1973-05-24

Welcome to Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America as seen by leading world newspapers with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group.

The Miami Herald this week commented on the effect that the May 4th kidnapping of a US consul in Mexico has had on the Mexican people. The dramatic kidnapping of a US diplomat has suddenly thrust an unheard of guerilla organization into prominence in Mexico. Almost overnight, the name FRAP has become a commonplace. It stands for Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People. Up to now, Mexico had been relatively free of the urban guerrilla activity that has swept Latin America in recent years. Anti-government groups have sprung up and died out here without the spectacular publicity of the Tupamaros in Uruguay or the underground groups in Brazil.

But FRAP succeeded by kidnapping US consul, Terrence G. Leonhardy in Guadalajara on May 4th and holding him until the government released 30 prisoners and arranged a ransom of $80,000. In all Leonhardy was in guerilla custody for 76 hours. He was not harmed. The prisoners were flown to Cuba and given asylum. FRAP in the meantime, won wide publication of a manifesto assailing the Mexican government and emphasizing what it termed the injustices against Mexico's poor. Never before in Mexico's turbulent history has a single anti-government group put its political philosophy before so many people so rapidly.

The FRAP manifesto was very much to the political left and called on the poor to join in an armed fight against social ills by overthrowing the government. Authorities in the interior ministry, which deals with political matters and subversion say they know little about FRAP. Who its members are, where it is headquartered, or who directed the abduction of Leonhardy. The manifesto was well written and well reasoned. Leonhardy reported being asked questions apparently prepared by someone with more education than the men who handled the actual abduction and guarded him.

The manifesto touched on some sore points in Mexican society. It noted the huge gap between rich and poor, charged exploitation of rural and urban poor by landowners and industrialists, accused the establishment of failing to provide educational opportunities to the poor, and claimed that both the poor and poorly educated are mistreated by police and politicians. It accused the government of trying to convince Mexicans that guerrillas are common criminals, cattle thieves, hired killers, enemies of the country, people who work against Mexicans and other such things.

FRAP said it and other guerrilla groups had entered the armed fight because they feel it is necessary to put an end to this privileged caste, which for hundreds of years has been enriching itself at the cost of the sweat under subhuman conditions of the laborer, the farmer, and all workers in exchange for a miserable salary, which is barely enough for bad food.

The manifesto apparently met with much sympathy in Mexico. It expressed what the Mexican middle and lower middle classes discuss in their homes. Through radio and television the manifesto reached millions of illiterate poor. It's said that the poor are no better off than before this country's 1910 agrarian revolution, aimed at ending the oppression of the rural dwellers. Mexico has a population of close to 50 million. Its per capita income is among the highest in the developing world, a bit more than $600 a year, but 13 million Mexicans live on less than that. About half a million campesinos or peasants earn no more than 16 cents a day. 

A factory worker in Mexico City probably earns the minimum daily wage allowed by law, $2 and 52 cents a day. The contrast between rich and poor is evident throughout Mexico. Lavish homes are walled off from tin and cardboard hovels. Multi-million dollar luxury hotels in Acapulco are within walking distance of abject poverty. This report from the Miami Herald. 

On a practical note, David Belknap of the Los Angeles Times service reports kidnapping for politics or profit or both has created a demand for a new kind of insurance in Latin America, and the latter has lately become available. English underwriters, most of the members of the Lloyds of London Group, now offer kidnapping insurance. Policies that will reimburse the hefty ransoms currently being exacted south of the border by urban guerrilla organizations.

With a present annual average of more than one big money kidnapping a week, Argentina is a prime market for the new insurance, now available everywhere in Latin America according to industry sources here. Besides Argentina, nations with kidnapping problems dating from as long ago as 1968 include Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.

Brokers hesitate to discuss for publication details of the new insurance. Beyond saying that it is available to families and corporations with the name or names of insured individuals specifically mentioned in the policies. That means that if the top five men of a company are mentioned and number six gets snatched, the policy doesn't apply, said one industry source. Blanket coverage isn't available yet, the concept is still too new for blanket premiums to be calculated. This from the Los Angeles Times service. 

The Brazilian Weekly Opinião reports that in the first public disagreement over economic policy within the government in over three years, Brazil's Minister of Agriculture resigned in protest last week. In his letter of resignation, the minister complained of the continuing low income levels in rural areas despite increases in all farm prices. His letter stated, "Unfortunately, governmental policy has favored the industrial sector and the commercial export sector, both of which are increasingly foreign owned." 

