1973-11-01

This is The Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America as seen by leading world news sources, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group of Austin, Texas. 

Secret testimony by William Colby, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has confirmed a number of charges made by Chileans who support the overthrown government of President Salvador Allende. Colby had discussed the US relationship to the military coup in Chile in October 11th testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Washington Post correspondent, Tad Szulc, was given a transcript of the testimony by sources in the intelligence community. 

"This extensive testimony," says the Post, "touches principally on the CIA's own very extensive covert role in Chilean politics, but it also helps in understanding and reconstructing the administration's basic policy of bringing about Allende's fall one way or another. We are appraised not only that the CIA's estimate of the number of victims of the military government's repression is four times the official Santiago figures, but that the United States in effect condones mass executions and imprisonments in Chile because a civil war there remains a real possibility." Yet even Colby warned that the Junta may "overdo repression." 

Colby's testimony, according to The Washington Post, in parts unclear and contradictory, offered a picture of the CIA's activities in Chile between Allende's election in 1970 and the September 11th coup. The activities then described a range from the penetration of all the major Chilean political parties, support for anti-regime demonstrations, and financing of the opposition press and other groups to heretofore unsuspected Agency involvement in financial negotiations between Washington and Santiago in late 1972 and early 1973, when Chileans were desperately seeking an accommodation. 

There are indications that the CIA, acting on the basis of its own reports on the deterioration of the Chilean economic situation, was among the agencies counseling the White House to rebuff Allende's attempts to work out a settlement on the compensations to be paid for nationalized American companies in Chile. 

"Although denying CIA involvement in the coup and the preceding truck owner's lockout", says The Washington Post, "Colby conceded the CIA had assisted various anti-Allende demonstrations. He refused to answer questions about CIA involvement in the rightist offensive in October 1972 and an abortive coup attempt in March 1973 because, 'I don't want to be in a position of giving you a false answer.' Colby told the closed session, 'We have had various relationships over the years in Chile with various groups. In some cases this was approved by the National Security Council, resulting in assistance to rightists.'" 

Colby's predecessor, Richard Helms, had earlier disclosed in testimony that the CIA had sent about $400,000 to Chile to support anti-Allende newspapers and radio stations before the 1970 elections. This had been authorized by a high-level meeting of the Committee of Forty, a special crisis management team headed by Henry Kissinger. Colby refused to say if these subsidies were continued to the present. Several Congress members at the hearings said some US money had been sent into Chile via Latin American subsidiaries of US corporations, particularly from Brazil. 

Colby said, "Armed opposition now appears to be confined to sporadic, isolated attacks on security forces, but the regime believes that the left is regrouping for coordinated sabotage and guerrilla activity. The government probably is right in believing that its opponents have not been fully neutralized. Our reports indicate that the extremist movement of the revolutionary left, the MIR, believes its assets have not been damaged beyond repair. It wants to launch anti-government activity as soon as practical and is working to form a united front of leftist opposition parties. Other leftist groups, including the Communist and Socialist parties, are in disarray, but they have not been destroyed." 

Colby also noted, "Armed resistors continue to be executed where they are found, and a number of prisoners have been shot, supposedly while trying to escape." This report from The Washington Post. 

An article in the Bulletin of the Committee for Puerto Rican Decolonization describes the most recent developments in the growing controversy over the construction of a superport. The Committee comments that, "Responding to pressure from the United States, government Rafael Hernández Colón announced in San Juan in mid-September that the colonial government is going ahead with the construction of the controversial superport complex. However, tremendous opposition to the project has forced him to withdraw his original proposal for building the port in Aguadilla, in northwest Puerto Rico." 

Instead, the plan calls for the construction to begin on Mona Island, a small island 40 miles from Puerto Rican shores. Many experts agree that the project on the island of Mona could be only a first step to be followed by refineries, petrochemical industries, and a metallurgical center on the island of Puerto Rico itself. 

"In his announcement," says the Bulletin, "Governor Colon insisted that the new superport is being constructed solely for Puerto Rican needs. But studies publicized by opposition to the superport indicate that the project will benefit mainly the large US oil companies while doing fatal damage to the Puerto Rican economy and environment." 

