1973-08-30

Welcome to the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America, as seen by leading world newspapers, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group.

For today's broadcast, we have compiled a summary and background of important events of the past six months in two Latin American countries, Chile and Uruguay. These analyses are compiled from reports from several newspapers and periodicals, including the London weekly, Latin America, The Mexican daily, Excélsior, the Chilean weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Uruguayan weekly, Marcha. By far the most troubled country on the continent this year has been Chile, whose Marxist president, Salvador Allende was elected in 1970 on a platform of carrying out a program of peaceful socialist revolution. Soon after his election, Allende legally carried out several popular measures, including the nationalization of major US copper companies holdings and extensive agrarian reform measures. 

While these steps won widespread approval among Chilean workers and peasants, they incurred the wrath of the United States and powerful opposition groups within Chile. Thus, the first two years of Allende's administration have been marked with political and economic battles between Allende's Popular Unity government and powerful Chilean interest groups and political parties backed by the United States, as well as by confrontations with the United States government itself and US corporations over issues such as compensation for nationalized industries.

In October of last year, a truck owner's strike, in opposition to the popular Unity government, paralyzed the country. The Allende government received a big boost in the Chilean congressional elections last March though, when the Popular Unity Coalition increased its representation in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. While the vote left the Popular Unity Coalition still short of a majority in the Congress, the results were considered evidence of the growing popularity of the government among Chileans.

In the weeks following the congressional elections, the Christian Democrats, the major opposition party seemed to soften its defiant stand against the Allende government. Party leaders announced that the Christian Democrats would end their alliance with several smaller right-wing parties, and that the party would pursue an independent, more flexible line. The storm clouds broke though, in late April, when miners at El Teniente, a nationalized copper mine, went on strike.

The strikers, many of whom were white-collar workers, and all of whom were among the highest paid workers in Chile, walked out demanding higher production bonuses. The Allende government, which had vowed to end privileged sectors of the Chilean labor force, firmly refused the striker's demands. Seeing an opportunity to mobilize opposition against the government, opposition groups seized the strike as an issue and began organizing support for the strikers. The Christian Democrats fell into line and began attacking the government vehemently.

In May, clashes between the government and opposition became increasingly bitter, as economic problems and the El Teniente strike encouraged the opposition forces to use bolder tactics. Early that month, groups of 15 to 18-year-old students swarmed into Santiago, chanting anti-government slogans and openly seeking clashes with police and supporters of the popular Unity government. The demonstration, which was organized by the Christian Democrats, culminated in the throwing of Molotov cocktails.

In another demonstration, shots apparently fired from the Christian Democrat party headquarters killed one student. The crisis continued through April, as clandestine operations by rightist groups occurred with growing frequency. A socialist party radio station in Rancagua was seized, and a number of communist and socialist party premises, homes, and newspapers across the country were sacked in an apparently coordinated effort.

Such confrontations continued through May and June as economic problems worsened and the El Teniente strike remained unsettled. Talk of armed confrontation was widespread and Allende warned that rightest groups were planning a coup d'etat attempt. While these struggles raged in the streets of Chile in the months of May and June, the battles between Allende and the opposition filled the halls of the Chilean Congress as well.

At a convention of the Christian Democratic Party in early May, the hardliners favoring a position of militant opposition to the Allende government, gained the upper hand. As a result, the Christian Democrats once again joined hands with other opposition parties in Congress, and clashes with the government over legislation became increasingly bitter. Debates raged over Allende's educational reform bill, agrarian reform measures, and legislation dealing with nationalization of foreign holdings.

At one point, certain members of Congress tried to have Allende removed from office by using a clause in the Chilean constitution, which was intended for cases in which the president was seriously ill. Allende in response is said to have considered exercising his constitutional right to temporarily disband Congress and immediately call new parliamentary elections. Matters came to a head on June 29th when certain sectors of the army attempted a military overthrow of the popular government. Most of the armed forces rose to defend the government and the revolt was crushed. 

Actually, the attempted coup and its defeats were a big boost for the Allende government. The determination of the military to defend the Constitution served as a warning to right-wing extremists who might've been thinking of armed confrontation, and it crushed the hopes of those who were hoping the military would intervene against the government. Soon after the attempted coup, a compromised settlement was reached at the El Teniente strike.

The Allende government was thus given a breathing spell. The respite was short-lived, however, as the Christian Democrats soon renewed their attacks in Congress and even more serious transportation owners went on strike in early August complaining that they have been unable to get spare parts for their vehicles.

