1973-12-13

This is the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America, as seen by leading world news sources with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group of Austin, Texas. 

We will depart from our usual format for the next three weeks to present news roundups of 1973 events in Latin America. On this report, Argentina and Bolivia. Sources for this report include the British News weekly, Latin America, the Mexico City daily, Excelsior, the Christian Science Monitor, and La Prensa of Lima, Peru. 

One of the most dramatic and unexpected changes that rocked Latin America in 1973 took place in Argentina. The event around which all subsequent events now seem to turn was the return to power of Juan Domingo Perón, the 77-year-old popular leader, who despite his 17-year absence, has maintained control over the largest political movement in Argentina. Perón first came to power in 1943, as a result of a military coup.

He gained a firm grip on the government in the immediate post-war years and began to implement his policies of state intervention in the economy and high import barriers to keep foreign industrial competition out and allow Argentine industry to develop. These nationalistic policies aroused the ire of the United States, but with the help of huge export earnings due to the high world price of Argentine beef, they spurred tremendous growth in the Argentine economy.

In order to consolidate his power base, Perón mobilized Argentine masses both by creating an extensive Peronist party apparatus and building the trade union movement. By the early 50s, Argentina's post-war boom had begun to slacken off and Perón lost political support as a result. In 1955, the military stepped in and took over the government, condemning Perón to exile.

In the years since Perón's downfall, the Peronist party has been prohibited from participating in Argentina elections, but the party has remained active and has cast blank votes in these elections. These boycotts of the elections have shown that, even while in exile, Perón was and is Argentina's most popular political leader.

The current series of events began last fall when the military government of Alejandro Lanusse announced it was considering allowing Perón to return to Argentina. In November, the government kept its promise and Perón flew to Buenos Aires, the nation's capital, and began negotiating with the ruling military leaders on what role his party would play in the upcoming March elections. The Argentina Perón returned to though was quite different from the Argentina Perón left 17 years before.

Deep division exists in Argentina and the Peronist movement itself. Clearly the most conservative element of the Peronist movement is the General Workers' Confederation, the huge union apparatus set up during Perón's previous regime. Over the years, though, the General Workers Confederation has championed the cause of Perón's return, but has been noticeably timid in fighting for workers' benefits. Thus, the union leadership has gotten along well with the military governments and has virtually lost contact with the masses it is supposed to represent.

The Peronist element which is responsible for much mass mobilization is the leftist Juventud Peronista, a Peronist youth group, whose socialist sounding slogans frighten many of the outline Peronists, especially when they see the Peronist youth's ability to turn out crowds. Still, further to the left, are the non-Peronist guerilla groups, such as the People's Revolutionary Army, who have made it clear that they consider foreign monopolist, local oligarchs, and the armed forces the enemies of the Argentine people. The ERP as the group is known, is famous for its kidnappings of foreign business executives and other operations which make it a force to be dealt with in Argentine politics. 

It was into this political arena that Perón stepped when he began bargaining with the military in November and December. Perón wanted to be able to run in the March presidential elections himself as opposed to seeing his party represented by someone else. At this point, it is worth noting Perón was considered a revolutionary of sorts and was feared by the US government and foreign businessmen. When the military refused to let Perón himself run in the elections, the disappointed leader returned to Spain and Héctor Cámpora, another Peronist, was chosen to run instead.

This was considered a victory for the left wing of the Peronist movement since Cámpora was felt to be an ardent nationalist and an anti-imperialist. When the elections were held in March, Cámpora was an easy winner and speculation began as to what kind of government could be expected when he took power on May 25th. Revolutionary guerrilla groups, anticipating a friendly regime, stepped up their activities in April and May.

The ERP got $1 million worth of medical equipment for the poor from Ford Motor Company for the release of a kidnapped Ford executive. Such activities caused many foreign businessmen to leave Argentina. When Cámpora and the Peronistas actually took power on May 25th though, it became clear that they had no intention of radically transforming Argentine society immediately. Although some boldly independent foreign policy moves were made, such as the recognition of Cuba and other socialist regimes, no sweeping domestic changes were announced. 

