revolutionary Army describe the reasons for their non-support of the new Peronist government. 

We think that this unusual interview illuminates some of the political and economic dynamics, the manifestations of which seem to be keeping Argentina on the front pages of the world newspapers. In as much as the spokesman for the guerrilla organization uses Marxist economic terminology, his usage of the following terms should be noticed. "Capitalist" is the class name given to those people who own or who control for-profit the means of production. That is the factories, the banks, the transportation facilities, often the land, et cetera. In poor and underdeveloped countries, many of the capitalists are foreigners, North Americans, and increasingly Western Europeans or Japanese, hence the term "Imperialist". 

On the other end of the economic and power scale are the working people, or as the Marxists refer to them, "the masses" or "the people", who own only their own labor power and sell this to the capitalists. These constitute, of course, the majority of a population. The "Bourgeoisie" are the capitalist, and as the term is used in this article, also those people who, while not themselves the super rich nevertheless, do have their interests sufficiently aligned with the capitalists so that they support capitalist institutions and capitalist societies. Here then is the interview:

A question? How do you characterize the Peronist Coalition and the Campora government in particular? 

We are not unaware that in the heart of Peronism there are important progressive and revolutionary popular sectors that make it explosive, but we don't feel this should fool anyone, because what predominates in Peronism and even more in the coalition is its bourgeois character. For in its leadership as in its program and its methods, the next parliamentary government of Campora will represent above all the interests of the bourgeoisie and of the capitalists. 

A question, how is this massive popular vote for the Peronist coalition to be explained then? 

For us, it reflects at the same time the repudiation of the military dictatorship, which was very unpopular and the persistence of the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie. It is necessary to remember that the masses were only able to choose from among the different bourgeois variants in the electoral arrangement that the dictatorship structured. And among the bourgeois candidates the majority of the working class opted for the Peronist coalition, which had based its campaign on a furious and productive confrontation with the military government, and on pro-guerrilla arguments. 

What then are the true purposes of the Peronists in the current government? 

Their leaders and spokesmen have explained them quite clearly. They say that they are to reconstruct the country, to pacify it by means of some social reform. This along with the maintenance of "Christian style of life", a parliamentary system, private enterprise, and a continuation of the competition of foreign capital. All of the elementary measures for a true social revolution, namely agrarian reform, the expropriation and nationalization of big capital, urban reform, a socialist revolutionary government, all of these are completely absent in the plans and projects of the coalition. The bourgeois sectors of Peronism dominate the government. 

Another question. Apparently the Peronist coalition cannot be considered a homogeneous whole, as there are different tendencies within it, some of them revolutionary and progressive, which produces contradictions within the whole. How does the People's Revolutionary Army respond to this? 

Truly, as we indicated earlier, in the heart of the Peronist front government and in the parties which compose it, they will have to be developed an intense internal struggle, led fundamentally by the revolutionary and progressive sectors within Peronism, that even as a minority must struggle consciously for a program and for truly anti-imperialist and revolutionary measures.

The People's Revolutionary Army will actively support these sectors of Peronism in their struggle, and will insist upon a coalition of the progressive and revolutionary Peronist organizations and sectors with the non-Peronist organizations, both in their work to mobilize the masses for their demands, and in the preparation for the next and inevitable stage of more and new serious confrontations between the people in the bourgeoisie.

Another question. We imagine that the Campora government will not be the ideal government envisioned by the military. Can we then disregard the possibility of a coup d'état? 

It is certain that this parliamentary government will not enjoy the complete confidence of the military, which has accepted the Campora government as the lesser evil, and as a transition to try and detain the advance of revolutionary forces. But we think that the military coup will remain latent, with coup intentions however, growing in direct proportion to the success in broadening mass mobilizations. 

In the case of a military coup, where will the People's Revolutionary Army be? 

Of course, we'll be shoulder to shoulder with progressive and revolutionary Peronism, in order to confront any attempt to reestablish the military dictatorship. 

In recent declarations, the president-elect Hector Campora, has asked the Argentine guerrilla organizations for a truce in their activities beginning May 25th in order to, "Prove whether or not we are on the path of liberation and if we are going to achieve our objectives." You have given a partial acceptance of this request. What is the basis for that decision of yours? 

The request of Dr. Campora arose as a consequence of various guerrilla actions. We understood that the request of the president-elect implied the total suspension of guerrilla activities. We believe that the Campora government represents the popular will, and respectful of that will, our organization will not attack the new government while it does not attack the people or the guerrillas. Our organization will continue, however, combating militarily, the great exploiting companies, principally the imperialist ones and the counter-revolutionary armed forces, but it will not attack directly the governmental institutions nor any member of President Campora's government.

With respect to the police that supposedly depend on executive power, although in recent years, they have acted as an axillary arm of the present army, the People's Revolutionary Army will suspend its attacks as long as the police do not collaborate with the army in the persecution of guerrillas, and in the repression of popular demonstrations.

What are the factors determining your less than total acceptance of the truce? 

We have stated them too in our reply to Campora. In 1955, the leadership of the political movement that Dr. Campora represents, advise the country to, "Not let blood be spilled, avoid civil war and wait." The military took advantage of this disorganization and disorientation of the working class and of people in general to carry out their coup and were able to overwhelm progressive organizations. The only blood that wasn't spilled was that of the oligarchs and the capitalists. The people on the other hand, witnessed the death through massacre and firing squad of dozens and dozens of the finest of their young. 

In 1968, the same leadership advised the nation to vote for Frondizi and this advice when followed prepared the way for the military takeover. In 1966 the same leadership then counseled the nation to, "Reign back until things become clear." And this action when followed, allowed freedom of action to the new military government. 

So when I reply to Dr. Campora, we specifically stated, our own Argentinian experience has shown that it is impossible to have a truce with the enemies of the nation, with its exploiters, with an oppressive army, or with exploitative capitalist enterprises. To hold back or to diminish the struggle is to permit its enemies, to reorganize and to pass over to the offensive. 

What sort of relations does the People's Revolutionary Army maintain with other armed Argentinian groups? 

Since our creation, we have made and continue to make an appeal for a unified effort of all the armed revolutionary organizations with the idea of eventually forming a solid, strong, and unified People's Army. In such an organization, they would undoubtedly be both Peronists and non-Peronists, but all would be unified by a common methodology, namely prolonged revolutionary war and a common ideal, the building of socialism in our country. We have many points of agreement on fundamental issues, so we maintain fraternal relations with all of our fellow armed groups. 

A final question. You have explained the policy to be followed after May 25th, as laid out in your reply to Campora. What will be the policy of the Revolutionary Workers Party and the People's Revolutionary Army in relation to labor union policy, legally permitted activities, the united front and so on? And how do you contemplate combining legally and non-legally permitted activities? 

Our legally permitted activities will be oriented towards the consolidation and the development of an anti-imperialist front, in common with progressive and revolutionary sectors. We will concentrate all our immediate activity in mobilizing popular opinion towards the release of all political prisoners, repeal of all repressive laws, legalization of all political organizations of the left and the press, and an increase in the real wages of the working class. In relationship to the army, we propose the development of an active educational campaign among draftees, calling upon them not to fire upon the people, nor to participate in repression, encouraging desertion of soldiers and calling upon them to join the People's Revolutionary Army. 

In relationship to the popular front, the Peronist front, we call upon all of the left, all labor, popular progressive and revolutionary organizations to close ranks, to give each other mutual support, and to present an organized common front to the political, ideological, and military offensive of the bourgeoisie, not only in its repressive form, but also in its current populous diversionary one. 

As concerns the relationship between legally and non-legally permitted operations, we wish to carefully maintain the clandestine cell structure of the People's Revolutionary Army and of the Revolutionary Workers Party, so as to assure the strict carrying out of security measures and ensure their safety. But we wish to amplify to the maximum, the legally permitted activities of the organization and that of those groups on its periphery. And through this combination of legally permitted activities and illegal ones, we will attempt to procure the greatest advantage from the potential, which the vigor of the popular support gives to our organization. 

To sum up as far as your organization is concerned, what is the watch word for the present situation? 

We'll make no truce with the oppressive army and no truth with exploitative enterprises. We will seek immediate freedom for those imprisoned while fighting for freedom. Also an end to oppressive legislation and total freedom of expression in organization. We will try to build unity among the armed revolutionary organizations who we will struggle or die for the Argentine. 

Thank you. Our feature today has been a published interview with a member of an Argentinian guerrilla organization called The People's Revolutionary Army. The interview was published in the Chilean newspaper, Chile Hoy. The People's Revolutionary Army is known as the strongest and most effective guerrilla group operating in Argentina and was able, for instance, on the mere threat of a kidnapping, to force Ford Motor Company to give $1 million to various children's hospitals in Argentina. 

Miami Herald reports from Guatemala City. Tensions remained high in Eastern Guatemala on Monday, after a gun battle between squatters and troops. At least 17 persons were reported killed. Police and troops surrounded the hamlet of Palo Verde, 72 miles east of the capital, in an attempt to head off further violence, but hundreds of peasants were reported holding onto the land they had seized during the weekend. On Saturday, a group of 1000 landless peasants seized privately-owned agricultural plots outside Palo Verde. Military policemen were sent into the area and started arresting the peasants. The police in the army said the peasants opened fire and authorities said military policemen and 11 peasants were killed.

Area residents said the peasants claim the landowners took their grazing lands many years ago. The army spokesman said, "Many of the peasants received military training in 1954, when the government recruited them to fight rebel army forces". This from the Miami Herald. 

Latin America also reports on the ideological and economic developments in the Peruvian Revolution. Peru's military rulers have come under pressure recently, which they, at any rate, seem to feel threatens their image as the independent inventors of a new development strategy that is neither communist nor capitalist. There has been a spade of declarations by senior officers emphasizing the Peruvian Revolution's peculiar characteristic and last week the Prime Minister declared, "It is very easy to copy, to imitate, but very hard to create."

The government's revolutionary credentials have come under doubt, not least because of recent labor troubles. Suspicions on the left were also aroused by some interpretations of last week's visit to Lima by the United States Secretary of State Rogers. This has been seen in some quarters as the first sign of warmer relations between the two countries, particularly as it coincided with confirmation that the Inter-American Development Bank was ending its long boycott of Peru with a $23.3 million loan for agricultural development.