Opposition parties, including the Christian Democrats have once again taken the side of the strikers against the government and truck owners who have refused to observe the strike have been subjected to increasing violence. The past months have been marked by bombings, sabotage, and assassination, and many observers feel that the nation is careening towards civil war. At the time this story was written, the strike was unsettled and the situation looked grave, but civil war had not yet erupted. 

Before leaving Chile, two important points should be made about the six months of strife. Just mentioned first as a North American correspondent recently said, "the United States is directly responsible for much of the current turmoil in Chile". When Chile nationalized US copper companies holdings two years ago, the US demanded compensation for the property. Allende politely responded that since the excess profits removed from the Chile by the copper companies was far greater than the value of the company's holdings, there would be no compensation.

Since then, the United States government has used its powerful influence to stop all loans and credits to Chile from multilateral lending agencies such as the Import Export bank, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. 

Many of these loans, especially those from the Import Export bank, are not really loans as such, but simply credits which allow small nations to make purchases from companies in larger nations on the basis of payment within 30 to 90 days. When these credits were cut off, Chile had to find large amounts of foreign currencies in advance in order to make such purchases. Often unable to get such amounts, Chile has been faced with shortages of many essential imported goods.

Thus, for example, the shortage of replacement parts for cars, trucks, and buses, which has led to two transportation owner strikes and serious domestic turmoil can be traced directly to United States policy within these multilateral lending agencies.

The same mechanisms have also led to shortages of food and other essentials which has heightened Chile's inflation. It is perhaps for these reasons that Allende told the United Nations last November that the US is waging economic war on Chile.  The second point, which should be made about the recent turmoil in Chile, is that reports of such strife often make it appear as if Allende's nation has turned against him. In fact, though most indicators show that Allende and his Popular Unity Government are now more popular than ever.

Allende was elected three years ago with a bare plurality of the votes, but since then, local and congressional elections have consistently shown dramatic rises in his popularity. Also during the aborted coup attempt last June, workers in hundreds of factories throughout the country armed themselves and seized their factories. This serves as an indication that there are many Chileans who definitely feel that the Popular Unity Program of change is their revolution, and that if it is threatened, they are prepared to defend it.

Another country which deserves special attention at this point is Uruguay, a small nation wedged between Argentina and Brazil on Latin America's South Atlantic coast. The past six months have seen the collapse of civilian rule in Uruguay and the institution of a military dictatorship. Actually, the constitutional fabric of Uruguay has been disintegrating for quite some time. Former president Jorge Pacheco ruled the better part of his term in office by decree and through emergency security measures.

And, like the Uruguayan Congress, it was constantly riddled by scandals exposing the corruption of the regime. The current president of Uruguay, Juan Bordaberry, can hardly pose as a champion of democracy and civil power either. He was a long serving member of the Pacheco government and his own term has been marked by brutally repressive measures at times. The growing involvement of the armed forces in Uruguayan political life began in April of last year when President Bordaberry declared a state of internal war and called in the armed forces to confront the Tupamaros, an urban guerrilla group.

The Tupamaros, and armed group dedicated to the establishment of a new social order, have gained great support among Uruguayan urban masses in recent years simply because in cities such as Montevideo, there are serious social problems which previous Uruguayan regimes, both military and civilian, have failed to deal with. The Tupamaros, in fact, seem to have had some effect even on the military. In the battles waged last spring, many of the captured guerrillas began to tell their captors that the real enemies, cattle smugglers, corrupt politicians, tax dodgers, and currency speculators, were still at large, often in high places in the government.

As a result, many Uruguayan soldiers and even some senior officers emerged from the campaign saying that the Tupamaros would not finally be defeated unless the root causes of the country's social and economic problems were tackled. Yet despite the reservations of some officers, the military accomplished its task of defeating the Tupamaros with brutal effectiveness.

This military campaign against the Tupamaros had two important consequences. First, the most powerful force on the left had been eliminated, and thus, leftist leaders in both the military and in Congress were in a weakened position. When the military began going after more moderate political figures later on, it no longer had to worry about reprisals from the Tupamaros. Secondly, the material buildup of the military gave them much more political clout. This clout was demonstrated in February, when a clash between Bordaberry and the armed forces resulted in a state of near-civil war.

Bordaberry, however, realizing that the military held the cards in any such confrontation, was forced to accept a junior partnership with them. A National Security Council was set up, which placed Bordaberry virtually under the military's control. The Congress, relegated to a somewhat lower position, was furious, and many of its members made strong anti-military statements. The weeks following the military's intervention in February saw the increasing hostility between the Congress and the military, with Bordaberry somewhere in-between.