Meanwhile, popular pressures within Argentina continued to build. In June, in addition to continued guerrilla activity, government buildings and hospitals were occupied by workers demanding better wages and working conditions. Such developments did not go unanswered by right-wing forces. At a welcoming demonstration for Perón's return, thugs hired by the conservative leadership of the General Workers Confederation opened fire on a Peronist youth column in the crowd.

In the resulting shootout, 20 people were killed and more than 200 injured. Also, the General Workers Confederation undertook a campaign of brutal repression against rival unions in the important industrial state of Cordoba. The Cordoba Unions have rejected the leadership of the General Workers Confederation and have instead defined their movement in terms of class struggle.

In July, most observers were stunned when President Cámpora announced that he was resigning in order to allow Perón to take the reins of power directly. But it appeared that the return Perón would be a different leader. In both cabinet appointments and restructuring his party, Perón embraced conservative elements and left the more radical sectors out of the movement. Reflecting this shift, the US took an about-face and endorsed Perón.

On September 22nd of this year, three decades after he first came to power, and after a 17-year military imposed exile, Perón won a decisive victory at the polls, reaping 62% of the votes. Even with Perón in the presidency, however, there is neither the hoped for stability in Argentina nor a unified civilian front. Building such a coalition to oppose the military front, which ruled Argentina for the past 18 years is Perón's first priority. His return, however, has ignited rather than appeased the smoldering social forces.

Two days after his presidential victory, a chain of political assassinations was set off beginning with that of Jose Rucci, a moderate trade union leader. Although the ERP, which Perón outlawed upon taking power, was immediately handed the blame, the prevailing speculation is that it was actually the work of right wing provocateurs anxious to disturb the stability of Perón's government from the outset. Soon after the Rucci assassination, the right murdered the young leader of a Peronist youth group and bombed the offices of their weekly paper.

These murders were followed by continued sectarian violence with paramilitary and para-political groups flourishing. The General Workers' Confederation, surprisingly, is maintaining a conciliatory line within the Peronist movement. The Argentine justification of the violence is that the current wave of bombings and assassinations is nothing compared to what would've happened if Perón had not imposed his heavy hand of authority.

Foreign observers interpret the warfare between the Peronist youth and the trade union bureaucracy as evidence that Peronism is, was, and will be, a fascist movement, and that the flirtation with the left was no more than a tactical maneuver to win votes. Perón has given strong evidence that he is now interested in appeasing the right. His most recent step was to give unequivocal instructions that Marxism must be rooted out of the Peronist movement.

Although this announcement set off massive demonstration in Argentina's largest university and provoked response at the gubernatorial level, the Peronist left has accepted with as much grace as possible this crusade against Marxism. The ERP on the other hand, continues to pursue its guerrilla tactics hoping to split the government's supporters.

One of the most reassuring developments since Perón's ascension to the presidency has been the passivity of the military. They have shown themselves willing to accept such events as the shooting of a colonel by a member of the ERP because no other course is open to them with politics under Perón's control. The economy has not been so passive. Inflation is running at an annual rate of 60% and prices are being held down by decree. To ensure effective rationing and control the black market, Perón has instituted a system of state distribution. 

Perhaps the most important single development in Argentina in 1973 may turn out to be Perón's decision to reach an accommodation with Brazil. Only the first steps have been taken, but the reversal is dramatic. Perón does not seem to have taken a major step towards providing a new framework for inter-American relations. In the end, however, Argentine unity at home and influence abroad depend primarily on one man, and by virtue of this, on an old man's heartbeat. For Perón is now an ailing 78 years old, and the reports that he has suffered another heart attack in late November only emphasize the fragility of the national recover that depends on such a delicate base. 

In Bolivia, the regime of general Hugo Banzer has been beset by economic chaos, social unrest, and threats of an ultra-right coup during the past year. Many analysts interpreted Banzer's decision of last July to hold free elections in 1974 as a sign of the weakness of his government. The instability of the situation in Bolivia is further underscored by Banzer's recent unexpected announcement that he will not be a candidate for office in next year's promised elections.