Further doubts have been aroused by the government's decision to postpone its proposed petroleum comunidades which would have brought into the petroleum industry the kind of workers' participation it is trying to develop for mining and industry. The well-informed Peruvian Times suggested that this was due to the dismay among the petroleum companies working here as contractors. This would clearly be particularly unwelcome to the government when it is on the verge of signing new contracts with foreign oil companies.

Latin America continues the foreign business fraternity however, is currently deeply suspicious of the government's intentions as a result of the nationalization of the fishing industry earlier this month. Uncertainty is being expressed about the part reserved by the government for foreign investors and the private sector as a whole in the country's development. In fact, public investment in the economy rose by 22.4% overall in 1972 while private investments were down by 8.9%, according to official figures.

Government spokesman continued to express their faith in the compatibility of predominant state and social property sectors with a reformed private sector in a new kind of mixed economic model. However, the figures seemed to indicate that the private sector is no more keen on being reformed by way of comunidad laboral than the unions are by being supplanted by participation devices dreamed up by the government.

An economy in which the private sector competes freely with the state and social sectors is quite contrary to the advice given by foreign experts on workers' control who do not believe in the viability of such a mixed formula or in the predominance of wage labor, which is at the very root of the present government's economic reforms. To make their scheme work, the Peruvian military authorities and their civilian theoreticians will either have to produce prodigious feats of persuasion or else modify one or more of its components. Some observers believe this modification may now have come about with the state takeover of the anchovies fishing industry.  

That the takeover has taken the form of state rather than workers control signifies a political triumph for the Minister of Fisheries, General Vanini, a brilliant shirt-sleeves populist and one of the recent Peruvian pilgrims to Cuba. The state company is clearly seen as preferable to self-managing units, which would certainly have resisted the forthcoming rationalization program. This hardly makes the government look like left wing extremists. This from Latin America.

Several significant events in the continuing political struggles in Chile have been reported by Excélsior. In Santiago, the government of President Salvador Allende has rejected any kind of mediation in the two-month-old strike at the huge copper mine known as El Teniente. The statement reaffirmed the position of the government to hold down large wage increases which would heighten the serious inflation the country now faces. A previous announcement had indicated the government's opposition to the strikers' suggestion of mediation by the National Confederation of Copper Workers. This is consistent with a Allende's announced intention of ending special privileges enjoyed by certain sectors of the Chilean labor force, which have enjoyed higher pay than other sectors. 

Meanwhile, eight opposition radio stations advised the government that they would not comply with the new law designed to integrate the stations into a national network and that they would refuse to pay any fines imposed. This declaration follows the government's order that all stations must broadcast a daily program of official government announcements. It is thought that the order was given largely in response to the failure of many stations to broadcast an important speech by the Minister of Housing, that from Excélsior. 

Our feature this week is a report by German anthropologist Mark Munzel on the Indian situation in Paraguay. In South America, unlike most other areas of the world, indigenous tribes subsist in some primitive areas. However, they are fast-disappearing because of the advance of urban civilization and the repressive policies of certain governments. The purpose of this report is to demonstrate how the basic human rights, described in the United Nations Charter of Human Rights, are denied to the Aché Indians of Paraguay. Not through indifference or neglect, but by deliberate government policy of genocide disguised as benevolence. 

There has never been any particular respect for Indian lives. An early account describes the situation, "In 1903, Paraguayans shot several Aché and even cut one of the bodies into pieces and put him in a cage trap as jaguar bait." Munsusin saw a settler pull out of his hunting bag the finger of an Aché and boast about it. Then again in 1907, "They had followed the traces of the Aché, and when they reAchéd the Indians the very first evening of the journey, they slaughtered seven women and children and caught seven small children." This report by the Brazilian Ethnologist, Baldus, is neither the first nor the most cruel one concerning the inhumane treatment of the Aché over the centuries. 

Unlike the sedentary Guarani Indians, their neighbors and linguistic relatives, the majority of the nomadic Aché never surrendered to the white man. Without being exactly aggressive, they attempted to defend their territory against incursions and withdrew deeper into the forest when they could not resist. On the other hand, captive Achés, once separated from their people, proved to be of extreme tameness and have a lack of aggression against their captors and the white Paraguayans soon learned to appreciate their aptitude for any kind of agricultural labor.

The Ethnologist Clastres notes the sharp contrast between the two kinds of relations the Aché know. For an Aché tribe, there is no kind of relation to strangers other than hostility. This is in astonishing contrast to the perceptible constant effort to eliminate all violence from relations between comrades. The most extreme courtesy always prevails, the common will to understand each other, to speak with each other, to dissolve in the exchange of words all the aggression and grudges which inevitably arise during the daily life of the group.

So it seems that the captive Aché, once they realized that they have to stay among the whites forever, decided it is wiser to use their non-aggressive approach, hence the softness for which they are liked. The author says, "I have only known captive Aché, no free forest Indians, and all I can say is that I have never met any other people who are so tame and obedient. I also happen to meet at Aché's who have been captured just three days previously. They were desperately unhappy but ready to do anything they were commanded to do."

Thus, war against the Acha since colonial days has served not only to conquer new territories, but also to obtain captives as a cheap and appreciated labor force. The hunting and selling of Achés became, and still is, an important branch of the economy in areas close to the lands of the wild Aché.

The extermination of these Indians is very much related to the economic development of the country. If the remotest parts of the country were to be open to foreign investment and to international roads, as is the government's intention, the anachronism of slavery may have to be eliminated in order to make the country exhibitable to foreign eyes. But at the same time, commercial penetration is bound to render the situation of the Indians more difficult. Since 1958, and especially since 1968, their situation has indeed become worse.

This coincides with the foundation of the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense, which meant that Indian affairs were put under military control as a part of the general transfer of power from civilians to the military and with the subsequent retirement of an official in 1961. But there are also deeper reasons. Paraguay has in recent years experienced a slight economic boom. The international road through Eastern Paraguay, from Asuncion to Puerto Presidente Stroessner, was completed in 1965. An additional road, which cuts the forests of the northern Aché into two parts, was completed in 1968.

Land prices are rising in the areas which have become more accessible through the improved system of communications, as well as the price of forest products; timber, palmito, and [inaudible 00:19:41]. And most especially that of cattle, which means that less land is reserved for the Indians. Commercial penetration means, from the Aché point of view, that the forest, the indispensable basis for their hunting life, is cut down. Or at least crossed by roads that frighten away the game. There have been slight Indian efforts at resisting, especially attacks on woodcutters who were destroying trees that bore beehives. Honey is a very important element in the Aché diet. 

But more frequently, the Achés try to adapt to the new situation. If they neither wish to die from hunger on their reduced hunting grounds, nor enter the of working for Paraguayan masters, their only way out is to steal food from the Paraguayans. This is the reason for the frequent, but normally non-violent raids on white men's cattle and fields. The Achés also steal iron implements in order to compensate for their loss of territory by the intensification of subsistence technology. Those who live on the Indian frontier are thus confirmed in their hatred of Aché and so the new invaders of the forest, wood cutters, palmito collectors, and landowners, want to have the forest cleaned of Achés for they are bothered by the presence of the ancient owners of the forest.

Most sources agree that manhunts for the Aché have increased in volume and in violence during recent years. In 1968, a member of the armed forces and of the ruling political party, then vice director of the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense, wrote that the Acha were close to extinction due to repressive actions that follow any of their efforts to resist the occupation of their lands. In December, 1971, the reporter Jay Mesa of ABC Color, an important newspaper in Asuncion Paraguay, wrote of murders of fathers and mothers as the only way of seizing Aché children who are then sold and brought up as servants.

They even tell of prizes for those who managed to kill the Indians. The Paraguayan anthropologist, Chase Sardi, confirmed this in an interview in the same newspaper in 1972. "They're hunted. They're pursued like animals. The parents are killed and the children sold and there is no family of which a child has not been murdered. I was told by Paraguayan country people that the price of Aché children is falling due to great supply. It is said to be presently at about the equivalent of $5 for an Aché girl of around five years of age."

The following recently documented cases are rather typical. In 1970, [inaudible 00:22:20] learned in Itakyry of a raid that had been organized there. The killers kidnapped three children, all of whom died thereafter. On another incident, in about June of 1970, on the river Itambay, approximately 52 kilometers up river from Puerto Santa Teresa, several Indians were killed in a raid according to the claims of a palmito collector, an Indian hunter, who says he killed several Indians before he was wounded. Two kidnapped girls were given to the organizer of the raid. In February, 1972, close to San Joaquin, Munzel himself reports being told by several people of an Aché hunt in the area southeast of Itakyry.

"We were not able to gather any concrete or detailed evidence," he says, "but I believe that an inquiry commission sent to the area could easily gain this information." The massacre seems to have taken place about the middle of 1971. Various children of slain Aché parents were then deported. The kidnappers were said to have declared that the only reason why they did not take more children was that they were not able to carry off more at one time and that they were forced to leave several children with their dead parents, but that they would return to the forest later on to seize them.

Despite documentation and reports to government authorities, very little is being done about the problem. Recently, the director of the Native Affairs Department declared that there were no concrete indications of massacres of Indians in Paraguay. General Bejarano, president of the Indigenous Association of Paraguay, described massacres as problems that were normal in any part of the world. The officially recommended solution of this problem does not include the limitation of the massacres by means of legal pressure, but the installation of a reservation to which the Aché, who were a problem elsewhere, may be deported.

A well-known hunter and seller of Achés in 1950s was Manuel Jesus Pereda, a junior partner of the biggest manhunter in the area. In 1959, a band of Aché whose hunting possibilities had been reduced too much to permit the continuation of their free existence, and who were suffering strong pressure from the manhunters surrounding them, surrendered to Pereda at Torin. This was at the time when the authorities had taken some measures against the slave hunters. Afraid of legal prosecution, Jesus Pereda did not dare sell his new Indians, but used them instead as a cheap labor force on his farm at Torin.

The story he told the authorities was that the Indians had sought his protection because they loved him. Pereda was shortly thereafter nominated as a functionary of the Native Affairs Department of the Ministry of Defense. And his farm transformed into a reservation called the Indian Assistance and Nationalization Post Number One.