The letter went on to note that the smaller, medium-sized Brazilian industrialist and farmer have suffered from governmental policies while the multinational corporations have prospered. This is the first time a high official of the Brazilian government has stated that the much praised Brazilian economic miracle has actually been detrimental to the Brazilian people. The minister's letter was printed in Opinião of Rio de Janeiro. 

On the same subject. The Washington Weekly Times of the Americas commented that it has long been widely assumed that President Medici is strong enough in military circles to name his successor when his term ends next year, but his agriculture minister's resignation serves to raise some doubts. 

In further news of Brazil, Prensa Latina reports, the scandal involving the Fiat Auto Corporation and the Minas Gerais state government is one of the main topics in Brazilian political and business circles. According to the Brazilian press, the government has submitted for the approval of the State Assembly, a bill for setting up a Fiat plant without clarification of important data on the amounts of investments and with large parts of the commitment completely blank. For example, the articles on the transfer of know-how and the technological aid to be provided by the parent corporation in Italy to its Brazilian subsidiary are all left blank, thus permitting endless undercover deals. 

The bill with all its defects was passed by the two existing political parties without important commentaries simply because none of the members of the state Assembly had seen the bill beforehand. Another point criticized in Brazil was the decision by the new partners to name the International Court of Justice at The Hague, not Brazilian courts as the body to settle any future disputes. Thus starting a precedent extremely favorable to transnational corporations. Meanwhile, Italy's Fiat workers have protested against the exploitation of Brazil's extremely cheap labor. The main reason why the plant was set up in Minas Gerais, this from the Latin American News Agency, Prensa Latina. 

In yet another scandal, the New York Bank account of Costa Rica president Jose Figueres has grown by $325,000 dollars since that Central American nation gave haven to American financier Robert Vesco. According to the Wall Street Journal. The Journal said securities and exchange commission documents show that 325,000 was transferred to the Figueres account at the National Bank of North America in New York over a period from last August to early this year. The money, the Journal said, came from Vesco linked companies in The Bahamas and Costa Rica. 

Vesco is under indictment in New York, along with former Attorney General John Mitchell and former commerce secretary Maurice Stans on charges of trying to influence a securities and exchange commission investigation with a $200,000 dollar contribution to President Nixon's 1972 campaign. The SEC has brought suit against Vesco in the United States, charging him with defrauding shareholders of investors overseas services of $224 million dollars during a period when he was investing heavily here. 

Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, where Vesco has been a controversial figure since last summer, the 37-year-old financier was cleared of any charges of wrongdoing in that country by a special congressional committee, but it is estimated that he had put 5.25 million into Costa Rica nationalized banks, 1.5 million into a government housing institute, 1 million into a government waterworks institute, and an undisclosed amount in private residences, a coffee plantation, timber-works, and low income housing construction. This story from the Wall Street Journal. 

Chile Hoy from Santiago reports that the Peruvian Minister of Fisheries announced May 7th, that the state had taken control of the fishmeal industry, which earns 32% of the country's foreign exchange. The fishing industry consists of 105 factories, 1400 fishing vessels, and for the past two years has experienced a production crisis, aggravated since 1972 by the diminishing supply of anchovies. The importance of this decision is estimated to be equal to the 1969 nationalization of oil and the agrarian reform.

Using statistical tables and citing the recommendations of international agencies such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the minister explained the wasteful existence of excess capacity in fishmeal factories, which could process practically a whole year's production in only 10 days. That is 10 million tons of anchovies.

The decision adopted by the military government makes economic and revolutionary logic. The rationalization of fishing production was inevitable, not only because of the excess installed capacity, or in other words idle capacity of more than 50%, but also because the structural deficiencies of this strategic economic sector contributed to its external dependency. As expected said, Chile Hoy, the big industrialist cried out in anger. According to the conservative Peruvian daily Correo, the measure is unjust, arbitrary, and inconvenient, and will result in increasing unemployment. This newspaper is owned by the wealthy fishing magnate, Luis Rossi. 

The Washington Weekly Times of the Americas commented that five US firms are affected by the Peruvian nationalization. They are Gold Kist with headquarters in Atlanta, StarKist Foods of California, Cargill of Minneapolis, and local subsidiaries of General Mills and International Protein. Assets of these companies are valued at about $40 million. Companies owned by British, French, Japanese, and Norwegian interests are also involved. 