By April though, an alliance was clearly emerging between Bordaberry and the conservative sectors of the military. First, Bordaberry created a special junta of commanders in chief to advise him. Also, the National Confederation of Workers, Uruguay's largest trade union syndicate, demanded a 30% wage increase to make up for cost of living increases since the beginning of the year. The military supported Bordaberry and his flat rejection of this demand.

In fact, Bordaberry allowed the military to step up its program of political arrests and systematic torture, and even supplied it with some of the most repressive legislation in the world. An issue of increasing importance to the military was that of the parliamentary immunity from arrest. One Senator, Enrique Erro, was a constant thorn in the military's side, and in April, the National Security Council accused Erro of collaborating with the Tupamaros and asked that his parliamentary immunity be lifted. 

When the Senate refused to lift Erro's immunity in May, the military moved troops into the capitol. A crisis was averted when the question was sent to a house committee for reconsideration. In late June, a final vote was taken and the request was again refused. This time, Bordaberry responded by dissolving the Congress altogether, making the military takeover complete. The National Confederation of Workers did what it always threatened it would do in the event of a military coup and immediately called for a nationwide general strike. The government responded quickly and brutally.

It officially dissolved the National Confederation of Workers and arrested most of its leadership as well as other prominent trade unionists. But this decapitation failed to do the job, the unions were well-organized on a grassroots level and had support from students as well. Many workers occupied their factories, and student demonstrations and other agitation kept the army and police constantly on the run. 

As the strike went on, continuous arrests overflowed the jails, and police began herding prisoners into the Montevideo football stadium. Finally, the strike collapsed and Bordaberry was able to bring things somewhat under control, but opposition continues. Anti-government demonstrations have recurred and another general strike has been threatened. Bordaberry certainly did not eliminate all of his opposition by dissolving the Congress and crushing the general strike. The Tupamaros, for example, have been slowly rebuilding their strength and avowed to continue their struggle. 

This has been a summary and background of important events in the past six months in two Latin American countries, Chile and Uruguay. These analyses are compiled from reports from several newspapers and periodicals, including the London weekly, Latin America, the Mexican daily, Excélsior, the Chilean weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Uruguayan weekly, Marcha. 

You're listening to the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions about the program are welcome and may be sent to us at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin. 

For today's feature, we have compiled a summary and background of important events in the past six months in two Latin American countries, Argentina and Brazil. These analyses are compiled from reports from several newspapers and periodicals, including the London weekly, Latin America, the Mexican daily, Excélsior, the Chilean weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Uruguayan weekly, Marcha. 

The winds of change have been blowing in Argentina for the past six months. They have brought the return to power of Juan Domingo Perón, the 77-year-old man who, even in his 17-year absence, has controlled the largest political movement in Argentina.

Perón first came to power in 1943, as a part of a military coup. Gaining a firmer grip on power in the immediate post-war years, Perón favored significant state intervention in the economy and high import barriers to keep foreign industrial competition out and allow Argentine industry to develop. Such nationalistic policies aroused the ire of the United States, but with the help of huge export earnings due to the high world price of Argentine beef, they spurred tremendous growth in the Argentine economy.

In order to consolidate his power base, Perón mobilized Argentine masses, both by creating a huge peronist party apparatus and building the trade union movement. In the early fifties though, Argentina's post-war boom began to slacken off and Perón was weakened politically as a result. In 1955, the military stepped in and took over the government, condemning Perón to exile. In the years since Perón's downfall, the peronist Party has been prohibited from participating in Argentine elections, but the party has remained active and has cast blank votes in the elections.

These boycotts of the elections have shown that, even while in exile, Perón was and is Argentina's most popular political leader. The current series of events began last fall when the military government of Alejandro Lanusse announced it was considering allowing Perón to return to Argentina. In November, the government kept its promise and Perón flew to Buenos Aires, the nation's capital, and began negotiating with the ruling military leaders on what role his party would play in the upcoming March elections. The Argentina Perón returned to though was quite different from the Argentina Perón left 17 years ago.

Deep divisions exist in Argentina and in the peronist movement itself. Clearly the most conservative element of the peronist movement is the General Workers Confederation, the huge union apparatus set up during Perón's previous regime. Over the years, though, the General Workers Confederation has championed the cause of Perón's return, but has been noticeably timid in fighting for workers' benefits. Thus, the union leadership has gotten along well with the military governments and has virtually lost contact with the masses it ostensibly represents.

The peronist element which is responsible for much mass mobilization is the leftist Juventud peronista or a peronist Youth Group, whose socialist- sounding slogans frighten many of the old-line peronists, especially when they see the peronist Youth's ability to turn out crowds. In addition, there are peronist guerrilla groups who have added clandestine operations to their socialist platforms. Still farther to the left are the non-peronist guerrilla groups, such as the ERP, the People's Revolutionary Army, who have made it clear that they consider foreign monopolists, local oligarchs, and the armed forces, the enemies of the Argentine people.