Extensive documentation at the Aché reservation shows this to have been the scene of criminality of the grosses sort. Jesus Pereda's first administrative act was to plunder the goods of his wards in order to sell them as tourist souvenirs. There's also extensive documentation of sexual abuse of women and of very young girls by the reservation administration. And very numerous acts of gratuitous violence, including murders of Aché. Food allocated for the Indians is often sold instead to local farmers for profit.

Also, the resources, land, and water of the reservation itself are very far from generous. Furthermore, virtual manhunts through the forest are still used to round up Indians and forcibly bring them to the reservation. Captured, domesticated Indians are encouraged to participate in this activity.

In June of 1962, the reservation of Aché numbered about 110, at least 60 of whom had been brought there by direct violence. In July of 1968, only 68 Indians were left. This demographic reduction becomes more spectacular if we take into account that the Aché are a very fertile people. Anthropologist, Chase Sardi in 1965, pointed out the absolute lack of any type of preventative medicine on the Aché reservation. Officially in 1968, the absence of medical and sanitary assistance was admitted as one of the reasons for the deaths. Other evidence shows that the oft cited biological shock of the first contact with the microbes of the white man cannot be the main reason for the disappearance of so many Indians.

Many of them had been in contact with whites before, having been captured by the Paraguayans and having escaped again before finally coming to the reservation. Besides, the greatest reduction of population took place, not when the reservation was first established, but later on. The main reasons for the reduction of the Aché population seem to be hunger and hunger related diseases, as well as the selling or giving away of reservation Indians to outsiders. 

An element of psychological importance is the brutal destruction of the cultural inheritance of these Indians. This is not the place to discuss whether primitive cultures should be preserved or modernized. What has taken place in the case of the Aché is not modernization, but the destruction of the identity and even the self-respect of the Achés as human beings. Munzel recorded on tape many songs lamenting the end of the Aché, in which the singer regards himself as no longer an Aché, not even as a human being, but as half dead.

A French ethnologist, Clastres, describes a song he recorded on the reservation. "[inaudible 00:28:00] on a sound of deep sadness and nausea," he said, "ended in a lamentation that was then prolonged by the delicate melancholy of the flute. They sang that day of the end of the Aché and of his despair in realizing that it was all over. The Aché, when they were real Aché, they hunted the animals with bow and arrow, and now the Aché are no more. Woe is us."

Especially since 1972, the Aché situation turned into a public scandal yet still no action has been taken against those who, outside the reservation, continue to hunt the Aché like animals. Still there are Aché slaves all over Eastern Paraguay. Still, countless Aché families remain separated through slavery or through the deportation of some of them to the reservation. Still, the reservation is located on such ungenerous soil that one can foresee its bitter end.

This has been a report by Mark Munzel of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs is a non-political, non-religious organization concerned with the oppression of ethnic groups in various countries.

The work of the opposition parties in Chile continues full strength this week as the Christian Democratic sectors among the miners and white-collar workers of the nationalized El Teniente copper mine remain on the strike that began in late April. In May, the Christian Democratic workers burned cars, fought with police, and seized a Socialist Party radio station in the city of Rancagua. The strike is costing Chile a million dollars a day. Though the strike demands are economic, its political character is seen in the rejection of any government solution, as well as the firm support given by the newspapers, radios, and political organizations of Chile's extreme right, which has been built up over a period of years only by being able to repress the labor movement. 

The London Weekly Latin America comments that early in June, the state-owned Chilean Copper Corporation declared a freeze on all June deliveries from the El Teniente mine where some of the miners have been on strike for the past two months. For July, 50% of deliveries from El Teniente and all deliveries from Chuquicamata mine, where white-collar workers have struck in sympathy with the El Teniente strikers, are similarly affected. Between them, the two mines produce two-thirds of Chilean copper production. 

The strike has political overtones, claims Latin America. Only the most highly paid workers are involved in the strike, which concerns a dispute over production bonuses. Young Christian Democrats have organized marches of support for the strikers. Outbreaks of violence between strikers and the security forces have increased sharply since an employee of the mine was shot dead last week when he started to drive his vehicle over a patrol guarding miners who were still working. Several people on both sides have been injured and 33 arrested. The halt in copper exports will further aggravate the country's economic difficulties. 

The Santiago weekly, Chile Hoy, gives an analysis of the crippling copper miner strike which lays the blame on the opposition Christian Democratic Party. The miner strike at El Teniente mine has just completed its second month. Until now, its result has been a loss of $40 million in expected copper revenue, the suspension of copper shipments to Britain and Germany with the accompanying deterioration of the image of Codelco, the state-run copper enterprise in terms of its ability to complete its contracts, a congressional censure of two government ministers, and a climate of explosive tension in the northern city of Rancagua. For much less reason than this, ex-president Eduardo Frei ordered the Army in 1966 to violently repress the striking miners at El Salvador Mine, killing six miners. 

The most painful aspect of the situation for the Chilean working class is a fragmentation caused by the strike within the copper workers who manage one of the most vital industries in Chile. For years, the Christian Democrats worked to divide Chilean workers and its Catholic unions were the worst enemy of the Central Workers Federation. As in all sectors which the Christian Democrats are not able to actually control, they promote fractionalism and division inside the Federation. This is the purpose of the El Teniente strike. It is strictly an economist struggle. 

Chile Hoy goes on to say the progressive sectors of the miner's union resolved this time to sacrifice their immediate needs for a higher living standard, viewing the strike issue as a question of political conscience. The strike vote at Chuquicamata mine demonstrated this new "conciencia", 1,750 against the strike in 1,450 in favor. This increasingly class-conscious attitude was expressed last week in Rancagua during a demonstration of solidarity with the two censured cabinet ministers. 

A union leader advised the miners that the strike was characterized by the eagerness of the right-wing Christian Democrats to impose the minority's wishes upon the majorities and thus destroy the base of union democracy. He said that this method was an old tactic of the Christian Democrats and that the El Teniente strike was one more move designed to destroy the popular unity government. This report on the copper miner strike in Chile is from the weekly, Chile Hoy. 

Excélsior, the Mexico City daily, gives a more recent account of the increasing unrest and tension caused by the strike in Chile. Excélsior reports from Santiago that last week, public forces used armored cars and tear gas to disperse striking miners concentrated in front of the Christian Democratic Party barricades in Santiago. 

Carlos Latorre, one of the youth leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, called out to the militants to unite rapidly and repel the police aggression but the police forces were able to dismantle further concentration. Speakers for the state-owned copper corporation, Codelco, announced that Allende had made the same offer to the striking copper miners, which weeks ago was refused. Namely, a subsidy of $240 monthly to compensate for the rise in the cost of living, which has been 238% in the past 12 months. The strikers asked for a 41% raise in salary. 

Sub-Secretary of the Interior, Daniel Vergara, announced that he had drafted orders to arrest the director of La Segunda, the afternoon edition of the newspaper El Mercurio, and to arrest the director of Radio Agricultura. Vergara said these medias broadcasted false news. After the disturbances, Allende emphasized that the doors of the palace are open to the workers, whoever they may be. This from Excélsior of Mexico City. 

This week's feature concerns the military dictatorship in Brazil. The following interview with Brazilian exile, Jean Marc von der Weid was made while he was on a national speaking tour sponsored by the Washington-based Committee Against Repression in Brazil. Von der Weid was a student leader in Rio when he was imprisoned and tortured in 1969. He was subsequently released from prison in 1971 along with 69 fellow prisoners in exchange for the kidnapped Swiss ambassador to Brazil. We asked Jean Marc von der Weid about his involvement in the student movement in Brazil.

Well, I was president of the National Union of the Brazilian Students, and I was elected in 1968 in an underground congress. The student movement was strongly opposed to the Brazilian dictatorship that came to power in 1964 by the overthrow of the constitutional government of João Goulart. The National Union was banned, was out-ruled in 1965, and it went underground, but it had a normal support the support of the overwhelming majority of the university students in Brazil, and I was elected with the participation of 200,000 students. 

The university students in Brazil were fighting for some specific goals, at the beginning against the repression on university, and again, the banishment—the decree that closed the National Union of Brazilian Students and fighting for the right of a free association. And also, they began to fight against the whole system of dictatorship and oppression, not only on students, but also on all the Brazilian society. So, we criticized the repression on the working class and the trade unions and on the peasant leagues and all the imprisonments and everything. 

And also, we had a specific problem in terms of the university that was the military government proposed university reform based on a US aid program that should transform the public university in Brazil in a private foundation. And already, two American foundations were proposing to invest on that. Those foundations were the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation. And so we strongly opposed to that and for two reasons. One is that in general, the middle class student has not the money to pay for the university so lots of us would have to quit.

And another point that we didn't want the American foundations, that means foreign foreign enterprises, to control the universities in Brazil. We thought this would be against the national interest of the Brazilian people. And so we fought against this reform in a very successful way. In a way, until today, they could not, let's say, completely impose it.

And finally, in general, in a very general analysis, we knew that our specific problem in terms of university reform or freedom of association at university was closely linked with the problems of the Brazilian society in general. So, we were fighting for the liberation of the Brazilian people from foreign domination. So, we saw that, for example, that if it was necessary for the American money to dominate the Brazilian university, that exist because they dominated already the Brazilian industry so they needed to adapt the university to their needs on the industry. 

So, we began a very strong anti-imperialistic campaign in Brazil. And this campaign, one of the big points of it was the 1969 demonstrations against the visit of Governor Rockefeller to Brazil. And this was one of the charges on my trial in 1970.

Could you describe your imprisonment and torture and then later release? 

Well, in 1969, the end of '68 and during 1969, well, I was already—how do you say this in English?—being searched by the Brazilian political police because of my role as student leader. And they took 24 hours to identify me as a student leader, as the person they were searching. And when they did so, they transported me to the Island of Flowers. That was the Marine battalion headquarters where the Navy information service worked. 

And then I was submitted to a continuous torture during four days and four nights. And this torture consisted on electric shocks, beatings on the kidneys, well, almost—on the whole body, on the head, very strongly on the head in the kind of torture they call telephone. And also, I was all the time suspended by hands and feet from a rope and then spanked and received electric shocks in that position. There were also some other things like drowning or a false firing squad. 

Well, then I spent almost one year and a half in prison in the Island of Flowers and then in the air force base of Rio, and in very bad conditions. We were threatened several times to be shot, those they considered irrecuperable? Yeah. 