The Committee claims that superports accommodating supertankers carrying loads of 200,000 to 1,000,000 tons of crude petroleum from Arab oil fields to the US are essential if the large oil corporations are to maintain the huge profits from the importation of oil from the Middle East. The rate of profit of US oil investments in the Middle East reached 80% in 1971, and US returns on investments in Middle East petroleum have reached 20% of the total return on all US foreign investment. 

As a colony of the US occupying a key geographic position in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico has been singled out for intensive study as a center for the reception and refining of massive quantities of crude petroleum from the Middle East. 

Investigation of these investment plans by independence forces in Puerto Rico has revealed the disastrous effect the superport and refining complex would have on the island, spreading over and contaminating a large land area, totally absorbing for cooling purposes Puerto Rican water resources, and contaminating surrounding seawaters. Independence forces maintain that not only the livelihood, fishing, farming of a large section of the population, but also the very existence of the Puerto Rican nation would be seriously endangered. 

The Committee for Puerto Rican Decolonization concludes by pointing out that massive demonstrations and hundreds of local protests against the superport have taken place on the island, forming an opposition which shows no sign of letting up, despite the Mona decision. 

The issue has also been taken to the United Nations by leaders of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and the Puerto Rican Independence Party, which resulted in a resolution passed by the Committee on Decolonization requesting that the US government, or any corporate body under its jurisdiction, refrain from any measures which might obstruct the Puerto Rican people's right to independence. It is expected that the resolution will be taken up by the U.N. General Assembly in early November. This report from the Bulletin of the Committee for Puerto Rican Decolonization. 

Excélsior of Mexico City reports the military Junta in Chile has taken measures to depoliticize the university, placing it under absolute bureaucratic control. Captain of the Navy, Guillermo González, who has taken over the positions of rector and counsel of the university, announced that 8,000 of the 19,000 students at the University of Concepción have been expelled for participation in leftist politics. These students will not be able to enroll in any other Chilean university. 

More than half of the faculty will also be expelled from the University of Concepción. Many faculty members have been imprisoned, including the director of the Department of Music, Joaquín Jaime, an internationally recognized musicologist, who is being held in the island of Quiriquina. This from Excélsior. 

The New York Times reports from Santiago that the Chilean military Junta has ordered the expulsion of three more foreign priests. According to the Catholic Church Bulletin, that brings to 50 the number of priests expelled by the Junta. Also, according to the Church Bulletin, a number of priests have been arrested and a large number of churches have been raided by the military looking for arms. The church stressed, however, that nothing compromising had been found in those raids. 

Two foreign executives have been kidnapped recently in Argentina in apparently separate incidents. The newspaper Excélsior of October 24th reports that Kurt Schmid, Latin American director of the Swiss airline Swiss Air, was kidnapped on October 22nd by the ERP, People's Revolutionary Army. The leftist guerrilla group is asking 125 million pesos ransom, about $10 million, a record-breaking amount. 

Five executives from Swiss Air have flown from Geneva to Buenos Aires to conduct negotiations with the urban guerrilla organization. The ERP was declared illegal by the Argentine government in September. Up until now, the highest ransom paid for any foreign executive in Argentina is 40 million pesos or $3 million for the release of John Thompson, director of Firestone, in July of this year. 

Excélsior also reports that David Wilkie, general director of the North American Petroleum Enterprise, Amoco Argentina Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, was kidnapped on October 23rd. His ransom has been set at $1 million. Company officials denied that Wilkie had been kidnapped, claiming that he was in Chicago. Nevertheless, police sources affirmed that negotiations were being held to obtain Wilkie's release. It was not known whether the ERP was responsible for Wilkie's abduction. This report on kidnappings in Argentina from Mexico City's daily, Excélsior. 

There has been much controversy since the September coup in Chile about the role of US military assistance and training in the support of military dictatorships in South America. An article in The New York Times last week described perhaps the most important US military training institute for the Latin American military. Scattered across South America and the Caribbean are more than 170 graduates of the United States Army School of the Americas, who are heads of government cabinet ministers, commanding generals, chiefs of staff, and directors of intelligence. 