The news agency, Prensa Latina reports from Buenos Aires, Argentina. The new government of Peron's Hector Campora, will order an investigation into the events at Trelew Navy Air Base in which 16 political prisoners were murdered declared Vice President-elect Vicente Lima. The events occurred on August 22nd, 1972 when 19 political prisoners who had escaped from Rawson Prison in Patagonia were machine-gunned in their cells after capture. 16 were killed and three seriously wounded by Navy personnel.

The vice president-elect reiterated that the new administration will send the legislature a bill for a full amnesty for political prisoners. Argentina has about 5,000 such prisoners, including many urban guerrillas. The military have stated they will not permit the amnesty.

Also from Prensa Latina. The Uruguayan government has sent Congress a bill considerably curtailing trade union rights. According to the government, the bill is designed to depoliticize union activities. It enjoys the support of the Junta of Armed Forces Chiefs who described as legitimate any action that the president might undertake in that sphere. The Powerful Trade Union Federation with almost half a million members in a country whose total population is two and a half million oppose this attempt to curtail union rights.

Congress will also vote on the dangerous state law, which includes up to six years imprisonment for sympathizing with the Tupamaro guerrillas and which sets forth a series of offenses that in the view of one opposition lawmaker amounts to the civic death of Uruguay. This report from Prensa Latina.

The British Newsweekly, Latin America continues on the Uruguayan situation. The attempt by military justice to lift the parliamentary privileges of Senator Enrique Erro seemed unlikely to succeed in the Senate this week, and the military were quite unable to resist the Senate committee's demand to interview the guerrilla prisoners who informed against Erro. It remains evident that the military did not win an outright victory last February. The limits of military power and authority have not yet been properly tested, and they may require a new institutional crisis to indicate where the frontier runs.

On Monday, Amodio Perez, a former leader of the Tupamaros who defected last year, was brought before the Senate committee, which is considering the Erro case and repeated his charge that the Senator had sheltered Tupamaros. The appearance of Amodio Perez still evidently in military custody was really more interesting than his evidence, as it had been widely rumored that he was enjoying the fruits of his defection in Paris or some other European capital.

But outside the further uncovering of bureaucratic scandals, the military seemed to be right behind President Juan Maria Bordaberry's hard line on labor and social questions. While nationalists all over Latin America still cherish hopes that the Peruanista faction and the Uruguayan armed forces will emerge victorious, the Cuban News Agency, Prensa Latina this week voiced Cuban disgust with the way things are going, citing continuing arrests, systematic torture of detainees and new repressive legislation. This from Latin America. 

You are listening to Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions about the program are welcome and may be sent to us at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communication Center, the University of Texas at Austin. 

At the 1971 meeting of the National Latin American Studies Association, a resolution was passed to carry out an investigation on terrorism in Guatemala. Our feature this week is the official report of the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala.

There's no doubt that 1971 was Guatemala's worst year in recent history in terms of semi-official and official right wing terror. According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper El Grafico, during 1971 under the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, there were 959 political assassinations, 171 kidnappings and 194 disappearances. A disappearance in Guatemala is generally equivalent to a death. Most of those who disappear are found dead weeks or months later, their bodies often bearing marks of torture. Articles in the US newspapers estimated that a total of 2000 had been assassinated from November 1970 to May 1971, including 500 during May alone. The above are conservative figures, since they cover only those cases reported in the newspapers. 

It is no less clear that most of the incidents of political violence were committed by the right. According to the annual of power and conflict, which generally emphasizes communist political violence, by the end of March, political killings totalled over 700, but many more people were believed to have disappeared without trace. Most of the killings have been attributed to officially supported right-wing terrorist organizations. Ojo Por Ojo, an "Eye for an Eye", and Mano Blanca, "White Hand". 

The predominance of rightist terror was also confirmed by Le Monde Weekly. Foreign diplomats in Guatemala City believe that for every political assassination by left-wing revolutionaries, 15 murders are committed by right-wing fanatics. In addition to operating freely with no visible attempt by the government to control them, these rightist groups are generally known to have their base in the official military and police forces. The only major action undertaken by the leftist guerrillas during 1971 was the August kidnapping of a large landowner and banker, a close associate of the ex-president and a key figure in planning the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The banker was released unharmed five months later. 