And I was released in January '71 in exchange of the release of the kidnapped Swiss ambassador who was kidnapped by a revolutionary organization in Rio. And then I was sent to Santiago with 69 other political prisoners. 

And what's been your activity since then? 

Well, I have been traveling around in North America, mainly in Canada, and Europe and also Santiago, Chile, to denounce the violations of human rights and the crimes of the Brazilian dictatorship and to develop a consciousness, an awareness on the international public opinion to that and to develop pressure on the Brazilian dictatorship, at least to limit the level of violence they're using today. 

Who supports the military? 

Well, the support of the Brazilian dictatorship is a very narrow one. They just have the military forces, and even the military forces are divided in different factious groups. And they have the support of a very small strata of the Brazilian upper class, perhaps 5% of the Brazilian population. And these people are those who are profiting from the exploitation of the 95 million Brazilians who are suffering this economic miracle. And these are, let's say, the Brazilian supporters of the military dictatorship. 

But the main supporters of the military dictatorship or the foreign powers, like the United States and other investors in Brazil, like Germany, Japan, Switzerland, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, England. All them—Canada, are big investors in Brazil. And the US are the most important investors. The American money controls, let's say it's 55% of the whole foreign investment. And they control 75% of the capital goods production and the durable goods production and 52% of the non-durable goods. So, our economy is completely controlled by foreign investment and mainly US investment. 

To guarantee these investments, the American policy in Brazil is to support the military dictatorship with the Military Assistance Act and with the public safety program of the US aid. And that even a direct, let's say, diplomatic support for the General Médici, who is the current dictator. So, it's very clear that the American strategy for Brazil is to make Brazil the privileged satellite of the United States in economic, political, and military terms.

And the Brazilian army is being prepared, as the Brazilian generals say themselves, to face the internal and external war at the same time, if necessary. That means to oppress the Brazilian people and people from other nations in the continent. So, there's a kind of Vietnamization of Latin America, if we can say so. The Brazilian armed forces are being prepared to fight for the American interest in the whole Latin America. And this can provoke in this next 10 years, let's say, a general conflict and a general struggle in Latin America.

Can you give some incidents of how Brazil has played this gendarme role in Latin America? 

Yeah, there are two good examples. One is Bolivia. Brazil has prepared the Colonel Banzer's coup d'état of 1971 since the '70s, since the General Torres came to power in 1970. And in the first attempt of the coup d'état that failed, the one that failed at the beginning of '71, a Brazilian brigade invaded the border of Bolivia and had to come back when the coup failed. Then, they prepared it better and giving weaponry and money and a kind of base, let's say, a Rio guard base to the reactionary rebels of Colonel Banzer. And so Banzer's government is a satellite from Brazil right now, and the Brazilian troops has received order to invade and occupy Santa Cruz if the coup d'état not work in La Paz. 

That was an interview with Brazilian exile Jean Marc von der Weid. You have been listening to Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America, as seen by leading world newspapers, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. 

The Peruvian government of General Velasco Alvarado, according to the Manchester Guardian, is presently facing its most serious internal challenge since its seized power in 1968. Both the Guardian and the British Weekly Latin America report that there have been several confrontations over the past months between the government and organized labor. There is general dissatisfaction among the working classes with regard to the newly instituted pensions law, which substitutes retirement at age 60 for the previous arrangement of retiring after 25 years of work. Another reason for general labor unrest is the government's attempt to dissolve the various political trade unions into a single union controlled by the regime. 

Both British weeklies view the current crisis as a consequence and a test of the particular brand of nationalism implemented by this military regime in their attempt to institute a revolution from above and to steer a course between capitalism and communism. Chile Hoy offers a discussion of the current director of the Peruvian CAEM agency, which provides historical and interpretive background to the current Peruvian military regime in an attempt to explain why its policies sometimes baffled the left and the right alike. 

A government which has nationalized the US controlled international petroleum company, a government which has instituted the most comprehensive agrarian reform on the continent since the Cuban Revolution, and which is the first country in Latin America to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba, is also a government which continues to offer attractive concessions to foreign business investors and encourages foreign control of many sectors of the economy. The contradictions of such policies are apparent. 

What kind of transformation did the Peruvian armed forces undergo to make possible the particular approach of the present nationalist government? The Peruvian official quoted in Chile Hoy traces the preparation for change back to a realization after World War II that the capacity of a nation to guarantee its own security depends on the degree of its development. A country whose economic interests are subordinate to another country is not truly sovereign. But any attempt to reach a solution to the problem of Peru's underdevelopment inevitably involved the adoption of far-reaching institutional changes. 

There was an awareness that the armed forces as an institution must divest itself of the traditional myths of its apolitical nature, its conservative character, and the strict definition of its professional sphere of action. The formation in the 1950s of CAEM, the Center for Advanced Military Studies, was to have a profound impact on every subsequent generation of Peruvian military men. Over half of the members of the present ruling Junta share the common experience of attending special courses at the center. 

Chile Hoy's Peruvian analyst views the social origins of the Army's officer corps as a secondary factor in explaining the break with traditional alignments between the military and the Peruvian oligarchy. Because of their ethnic mixture of Indian and Spanish blood, and their provincial origins, Peruvian officers were far removed from the traditional centers of economic and political power. The policy of rotation exposed the officers to several different parts of the country during their career, giving them a direct acquaintance with the particular problems of each region. Finally, the political impact of the guerrilla movements brought the true nature of Peru's structural problems to light and demonstrated the need to alleviate the situation before the existing tensions were unleashed in violent revolution. 

In 1962, the Army took control of the government for 10 months to ensure elections. Then, in 1968, convinced that no other group was qualified to accomplish the task at hand, they instituted themselves as Peru's existing government. A balance sheet of the first five years indicates increased concessions to the interest of foreign investors, a slowing down of the agrarian reform, a waning of initial popular support, and an increase in repressive measures against dissenting sectors of the population. 

Current political tensions in the country are explained by some commentators as the result of Velasco Alvarado's recent absence from government due to a leg amputation. Other observers, however, see the current tensions as an expression of the contradictions which this type of nationalist capitalist experiment must inevitably incur. They see the Peruvian government's inability to find an adequate solution as a warning to other Latin American countries who are set on a similar course. This report from the Manchester Guardian, Latin America, and Chile Hoy. 

Our feature this week concerns Latin immigrants in the United States. Their status, their role in the US economy, and recent actions by the immigration service, which appear aimed to shift the blame for the nation's economic and social problems to the immigrant. 

A recent article in The Guardian reported that there are mounting signs that a new anti-alien drive is underway to turn neighbors into scapegoats for unsolved social problems. Without fanfare, since mid-1972, immigration authorities have conducted dragnet raids, victimizing thousands on the street, outside a movie theater, at bus stops, at a dance hall, anywhere if they were dark skinned and looked Latin American. More than 2000 persons, most of them Chicanos, demonstrated in Los Angeles, June 16th to protest massive deportations of people of Mexican ancestry by the United States Immigration and Naturalization service. 

The immigration service, a branch of the Justice Department, began rounding up persons who were supposedly here illegally, arresting more than 1000 people last May 23rd in drag net raids throughout Los Angeles and Orange County. Since then, more than 6,700 people, most of them of Mexican descent, have been arrested and forced to sign papers agreeing to voluntary repatriation. 

As the Guardian points out, the raids have resembled more a Gestapo roundup than a deportation campaign, with the immigration service setting up roadblocks in the Chicano community of East Los Angeles and checking drivers and passengers for proof of citizenship. In addition, immigration service agents have also been arresting people at bus stations, restaurants, on their jobs, and have been breaking into private homes. 

In one instance, the immigration service bursted into a Catholic church service, dragging out more than 200 people. In another case, agents tore down a window screen and climbed into a house, taking away an 11-year-old boy who was there all alone. Later, the parents returned to find the doors wide open and the house empty, only to be informed by neighbors that the boy had been deported to Tijuana, Baja, California, some 130 miles away. 

The deportees have been taken to the Long Beach Naval Station, where they are kept handcuffed overnight before they are shipped across the border. Reporters have stated that immigration officials have removed handcuffs when news reporters have come to inspect the camp. Furthermore, news sources have reported that mothers were unable to attend to their children because their hands are manacled. 

"The deportation", says the Guardian, "have increased to astronomical proportions over the last two years and have begun to resemble the campaign of 1954, when more than one and a half million people were deported, many of whom were United States citizens of Mexican ancestry. In 1971, the immigration service booted out more than 250,000 people, and last year more than 450,000 people were deported, most of them Latins or Mexicans."

The Institute for Social Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico has documented many of these deportations and has discovered that most of the deportees were poor agricultural laborers, who were kicked out after harvest time and without a cent. The author of this study also said that these Mexicans live in the United States in a situation of complete slavery, with terrible working conditions imposed by the owners and without any regard for the precepts of law or humanity. This story appeared in The Guardian. 

Despite allegations to the contrary, immigrant labor contributes more to the US economy than it receives in return. A recent study entitled "Workers Without Visas", a permanent part of the workforce and economy of the United States, makes some startling revelations about the true status of these workers. Published in the latest issue of the magazine of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the article was written jointly by Umberto Corona, Secretary of the Center for Autonomous Social Action, a Los Angeles based organization dedicated to defending the rights of immigrant workers, and Lorenzo Torres. 

Mexican workers without visas in this country do in fact pay taxes. Actually, they pay more taxes than all other residents or workers on the same amount of wages earned. The Internal Revenue Service denies these workers the right to deduct for dependents, even though their dependents may be US citizens or permanent residents. Mexican workers without documents also pay for Social Security benefits through their regular weekly payroll deductions. They cannot, however, collect these benefits when they need them most, when old or sick. 

According to Corona and Torres, these workers cannot take advantage of labor law enforcement rights and facilities when employers refuse to pay wages, overtime pay, vacation, pay, pensions, or even the minimum wage. If they complain, the employer calls the immigration agents and out they go across the border. When these workers cannot produce papers proving citizenship or permanent residency, they are denied welfare benefits, even though they have been workers in this country for years. When jobless, many times they're not able to collect unemployment insurance benefits, despite years of steady work 

In many areas, their children are refused public schooling and are not eligible for scholarships. They have no recourse in civil court for fear of deportation. During the arrest and detention process, prior to deportation, they're denied due process, the right to counsel, to bail, to appeal, on grounds that they're not criminals. They're merely being detained under administrative procedure, the immigration service argues. Finally, but most importantly, they cannot vote and so have absolutely no political recourse. 