General Banzer, an impeccable conservative and anti-communist, who was trained at the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone and in the United States, came to power in 1971 by means of an unusually bloody coup against the left-wing government of Jose Torres. At that time, he received an outright grant of $2 million from the United States and has done little to disturb US officials during his term of office.

At the beginning of 1973, Bolivia was still reeling from the effects of a 66% currency devaluation enacted a year ago. At that time, the government froze wages while the cost of living rose 50%. To make matters worse, President Nixon announced in March of this year that the General Services Administration would start selling its large stockpile of metals, bringing down the price of 10, upon which the Bolivian economy depends, by 13 cents a pound. In an attempt to ward off a new crisis, Banzer lifted the wage freeze and left open the possibility of upward adjustments.

At the same time, however, the price of wheat, meat, coffee, and potatoes went up. The economic situation has given rise to protests by consumers and small merchants, the Underground Trade Federation and the 5,000 small and medium tin mine owners have also staged protests. In October, 89 labor leaders were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government leading to strikes involving 40,000 trade union workers.

Banzer has also failed to keep the support of the two main political parties upon which he has depended in the past. The moderate National Revolutionary Movement, the MNR, and the ultra-right perhaps misnamed, Bolivian Socialist Falange, FSB. In May, Banzer reshuffled his cabinet to give the moderates a slight political advantage. His recent decision of late November to reshuffle his cabinet again, this time in favor of the conservatives, led to the complete withdrawal of the support by the more moderate MNR.

It has been suggested that the MNR will seek to form some alliances with leftist groups. Banzer's recent announcement that he will not be a candidate for office in 1974 suggests that the situation is out of his hands and that Bolivia may look forward to a period of rule by the ultra-right.

You have just heard a summary of events which have taken place in Argentina and Bolivia during 1973. These reports have been compiled from the News Weekly Latin America, the Mexico City Daily Excelsior, the Christian Science Monitor, and La Prensa of Lima, Peru. 

You are listening to the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America as seen by leading world news sources, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be sent to the group at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin.

The views expressed are solely those of the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group and its sources, and should not be considered as being endorsed by UT Austin or this station.

The Latin American Press Review continues its summaries of events which have happened in particular countries in Latin America in 1973. The countries covered here will be Peru and Brazil. These reports have been compiled from the British News Weekly Latin America, the Mexico City Daily Excelsior, the Christian Science Monitor, and La Prensa of Lima, Peru.

In Peru, the current junta of generals, which has governed the country since seizing power in a coup in 1968, has been called nationalist progressive anti-imperialist, even revolutionary by some. It aroused the anger of the United States in 1970 when it nationalized the International Petroleum Company, a Rockefeller subsidiary. It was quick to assure both the US government and foreign corporations that not all foreign investments in Peru would receive the same treatment.

In fact, the government has often consulted US corporations before announcing major economic guidelines and has given them a hand in planning Peruvian development strategy. Thus, foreign investments have not stopped coming to Peru since the military took power, and it is this presence of foreign firms which have made many doubt the sincerity of the Peruvian revolution.

Peru began this year by clashing with foreign fishing concerns over the limits of territorial waters off Peru. Peru insisted that foreign ships could not fish within 200 miles of the Peruvian shore unless they bought a special fishing license from the Peruvian government. Other countries, most notably the United States argued that Peru could claim only a 12-mile limit to its territorial waters. In any case, foreign boats continued to fish within the 200-mile limit and the Peruvian government arrested 25 of them, mostly American, in January.

Soon, fishermen from several countries came in and began buying licenses from the Peruvian government to fish legally. The Soviet Union agreed to respect the limits set by the Peruvian government, the US though remained intransigent.

Another problem which has plagued Peru this year is labor unrest. In May, labor troubles in several parts of Peru led to considerable speculation about the government's whole labor policy. Among developments that month were the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the arrival of strong police reinforcements to prevent a general strike in the crucial southern mining town of Moquegua. Together with the announcement by the labor minister that outdated legislation would have to be overhauled to prevent workers from abusing the right to strike.