The school has graduated 29,000 officers and enlisted men since its establishment here in Panama City in 1949. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the Navy's small craft instruction and technical team, the Army School, and Army and Air Force programs for nation building, relief, and welfare are key elements in the United States Army Southern Commands program to maintain good relations and influence in Latin America. The Chilean military, which took over control of that country last month, had six graduates of the Army School of the Americas in higher ranks. 

The New York Times points out that General Omar Torrijos Herrera, the chief of Panama's government, the deputy commander of the National Guard, the chief of staff, and four deputy chiefs of staff are all graduates. Four members of Argentina's command were graduated from the Canal Zone School, and 19 other senior officers have attended military schools in the United States. The commandant, Colonel William W. Nairn, said, "We keep in touch with our graduates, and they keep in touch with us." 

"The school offers 38 separate courses," says the Times, "all of them conducted in Spanish. Last year, about 1,750 officers, cadets, and enlisted men from 17 countries attended courses. The school's four instructional departments deal with command, combat operations, technical operations, and support operations." 

According to The New York Times, this year the school is offering new courses in urban counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency tactics, but there is a wide variety of other course rangings from industrial management to break relining. The school is located at Fort Gulick on the Atlantic side of the Canal Zone. 

According to the Army Digest magazine, the school teaches various measures required to defeat an insurgent on the battlefield as well as military civic action functions in an insurgent environment. Military cadets undertake a week-long maneuver known as the Balboa Crossing, in which they trek across the Isthmus from Pacific to Atlantic shores on a simulated search-and-destroy mission, putting into practice what they have learned about guerrilla warfare and jungle living. 

The United States apparently profits from this military training arrangement as well. According to Army Digest, "Training Latin Americans in US military skills, leadership techniques, and doctrine also paves the way for cooperation and support of US Army missions, attachés, military assistance advisory groups, and commissions operating in Latin America." This description of the US Army School of the Americas from the magazine Army Digest. 

The military-backed regime in Uruguay last week extended its control in that country by attacking the universities. The Christian Science Monitor reported from Montevideo that Uruguay's army was in occupation at the University of Montevideo. Authorities said discovery of arsenals of homemade weapons allegedly produced by left-wing students justified the occupation. But student sources denounced the occupation as a long-expected plan to seize control of Uruguay's centers of higher education, the last major organization still independent since President Bordaberry staged his military-backed coup in June. 

You are listening to The Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America as seen by leading world news sources, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be sent to the group at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin.

The views expressed are solely those of the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group and its sources and should not be considered as being endorsed by UT Austin or this station.

This week's feature concerns the three-year experience of the Popular Unity government in Chile. Since the military coup in Chile on September 11, press reports from Latin America have been saturated with news from that country. They have dealt largely with repression, brutality, press censorship, the plight of political refugees, severe economic austerity measures, and reports of armed resistance. In the den of the conflict which has raged in Chile, though, little has been said about the government which now lies in the ashes. 

November 4th was the anniversary of the inauguration of Salvador Allende and the Popular Unity Party at the head of the executive branch of the Chilean government. It is appropriate, then, to take a critical look at the Popular Unity Party, its origins, its historical uniqueness, what it hoped to accomplish, and why it ultimately failed. The following analysis is written by Catherine Winkler, a History student, and Dave Davies, an Economics student, both with a special interest in Latin America at the University of Texas at Austin. 

The Popular Unity government was not actually a party as such, but a coalition of parties, the largest of which were the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. While the coalition included some other smaller parties as well, all shared the common goal of achieving some form of socialism in Chile. Much of classical Marxist-Leninist theory says that there is no such thing as an electoral path to socialism, that in a capitalist society it is the capitalist class which has far greater resources and can thus manipulate the political process. 

Critics of the Popular Unity strategy often said that in a capitalist society they could win national elections, but that if they did, the capitalist class would use illegal means to bring them down. Members of the Popular Unity coalition answered that Chile was not an ordinary country. They pointed out that Chile had strong democratic traditions and that virtually all parties had been tolerated, from the extreme right to the extreme left. 