Corona and Torres consider that special mention must be made of the terrible injustices being committed daily against hundreds of thousands of deported families, particularly children, but also spouses who are United States citizens. They are unable to return to the land of their birth simply because the breadwinner in their family has no visa. 

The United States economy benefits from the presence of immigrants without visas in yet other ways. The US economizes on the expenses for health, education, and whatever vocational training the immigrant worker receives prior to joining the labor force. The US bears neither the expenses of youth nor of old age, for when one worker without visa is too old, no longer profitable enough, he is deported to the country of origin or simply denied Social Security benefits. 

Immigrant workers, particularly the ones without documents, represent not only a great saving for the US capitalist society at large, but also for the individual capitalists who employs them. In the Southwest, agribusineses has been based in great part on the supply of workers without visas as a source of cheap labor. In more recent years, industry and business in the urban areas have also been taking advantage of the worker without papers, by paying them substandard wages. It is the lowest of the lowest paid jobs, the most arduous, the dirtiest, and the most undesirable to which the immigrant, particularly the one without papers, is assigned. 

Corona and Torres said that in many industries where machines have displaced highly paid workers, these companies have also introduced the use of immigrant Mexican and other Latin American workers without visas at the lowest of wages to perform the rationalized operations that then feed the automated ones. They contend that companies are not interested in automating the very dangerous, unhealthy, or backbreaking jobs when they can pay meager wages for them. 

Many employers hire these workers knowing full well their legal status. When they don't bend to his particular whims, the employer calls the immigration agents. If demand slackens and he must cut his workforce, the employer might withhold wages for a while. When the workers become restive. However, he'll call the immigration service and thus avoid further payment. The bosses can hire these workers for a 10 to 14 hour day for as little as a $1.00 to a $1.30 an hour. 

Corona and Torres say that corporations and government place the blame for the ills of the nation on the immigrant, particularly the illegal one. Some trade unions, adopting this line of reasoning as their own, further argue that these workers block the organizing of unions in industries where they predominate. This is true. These workers are a source of cheap labor for the employer. So long as they remain unorganized, they do exert pressures on the wages of all other workers. 

Some unions have sought an easy way out. They've ignored shops with large concentrations of workers without visas. In some cases, they report them to immigration agents. These unions reject these workers on the pretext that their vulnerability makes them good prey for employers who want to break a strike. 

The approach of the United Farm Workers and other progressive unions has been to include the immigrant without papers in union membership and strike activity. In Hawaii, the International Longshoremen's and Warehouse Men's Union defended foreign workers, Filipinos, Okinawans, Japanese, and other Asians from deportation and the threat of it by plantation owners. The union also used natives of these countries as organizers who would travel with the migrant stream during the on and the off season. It was the only way the union could shield itself against the employer's encroachment and promote unity within this labor pool all year long. 

As recently as last year, the United Farm Workers successfully applied the same tactic during the Yuma organizing strike drive along the Arizona, Baja California border. Here, the union convinced Mexican workers not to scab, and from among them, recruited some of the best organizers for the duration of the strike. 

Coupled with welcoming these workers into the ranks of labor, these unions and community groups argue that a national drive, such as being spearheaded by the Center for Autonomous Social Action, must be given full support by labor and other sections of the population for rejection of laws that restrict the rights of immigrants. They contend that anti-scab legislation is the key to guaranteeing the rights of those and all other workers. Otherwise, the employer will inevitably use workers without documents, who may already be disenchanted with a union that doesn't care for their wellbeing, against the rest of the workforce. 

Immigrants traditionally feel that they have the right to fight for their existence anywhere on the globe. "Mexicans," continues Corona, "don't view their presence here in any way as an intrusion. Mexican families in the United States are descendants of those who colonized, peopled, and developed what is known as the American Southwest long before 1776." 

They ended their article with a warning. "We see the revival of an anti-alien hysteria and jingoism that seeks to place the blame upon Mexican and other Latin American workers for the loss of jobs that have been brought about by automation, termination of certain war contracts, defense spending shifts, space contract cutbacks, and runaway shops, the importation of goods from low wage countries, the closing down of not so profitable operations, and the accompanying lack of planning for the future fate of the workers that are displaced. The allegations against immigrant workers," Corona and Torres charge, "are a phony escape valve to further divide workers, to confuse them, and to divert them from taking joint action against the real culprits, the businesses for which they work." 

The immigration service's recent crackdown on illegal aliens is further described in an article from the New York, Daily World. The article describes the experiences of farm worker and United States citizen Armando Muñoz, who was deported from Florida and sent to Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. After two months of frequent cold and sleepless nights, and a 1,200 mile journey, Muñoz reached Matamoros just across the border from Texas, where he called relatives. They hurried across the border with Muñoz's birth certificate, proving his US citizenship and took him back to Texas. 

Muñoz is now suing the immigration service for $25,000 in damages. Munoz's experience is typical of what happens yearly to thousands of US citizens, permanent residents, and workers without visas of Mexican origin, who are whisked across the border without a hearing when they cannot produce documents on the spot. 

Some observers see the recent flurry of activity on the part of the immigration service as being prompted by disclosures of corruption. Top immigration officials and Attorney General Kleindienst are among those who have been implicated in cases of corruption, first disclosed by the New York Times. 11 persons, including seven immigration officers, have so far been indicted by the Department of Justice. 

The federal investigation found that at least one high official is engaged in illegal activity at every major point of entry along the 2,000 mile United States Mexican border. The investigation reveals that immigration officials smuggle drugs and immigrants and sell false documents. Some have raped Mexican women or have traded entry documents for the women's sexual favors. When in their custody, workers without visas who refuse to do their bidding or answer questions have been beaten with lead weighted gloves. In collusion with employers, immigration officials have robbed workers of their wages by conducting a raid just before pay time, in return, receiving cash, or other kinds of payoff. 

The information for this report was drawn from The Guardian, the Daily World, the New York Times, and the World Trade Union Magazine. 

This week's feature deals with recent events in Chile. A recent Associated Press article summed up the Chilean situation, reporting on the resignation of several ministers as part of a political shift taking place. President Salvador Allende is moving towards less military participation in his government after revolt and attempt attempted coup by several low ranking rightist officers. About 100 members of the second armed regiment assaulted the defense ministry and presidential palace with tanks and automatic weapons. The gunfire killed 22 and wounded 34 other people, mostly civilians.

Although the revolt was easily squelched with the aid of the higher ranking military who feel a commitment to defend the Constitution, Allende decided to form a new cabinet without the participation of the armed forces. Much of the political tension leading up to this crisis arose from the controversial strike of the copper miners at Chile's biggest mine.

The strike lasted 76 days and cost Chile an estimated $60 million in lost production. Strike related violence also cost two lives and resulted in injuries to more than 100 persons. There was a great deal of controversy over the way the Allende regime professing a socialist ideology should handle disputes with their constituency, the workers. Related to this was debate over the validity of the miner's claims. While critics such as Hugo Blanco, well known South American revolutionary writing for Intercontinental Press Service, supported the minor's claims, others have been severely critical of what they term "elitist demands".

In a recent interview, David Barkin of the City College of New York questioned fellow economist Andrew Zimbalist. Zimbalist recently returned from Chile where he had been working with a government planning agency, effectively points out some of the difficulties and sides with the government. Subsequent to this interview, the minors did in fact accept a government settlement and have returned to work. However, the Chilean economy has been severely damaged. In the following interview, Zimbalist and Barkan examined the reasons for the strike as well as its political implications. This interview comes to us from Chilean newsletter produced by the What's Happening in Chile Group in New York City. 

We've been reading a lot in the New York Times about the Chilean labor problems and especially the strike at El Teniente copper mine, one of the largest copper mines in the world. Most especially, we've read about a lot of violence and the fact that copper exports from Chile have been stopped because of these events. Could you comment on the coverage of those events by the New York Times and tell us a little more about what's happening? 

Sure. True to form, the New York Times has succeed in completely distorting the events at this of the copper Strike. The two articles that I read this past week on the strike failed to mention what seems to me to be the most fundamental aspects. One, that it is a strike instigated by the right. Two, that the demands that the right are raising are completely illegitimate, which is to say that they're asking for that the workers of El Teniente receive a 150% readjustment for the rate of inflation when all the other workers in the country are receiving 100%.

And this would be to make the most privileged sector of workers in Chile, even more privileged. The government has, and is one of the first governments to do this in Chile, guaranteed a 100% to everybody, so nobody is hurt by inflation. The right has taken advantage of this and is trying to claim that the workers at El Teniente should get 150%, an outrageous demand not justifiable on any terms. The New York Times article did not mention this.

The other thing, and perhaps even more egregious, that the New York Times article did not mention is that today only 20% of the workers at El Teniente are on strike. 80% are working. And the workers that are on strike are workers that are in the opposition to the government, they're administrative workers, they're white collar workers, and they're not the blue collar workers. Even though the New York Times article says that this is creating a conflict between the government and the blue collar workers of the country. 

The fact that it's the white collar workers that are on strike, that makes the current episode very strikingly similar to the episode last October when the truck drivers were on strike and the New York Press or the United States Press in general made it seem like it was a workers strike, when in fact it was owners of the trucks which initiated the strike, which was taking place in Chile. Is the parallel correct in looking at the current event in light of what happened last October, and can you tell us a little about why the right has chosen the copper mines as the object of their strike? 

The parallel is the following that the right in October for 30 days orchestrated a general strike. The strike was a failure because it didn't have worker support. 99% of the white and blue collar workers in the country were working. The right this time around, more determined than ever, has decided that the only way they're going to get a general strike to work is to divide the working class, and they're trying to do that by using those sectors of the white collar workers where they have some support to support a political strike, and this is what they're doing.

They've tried to do that at El Teniente and they succeeded to some extent. They tried to do it at Chuquicamata, which is the other large copper mine in the north and other copper mines. In fact, labor leaders of El Teniente traveled several hundred miles to these other mines to try to instigate these strikes. They failed. They're also trying, of course, to do it in other industrial sectors, but to date have also failed. Now the second part of your question was related to—

Why they've chosen the mines themselves as the object? 