Unabated strike activity in important sectors of the economy appeared to be causing serious concern about the likely effect on the regime's whole development strategy. The government may have been attempting to attract foreign financiers with a tougher line on labor militancy. In June, the death of a worker who had been injured in a clash with police and strike activity led the General Workers' Confederation of Peru, a communist led union, to call a one-hour general strike on June 15th.

The protest hardly affected production figures, but the communist led union seemed so passive lately that it was a measure of the pressure building up from below that a strike could be called at all. The government remained in dispute with the country's teachers, and in the northern town of Piura, more than 1000 secondary school students stoned the local headquarters of the SINAMOS, a government agency, in protest against that organization's attempt to control every aspect of popular expression. 

In November, a new peasant union was formed in Peru. It had the backing of the government and is the most ambitious attempt yet made at mobilizing the rural population in support of the government's policies. It was openly suggested by journalists who normally reflect official thinking that the government is preparing the ground for a number of drastic measures, which will require political support at all levels. Alongside the signs that the government is genuinely interested, almost for the first time in mobilizing support, there are indications of an impending purge of both right wing and left wing critics. 

Two of the most influential intellectual critics of the regime from the left, Aníbal Quijano and Julio Cotler, had their magazine, Society and Politics, closed down and were themselves deported to Argentina earlier this year. All of the government's political leverage was used to break the one-day teacher strike in November, and even a non-communist workers meeting last week received a clear warning from the labor ministry that their activities were under close scrutiny.

The labor minister, in an effort to win the support of the peasants of Cusco, told them that ultra-left groups were working on behalf of imperialism and would have to be eliminated. Although a number of inconveniently active leftists have been sent to exile during the past five years, Peru has generally been freer from repression than any country on the continent except for Chile under President Salvador Allende. It's beginning to look now as if this period of toleration is nearing an end.

The single most important event in Brazil this year was the announcement in June that current military president, Emilio Médici, will be succeeded next March by another general, Ernesto Geisel. In this analysis, we will look at developments in three main areas and attempt to foresee what changes, if any, can be expected when Geisel assumes power. We will examine Brazil's economic development, its role role in Latin America, and recent reports of dissidents in Brazil. The military has been in power in Brazil since 1964, when a military coup toppled left liberal president Goulart.

Since then, Brazil has opened its doors to foreign capital, attempting to promote economic development. In some ways, results have been impressive. Brazil's gross national product has grown dramatically in recent years and it now exports manufactured goods throughout the continent, but this kind of growth has not been without its costs. The Brazilian finance minister received heavy criticisms this march for two aspects of Brazilian economic development.

The first was the degree of foreign penetration in the Brazilian economy. For example, 80% of all manufactured exports from Brazil come from foreign-owned subsidiaries. The second problem brought up was the incredible maldistribution of income in Brazil. The rub of the critic's argument is the top 5% of the population enjoys 40% of the national income, while the top 20% of the population account for 80% of the total. Moreover, this heavily skewed distribution is being accentuated as Brazil's economy develops. Whether any of these policies will change when Geisel comes to power next March or not as uncertain. Some feel that he is an ardent nationalist who will be called to business interests.

Others recall that it was Geisel who provided lucrative investments to foreign companies, including Phillips Petroleum and Dow Chemical, when he was president of Petrobras, the state oil industry, which was once a symbol of Brazilian nationalism. They also say that he has consistently supported the concentration of wealth into fewer hands.

Brazil has sometimes been called the United States Trojan Horse in Latin America. The idea is that Brazil will provide a safe base for US corporations and then proceed to extend its influence throughout the continent, either by outright conquest or simply economic domination. Brazil has, to be sure, pretty closely towed the line of US foreign policy. It has taken the role of the scourge of communism and has been openly hostile to governments such as those of Cuba and Chile under Allende, and it is clear, as has been stated before, that American corporations do feel at home in Brazil.