The context for this situation of rightist violence was a year long state of siege imposed by the Arana government, suspending all constitutional guarantees and prohibiting all political activities. In general, the victims of this violence, although it was committed in the name of counter insurgency against revolutionary guerrillas, were moderate leaders of the political opposition, progressive intellectuals, students, professionals, and even a few businessmen, as well as uncounted numbers of peasants and workers. 

The Latin American Studies Association report continues. A prime target during this period was the National University of San Carlos. One indication that much of the terror was directed against university professors and students is that Ojo Por Ojo, "Eye for an Eye", is acknowledged to be mainly active in the University of San Carlos. A number of students and student leaders were openly assassinated or disappeared, never to be seen again. In late 1970 and 1971, several prominent professors were assassinated outright.

Many of the victims were progressives who had participated in the pre 1954 governments of Arrevallo and Arbenz. In addition to these killings, numerous university students and professors and even the university treasurer were arrested and held in prison for days or weeks. Other university officials were kidnapped by rightist groups and the rector of the University of San Carlos received threats on his life from the group Eye for an Eye.

In addition to these acts directed against professors and students, the university itself has been threatened. On November 27th, 1971, in a clear violation of the university's traditional autonomy, the University of San Carlos campus was occupied by the army using 800 soldiers, several tanks, helicopters, armored cars, and other military equipment. The objective of this raid was to search for subversive literature on arms, but a room by room search revealed nothing.

Then following a January 1971 statement by the university governing council protesting the state of siege and the violence, the government continued its attack on the university by proposing that it submit its budget to the executive branch of the government for approval rather than to the university's own governing council. If carried out, this measure would have completely ended university autonomy.

When the 12,000 students at the University of San Carlos went on General Strike in October 1971 to protest the violence against students and professors and to demand an end to the state of siege, the government responded with a warning that it would forbid any public demonstrations at the university and a hint of military intervention and termination of the university's autonomy. 

This situation is of special concern to North Americans because of the role of the United States. Although US involvement in Guatemala dates back to the mid 19th century, it assumed major proportions at the turn of the century coinciding with the generally expansionist US foreign policy under President's McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. More recently, US involvement in Guatemala became more direct and increased dramatically in 1954 after the US engineered overthrow of the Arbenz government. It has remained on a high level to the present. 

US involvement in the semi-official and official rightist terror of 1971 took several forms. Most important was US military and police assistance. The full extent of US expenditures on training and equipping the Guatemalan military and police is impossible to determine without access to classified information. Even according to conservative official figures, the US spent $4.2 million dollars in public safety assistance from the late 1950s through 1971 and an average of $1.5 million dollars, but up to $3 million dollars a year in military assistance, not counting arm sales. The fact that these figures hide the full amount of US assistance came out in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in response to a question about military assistance to Guatemala. 

In the past, Guatemala has received $17 million since 1950 in grant aid from the United States. In supporting assistance Guatemala has received 34 million since 1950 and is scheduled for 59,000 for fiscal year 1971. In fiscal year 1970, Guatemala received $1,129,000 in public safety funds, the highest of any Latin American country. In fiscal year 1971, Guatemala received the third-highest amount and in fiscal year 1972, the second highest. A new police academy was constructed in 1970-72 with AID funds.

An additional $378,000 a year approximately has gone for police vehicles and equipment. US advisors train Guatemalan soldiers and police and provide them with arms, communications equipment and so on. The ratio of US military advisors to local army forces has been higher for Guatemala than for any other Latin American country. US officials have consistently denied any direct role in pacifying Guatemala. Nevertheless, according to one 1971 Washington Post report,

25 US military men and seven former US policemen carrying sidearms and accompanied by Guatemala and bodyguards are known to live and work in Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known. Military mission members assist the Guatemalan Air Force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations, and its civic action program. 

A senate foreign relations committee staff study of 1971 reported that US public safety advisors were accompanying Guatemalan police on anti-hippie patrols. These reports follow those of several years ago regarding the active role of US Green Berets in the Izabal and Zacapa counter insurgency campaign. Although US officials insist that their programs are designed to modernize and professionalize the police and military, nevertheless, the US has not withheld its assistance from Guatemalan security forces, which are known to serve as a base of operations for the right-wing terrorist groups.

Some allege and claim to have documentation that the US military advisory team in Guatemala urged the formation of these rightist groups. In evaluating US aid programs to Guatemala, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee study concluded,

The argument in favor of the public safety program in Guatemala is that if we don't teach the cops to be good, who will? The argument against is that after 14 years on all evidence, the teaching hasn't been absorbed. Furthermore, the US is politically identified with police terrorism. Related to all this is the fact that the Guatemala police operate without any effective political or judicial restraints, and how they use the equipment and techniques which are given them through the public safety program, is quite beyond US control.