Yeah, the other part of their strategy having a general strike is to affect the sector of the economy that is most vital to the economy. Copper accounts for 80% of the export earnings of Chile, or 80% of the dollars that Chile earns comes from copper. And El Teniente incidentally produces something of 50% of the copper in the country, a little bit less perhaps.

Now, Chile doesn't have the dollars to import the raw materials and the imports they need for production, and they need a lot of them because their industry has to date or up until the end, they've been based upon foreign capital and foreign technology and to service that technology, they need inputs that aren't producing the country. So if they don't have the dollars to buy those input and if they don't have the dollars to buy the food that's necessary to feed the population and other items, then the economy approaches chaos, and this is what the right is trying to do.

They're trying to create the situation of chaos to justify a military intervention which would supersede Allende. Now, there's no indication at the present that the military is disposed to do this, but the right goes ahead with the strategy of creating more and more chaos. This general strike has cost Chile some 30 million in dollars, in foreign exchange earnings. If the strike continues, it will cost them more if they generate sympathy strikes in other parts of the country amongst the white collar workers who are already in the opposition, and I should point out that somewhat around 20% of the workers in Chile are in the opposition to the government, and these workers almost universally turn out to be white collar workers, and the blue collar workers in almost a %100 of them are supporting the government. 

So if the right does succeed in dividing the workers, some of the white collars from the mass of the workers, and continues to generate the sabotage, then they are hoping that the situation will call for a military intervention saying that the situation is unsalvageable in any other way. And this would of course usurp Allende's powers.

These sorts of economic problems which are being generated by a small segment of the labor force must be having repercussions throughout the rest of the country. Could you comment on that a little? 

Well, as I say, they've tried, they've gone to the other mines, they've gone to other industries. They're generating other sorts of economic chaos from the black market, controlling distribution mechanisms. In fact, at El Teniente, as a means of sabotage, they've blockaded the road to the mines for the workers. The 80% that want to work have been blockaded. They've been terrorized. They've in fact blown up several factories—a factory in Concepcion that was completely destroyed.

They've intercepted distribution of industrial inputs. They intercepted, for example, during the strike of October, which was the planting season in Chile. They intercepted the distribution of seed and fertilizers, which lowered the agricultural production this year, and of course, food is a basic item, and there's no better way to make people revolt against the government than to starve them. Now, they haven't succeeded fortunately in doing that, but the strategy is to raise the level of the sabotage and raise the level of the disturbance so that there would be no other alternative but to have a military intervention.

When you talk about this industrial sabotage and problems of the white collar workers, you're talking about a very special echelon of the labor force. What about the other groups, the large members of blue collar workers, the rest of the labor force, which is in fact trying to fight this? We read about conflicts between the workers and we read even about workers being killed. Could you comment about that in the light of this? 

Well, the only thing to say is that the great majority, the great great majority, and it has to be over 95% of the blue collar workers are supporting the government. Several months ago, there was a march in favor of the government and from the headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party, which is an opposition party, came some shots and killed a blue collar worker. Methods of terrorism. They'll resort to anything to try to divide workers, to scare workers. And I would say that it's going to be very hard for them to divide the blue collar workers, very hard for them to take them away from supporting the government. 

This must be causing substantial sacrifices then, for the blue collar workers. I mean it's substantial problem for them, specifically if they're being prevented from going to their work at the mines, for example. 

At El Teniente there are serious problems. On the whole, everybody's experiencing more problems than Chile, but we can say without hesitation that the blue collar workers today in Chile are eating much, much better. They're consuming 20% more. They have better housing, they have better facilities, better plumbing, electricity where they haven't had it before. In the factories they have medical centers, in the factories they have dental centers, in the factories they have libraries, they have cultural groups. In short, they have everything. They have a lot of things that they never had before and are very satisfied. 

Nevertheless, the present crisis does add up to a great many political problems for the Allende government. To what extent is there any external participation in this current political crisis, this Chilean play of power, and is the United States involved in any way in this internal power play? 

Yeah, it's very hard to see the CIA. There is indirect evidence that they're doing something. For instance, during the general strike of October, curiously, a very large amount of dollars entered the country that wasn't accounted for either by increasing exports or by loans or whatever. And one noticed this because the exchange rate for the dollar or the dollar in relationship to the escudo became much less valuable, and that only happens through the situation of supply and demand when you have more dollars.

And it was very clear then that the United States or somebody, some conduit was funneling dollars to support the strike, to support the truckers in October, the same thing is happening now. There are sorts then of this indirect evidence, but we know more directly that in Bolivia there are Brazilian and Bolivian troops mounting on the Chilean border, at which point or if they'll ever intervene. If they'll ever invade Chile, we don't know, but they're preparing to do that. We don't know if they would initiate a conflict or jump in once a conflict had been started.

One last short question, and that is these international and in internal political events which are occurring in Chile leave most of us in America in a quandary. How do we get the sort of information or how can we reinterpret the sort of information that is available in such a way that would permit us to understand better what's happening in Chile? Are there any sources of news outside the United States which might be available here? For example, the European Press. Is the European press reporting it differently and better? 

Well, I'm living in Chile. I'm not all that familiar with the European Press. There are papers like Le Monde, which are in French, that report better, of course. But I can say that in New York City, there's The Guardian. And there's very good coverage in The Guardian. There's good coverage in The Nation. I understand, of course, that's not a daily paper. I would say for weekly reports on Chile, The Guardian is fine. 

Thank you very much. We've been speaking with Andrew Zimbalist, who is in from Chile, where he's been working on problems of economic development in the present government of Salvador Allende. 

The Miami Herald reports that 30 years of democracy in Uruguay have ended in a military-backed coup by the current president Juan Bordaberry. The demise of the Switzerland of the Americas, reputed for years to be Latin America's most progressive country, has been a slow and lengthy process. Gradual Errosion of the country's economic position, runaway inflation, which reached nearly 100% last year, widespread popular opposition to governmental policies, increasing thirst for power on the part of the military, and a gradual eradication of all civil rights, these were the prelude to the events of late June. 

The Manchester Guardian claimed that the response to the deterioration of government in Uruguay was to be found in increased workers' militancy, the longstanding successes and popular support won by the Tupamaros guerrilla group, the high percentage of the vote pulled by the leftist Broad Front coalition in the 1971 elections, the constant exposure and public outcry at scandals in the government, and the increased use of torture and United States developed military and police technology, which failed to either eradicate the revolutionary opposition or to satisfy demands for more effective government. 

Bordaberry was driven to take a drastic step. On June 27th, he dissolved Congress. Public response came in the form of a general strike, which continues to virtually paralyze the country. Industrial production has ceased, banks have shut down, public and private transportation has come to a standstill.

To counter this popular resistance, says the Manchester Guardian, Bordaberry, in a move without precedent in Uruguayan history, declared that the country's largest and most powerful labor union shall be henceforth illegal. The leadership of the National Workers Convention went immediately underground. It is known that the government has issued a list of 52 union leaders who are to be arrested on site.

Still, the general strike continues. Despite efforts by the military and some technicians to reopen the most vital plants, striking workers have been threatened with being fired and being inducted into the army. Many have been rounded up and are being held in a large football stadium.

La Nación of Bueno Aires comments that the battle between Bordaberry and the Congress has been a long one. Congress has been fighting off its own demise since February of this year. At that time, the army intervened in the government process to force Bordaberry to set up a council of national security to be controlled by three top military officers. In March, when Congress reopened, Bordaberry proposed anti-union legislation and the institution of new security measures. He also demanded the lifting of parliamentary immunity from two opposition senators. 

Congressional hearings on one of these congressmen, Enrique Erro, continued throughout April and May. Erro contended that the attack against him was motivated by his documented charges that the military had carried out illegal arrests, tortures, and murders against members of the opposition. He also uncovered evidence of US involvement in these activities. The senators refused to revoke Erros' immunity, and in the face of their opposition, the alliance between Bordaberry and the military became stronger. In April, Bordaberry appointed three military commanders in chief as official advisors to the president, and the Council for National Security began investigating and firing school teachers and principals whom they considered too liberal. 

By early June, the crisis was coming to a head. Members of the opposition parties boycotted the meetings of the legislature to prevent passage of Bordaberry's repressive legislation. And on June 27th, he ordered the military to surround the congressional palace and then dissolved Congress. 

Excélsior of Mexico City comments, "Those who hope for nationalist progressive solutions, somewhat along the lines of the current Peruvian government, were disappointed. The younger and more progressive officers were outmaneuvered by the Army's nationalist conservative wing, who have consistently called for a more authoritarian regime and who are reputed to have been preparing Parliament's demise for the past six months, through the Army Intelligence Unit." 

"Since the decree, the country has been in turmoil. Daily activity has been brought to a halt by the general strike. A large woman's march through Montevideo to Constitution Square, in protest of the suspension of Congress, was disbanded by police and tanks. Bands of youths hurled stones at public buses, defying the strike, at least one of the youths was killed by the police." This report compiled from the Miami Herald, the Manchester Guardian, La Nación of Buenos Aires, and Mexico City's Excélsior. 

Uruguay's president, Juan Bordaberry, now vested with dictatorial powers, discussed the causes which motivated him to dissolve the Uruguayan Parliament in an exclusive interview with a correspondent of the Argentine daily La Nación. In the interview, Bordaberry stressed his conviction that despite certain similarities with the Brazilian military regime, his government's newly assumed stance is "strictly Uruguayan."  

Bordaberry denied any imitation of Brazilian political practices on the part of his government, but he admitted to a certain sympathy for the Brazilian regime and stated that both governments share a common desire for democracy against communism. Referring to his recent visit to Argentina for the inauguration of the new Peronist president, Hector Campora, Bordaberry denied that angry crowds had shouted "murderer", "torturer" to him as he passed by.

The proposed constitutional reform, according to Bordaberry, will have as its primary goal the limitation of parliamentary power in order to prevent its encroachment on the power of the executive. "Such a procedure, he added, is in line with all modern constitutions." In light of the current political events in the country, Bordaberry indicated that the population is not up to an electoral campaign. Consequently, the constitutional plebiscite will be postponed until the national elections in 1976. This interview is translated from La Nación of Buenos Aires. 

Our feature this week is a commentary on Latin American art, taken from a recent book by Jean Franco called "The Modern Culture of Latin America".