Brazil, of course, discounts the Trojan horse theory and instead expresses almost paranoia fears of being surrounded by unfriendly governments, whether for conquest or defense though, Brazil has built up its armed forces tremendously in recent years. In May of this year, Brazil signed a treaty with neighboring Paraguay for a joint hydroelectric power plant. Opposition groups within Paraguay called the treaty, a sellout to Brazil, and it is generally agreed that the treaty brings Paraguay securely within Brazil's sphere of influence.

The treaty was viewed with dismay by Argentina, which has feared the spread of Brazilian influence on the continent for years, especially in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. A Brazilian military buildup along its border with Uruguay caused some alarm last year. And this spring, an Uruguayan senator said he had discovered a secret Brazilian military plan for the conquest of Uruguay. According to the plan, Uruguay was to be invaded in 1971 should the left wing Broad Front coalition win the Uruguayan elections.

While these developments seem to point to an aggressive program of Brazilian expansion, some observers feel that Brazil may be changing its policy in favor of more cooperation with its Latin American neighbors. They point to the Brazilian foreign minister's recent diplomatic tour in which he spoke with representatives of Peru and Chile as evidence. Others expect Brazil to continue its expansionist policies. It is interesting to note that General Geisel has the full support of the conservative General Golbery, the author of a book proclaiming that Brazil's domination of Latin America is manifest destiny.

During the past year, there have been increasing reports of dissidents against Brazil's military regime. In recent months, the Catholic Church has risen to protest occurrences of torture of political prisoners with surprising boldness. In April, 24 priests and 3000 students held a memorial mass for a young man who died mysteriously while in police custody. The songs in the service which was conducted in a cathedral surrounded by government troops were not religious hymns but anti-government protest songs. 

The real blockbuster came a month later when three Archbishops and 10 bishops from Brazil's Northeast issued a long statement, a blistering attack on the government. The statement, which because of government censorship did not become known to the public for 10 days after it had been released on May the 6th, is notable for its strongly political tone.

The declaration not only attacked the government for repression and the use of torture, it also held it responsible for poverty, starvation wages, unemployment, infant mortality, and illiteracy. In broader terms, it openly denounced the country's much boned economic miracle, which it said benefited a mere 20% of the population, while the gap between rich and poor continued to grow. There were also derogatory references to the intervention of foreign capital in Brazil. Indeed, the whole system of capitalism was attacked and the government accused of developing its policy of repression merely to bolster it up.

The military regime is also threatened by a major conflict with trade unions. Because of government efforts to cut dock workers wages, dock workers threatened to strike against reorganization of wage payments, which union officials said would've cut wages 35 to 60%, but since strikers could have been tried for sedition, they opted for a go-slow, which began on July 25th in Santos, Brazil's main port. After six weeks, the government announced restoration of wages, froze them for two to three years.

The freeze will have the effect of diminishing wages as much as the government wanted to in the first place. At this time, the unions are appealing the case through the courts. The military rulers are also under pressure from the Xavante indians, who warned President Medici in November that unless a start is made within a month to mark out the Sao Marcos Reservation, they will have to fight for their lands.

The latest reports indicate that a number of Indians have captured arms and are massing in the jungle. At the same time, the government continues to be plagued by guerrilla operations on the Araguaia River. Various incidents during the past months have signaled the impotence of the armed forces in the face of these guerrilla activities. In São Domingos das Latas, a little town about 30 kilometers to the east of Marabá, along the Trans-Amazonian Highway, two landowners have been killed by the guerrillas for collaborating with the armed forces.

The guerrillas have distributed a manifesto written in simple direct language dealing with the principle demands of the local population. The Army claims that the guerrilla forces have been reduced to half a dozen fugitives, but civilians in the area estimate that there are from 30 to 60 members of the guerrillas, who seem to enjoy a fantastic popularity among local people.

You have been listening to a summary of events which have taken place in two Latin American countries, Peru and Brazil in 1973. These reports have been compiled from the British News weekly, Latin America, the Mexico City daily, Excelsior, the Christian Science Monitor, and La Prensa of Lima, Peru. 

You have been listening to the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America, as seen by leading world news sources, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be sent to the group at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin.

The views expressed are solely those of the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group and its sources, and should not be considered as being endorsed by UT Austin or this station.