They also pointed out that in Chile there was much less threat of a military coup than in many other Latin American countries. Military intervention in Chilean politics had indeed been a rarity. The thing which distinguishes the Chilean Popular Unity coalition from Marxist electoral coalitions in other countries is that in the Chilean presidential election of 1970, it won. Salvador Allende won the three-day presidential race on a platform which promised to free the country from what he said was the domination by foreign corporations, to carry out an extensive agrarian reform program in order to give land to the peasants of Chile, to promote a higher living standard for the Chilean working class, and to maintain Chile's democratic institutions intact. In short, the Popular Unity coalition promised a peaceful road to socialism. 

In its first year, the government began to implement this program, and the results were impressive. US-owned copper mines were nationalized, a move which was unanimously approved by the Chilean Congress. Large-scale agrarian reform was carried out under existing legal structures. Economic indicators also showed signs of health. The rate of inflation declined. Unemployment fell from 6% to 3.8%, and industrial production increased by 11%. These steps by the Popular Unity government seemed to be well-received by most Chileans. 

Municipal elections held in April 1971 showed dramatic rises in the popularity of the government. However, the measures taken by the UP government aroused the wrath of the United States and powerful opposition groups within Chile. Thus, much of Allende's administration was marked with political and economic battles between the Popular Unity government and powerful Chilean interest groups and political parties backed by the United States, as well as by confrontations with the United States government and US corporations over issues such as compensation for nationalized industries. 

In October of last year, a truck owner's strike in opposition to the Popular Unity government paralyzed the country. This year, organized opposition to the Popular Unity government reached an unprecedented pitch and operated on basically three fronts. First, there were battles in the Chilean Congress, where Allende did not have a majority. The major opposition party was the Christian Democrats, whose candidate for president was barely defeated by Allende in 1970. 

The second front in which the Allende government faced its opponents was that of labor struggles. This took the form of a strike by copper miners and a second more serious strike by transportation owners. Finally, some of Allende's opponents resorted to illegal and often violent tactics, including bombings, assassinations, and sabotage. 

The Allende government received a big boost in the Chilean congressional elections last March when the Popular Unity coalition increased its representation in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. While the vote left the Popular Unity coalition still short of a majority in the Congress, the results were considered evidence of the growing popularity of the government among Chileans. 

In the weeks following the congressional elections, the Christian Democrats, the major opposition party, seemed to soften its defiant stand against the Allende government. Party leaders announced that the Christian Democrats would end their alliance with several smaller right-wing parties and that the party would pursue an independent, flexible line. 

The storm clouds broke though in late April when miners at El Teniente, a nationalized copper mine, went on strike. The strikers, many of whom were white-collar workers and all of whom were among the highest-paid workers in Chile, walked out demanding higher production bonuses. The Allende government, which had vowed to end privileged sectors of the Chilean labor force, firmly refused the strikers' demands. 

Seeing an opportunity to mobilize opposition against the government, opposition groups seized the strike as an issue and began organizing support for the strikers. The Christian Democrats fell into line and began attacking the government vehemently. 

In May, clashes between the government and opposition became increasingly bitter as economic problems and the El Teniente strike encouraged opposition forces to use bolder tactics. Early that month, groups of 15 to 18-year-old students swarmed into Santiago, chanting anti-government slogans and openly seeking clashes with police and supporters of the Popular Unity government. The demonstration, which was organized by the Christian Democrats, culminated in the throwing of Molotov cocktails. In another demonstration, shots apparently fired from the Christian Democrat Party headquarters killed one student. 

The crisis continued through April as clandestine operations by rightist groups occurred with growing frequency. A Socialist Party radio station in Rancagua was seized and a number of Communist and Socialist Party premises, homes, and newspapers across the country were sacked in an apparently coordinated effort. 

Such confrontations continued through May and June as economic problems worsened and the El Teniente strike remained unsettled. Talk of armed confrontation was widespread and Allende warned that rightist groups were planning a coup d'etat attempt. While these struggles raged in the streets of Chile in the months of May and June, the battles between Allende and the opposition filled the halls of the Chilean Congress as well. 

At a convention of the Christian Democratic Party in early May, the hardliners favoring a position of militant opposition to the Allende government gained the upper hand. As a result, the Christian Democrats once again joined hands with other opposition parties in Congress and clashes with the government over legislation became increasingly bitter. Debates raged over Allende's educational reform bill, agrarian reform measures, and legislation dealing with nationalization of foreign holdings. 