The ERPs now famous kidnappings of foreign business executives and other operations make them a force to be dealt with in Argentine politics. It was into this political arena which Perón stepped when he began bargaining with the military in November and December.

Perón wanted to be able to run in the March presidential elections himself rather than simply a representative of his party. At this point, Perón was considered a revolutionary of sorts and was feared by the United States government and foreign businessmen. When the military refused to let Perón himself run in the elections, the disappointed leader returned to Spain and Hector Cámpora was chosen to run instead. This was considered a victory for the left wing of the peronist movement.

Since Cámpora was felt to be an ardent nationalist and an anti-imperialist when the elections were held in March, Cámpora was an easy winner and speculation began as to what kind of government could be expected when he took power on May 25th. Revolutionary guerrilla groups anticipating a friendly regime stepped up their activities in April and May. The ERP got $1 million worth of medical equipment for the poor from Ford Motor Company for the release of a kidnapped Ford executive.

Such activities caused many foreign businessmen to leave Argentina. When Cámpora and the peronist actually took power on May 25th, though it became clear that they had no intention of radically transforming Argentine society immediately. Although some boldly independent foreign policy moves were made, such as the recognition of Cuba and other socialist regimes, no sweeping domestic changes were announced. Meanwhile, popular pressures within Argentina continued to build through June.

In addition to continued guerrilla activity, government buildings and hospitals were occupied by workers demanding better wages and working conditions. Such developments did not go unanswered by the right wing forces in Argentina at a welcoming demonstration for Perón's return at a Buenos Aires airport, thugs hired by the conservative leadership of the General Workers Confederation opened fire on a peronist Youth column in the crowd. In the resulting shootout, 20 were killed and more than 200 injured. Also, the General Worker Confederation has undertaken a campaign of brutal repression against a rival union in the important industrial state of Cordoba.

The Cordoba Union has rejected a leadership of the general workers confederation and has instead defined its movement in terms of class struggle. In July, most observers were stunned when President Hector Cámpora announced that he was resigning in order to allow Perón to take the reins of power directly. Thus, new presidential elections will be held in September, and Perón is a shoo-in to win, but Perón seems to have moved significantly to the right in recent weeks in both cabinet appointments and in restructuring his party, Perón seems to have embraced conservative elements and left the more radical sectors of the peronist movement out in the cold.

Reflecting the shift, the United States has suddenly taken an about face and has endorsed Perón. It appears to many now that Peron's revolutionary statements earlier this year were simply a part of his strategy of constructing a broad populist front to isolate the military and allow him to return. However, deep divisions exist within the Argentine society and the popular forces unleashed in recent months may prove somewhat difficult to contain.

The last country we will look at today is Brazil. While Brazil has not experienced the political turmoil of other countries in this broadcast, developments in Brazil are important, simply by virtue of the importance of Brazil on the continent. The single most important event in Brazil this year was the announcement in June that the current military president, Emilio Médici, will be succeeded next March by another general, Orlando Geisel.

In this analysis, we will look at developments in three main areas dealing with Brazil and attempt to foresee what changes, if any, can be expected when Geisel assumes power. First, we will examine Brazil's economic development and its effects. Next, we'll look at Brazil's foreign policy and its role in Latin America, and finally, we will deal with recent reports of torture by the Brazilian government.

The military has been in power in Brazil since 1964, when a military coup toppled left liberal president João Goulart. Since then, Brazil has opened its doors to foreign capital, attempting to promote economic development. In some ways, results have been impressive. Brazil's gross national product has grown dramatically in recent years, and it now exports manufactured goods throughout the continent, but this kind of growth has not been without its costs. The Brazilian finance minister received heavy criticisms from his countrymen this March for two aspects of Brazilian economic development. 

The first was the degree of foreign penetration in the Brazilian economy. For example, 80% of all manufactured exports from Brazil come from foreign owned subsidiaries. The second problem brought up was the incredible mal distribution of income in Brazil. The essence of the critic's argument is that the top 5% of the population enjoys 40% of the national income while the top 20% account for 80% of the total, and moreover, this heavily skewed distribution is becoming worse as Brazil's economy develops.

Many of these same criticisms were raised again in May when Agricultural Minister Fernando Cirne Lima resigned in disgust. He said it would be preferable to cut down Brazil's growth rate to some 7% or 8% in the interest of a more equitable distribution of income. He also said, "The quest for efficiency and productivity has crushed the interests of Brazilian producers of the small and medium businessman to the benefit of the transnational companies."