An intense social concern has been the characteristic of Latin American art for the last 150 years. Literature and even painting and music have played a social role, with the artists acting as teacher, guide, and conscience of his country. The Latin American has generally viewed art as an expression of the artist's whole self, a self which is living in a society and which therefore has a collective as well as an individual concern. On the other hand, the idea of the moral neutrality or the purity of art has had relatively little impact. 

In countries like those of Latin America, where national identity is still in the process of definition and where social and political problems are both huge and inescapable, the artist's sense of responsibility towards society needs no justification. Generally, movements in the arts have not grown out of a previous movement, but have arisen in response to factors external to art. A new social situation defines the position of the artist, who then improvises or borrows a technique to suit his purpose. 

Ms. Franco's book is a careful study of these changes in the artist's attitude to society and the way that this is expressed in literature and, to some extent, the other arts. She begins her analysis with the year 1888, the year of the publication of an influential volume of poetry by Ruben Dario, the leader of Latin America's first native artistic movement, known as modernism. 

Modernist is a term used to characterize many diverse writers, such as Nicaraguan Ruben Dario, the Cuban Jose Marti, and the Colombian, Jose Silva. All of these writers had a great deal in common. The type of society the modernist hated above all was contemporary bourgeois society. This may seem strange, since Spanish America was only at the margin of industrial and capital expansion.

Yet the poets did not have to see dark satanic mills on their doorsteps to realize that a new and disturbing force was looming over them. The cash nexus, destructive of all other human relations, was what the artist most feared. Indeed, many of the prose pieces written by the modernists are in the nature of allegories about the relation of the artist to a materialist society. The poet's hatred of the materialism of his age was often to remain exclusively verbal.

But there were very many different shades of social involvement. From Dario's aloofness to the militant commitment of Jose Marti, a dedicated fighter for Cuban independence, nothing could be further from an elite attitude than these words of Marti. "Poetry is the work both of the bard and of the people who inspire him. Poetry is durable when it is the work of all. Those who understand it are as much its authors as those who make it. To thrill all hearts by the vibrations of your own, you must have the germs and inspirations of humanity. Above all, you must live among a suffering people." 

After this early period, characterized by a real or symbolic rebellion, came an intense concern with culture rather than politics. A new influential movement known as Arielism took its name from an essay by Uruguayan Rodo, in which he emphasized the spirituality of Latin American culture, especially when contrasted with the vulgar neighbors to the north, the United States. There was an emphasis on original native culture and efforts to revive the memories of heros of the past. 

After the first World War, the Latin American intellectuals began to seek some roots in the cultures of the Indian and the Negro, and in the land itself, alternative values to those of a European culture, which seemed on the verge of disintegration. Literature about Indians and Latin America was to have two distinct functions. One was to fulfill a direct social purpose by arousing a general awareness of the plight of submerged sections of the population. The other was to set up the values of Indian culture and civilization as an alternative to European values. 

This tenancy found its best expression in Mexico, where the world famous muralists Diego Rivera, Orozco, Siqueiros, and O'Gorman revived mythological Indian figures with very beautiful and innovative techniques. The Negro tradition expressed itself in the 1920s within Cuba and fostered a great deal of literature, as well as music. This trend towards more native emphasis in Latin America was a very important stage of development. At its most superficial, it was a gesture of defiance towards Europe and the United States. At its best, it did justice to hitherto ignored, if not disparaged segments of the population. 

In the 1920s, the world gradually began to divide into the hostile political camps of communism and fascism. Political concern was almost unavoidable. Whether such concern would be reconciled with the pursuit of art was another matter. Some intellectuals became militants and abandoned their painting or poetry. Some put their art to the service of a message. A few attempted to find a form of art which would universalize their political concern. 

In Latin America, many communists and socialist parties were founded and run by the artists and intellectuals. The most outstanding example was the Mexican Communist Party, which had, at one time, no less than three painters, Rivera, Siqueiros, and Guerrero on its executive committee. In Peru, the socialist party was founded by an intellectual, Mariategui. In 1936, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War drew many more writers and artists into the left-wing ranks, and prompted middle-class intellectuals to join with workers and peasants. 

Of all the poets and authors involved in this political reawakening, Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, succeeded most in bringing political elements into poetry without sacrificing originality or creative depth. While arguing that poetry should not be separated from everyday life, but rather should be impure, as he put it, "corroded as if by an acid, by the toil of the hand, impregnated with sweat and smoke, smelling of urine and lilies". He still managed, as is obvious from the quote, to use very striking and beautiful imagery. 

The novelists of the early 20th century also show political concern, but are preoccupied with such philosophical and ethical issues as authenticity. Carlos Fuentes and Juan Rufo in Mexico both struggled with the problems of the Mexican consciousness. Ms. Franco writes, "In the modern novel, revolution is no longer seen as a total solution. At best, it is only an essential first step. The real battle, it has suggested, is now within the human mind and particularly within the minds of the upper and middle classes, whose failure to construct a reasonable society is one of the tragedies of Latin America." 

For a century and a half, the republics of Latin America have been following different paths. Mexico has undergone a social revolution. Paraguay has lived under a series of dictators. Argentina's population has been transformed by immigration from Europe. Obviously, such factors have their repercussions in the continent's literature, which besides common Latin American features, has also specifically Argentinian, Mexican, or Paraguayan characteristics. 

These local variants are not necessarily political. The incidents of illiteracy, the presence of a large rural population also affect the artistic environment. This does not mean that socially underdeveloped countries do not produce good literature, but simply that in such places the artist's task is lonelier and more difficult. 

Most countries in Latin America have experienced political oppression during the present century, and in many, the condition has been constant. Contemporary literature abounds with the personal testimonies of men who have been imprisoned and persecuted by dictators. In many countries, the problem of oppression is much wider than the immediate physical consequences. The writer suffers from the much slower torments of frustration, lack of freedom to write as he wishes, and a crushing intellectual environment. To be born and grow up in a Latin American dictatorship is, to use the words of Asturias, "to be born into a tomb". 

Two outstanding writers, Augusto Roa Bastos and Miguel Angel Asturias, the first from Paraguay and the second from Guatemala, have succeeded in gaining an international reputation, despite the inhibitions of their background. Asturias' book, Men of Corn, traces the dispossession of the Indians and the commercialization of agriculture. Roa Bastos' short story, "The Excavation", presents a nightmare of frustration in which those who rebel against the status quo are shamelessly murdered. The works of such writers as Asturias and Roa Bastos only serve to emphasize the tragic waste of human potential inherent in a dictatorship. These problems are particularly relevant to the Brazilian situation today, where a censorship of all printed and electronic media is unlimited. 

Latin American intellectuals have always been intrigued with the subject of revolution. The Mexican experience of 1910 is very prominent in the literature and art of the last decades. The Cuban Revolution has also had a great effect on national cultural life. Although the changes in the political and social life of Cuba are still too recent for a solid judgment to be formed, the revolution of 1959 changed the social structure of Cuba. Most of the upper class and many of the middle and professional classes left the island.

A vigorous campaign against illiteracy has brought into being a new amass readership, encouraged to write and help to publish by the official Union of Artists and Writers, and by the prizes offered by the Casa de las Americas, which acts as a cultural clearinghouse. Book production has enormously increased, and there are now available cheap editions of many Cuban and Latin American classics.

In a 1961 speech to intellectuals, Castro guaranteed freedom of literary expression, declaring, "Within the revolution, everything, outside the revolution, nothing," a guarantee that was repeated by other leading intellectuals and which has allowed a remarkable variety of styles. Unlike Soviet writing, realism has not been the only permitted style. Science fiction, fantasy, and black humor are all common. Within the first 10 years, the struggle in Cuba has not meant the sacrifice of spontaneity and variety. It'll be interesting to see whether, in time, totally new art forms will emerge. 

To declare one's self an artist in Latin America has frequently involved conflict with society. In the 19th century, the artist was divided from most of his fellow countrymen because of his culture and upbringing. As we have seen, the majority of 19th century reformers were also political fighters dedicated to reforming their society. It was only towards the end of the century, with modernism, that it was even suggested that art might be more important than the political struggle. 

This did not mean that they had given up on social programs. On the contrary, the modernist ideal of society was the exact contrary of the vulgar materialism, which they regarded as the symptom of the age, and their way of life was a protest against those who were uncritical of bourgeois values. Without abandoning ideals of culture and refinement, the Arielist generation saw itself as moral leader. The artist put his faith in education and in the written word as a means of changing society. 

However, ultimately, neither the written word or education was effective. The Arielist generation was overtaken by a rising tide of unrest, by the shattering impact of world events such as the Russian and Mexican revolutions and the First World War. The post-war generation was no longer in a position to feel superior. The masses had become a power to be reckoned with. The intellectual was therefore obliged either to regard himself as an ally of the masses, a helper in their cause, or if he could not do this, he tended to stand aside, proclaiming that politics and social reform belonged to a world of appearances. 

At any rate, there are many signs that Latin American literature has come of age. Two Nobel Prizes in the last five years have gone to Latin Americans, Miguel Angel Asturias of Guatemala, and Pablo Neruda of Chile. The work of these two men effectively summarizes many of Ms. Franco's points about Latin America and the artist's social concerns. Asturias' most famous series of novels deals with the role of foreign banana companies in his native country, and Neruda's verse is an enthusiastic witness to the success of the new Chilean regime. 

This week's feature will be a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago paper, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President Dorticos. 

Mr. President, in the past few years in Latin America, there have been several types of revolutionary change, the military nationalism of Peru, the Chilean elections, the semi-peaceful taking of power in Argentina. My question is why do you think the guerrilla tactics which characterized the '60s, as for instance, Che's campaign in Bolivia, have been replaced by other revolutionary tactics? 

I think the guerrilla campaign of the '60s had a direct effect on what is happening now despite the fact that the guerrilla campaign did not result in any military victories. The moral and political strengths of these campaigns is affecting not only those struggling with arms, but all revolutionaries with its example of revolutionary dedication, and this influence is tremendous. The presence of Che, which I saw in my recent trip to Argentina among the people, Che's original homeland, his figure, his thoughts, his humanism, his example is greater now than during his guerrilla campaign. 