On balance it seems that AID public safety has cost the United States more in political terms than it has gained in improved Guatemalan police efficiency. As is the case with AID public safety, the Military assistance program carries a political price. It may be questioned whether we're getting our money's worth.

In summing up the 1972 situation, one of the members of the Latin American Studies Association who visited the country three times in 1972 wrote, "I'm convinced that the situation in Guatemala, despite the placid exterior, is a dark one. The Arani government has employed a variety of tactics to get rid of its opposition. The year 1971 was by all accounts, the bloodiest in Guatemala's recent history.

The year 1972 was in comparison, a much more peaceful year. Yet, the government effort to get rid of opponents continued with much of the effort in the hands of rightist terrorists, and much of it kept out of public consumption by a government that is increasingly skittish about press coverage and public opinion."

The continuation of rightist political violence was confirmed by other sources. According to documents sent to the prestigious London-based organization, Amnesty International, which defends political prisoners throughout the world, including those in communist countries, there were at least 70 reported disappearances in 1972. Amnesty deplored the continued and uncontrolled violation of the most fundamental human rights in Guatemala. The most notable examples of the continuing violence include the following:

On June 26th, 1972, Jose Mendoza, leader of a large union of bus drivers in Guatemala City disappeared. At the time, Merida was leading a union protest against the bus company. Merida was only one of the many labor and peasant leaders who have been harassed, arrested, disappeared, or killed outright. 

Most dramatic was the disappearance in September 1972 of eight top leaders and associates of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The families of the eight claim that they were arrested by police. Witnesses noted the license numbers of the official police vehicles involved in the arrest. The government claimed to have no knowledge of what happened to the eight. This denial was called into question two months later when an official police detective, kidnapped, acknowledged his role in that of other police in the arrest and imprisonment of the men.

Subsequently, the same detective said that the victims had been arrested, tortured, and thrown into the Pacific Ocean. Since the eight have not been found or heard from since September, it is generally assumed that they were killed. Nearly all observers within Guatemala and internationally, including Amnesty International, hold the government responsible.

To put this situation in perspective. We conclude with a few words about the general political situation in Guatemala, specifically the institutionalization of the repression. One measure of the degree to which political violence and repression has become a system or way of life is that during the nine years from 1963 through 1971, Guatemala spent 48 months or nearly half under state of siege. A state of siege has always meant the abrogation of constitutional guarantees and political rights, the prohibition of regular political activity, even by legal parties, and strict censorship of the press and radio. 

In early 1972, shortly after the state of siege was lifted, the government proposed another means of institutionalizing the repression, the so-called "Ley de Peligrosidad Social" or law of social dangerousness. The law would've given the government total license in preventive detention of the unemployed, lazy, or rebellious. Of homosexuals, prostitutes, the mentally ill, or anyone "acting disrespectfully."

These socially dangerous persons would be imprisoned in rehabilitation camps or confined in other ways. The law, which represented a legalization of defacto government practices, which finally defeated in Congress because it had aroused almost universal opposition throughout the country. Nevertheless, the government was subsequently designing a substitute measure which would accomplish the same objectives.

In short, it should be clear that the situation in Guatemala in 1971 was not a temporary aberration or excess in a generally democratic system. Rather, it was part of a system of official terror and repression, which has existed in Guatemala since 1954 and which has been intensified in recent years. A system which in the words of one analyst's, "Aims to liquidate the political party structure that has developed since 1944.

For tactical reasons, the government may attempt to reduce the level of official violence in 1973. If this happens, and it is not yet clear whether or not it will, this temporary and tactical reduction should not be mistaken for an end to the violence. That violence will end only when its root causes are faced and Guatemala's huge social and economic problems are resolved."

This has been the report from the ad-hoc committee on Guatemala of the Latin American Studies Association. You've been listening to Latin American Press Review, a weekly selection and analysis of important events and issues in Latin America, as seen by leading world newspapers with special emphasis on the Latin American press. This program is produced by the Latin American Policy Alternatives Group. Comments and suggestions about the program are welcome and may be sent to us at 2205 San Antonio Street, Austin, Texas. This program is distributed by Communications Center, University of Texas at Austin.