Whether any of these policies will change when Geisel comes to power next March or not is uncertain. Some feel that he is an ardent nationalist who will be cold to business interests. Others point out though that the interests which have maintained the current military regime are not likely to stand for any radical changes. Brazil has sometime been called the "United States Trojan Horse" in Latin America.

The idea is that Brazil will provide a safe base for US corporations and then proceed to extend its influence throughout the continent, either by outright conquest or simply economic domination. Brazil has, to be sure, pretty closely toed the line of US foreign policy. It has taken the role of the scourge of communism on the continent and has been openly hostile to governments such as Cuba and Chile, and there's no doubt that American corporations do feel at home in Brazil.

Brazil, of course, discounts the Trojan Horse theory and instead expresses fears of being surrounded by unfriendly governments. But whether for conquest or defense, Brazil has built up its armed forces tremendously in recent years. In May of this year, Brazil signed a treaty with neighboring Paraguay for a joint hydroelectric power plant opposition groups within Paraguay called the treaty a sellout to Brazil, and it is generally agreed that the treaty brings Paraguay securely within Brazil's sphere of influence. In fact, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister said recently Paraguay will not involve itself in any project with any other country without prior agreement of Brazil.

The treaty was viewed with dismay by Argentina, which has feared the spread of Brazilian influence from the continent for many years, especially in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. A Brazilian military buildup along its Uruguayan border caused some alarm last year and this spring and Uruguayan senator said he had discovered secret Brazilian military plans for the conquest of Uruguay. According to the plan, Uruguay was to be invaded in 1971 if the left wing Broad Front Coalition won the Uruguayan elections.

While these developments seem to point to an aggressive program of Brazilian expansion, some observers feel that Brazil may be changing its policy in favor of more cooperation with its Latin American neighbors. They point to the Brazilian foreign minister's recent diplomatic tour in which he spoke with representatives of Peru and Chile as evidence, but if Brazil's attitude towards its neighbors is beginning to thaw, it will be sometime before many countries can warm up to Brazil's ominous military regime. 

Since the military regime came to power in Brazil, there have been increasing reports of torture of political prisoners. In recent months, the Catholic Church has risen to protest such occurrences with surprising boldness. In April, 24 priests and 3000 students held a memorial mass for a young man who died mysteriously while in police custody. The songs in the service, which was conducted in a cathedral surrounded by government troops, were not religious hymns but anti-government protest songs. The real blockbuster came though a month later when three Archbishops and 10 Bishops and from Brazil's northeast issued a long statement, a blistering attack on the government.

The statement which because of the government's extreme censorship, did not become known to the public for 10 days after it had been released, is notable for its strongly political tone. The declaration not only attacked the government for repression and the use of torture, it also upheld it responsible for poverty, starvation, wages, unemployment, infant mortality, and illiteracy. In broader terms, it openly denounced the country's much vaunted economic miracle, which its said benefited a mere 20% of the population. While the gap between rich and poor continued to grow, there were also derogatory references to the intervention of foreign capital in Brazil. Indeed, the whole system of capitalism was attacked and the government accused of developing its policy of repression merely to bolster it up.

Such a statement could hardly have occurred in the view of many observers without the green light from the Vatican, something which gives Brazil's military rulers cause for concern. The government up to now has been able to stifle dissent through press censorship, but with the prospect of statements such as these being read from every pulpit and parish in the country, it would appear that the censorship is powerless. Whether by design or pure force of circumstances, the church is on the verge of becoming the focal point of all opposition, whether social, economic or political to Brazil's present regime, perhaps because of pressure from the church. The government recently admitted that torture had occurred in two cases and the offending officers are awaiting trials. 

In the view of some observers the mere fact of these two trials is an admission by the government that torture is being used in Brazil and this in itself is a step forward. It is being seen as an indication of new and less repressive policies to be introduced when General Ernesto Geisel takes over their presidency next year, but others are less optimistic. They point out that these cases relate only to common criminals and that this cannot be taken as an indication of any easing of repressive measures against political prisoners. 

This week's feature has been a summary and background of important events in the past six months in two Latin American countries; Argentina and Brazil. These analyses are compiled from reports from several newspapers and periodicals, including the London weekly, Latin America, the Mexican daily, Excélsior, the Chilean weekly, Chile Hoy, and the Uruguayan weekly, Marcha.

You have been listening to the Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America, as seen by leading world newspapers, with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions about the program are welcome and may be sent to us at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, University of Texas at Austin.