To discount the influence of Che's actions on Latin America today is to discount a driving force in the hearts of Latin American people. Of course, this does not mean that all the revolutionary struggles have to follow the tactics of guerrilla's struggle which Che promoted. His greatest influence was his example, his conduct, his revolutionary will, and today, for example, it was with great personal satisfaction and profound emotion that I heard the Argentinian people improvising a slogan which, despite the habituation coming from years of revolutionary struggle, brought tears to my eyes. The slogan which I heard every day in Argentina was, "He is near. He is near. Che is here." This slogan is a perfect example of what I was saying. 

The triumph of the Cuban revolution is definitely a great turning point in the revolutionary process in Latin America. People have said that Cuba can be a showcase or trigger for socialism in Latin America. What is Cuba's role given the current realities in Latin America's revolutionary process? 

Its main contribution is to provide an example, an example of unbending and resolute spirit. 

Mr. President, certain groups have suggested that the friendly relations between the USSR and Cuba are actually a form of dependency. It's true that, in the past, there were differences in the Cuban and Soviet perspectives, differences which today seem to have largely disappeared. We'd be interested in hearing why these differences have disappeared and what is the current state of relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. 

There has been a detente, and the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union are better now than they ever have been. To speak of Cuban dependency with respect to the Soviet Union, however, is to make the grave errors of confusing imperialism with cooperation between a developed socialist country and an underdeveloped socialist one. One must look at the economic trade patterns and contrast the way Russia has related to us and the way the United States had related to us. 

If we look at the economic aspects of the relations, we can see that the Soviet Union's aid has been one of the main basis for Cuban development and survival. Looking back to the first few months of the revolution, when we lost the American sugar market, there was the Soviet market to take its place. When the blockade started by the United States cut off the flow of oil from countries aligned with the United States, there was Soviet oil. During these years, regardless of how relations between the two countries were going on, even when there were disagreements, as you mentioned, Soviet economic aid kept coming without interruption. 

Today, this economic aid has qualitatively improved. Entire sectors of our economy have been developed with the economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union and, thanks to this aid, new industrial plants will be built, and transportation and energy production will be expanded. These new plants will be Cuban plants, not Soviet ones, not plants indebted to foreign countries. 

In addition, the Russians have made it possible for the development of the nickel and textile industries, the modernization and expansion of our sugar industry and countless other projects, and all this has been done in the context of mutual respect and absolute equality in the political relations between two sovereign governments. 

With reference to the United States, which you've mentioned, what are the changes which Cuba would require before some form of dialogue or negotiations could take place concerning relations between the two countries? 

Before even dialogue can take place, there is one condition, that the imperialist United States government unilaterally end its blockade of Cuba, a blockade which it started and it must end. Until that happens, there won't be even any dialogue. If that occurs at some time in the future, we would then begin discussions of problems common to all of Latin America and the United States. We would not merely discuss bilateral affairs concerning only Cuba and the United States, but we would have to discuss it in the context of US relations to Latin America, generally. 

Looking at things from a purely pragmatic point of view, once the blockade has been unilaterally ended by the United States, we might be interested in a broad range of economic relations, including entrance into the American market and economic and technical cooperation. This in no way would involve Cuba's revolutionary government surrendering its revolutionary principles or giving in on any conditions which it might wish to establish, but we would not limit ourselves to this. For the discussions to be fruitful, we would have to discuss not only Cuba, but Latin America and the end of the United States' jerendent role in Latin America generally. 

One way of uniting Latin America so it could negotiate with the United States might be an organization such as the one which Chile has proposed. In the last OAS meeting, a wholly new Latin American organization excluding the United States was proposed. What is Cuba's position with respect to such an organization? 

First of all, we believe, as we've stated before, that the extant Organization of American States is undergoing a grave and insoluble crisis. Cuba will not return to the Organization of American States. We respect and even feel that some countries' suggestions for reforming the Organization of American States are a positive step, but we feel that the OAS as an institution, with the presence of the United States government in its very heart, is not the ideal means for Latin America to shape its future.

We do not belong to this organization, and we feel that a Latin American organization must be created with the participation also of the English-speaking Caribbean nations, which could then collectively form a united front to negotiate with the United States and defend Latin American interests with respect to American imperialism.

Does it seem to you that Nixon, if he survives Watergate, will be able to initiate such discussions at some time in the future, or do you feel that it will be necessary to continue to exercise revolutionary patience? 

We should not speak of speed or hurrying. Revolutionary theory teaches us to be patient and also impatient, and knowing how to reconcile the one with the other is what constitutes a tactical wisdom of a revolutionary. 

The diplomatic blockade of Cuba is falling apart. It has even been suggested that other governments such as Venezuela's, for example, might establish relations with Cuba in the near future. This could present an apparent contradiction with the internal policies of these countries. What is the Cuban position with respect to this problem, that is, with respect to reestablishing relations with governments which defy imperialism, but which do not have progressive policies at home and which may even repress their own people? 

We have made it clear before that we are not interested in having relations with the countries of Latin America for the mere sake of having relations. However, we feel that reestablishing relations with Latin American countries can be useful since we agree on the principle of demonstrating our sovereignty with respect to imperialism. 

You mentioned the hypothetical possibility of a government assuming a dignified international position with respect to imperialism while at the same time, in its internal affairs, oppressing or even repressing its people violently. To begin with, it is very hard for me to see how a country could have a correct anti-imperialist position, a dignified international position and at the same time oppress or violently repress its people whether or not revolutionary struggle was occurring.

That is because an anti-imperialist position cannot be maintained by a government without some changes in internal policies. Thus, internal policies are inevitably linked to international policies, as I have said, regardless of whether or not the country is in the midst of some kind of major change.

We understand that Prime Minister Castro in his last Mayday speech reaffirmed Cuba's solidarity with revolutionary movements. 

If we didn't reform our solidarity with revolutionary movements, we will be violating our own principles. 

Based on an analysis of the results of the 1970 sugar harvest, the Cuban economy has made great progress. What are the changes which have produced such progress? 

It would take an awfully long time to list all of the changes in our economy, and we should not exaggerate. Our economic growth is of necessity limited due to the underdevelopment of our economy which we inherited, the lack of energy sources, and the difficulties an underdeveloped country has dealing with developed countries, problems such as unequal exchange, which have been mentioned in the economic literature, but obstacles in the way of rapid economic growth. 

What have been the achievements since the 1970 harvest? Some figures can quantitatively measure these achievements. For example, in 1972, the economy grew by 10%. This is an extremely high rate of growth for the 1970s, and this growth rate was achieved despite a poor sugar harvest which resulted from two years of drought and organizational problems galore. 

Despite this and despite the important role sugar plays in our economy, we reached the 10% growth figure. Of course, that means that some sectors of our economy grew even more rapidly. Construction, for instance, was up 40%. Industry, not including sugar refining, was up 15%. For 1973, we have set a goal, which we may or may not achieve, of 17% growth. Looking at the third of this year, we find that the growth rate was 16%. Production of consumer goods has increased, and this has been one of the major factors leading to the financial health of the nation. 

Well, how has it been possible to achieve such growth? 

Basically, it has been possible with the better organization, better planning and, above all, with the help of lots of people. This is not an abstract statement. It is a concrete reality which can be observed in every sector of the economy even where there have been administrative problems or a lack of the proper technology. The workers' efforts have always been present and production quotas have been met and, in some cases, surpassed under conditions which are not at all optimum due to a lack of technicians or materials. These shortages resulted from our distance from the European markets we are forced to trade with. 

Despite our support from socialist countries, they cannot physically supply us with all the capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods that we need. Thus, we have to make large purchases from capitalist countries, with the resulting heavy loss of foreign exchange. Of course, our foreign exchange depends on our exports, which are limited, sugar, nickel, tobacco, fish and a few other lesser items. We are basically dependent on agriculture which is affected by climate changes. 

Thus, in response to your question, it is the incorporation of the workforce into the economic struggle at a higher level and the awareness of the need for such an effort and then the carrying out of these tasks, often through extraordinary efforts, which have led to this economic growth since Castro's call in his May 1st, 1970 speech..

Calls have gone up many times before for higher production. Why did the people respond more energetically this time than before? 

In the first place, it was due to the fact that it was crystal clear to many people that efforts had to be made in every sector of the economy and not just in sugar production. In the second place, it was due to the greater participation of mass organizations in economic decisions, in economic process. Finally, it was due to a growth in revolutionary consciousness which now has gone beyond the mere limits of revolutionary emotion and has matured into an awareness of the necessity of building socialism in our country if we want to get what we want. 

According to some analysis, this new economic growth is due to the abandonment of certain principles which the revolution was previously based upon. 

I don't think that's true. What principles are you referring to? 

Well, for instance, the replacement of the principle that consciousness should motivate workers instead of economic incentive in order to increase efficiency. 

It should be made clear that the importance we attribute to revolutionary consciousness has in no way been diminished, but we have noted that certain related factors such as, for example, tying salary to productivity cannot only serve as a material stimulus, but also serves to create and help people understand what is happening. Why does this occur? Because in a socialist society, which is not one of abundance, from the point of view of revolutionary justice, one must conclude that it is immoral and, thus, it does not help create consciousness if one who works less earns the same as one who works more. 

When you pay a worker according to what he has produced, that is, in relation to his productivity, this is both just and consciousness-raising. This is because, through his salary, the worker is being evaluated morally and he is being told that he was socially responsible, will have more than he was not socially responsible. It would be demoralizing and would prevent the raising of consciousness if a worker who worked less, a loafer, earned as much as a good worker. Thus, we are not cutting down the role which revolutionary consciousness should play, but we're aiding and adding new ways of raising revolutionary consciousness. 

Given the larger amounts of goods being offered, do some individuals have more access to these goods than others? 

Yes. They have greater access to un-rationed goods, but everyone gets the same amount of ration to basic goods. 

Why is it that some individuals get more on rationed goods? 

This is related to the remarks I just made linking productivity, the quality and quantity of work to salary, and this is tied to the salary scale. 

You have been listening to a reenactment of an interview between representatives of the Santiago weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticos.

There is growing opposition by Puerto Ricans to announce plans for the construction of a petrochemical super port on their island. Juan Mari Brás, secretary General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, was interviewed this month by The Guardian in New York City. The Guardian asked, "Mr. Mari Brás, I believe you are in the US to discuss several questions with the United Nations. One of the main ones being on the construction of a new super port in Western Puerto Rico. Could you discuss the political and economic significance of this project?"