At one point, certain members of Congress tried to have Allende removed from office by using a clause in the Chilean Constitution, which was intended for cases in which the president was seriously ill. Allende, in response, is said to have considered exercising his constitutional right to temporarily disband Congress and immediately call new parliamentary elections. 

Matters came to a head on June 29th when certain sectors of the army attempted a military overthrow of the Popular Unity government. Most of the armed forces, though, rose to defend the government and the revolt was crushed. 

Soon after the attempted coup, a compromise settlement was reached in the El Teniente strike. The Allende government was thus given a breathing spell. The respite was short-lived, however, as the Christian Democrats soon renewed their attacks in Congress, and even more serious, transportation owners went out on strike in early August, complaining that they had been unable to get spare parts for their vehicles. 

Opposition parties, including the Christian Democrats, once again took the side of the strikers against the government, and truck owners who refused to observe the strike were subjected to increasing violence. The month before the coup was marked by bombing, sabotage, and assassinations. 

Roberto Thieme, head of the ultra right-wing Fatherland and Freedom Organization, said later that the transport owner's strike was planned and engineered solely for the purpose of overthrowing the government. Thieme also admitted that his organization was responsible for much of the violence which occurred during the course of the strike. On September 11th, the military stepped in with a firm hand and have been in control ever since. In looking at the strife which ultimately led to the downfall of the Popular Unity government, certain points must be kept in mind. One such factor is the role of the United States. 

When Chile nationalized US copper companies two years ago, the US demanded compensation for the property. Allende politely responded that since the excess profits removed from Chile by the copper companies was far greater than the value of the company's holdings, there would be no compensation. Subsequently, Kennecott, a huge American copper company, filed suits in French and Italian courts, trying to stop companies in those countries from buying Chilean copper, thus denying Chile valuable export earnings. 

Even more importantly, the United States government used its powerful influence to stop all loans and credits to Chile from multilateral lending agencies such as the Import-Export Bank, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Many of these loans, especially those from the Import-Export Bank, are not really loans as such, but simply credits which allow small nations to make purchases from companies in larger nations on basis of payment within 30 to 90 days. 

When these credits were cut off, Chile had to find large amounts of foreign currencies in advance to make such purchases. Often unable to get such amounts, Chile was faced with shortages of many essential imported goods. Thus, for example, the shortage of replacement parts for cars, trucks, and buses, which led to two transportation owners' strikes and serious domestic turmoil, can be traced directly to United States policy within these multilateral lending agencies. 

The same mechanisms also led to shortages of food and other essentials, which heightened Chile's inflation. It is perhaps for these reasons that Allende told the United Nations last November that the US is waging economic war on Chile. 

In concluding, it is fitting to take a brief look at the most important figure behind the Popular Unity program to peacefully revolutionize Chile. Salvador Allende was one of those most influential in advocating and attempting to realize this peaceful revolution. From the time he began his political career as a young deputy from Valparaiso in the early 1930s, he strove to see the establishment of socialism in Chile through peaceful, democratic methods. 

In the highly politicized atmosphere of 1933, while still a medical student, Allende co-founded the Socialist Party. He nurtured, gave strength to the party, and persistently struggled to implement its views, running for the presidency in 1952, 1958, and 1964, before his hard-earned election in 1970. 

Prior to his first candidacy, Allende served as minister in the Popular Front government of Aguirre Cerda. He then was elected senator and eventually rose to be president of that body. Allende was firmly convinced that Chile's uniqueness provided the foundation for the achievement of revolutionary socialism through non-revolutionary means; that is, within the legal framework of Chile's constitution. 

It is a tragic irony that on this third anniversary of Allende's inauguration, his Popular Unity government has been replaced by a repressive military Junta, and Allende himself is dead. This analysis was written by two University of Texas students with particular interest in Latin America, Dave Davies and Catherine Winkler. 

You have been listening to The Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of news and events in Latin America, as seen by leading world news sources with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions are welcome, and may be sent to the group at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. 

This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin. The views expressed are solely those of the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group and its sources, and should not be considered as being endorsed by UT Austin or this station.